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After being expelled from Bhutan in the 1980s and 1990s, more than 100,000 
Bhutanese refugees were forced to reside in refugee camps in Nepal. Twenty 
years later, in 2006, a global resettlement programme was initiated to relocate 
them in eight different nations: the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, and the UK. Since 2010, about 350 
Bhutanese refugees have been resettled in Greater Manchester through the 
Gateway Protection Programme. This thesis is based on 14 months of 
ethnographic research with members of this community. 
 
This thesis analyses the complex relationship between forced migrants, social 
networks, and ruling, organisational entities, which facilitate refugee 
resettlement. This qualitative study looks at the structure, role and everyday 
utility of social networks amongst a small refugee community, and emphasizes 
that the creation of similarity and difference is an inherent part of community 
development. The research calls into question the assumptions of UK policy 
makers, service providers and academics alike, which hold that refugees are 
removed from their ‘original’ cultures through forced displacement, and 
thereafter strive to return to a state of ‘normalcy’ or ‘originality’, re-creating and 
re-inventing singular ‘traditions’, identities and communities. In response to 
these assumptions, policy makers and service providers in refugee camps and 
in the UK adopt a Community Development Approach (CDA).  
 
However, I argue that there is no fixed and bounded community amongst 
Bhutanese refugees, but that they actively reshape and adapt their 
interpretations, meanings and actions through their experiences of forced 
migration, and thus create novel communities out of old and new social 
networks. In the process, I juxtapose my informants’ emic understandings of 
community as samaj, with bureaucratized refugee community organisations 
(RCOs).  
 
This research shows that rather than a creating singular, formalized RCO to 
serve the ‘good of all’, the Bhutanese refugee community in Manchester is rife 
with divisions based on personal animosities and events stretching back to the 
refugee camps in Nepal. I conclude that RCOs may not be equipped to 
effectively deal with the divisive issues that arise due to refugee resettlement.  
 
The thesis is situated at the centre of anthropological investigations of forced 
migration, community, and policy, and uses interdisciplinary sources (such as 
policy documents, historical accounts) to highlight the complexities of forced 
migration and refugee resettlement. This critical research is also a response to 
the call to make qualitative, ethnographic research more relevant for policy 
makers and service provision, which is all the more important in this ‘century of 
the refugee’.  
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“Most human beings reside somewhere near their place of birth. 
Willingly leaving home to live and work elsewhere or being 
dispossessed and forced out seems, for many, to be more the 
exception than the rule of human existence. Yet migration is the 
story of human life. It is the story of population movement across the 
face of the earth. Migration has seen the planet conquered and 
societies and cultures shaped and reshaped by successive waves of 
human movement. Forced migration is one part of the migration 
history of humanity” (Chatty, 2010: 17). 
 
In 2014/15, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
announced that 59.5 million people1 across the world are forcibly displaced2 
(see Figure 13; UNHCR, 2015: 2). More than 32,000 people are forced to flee 
from their homes each day (ibid.). This is the highest number since World War 
II, overtaking the twentieth century4 as the “century of the refugee” (Colson, 
2003: 2). As Antonio Gueterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
states: “We are witnessing a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an era 
in which the scale of global forced displacement as well as the response 
required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before” (UNHCR, 2015: 3). 
                                            
1 In 2013/14 the number was just over 51 million, making 2015 the year with the highest annual increase 
(more than 8 million people) of forcibly displaced people since the UNHCR was founded in 1950 
(UNHCR, 2015: 2).  
2 These numbers are likely to be much higher since 2014, due to the conflict in Syria and other Middle 
Eastern nations.  
3 Data from UNHCR, 2015: 2; graph by Yamen Albadin, commissioned by the author of this thesis.  
4 The numbers from 1999/2000 indicate that at the end of the 20th century, just under 40 million people 




Daily news across the Western world is filled with stories about refugees 
and asylum seekers, dangerous journeys across lands and seas to 
reach developed nations, and refugee camps filled with forcibly 
displaced people. In today's world, mass-migration, transnationalism and 
migration policies are facts of everyday life for millions of people across 
the planet5. Globalisation is not only about the worldwide movement of 
goods and ideas, but also involves the global movement of people, often 
brought about through conflict and threats of violence (Appadurai, 1996; 
Soguk, 1999 in Chatty, 2010: 28). In these complex times of global 
migration, the world finds itself, as Bhaba (2004: 31) aptly put it, in a 
“moment of transit where space and time cross to produce complex 
figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, 
inclusion and exclusion”.  
                                            
5 According to the latest statistics (see graphic – from UNHCR, 2015) there are 19.5m refugees across 
the world (an increase of seventy percent since the late 1990s), mostly from Palestine, Afghanistan, 
Syria and Somalia. At the time of writing this thesis, this number is likely to have significantly 
increased due to ongoing conflicts across the world. There are approximately 1.8 million asylum 
seekers, predominantly in European countries, with the highest number from Syria. The largest group 
of displaced people, however, are the 38.2 million individuals who are forced out of their homes, but 
remain within their country. These internally displaced people are not only individuals fleeing conflict 
and violence, but also environmental disasters, such as the major earthquake that hit Nepal in 2015.  




How are we anthropologists to understand, research and address these 
issues? What is the role of anthropology in addressing problematic questions 
related to forced migration? 
 
Several anthropologists (e.g. Chatty, 2010 and Malkki, 1995) called on social 
scientists, international agencies and governments to address refugees and 
asylum seekers not as 'defenceless' victims only knowable through their 
needs, but rather to recognize these person’s ‘agency’ and ability to bring 
about political and economic change and stability both for themselves and for 
the international community. Moreover, social scientists (e.g. Baumann, 1996; 
Colson, 2003; Muggah, 2005; Turton,2005 and Zetter, 2007) highlight that 
research has to critically review social policies, and the assumption that all 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants can be conveniently encompassed in 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. As Malkki (1995: 496) argues, we have to 
address the “extraordinarily diverse historical and political causes and involve 
people who while all displaced, find themselves in qualitatively different 
situations and predicament”. More importantly, Malkki (1997: 225) urges 
anthropologists to critically reflect on aid intervention impacting on forced 
migrants.  
 
Anthropological research with forced migrants is focused on how ‘normality’ is 
restored in a time of uncertainty, following the anthropological definition of 
refugees as a “categorical anomaly” (Malkki, 1992) - as Harrell-Bond et al. 
(1996: 1077) claim: 
 
"[R]efugees are people who have undergone a violent 'rite' of 
separation and … find themselves in transition, in a state of 
liminality. This betwixt-and-between status may contain social and 
economic dimensions as well as legal and psychological ones”. 
 
This perception of refugees assumes that individuals move – or are moved 
involuntarily – from an ‘original’, coherent and homogenous culture, identity, 
location and community to a state of uncertainty and in-betweenness, which 
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can be overcome through (re-) integration in either their homelands or in new 
geographical and societal locations. Turton (2005) argues that forced migration 
is a traumatic experience6, which requires the re-creation and reestablishment 
of a sense of home and continuity (also see Chatty, 2010: 463-4). Forced 
migration is thus viewed as an example of Victor Turner’s (1967) ‘rite de 
passage’ moving from separation, to liminality, and ultimately to (re-) 
assimilation (see Chapter 4). The latter is seen as necessary to overcome the 
“shocking and disruptive experience” of forced migration (Chatty, 2010: 463). 
 
My research findings, however, based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork 
with Bhutanese refugees in resettlement in the UK, do not support these 
assumptions. To the contrary, my research calls into question the hypothesis 
that refugees are removed from their ‘original’, homogeneous cultures through 
forced displacement, and thereafter strive to return to this state of ‘normalcy’ or 
‘originality’, re-creating and re-inventing singular ‘traditions’, identities and 
communities. Throughout this thesis, I argue that there is no ‘Bhutanese 
Nepali-ness’ or ‘Bhutanese-refugee-ness’ as a culture that was “acquired at 
birth”, no shared and fixed identity and community that refugees “desperate[ly] 
attempt to re-create” (Gemie, 2010: 31). Rather, migrants reshape and adapt 
their values and meanings through their experiences, and thus create new 
norms and shared principles to which they may or may not choose to conform 
(Baumann, 1996: 13; 102). In Stuart Hall’s (2010: 448) words, migrants inhabit 
a “cultural third space”, characterised by social and cultural change, hybridity 
and reorientation through “social encounters and cultural articulations”.  
 
Therefore, my research is not based on the exploration of ‘traditional’ or 
‘original’ communities, cultures and identities amongst Bhutanese refugees, 
and how they reinvent and restore coherent, homogenous and traditional 
cultures in resettlement ‘how they were before’ (see Voiscu, 2013: 163). 
Rather, this thesis focuses on how these elements are actively produced by 
both Bhutanese refugees and external bodies, such as aid and relief agencies 
                                            
6 I do not discuss the emotional and psychological impact of refugee resettlement in this thesis. See 
Chase’s work (2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b) for excellent ethnographies on Bhutanese refugee’s 
‘coping strategies’ both in the refugee camps and in resettlement in the USA (also see Hutt, 2007; 
Evans, 2010, Muggah, 2005). 
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and UK policy makers and service providers. As Kalra et al. (2005: 15) 
summarise:  
 
“Migration is not a one-off event with one-way consequences, but an 
ongoing process of building links and relationships at the material and 
cultural level, changing both sending and receiving countries”. 
 
I explore how refugee resettlement brings about novel values and norms, 
which are largely informed by Western aid intervention and ‘social re-
engineering’ (Chapter 4). I demonstrate that amongst Bhutanese refugees, 
definitions and understandings (of e.g. culture, identity, community) are 
changing, and my informants are not the ‘same’ persons they were in Bhutan 
or Nepal before resettling in the UK. However, rather than viewing this as a 
negative consequence of forced migration, I argue that these changes and 
adaptations are a response by migrating individuals who make their own 
informed decisions and engender transformation.  
 
 
Research and thesis focus 
 
Since 2006, more than 100,000 Bhutanese refugees, who resided in refugee 
camps in Nepal for almost twenty years, have been resettled in eight different 
resettlement nations: the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Denmark, The Netherlands, along with the UK, which has been host to about 
400 of these refugees, who have been resettled through the UK’s Gateway 
Protection Programme since 2010 (Chapter 3). My research is based on 14 
months of ethnographic research in Greater Manchester, as well as Leeds, 
Sheffield and Bradford, where most of the UK’s Bhutanese refugees have 
been resettled. I identified about 30 key informants amongst Bhutanese 
refugees, and collected data from around 200 to 300 Bhutanese refugees.  
 
In this thesis I focus on community development – that is, on how Bhutanese 
refugees create and maintain community in a time of transition – both within 
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their own understanding as samaj7 (see Chapter 7) and as formalized 
networks within refugee community organisations (henceforth RCOs8). For my 
informants, close personal relationships that are forged within a community are 
important elements of daily life in resettlement. However, personal networks 
are sensitive to individuals’ moods, values, personal preferences and 
interactions (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 508). They are also prone to 
mistrust and personal animosities, leading – as we shall see in Chapter 9 - to 
disagreements between Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, and the split 
between three distinct RCOs, undermining the UK government’s aim to 
outsource governmental support to formalized community organisations.  
 
Moreover, neither samaj nor RCOs are a continuation or reproduction of social 
networks in Bhutan and Nepal, as my informants highlighted on several 
occasions. Chatty (2010:39) and Malkki (1992: 35) caution that the 
communities developed through migration are not an exact replica of the social 
networks individuals had before relocation. Bhutanese refugees fashion old 
and new social relationships within formalized settings under the authority of 
external, Euro-American bodies (e.g. UNHCR, International Organization for 
Migration [IOM]), who have their own long-term agenda related to community 
development (see Chapter 4). Consequently, aid intervention and service 
provision in refugee camps and in resettlement influences how Bhutanese 
refugees perceive themselves and their relationships with others. In turn, 
RCOs operate within British social policies, funding regimes and Euro-
American definitions and values. Therefore, RCOs are not Bhutanese 
Nepalese organisations, but are British associations with non-British members, 
to which my informants (more or less successfully) comply.  
 
Although community-development is important, there are other, equally vital 
elements that have an impact on the daily lives of my informants. For example, 
a whole thesis could be written on the significant alterations of perceptions of 
gender relations, or on the impact that forces migration has had on traditional 
                                            
7 Samaj is the Nepali word for ‘community’ used by Bhutanese refugees to refer to their family and 
friendship networks, which are not formalized. My informants perceive samaj to be based on shared 
understandings of mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social interaction, as I outline in detail in Chapter 7. 
8 A list of all abbreviations used in this thesis can be found at the beginning of this thesis. 
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forms of political participation or social stratification9 (e.g. the caste system). 
By focusing exclusively on community development, however, I am able to 
provide valuable details on the impact that social re-engineering has on 
refugees in one important aspect of everyday life.  
 
 
Relevance of research 
 
Malkki (2002: 358) cautions that refugees and their everyday experiences are 
a difficult study subject, and ethnographies on refugees may not be easily 
decontextualized (and thus generalised), as refugees’ experiences can “differ 
radically from context to context, from person to person” (ibid.). Traditionally, 
anthropologists worked with people in geographically bound areas, studying 
our informants’ lives, experiences and ‘cultures’ as something permanent – in 
Bourdieu’s (1977) term, a “habitus” which determines behaviours and 
interactions. However, in a globalised world, our informants no longer perceive 
themselves to be bounded to a specific locality or a ‘unique’, enduring culture 
(Baba, 2013: 2; Lovell, 1998: 5). As I shall show in my research, Bhutanese 
refugees are migratory individuals experiencing transition and change. They 
are in a continuous process of adapting to the context in which they find 
themselves, influenced by external forces, such as national and transnational 
policies, aid intervention (e.g. UNHCR, IOM), and nation states (Bhutan, 
Nepal, UK), whilst actively reworking their histories, identities, cultures, 
languages and socio-cultural practices. There is no unique Nepalese 
Bhutanese ‘habitus’ with distinct cultures and practices that are persistent 
across space and time. Rather, they are a community-of-change, creating 
multiple hybrid selves and cultures that are inconsistent and often 
contradictory. The term Nepalese Bhutanese is, in fact, misleading, because 
they are neither Nepali or Bhutanese, nor a combination of the two. I argue 
that there is no coherent, bounded group serving as the subject of my research 
– they are different individuals, with varying values, norms, identities and 
perceptions, influenced by history, aid intervention and forced migration. 
                                            
9 I remain confident that after the completion of my PhD, I will be able to address these other multifaceted 
areas of research, utilizing the vast bulk of qualitative data which cannot be included in this work. 
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Throughout my fieldwork, I have observed the changes in perception and 
behaviours amongst my informants – a transformation that is ongoing since I 
have left the field.  
 
This thesis also considers the “policy nexus” (Baba, 2013: 1) that affects 
migration and my informants’ lives. Here, I follow Baba’s (2013), Colson’s 
(2003) and Turton’s (2005) call for anthropology to become more relevant for 
social policy. I have intentionally chosen to study “policy through those 
affected” (Baba, 2013: 4) – that is, how policy impacts on Bhutanese refugees 
– rather than focusing on the interactions between policy makers, service 
providers, and their ‘clients’ (i.e. my informants). On the one hand, this has 
allowed me to gain unparalleled rapport with my informants, as they trusted in 
my ‘independence’ from service providers, governments and funding bodies10. 
On the other hand, my thesis is limited by the lack of voices from both policy 
makers and service providers. 
 
Moreover, although there are many ethnographies about refugee camps 
across the world, and studies on asylum seekers in the UK, there are hardly 
any anthropological investigations of organized refugee resettlement (in the 
UK) and the long-term consequences of resettlement on refugees. My thesis 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature, which is all the more important in a time 
in which the British government pledges to resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees 
from refugee camps in the Middle East (Home Office et al., 2015).  
 
This thesis is situated within three primary bodies of (anthropological) works: 
firstly, the foundation of my study is the anthropology of forced migration, 
drawing on works by Baumann (1996), Chatty (2010), Cohen (1985) and 
Malkki (1992, 1995, 1997, 2002). Secondly, my specific focus on community 
                                            
10 I am a mostly a self-funded student – that is, I have funded my Masters and PhD course myself 
through savings and part time employment, although I have received financial support from Brunel 
University, covering my tuition fees for three years. Therefore, I was independent of funding bodies’ 
agendas, whilst at the same time experiencing a severely decreased living standard, often below my 
informants, who received welfare and benefit payments from the UK government – something I (as a 
full time EU national) am not entitled to. The need to work at least 20 to 30 hours a week in unrelated 
part time jobs throughout my Masters and PhD courses significantly reduced my time in the field, as 
well as my ability to visit e.g. the refugee camps in Nepal, or Bhutanese refugee communities in other 
resettlement nations (although I did visit the Bhutanese community in Pittsburgh, USA in line with the 
SfAA conference in 2015).  
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requires a discussion of anthropological theories of community (Amit and 
Rapport, 2002; Anderson, 2006; Barth, 1998; Bauman, 1996: 14; Cohen, 
1985). Lastly, my research problematizes the policy nexus, and therefore looks 
at anthropological discussions of policy (in regards to [forced] migration; see 
Baba, 2013; Colson, 2003; and Turton, 2005). Throughout this thesis, 
ethnographic examples are used to exemplify my arguments, bringing to life 
the everyday experience of Bhutanese refugees in resettlement in the UK.  
 
 
Questions of definitions 
 
Before exploring the anthropological theories in which my research is situated, 
it is important to emphasize that I address my informants – that is, my contacts 
in the field who are comprised of Bhutanese refugees who resettled in the UK 
from 2010 onwards - by several terms, such as Bhutanese refugees, 
Bhutanese Nepalese or Nepalese Bhutanese11. As I explore in Chapter 5, this 
choice is informed by my respondents themselves12, and their request to 
refrain from addressing them as Lhotshampas, a term created by the 
Bhutanese government to denote Nepalese Bhutanese prior to their expulsion 
in the 1990s.  
 
I also emphasize that the phrase Bhutanese refugee community broadly refers 
to the whole group of Bhutanese refugees in the UK. Samaj, on the other 
hand, denotes the various social networks my informants create amongst 
themselves, including non-refugees such as myself (see Chapter 7). Samaj is 
based on mutuality, trust, and social interaction, and serves as a support 
network. Refugee community organisations (RCOs) signify the formalized 
associations Bhutanese refugees founded in the UK. There are three 
                                            
11 I use ‘Nepalese’ instead of ‘Nepali’ when referring to my informants (Nepali signifies the language and 
people of Nepal), although my informants and the literature on Bhutanese refugees use both terms.  
12 My informants in Manchester always self-identify as Nepalese Bhutanese, rather than Nepalese or 
Bhutanese. They place emphasis on the fact that although they retained Nepali language and socio-
cultural practices (e.g. Hinduism, in contrast to Bhutan’s Buddhism) whilst living in Bhutan, they are 
not Nepalese. But because of their migratory background over generations, they also stressed that 
they are not Bhutanese, but somehow both and neither. Similar to refugee-ness, this is an important 
distinction for my informants, creating sameness and difference, and in turn, a unique community with 
certain boundaries, as I show throughout this work. 
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Bhutanese RCOs operating in Manchester: Takin Association UK (abbreviated 
as Takin or TA), Bhutanese Welfare Association (referred to as Welfare or 
BWA) and Himalayan Nepali Church (henceforth HNC or the Christian 
community13). Although samaj is the foundation of RCOs, they are an outcome 
of refugee policies, and are based on highly formalized and politicised 
conditions and relations (see below). 
 
Furthermore, I will not follow Baumann (1996) and use the term community in 
italics or inverted commas in this work, as I define the use of the term below. 
Similarly, the term culture is used throughout this work, broadly referring to the 
“highly complex and fluid behaviours, norms, values, knowledges and 
practices people create, maintain and follow” (Taylor, 1871; cited in Pelissier, 
1991: 77). Culture has to be distinguished from notions of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ 
(see Chapter 5), and as I emphasize throughout this thesis, there is no unified, 
singular culture amongst Bhutanese refugees, but rather a “heterogeneous 
web of meaning spun by the people themselves” (Rabinow, 1977; cited in 
Robben and Sluka, 2007: 443). My informants’ multiple cultures are created, 
refashioned and maintained through interactions and discourses, as well as 
everyday experiences (Lovell, 1998: 5).  
 
 
The Anthropology of Forced Migration 
 
 
In the 21st century, we live in a globalised, interconnected world, in which 
geographical distances and cultural differences have shrunk, and various 
‘scapes’ “chase each other across the world” (Appadurai, 1996). This thesis 
focuses on ethno- and ideoscapes: the flows of people and of ideas (and 
ideologies)14. Migration and transnational flows15 are key aspects of this 
                                            
13 During my fieldwork, all Christian Bhutanese refugees in Manchester were part of HNC.  
14 The other ‘scapes’ are financescapes (flow of capital, investment and currencies); technoscapes (flow 
of technology) and mediascapes (flows of information, images and media) (see Appadurai, 1996). 
15 Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I do not discuss diaspora and transnationalism – that is, the 
interaction of individuals with their place of residency (in this case, the UK) and people’s ‘homelands’ 
(that is, Bhutan and Nepal). See (amongst others) Jain (2011); Kalra et al (2005) Lavie and 
Swedenburg (2001), Werbner (2002) and Ybarrola (2012) for relevant discussions on these topics.  
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globalisation16: in 2013, it was estimated that 232 million people reside outside 
of their country of birth (OHCHR, 2013).  
 
As Said (1979) argued, in today’s world, we are all subject to a “general 
condition of homelessness” (cited in Malkki, 1992: 25), resulting in a vast 
diversity of people, cultures and languages within local spaces, which 
intersect, interact and co-exist (Bromley, 2000: 14). We can indeed speak of 
an interdependent, transnational and heterogeneous “world culture”, which 
reshapes, delocalizes and redefines our notions of identity, community and 
nationality (ibid.: 7; 24). This ‘world culture’ has to be distinguished from 
‘multiculturalism’, which denotes the ethnic and cultural diversity within a 
locality. Multiculturalism assumes that each social (‘ethnic’) group has 
separate, bounded and homogeneous characteristics by maintaining internal 
“communal conformity”, and various ‘cultures’ co-exist locally, whilst remaining 
separate (Turner, 1993; cited in Baumann, 1996: 20).  
 
However, as I demonstrate throughout this thesis, social groups are not 
bounded: they do not share one homogeneous culture internally. Multiple 
cultures overlap and influence one another, putting into question the rigidity of 
boundaries assumed in discourses of multiculturalism. In fact, in a globalised 
world, the “very concepts of homogenous national cultures, the consensual or 
contiguous transmission of historical traditions, or ‘organic’ ethnic 
communities” (Bhabha, 2004: 36) have to be examined and ultimately, 
abandoned. Migration (especially if involuntary) brings about drastic changes, 
which involve radical modifications of identities, communities and hierarchies17, 
and redefine the boundaries of cultures (Colson, 2003: 1). Migration goes 
hand-in-hand with processes of “cultural translation” (Bhabha, 2004: 40), which 
detach individuals from their past, in order to create ‘new persons’, shaped by 
                                            
16 Appadurai (1996) sums up the other key aspects of globalisation: free global trade, capitalism and 
market competition; consumerism; rise of electronic media and global electronic content creation; 
deterritorialization and decentralisation of nation states, people and cultures; global diversity of 
cultural forms; and loss of boundaries, certainty and regularity. 
17 In this thesis, I use a standard definition of hierarchy as the (political, social) organisation and social 
stratification of people in ranks depending on power, authority and various forms of capital (Halsey, 
1996: 361-2; also see Chapter 8). 
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politics, history and personal experiences – Bhutanese refugees are one 
example of this.  
 
 
What is (forced) migration? 
 
In anthropology, migration is perceived as a complex process entailing 
interactions, formations and adaptations of relationships and socio-cultural 
practices, which impact both on the migrants themselves and the host society 
(Kalra et al., 2005: 15). As Baumann (1996: 13) claims, migration “produces 
culture, rather than being produced by it” (my emphasis).  
 
Chatty (2010: 24) argues that many academic discussions on migration focus 
predominantly on the economic reasons for migration, whilst leaving little room 
for the individuals’ agencies and motivations18. Forced migration does not fit 
neatly into these theories. Although economic factors may play a part in how 
displacement comes about, it is far more complex and contextualized than 
voluntary migration. Some argue that forced migration transcends an all-
encompassing theory because it is too “spontaneous and unpredictable” (ibid.: 
23). Each refugee group’s story can only be understood within the context in 
which it occurred, and requires interdisciplinary analyses of the various 
historic, political and individual processes that led to displacement. Therefore, 
this thesis offers a detailed overview of the ‘making of Bhutanese refugees’ 
(Chapter 2), providing the necessary historic and political background leading 
to my informants’ expulsion from Bhutan. Moreover, Bhutanese refugees 
migrated to the UK within a highly formalized resettlement programme, which 
depends on international and national policies, as I demonstrate in Chapters 3, 
4 and 6. 
 
Some anthropologists use Agamben’s (1998; 2004) theories of the ‘homo 
sacer’19 to theoretically frame forced migration (e.g. Chatty, 2010; Malkki, 
                                            
18 For a detailed discussion on theories of migration, see Castles et al. (2014).  
19 From Latin ‘scared man’ – under Classic Roman law, a man who is ‘in-between’: someone who has 
lost his citizenship, and can be killed by anybody, but not in a ritual sacrifice (Agamben, 1998) 
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1992; Zetter, 2007). Here, the refugee is excluded from a nation20 (by loss of 
citizenship), and not yet a citizen of another nation, whilst being subject to 
international laws (Zeus, 2011: 259). The category ‘refugee’ poses problems to 
the already fragmented, ‘globalised’ nation state, and the refugees’ histories 
and individual experiences are underpinned by forces far beyond economy. 
Refugees are in what Agamben (1998) calls an ‘Ausnahmezustand’21 – a state 
of exemption outside the “natural order” of nations and laws (Chatty, 2010; 
Malkki, 1992; see Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
 
Refugees as ‘abnormality’ 
 
Globalisation puts nation states in a crisis, leading to the breakdown of 
borders, the growth of transnational markets, laws and corporations, and 
decentralisation (Appadurai, 199622). Nations protect and control their 
populations, which are assumed to be comprised of homogenous, “historically 
continuous” groups of people (Turton, 2002: 25), complying with the norms 
and regulations of the nation state (see Anderson, 2006; Foucault, 1989). The 
control and surveillance of immigration is a central feature of national politics, 
and is widely discussed in public discourses, as explored in Chapter 5 (Baba, 
2013: 3; Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 676). However, refugees, as a people “out of 
place”, add an additional dimension to these complexities, transcending nation 
states and their laws (Turton, 2002: 26).  
 
Refugees are “liminal beings in a transitional state” of exception (Mortland, 
1987: 401) – an Ausnahmezustand – in which they are subject not to the laws 
                                            
20 Here, nation is defined as an “imagined political community” as proposed by Anderson (2006: 6): the 
notion of nation states as bounded and sovereign is imagined in the minds of its citizens, as these 
communities are not based on face-to-face interactions and personal relationships, but on the 
imagination of its members to ‘belong’ to a national community regardless of personal social 
networks. Rather than seeing the state as a centralized consent of citizens, the nation state itself is a 
site of struggle (Baba, 2013: 4).  
21 From German: Ausnahme (exemption) and Zustand (condition, state, circumstance) - in German 
language use, a person (or group, country, etc.) out-of-order and not complying with the status quo. In 
such a ‘state’ of exception or emergency, people are exempt from consequences of irrational actions 
and behaviours. The word implicitly suggests that a person is not responsible for the situation they 
are in, ascribing ‘victimhood’, in which responsibility can be denied (based on my experiences as a 
German native speaker).  
22 Following Habermas’ (1973 in Gissurarson, 2003: 39) assertion that nation states face a legitimation 
crisis, during which states lose their autonomy, power and authority over their ‘subjects’. 
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of nation states, but to international “refugee regimes”, and transnational 
organisations and institutions, such as the UNHCR (Turton, 2012: 27-8; 
Chatty, 2010: 23). Nation states who signed the 1951 Refugee Convention 
(Chapter 5) have the duty to offer protection to refugees (Turton, 2012: 28). 
However, as nations aim to achieve socio-cultural homogeneity amongst its 
citizens in order to control them, the refugees’ temporary state of exception 
has to be overcome by ‘integration’23 (Chatty, 2010: 459; Gemie, 2010: 34). 
This standardization begins in UNHCR-led refugee camps through social re-
engineering (Muggah, 2005), aiming to “civilize” individuals by erasing 
“theocratic, premodern…and superstitious ways” (Robins, 1996: 68), such as 
(in my informants’ case) the caste system or gender inequality (see Chapter 4). 
This paves the way for non-Western refugees to overcome their state of 
liminality and be resettled in Euro-American nation states24.  
 
Several scholars (e.g. Chatty, 2010; Mortland, 1987; Zeus, 2011) make use of 
Victor Turner's (1967; 2002) discussion of liminality in rite de passage to 
describe the refugees’ experience of fundamental transformations. Turner 
(2002: 359) uses Van Gennep's (1960) tripartite model of rites of passage as 
any process which requires a “change of place, state, social position and age”. 
Refugee displacement and resettlement can be understood as a ‘phase of 
transition’, because refugees have been separated from a previous state and 
socio-cultural structure (i.e. Bhutan), and ‘strive’ to be incorporated in a new 
state and organisation (Mortland, 1987: 377). In between, these liminal 
persons undergo an ambiguous ‘stateless’ period of Ausnahmezustand 
(Turner, 2002: 359). They are 'neither here nor there' – refugees are detached 
from the past (Bhutanese citizens) and are not what they will be in the future 
(e.g. British citizens), but are also not similar to the present, surrounding 
society (Mortland, 1987: 380). According to discourses on refugees, their state 
of liminality is something that has to be ‘overcome’ by re-integration in a 
community by one of the three so-called ‘durable solutions’ (Mortland, 1987; 
see Chapter 3). However, my research suggests that Bhutanese refugees do 
                                            
23 The concept and definition of ‘integration’ is widely debated in social sciences, and is referred to as 
‘integration’ (with inverted commas) in this work, to highlight the problematic nature of the term. 
Chapter 4 offers a definition of ‘integration’ as proposed by the UK government.  
24 Third-country resettlement as a durable solution for protracted refugee situations – see Chapter 3.  
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not experience their ‘in-betweeness’ as a problem, but rather adapt to and 
adopt newly acquired norms and identities in order to gain advantages. This is 
contrary to the view that refugees are “fundamentally flawed human beings” 
who are not “social agents and historical subjects” but “passive victims”, who 
need to be managed and controlled (Turton, 2005: 278; also see Malkki, 
1995).  
 
However, as I address in Chapter 4, the analogy of refugee situations to 
anthropological theories on rites of passage is not as straightforward or useful 
as scholars assumed in the past25. The purpose of ‘integration’ is the return to 
‘normality’, without giving a clue what this “normal order of things” should be 
(Mortland, 1987: 378). For Bhutanese refugees there is no possibility to return 
to Bhutan, and therefore they are obliged to learn to exist in and interact with 
their new environment in resettlement. Rather than regarding resettlement as 
the end of liminality, their negotiation, adaptation and transformation is a life-
long process that may never result in ‘re-integration’ (ibid.). In Chapter 5 I 
discuss how refugees actively use their presumed state of in-betweeness in 
resettlement, and create multiple identities depending on the experience in situ 
(Lovell, 1988: 5).  
 
 
A note on agency and hybridity 
 
In the past, scholars often assumed that forced migration is inevitably 
challenging26 (Colson, 2003: 6). Refugees are portrayed as individuals who 
lost their community, property, culture, identities and ‘roots’, and are therefore 
in a state of uncertainty that needs to be overcome through the re-invention of 
culture and emplacement in their new environment (ibid.: 3; 6). But as Malkki 
(1997) cautions, treating forced migrants merely as victims, “dehumanizes and 
                                            
25 The most notable difference between the experience of refugees and scholarly explorations of rites of 
passage is that in the latter, individuals are re-integrated into a society familiar to them, but do so with 
a new status (e.g. manhood). Refugees, however, are (involuntarily) thrown into unfamiliar cultures 
and spaces and have to confront the significant differences between their own cultures and values 
and the new environment (Mortland, 1987: 378-9). 
26 See Chase (2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), Colson (2003) and Mortland (1987) for detailed discussions of 
the presupposed psychological and emotional impact of migration.  
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dehistoricizes” refugees, and denies them agency to take control of their lives. 
 
As highlighted throughout this work, migration is not a one-way process: top-
down policies may impact on refugees, but they are not passive ‘subjects of 
policy and care’ – they actively use policies and ‘labels’ (e.g. ‘refugee’) for their 
own advantage, and negotiate their place and everyday lives in their host 
country (Gemie, 2010: 30; Muggah, 2005: 153; Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 
2010: 91; Williams, 2006: 866). Forced migrants are proactive and tactical 
actors who employ the “art of the weak”, as De Certeau refers to it (1984; cited 
in Williams, 2006: 867), in order to regain control over their lives. Furthermore, 
rather than mourning their lost ‘roots’, Bhutanese refugees actively adopt 
multiple identities, adapting to the contexts and discourses in which they find 
themselves. It allows us, as Chatty (2010: 437) puts it, to “comprehend and 
admire the capacity of the human being to survive [and] overcome 
indescribable suffering”.  
 
We live in a “world culture” of “encounter”, with the possibility to belong 
“simultaneously, mentally, psychologically and experimentally to a diversity of 
cultures” (Bromley, 2000: 7). Culture is no longer perceived as static, but is 
created through interactions, experiences, practices and ‘translations’, by 
which we negotiate and fashion our multiple senses of belonging (Hall, 2010: 
448; Baumann, 2996: 13; Lovell, 1998: 5). These assumptions accentuate the 
rudimentary argument of this thesis that Bhutanese refugees are not one, 
homogeneous group of people with a bounded culture, that remained 
unchanged before displacement and resettlement occurred. When they were 
forced to leave Bhutan, they took with them cultures, languages and identities 
that were already hybridized, and what I call ‘Bhutanese Nepalese-ness’. 
Resettlement in the UK brought additional changes to these complex, multiple 
identities, resulting in a multifaceted community of ‘British Bhutanese Nepalese 
refugees’ (my term).  
 
These new hybrid individuals are urged (by UK service providers) to create 
bureaucratised communities to serve the ‘greater good’. Therefore, it is all the 
more important to ground my thesis in the anthropology of community, which I 
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explore in the following section. As I argue through this work, the optimistic 
assumption of community (in both anthropology and within policies) as a purely 
positive force has to be reconsidered, and the notion of community has to 
become the focus of our analysis, rather than taking it as a taken-for-granted 
idea which is shared across difference. 
 
 
The Anthropology of Community 
 
 
Community is, as Chatty (2010: 475) asserts, a “notoriously ‘fuzzy’” concept27, 
which in spite of being widely used and cited across the social sciences, 
resists precise definitions (Rapport and Overing, 2000:60). It is the “most 
taken-for-granted and unexamined form as a unit of analysis, the location 
rather than the object of research” (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 919). That is, 
community often remains undefined in anthropology, which typically locates 
research within a community, rather than making the notion of community itself 
the focus of deeper investigations (Chatty, 2010: 475; Rapport and Overing, 
2000:60; also see Amit and Rapport, 2002). Similarly, policy makers do not 
critically reflect on the notion of community, and therefore, it is important to 
examine the term itself to highlight the shortcomings of policy-intervention for 
refugees. In this thesis, my informants’ uses of ‘community’ are juxtaposed 
with the meanings service providers in the UK bestow on it, demonstrating the 
fissure between ‘native’ understandings of community (as with Bhutanese 
refugees) and bureaucratic and public interpretation (which inform the 
refugees’ lives).  
 
 
The problematic nature of community in Anthropology  
 
In the past, social anthropology located most research within small, local 
communities, and contrasted them with the broader concepts of modern, 
                                            
27 Drawing on Chatterjee’s (1998) work on community in India.  
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industrial and urban societies and organisations (Seymour-Smith, 1986: 46). 
Community was broadly defined as “any group or persons united by a 
‘community of interest’” (ibid.), which tells us virtually nothing of the contextual 
meaning of the notion of community. Rapport and Overing (2000: 60-1) 
criticise that communities have been treated as empirical things-in-
themselves… apart from other things”, neglecting the wider bureaucratic 
environment and macrocosm of the state in which life takes place.  
 
My informants refer to community as both personal samaj and formalized 
RCOs founded in resettlement. However, this is not a reflection of the 
sociological theories of Tönnis (2002 [1887]), who juxtaposed community as 
personal, social relations (Gemeinschaft) that are “organic”, “authentic” and 
permanent (equating it with ethnic, ‘racial’ traits), with society (Gesellschaft) as 
a form of collectivity (Azarya, 1996: 114). Rather, the notion of community 
must be contextualized in the larger, historical and hierarchical structures in 
which social relations are imbedded (Shaw, 2008: 24, 30-2). I do not argue 
that samaj denotes Gemeinschaft and RCOs are Gesellschaft. Both are 
constructed around personal relationships based on mutuality and trust, 
grounded in face-to-face interactions. RCOs are engendered by personal 
social networks, but are also formalized within a framework of British social 
policies, as I explore in detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
Thus, rather than following Tönnis, I make use of Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined 
communities’28 and Cohen’s (1985) ‘symbolic communities’. Moreover, 
drawing on Barth’s (1998) work, I show that communities are not only created 
by means of establishing similarity and solidarity, but also by creating the 
‘imagined other’, defining boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Chapters 8 and 
9). As I demonstrate in this thesis, intra-community divisions are not based on 
structural issues, but on individual, “ego-based” struggles and animosities 
(Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 508). 
 
                                            
28 Anderson’s work has been criticised by Amit and Rapport (2002: Loc 3521) and Barth (1998) who 
argue that communities cannot be sustained merely by ‘imagining’ it, but need to be actively 
maintained, predominantly through social interaction and by the creation of sameness and difference, 
discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
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Moreover, contrary to the ‘communitarian tradition’ in anthropology, which 
stresses singular and permanent “rootedness, sense of locality, identity” 
(Shaw, 2008: 25), I argue that Bhutanese refugees create multiple ‘roots’, 
belongings and identities depending on the situation in which they find 
themselves. Bhutanese refugees do not ‘re-invent’ a ‘traditional’ community as 
it was in Bhutan or Nepal. Rather, they form new, multiple communities, 
influenced by migration and social policies.  
 
I remain critical of the optimistic assumptions of the term community as a 
“concept of always positive evaluation and evocation…to which people would 
expect, advocate, or wish to belong” (Rapport and Overing, 2000:65). 
Community in public and even academic discourses has become an ideal, and 
a possibility to create homogeneity and equality from within a social group 
(Shaw, 2008: 27-8; 31). In public and political discourses in the UK, community 
is a “warmly persuasive word” that unlike other forms of social relations and 
organisations (e.g. the nation state) is seldom “used unfavourably” (Baumann, 
1996: 15). Within these discourses, community is characterised by “mutuality, 
co-operation, identification” and loyalty, perpetuating the credulous stereotype 
of “uniform commonality” within communities.  
 
My study, however, demonstrates that community can be a very problematic. It 
is imposed on my informants ‘from above’: firstly through the Bhutanese 
government’s categorisation of all Nepali-speaking Bhutanese as one 
homogenous community of ‘anti-nationals’ (discussed in Chapter 2); secondly 
through the Community Development Approach (CDA) in the refugee camps in 
Nepal (see Chapter 3); and thirdly through British policy makers, who 
outsource support-provision to formalized RCOs, disregarding the power 
relations that come into play in any social group that bridge “micro” (i.e. 
individual concerns) with “macro politics” (i.e. public issues) (Shaw, 2008: 31-2; 
Williams, 2006: 870). The divisions between Bhutanese refugee communities 
demonstrate that positive functions of community development may not reflect 
in real life. Therefore, a more critical stance towards the term community has 
to be employed. Many contemporary anthropologists go as far as to argue that 
‘community’, similar to other terms such as ‘culture’ or ‘nation’, is too 
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ambiguous and elusive to be of any use as an analytical tool for research (e.g. 
Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 323; Bauman, 1996: 14; Cohen, 1985: 165).  
 
The notion of community, however, continues to have “practical and 
ideological significance” in public, political and academic discourses (Amit and 
Rapport, 2002: 323; Rapport and Overing, 2000: 64). Policy makers and 
development agencies outsource support and responsibilities to communities. 
After all, bounded, homogenous and collaborative communities can easily be 
identified and serve political categorisation, such as the ‘Asian’, the ‘Black’ or 
the ‘Muslim’ community. This allows policy makers and the public to put people 
in (what they believe to be) easily identifiable categories29 by means of 
stereotyping, by for example physical characteristics, religion or ethnicity (also 
see Chapter 5).  
 
But community is also an important linguistic tool (to describe various 
formations of social relationships) and symbolic referent (to create identity, 
belonging and emplacement, see Cohen, 1985) for my informants. As a 
symbolic signifier, community is useful because it is vague, as it can be applied 
in various situations and social groups (Baumann, 1996: 177). Although Amit 
and Rapport (2002: Loc 323) warn us that the multiple uses of the term may 
“reduce the concept to banality”, anthropological research has the advantage 
of teasing out and analysing how and why notions of community are 
“negotiated and contested”, contextualizing it within the specific interpretations 
related to our fieldsites and informants, recognizing that such concepts are 
used, maintained and changed over time in specific contexts in which they 
emerge (Rapport and Overing, 2000:62).  
 
This does not, however, deny the positive effects of community as providing “a 
sense of purpose, belonging [and] security” (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 
94). Bhutanese refugees – as individuals in transition – assure continuity, 
rootedness and a sense of ‘home’30 by belonging to a (more or less well 
                                            
29 As Baumann (1996: 15, 29) highlights, in the UK (and indeed, across the global North), community 
became a “polite term for ‘ethnic minority’”, serving to identify people with a ‘common’ identity, 
ethnicity, religion or political affiliation (see Chapter 5).  
30 Nepali: ghar, see Nelson, 2015 
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defined) community (see Rapport and Overing, 2000: 63). For them, 
community becomes a useful tool to denote commonality whilst maintaining 
multiplicities of meanings. It defines boundaries whilst sustaining diversity. At 
the same time, however, community became a problem, rather than a solution 
for the many issues Bhutanese refugees face in resettlement. Their daily lives 
and communities are affected by both the UK’s and global migration policies, 
and intra-community divisions. This underlines my argument that in my 
fieldsite, community is, as Cohen (1985) argues, a symbolic concept that 
changes over time and space, rather than a fixed, structural paradigm.  
 
 
Community as the creation of similarity and difference 
 
Instead of focusing on community as a tangible and bounded social group of 
people sharing common traits and interests, as policy makers do, anthropology 
has shifted its gaze to community as a “categorical referent” (Amit and 
Rapport, 2002: Loc 185). Cohen’s (1985: 98) symbolic approach to community 
offers an alternative tactic to analyse community, defining it not as a 
sociological “fact” but as a concept created and maintained in the minds of 
community members31. Community, in this definition, does not exist 
independently of the meanings people attach to it, and the context in which 
community takes place (Chatty, 2010: 54; Rapport and Overing, 2000: 62).  
 
Community is reliant on commonality between its members. These shared 
traits, beliefs and histories, may not be actual (socio-cultural, physical, 
historical, etc.) realities, but are located in the imagination of community 
members (Anderson, 2006), who give meanings to these shared symbols or 
vocabularies (Rapport and Overing, 2000:63). These interpretations are not 
fixed, static or homogenous, but allow diverse, heterogeneous and even 
contradictory communities to emerge (ibid.:62). The adaptation of the term 
                                            
31 However, I do not go as far as to argue that community is merely a signifier of an idea rather than an 
organised social network of people (Amit and Rapport, 2002: 185). Both samaj and RCOs are 
dependent on face-to-face social interaction, through which relationships are created and maintained 
(see Chapters 7 and 8).  
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community amongst Bhutanese refugees to denote social groups from close 
family to the global diaspora, is testament to this contextualisation.  
 
As I attempt to unpack these various notions of community, it should become 
clear that community amongst Bhutanese refugees takes various forms, and 
operates as much through communality as it does through difference, or 
‘othering’. Community is often defined not only by what it is, but by what it is 
not (Amit and Rapport 2002: Loc 985). Both Cohen (1985) and Anderson 
(2006) draw on Barth’s (1998 [1969]) work on ‘othering’ amongst ethnic 
groups, who urges us to focus not on the commonalities between people, but 
on the boundaries that define social groups – that is, the “organisation of 
culture difference” and distinction between us and them (ibid.: 15; Amit and 
Rapport, 2002: Loc 1307). Cohen (1985) highlights that unity is created 
through exclusion, and the imagination and consciousness of others “beyond 
their boundaries” (in Rapport and Overing, 2000: 63, also see Butler, 2004; 
Hall, 1992; 1996). As Bhabha (2004: 30) put it, a community “begins its 
prescencing” exactly because of its consciousness of boundaries. The same 
applies in my study: Bhutanese refugee communities are constructed along 
“two key axes” (Mohan, 2002: 98): firstly by shared socio-cultural meanings, 
practices (or performances), histories and experiences, and secondly by 
means of ‘othering’, defining themselves vis-à-vis others (Chapters 8 and 9). 
Anderson (2006) highlights that this creation of similarity and difference is (akin 
to national identity) imagined by the individuals who employ it. That is, the 
criteria determining in- and outsider are not factual, but are negotiated, 
contested and amended by the people themselves. As I show in throughout 
this work, it is this imagined ‘othering’ that is important for the creation of 
community amongst Bhutanese refugees in the UK.  
 
Moreover, although people may move across boundaries, and move in space 
and time (as my informants have done), ‘othering’ continues, although the 
means and definitions of boundaries may have changed (Barth [1988] in Amit 
and Rapport, 2002: Loc 367). Several scholars suggest that this is 
accentuated for forced migrants, whose previous notions of similarity and 
difference have been deconstructed, and who seek familiarity and stability in a 
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time of transition (see Boddy, 1995: 18; Bromley, 2000: 5; Colson, 2003: 6; 
Shaw, 2008: 28; Wahlbeck, 1999: 11). My informants recognize that the 
values, meanings and interpretations that are shared (with insiders) or not 
shared (with outsiders) are changing through migration (Barth, 1998: 15). For 
example, my informants emphasized that in Bhutan, and initially in Nepal, 
boundaries based on gender-differentiations were common. However, due to 
aid intervention by the UNHCR, discrimination based on gender was prohibited 
in Bhutanese refugee camps. Nevertheless, new boundaries emerge which 
determine with whom it is and is not appropriate to engage in social practice 
(see Chapter 8).  
 
It is here where optimistic notions of community are most contested. The 
development of community and its inherent ‘othering’ has the potential to 
produce and accentuate internal differences, leading to conflicts and 
factionalism, rather than unity (Shaw, 2008: 29). My fieldsite is an example of 
how a social group is internally divided through the creation, negotiation and 
contestation of imagined differences (Baumann, 1996: 172), leading to the 
antagonistic assertion of insider versus outsider and the “potentially violent 
expulsion of those who are not ‘my blood, my family, my kin, my clan, my 
nation, my race’”. (Voiscu, 2013: 169; also see Rapport and Overing, 2000: 
64). The split between three different Bhutanese RCOs is an outcome of this 
‘othering’, as I show in Chapter 9.  
 
However, as I argue throughout this work, my informants are able to cope with 
an array of similarity and difference. Mutuality within a community does not 
imply a “homogeneity of views or interest” (Cohen [1985] in Amit and Rapport, 
2002: Loc 390), but allows for multiple views within a social group. They do so 
by a process of “synchresis”32, defined by the mestiza writer and activist Gloria 
Anzaldúa (1999) as a coping-strategy of migrants. They develop “tolerance for 
contradictions” and ambiguities, and learn “to juggle cultures” in order to adopt 
and operate in “plural personalities…and modes” and “sustain contradictions” 
                                            
32 Syncretism was also adopted by the Manchester University Anthropology School under Gluckman in 
the 1940s, denoting the emergence of new and hybrid cultural practices in growing urban areas, 
characterised by a considerable diversity of cultures, classes and personalities (Kalra et al, 2005: 74). 
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(cited in Bromley, 2000: 4-5), which “opens up the possibility of a cultural 
hybridity that entertains difference” (Bhabha, 2004: 34).  
 
Individuals belong to many social groups simultaneously, and thus adopt 
several different ‘cultures’, practices and loyalties, which change over time 
(Baumann, 1996: 23; 172). Migrants affiliate not only with their ‘native’ social 
networks, cultures and practices, but also with those of the receiving society 
(Zetter, 2007: 187). In turn, this allows for the tolerance of multiple, hybrid 
notions of boundaries, by recognizing that who and what lies beyond the 
boundaries of a community in one instance, may be included within its 
confines on other occasions (Shaw, 2008: 29). ‘Othering’ may be a key feature 
of community development and maintenance, but boundaries are adaptable, 
temporal (Grossberg, 1996), imagined (Anderson, 2006), and symbolic 
(Cohen, 1985). 
 
However, taking ‘othering’ to the extreme, Grossberg (1996: 93) appropriately 
criticises Cohen and Barth’s assumption that communities and identities may 
be analysed as mere “relations of difference”. It disregards the historical 
creation of ‘othering’ as systems of power, and takes the construction of 
difference as a given in all social relations (ibid.: 93-4). Although Bhutanese 
refugees employ ‘othering’, communities are still based on certain similarities 
(Chapter 7).  
 
Moreover, boundaries are not only created and maintained from within the 
community. Although I argue throughout this work that Bhutanese refugees 
have a high level of agency, certain boundaries are imposed from outside 
(Shaw, 2008: 29-30). Here, I explore the effects of aid intervention, social 
policy and public discourses on Bhutanese refugees’ communal identifications. 
For instance, refugee-ness is dependent on international definitions rather than 
on my informants (Chapter 5), and the experience of organized resettlement 
determines membership to Bhutanese RCOs (Chapters 8 and 9). Thus, 
formalized associations such as Takin, Welfare and HNC are constructed both 
by Bhutanese refugees and the social policies that underline the community 
development project (ibid.: 30). Forced migrants consciously politicize their 
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selves vis-à-vis other identities, and “reproduce a politicized version of an 
institutional category” (Zetter, 2007: 187, also see Hall, 1996: 15). That is, the 
development of community is a “professional…and a political practice” based 
on the relationship between individual agency, socio-political structures and 
power stratifications (Shaw, 2008: 26-7). A community can expand or limit its 
boundaries depending on economic, political and social advantages (ibid.: 29), 
demonstrating both the agency of social groups and the adaptability of 
‘othering’. Moreover, communities are created through and operate within 
interactions and experiences (Lovell, 1998: 5). Therefore, Bhutanese refugee 
communities in the UK are symbolic constructs within the specific context of 





One outcome of forced migration is said to be the destruction of “a 
community’s identity, values, activities, livelihoods and visions for the future” 33 
(Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 91). Within discourses of service providers, 
refugees are portrayed as “rootless” and utterly dependent individuals, who 
lost their support network (Williams, 2006: 865). Colson (2003: 8) claims that 
“[s]ince people define themselves in terms of the roles they play …, the loss of 
role structures means that they cannot know who they are or who anyone else 
is until new roles are constructed and people assigned to them”. Therefore, 
refugees actively fashion networks34 and foster relationships in order to create 
certainty, assure support and enhance social and cultural sustainability35 (Ibid.: 
94-97; Chatty, 2010: 465).  
 
                                            
33 Instigators of conflict may deliberately increase internal conflicts within communities (e.g. betrayal of 
kin, neighbours, etc.), leading to mistrust and suspicions, and therefore prevent a unified opposition 
(Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 91; see Chapters 2 and 3).  
34 These networks include transnational communities and diasporas, which operate across national 
borders (see Williams, 2006, Kalra et al, 2005). Bhutanese refugees maintain relationships across all 
resettlement nations and Nepal (not Bhutan, however), but due to the limited scope of this work, I do 
not discuss these global links.  




Migration brings with it new ideas, meanings, values and lifestyles somewhere 
in between the past (and ‘homelands’) and the present (the host society) 
(Mines and Lamb, 2010d), and requires a negotiation and transformation of 
relationships and hierarchical structures (Colson, 2003: 8). These new 
communities are marked by heterogeneity and multiplicities of belonging. My 
informants form communities-in-transition, building and maintaining multiple 
samaj by means of mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social interactions (see 
Chapter 7), through active practices of “social 
incorporation…cohesion…capital formation or the building of social 
relationships” (Chatty, 2010: 437; also see Zetter and Pearl., 2007). This 
reflects Appadurai’s (1996) ‘community of sentiment’, in which a group of 
people share feelings, values and imaginations, arising within a specific 
discourse of ‘ethnic’ categorisations36 (Chapter 5). However, just because 
refugees have a shared language, country of birth and experience of 
displacement does not mean that they are one cohesive community (Mitchell 
and Correa-Velez, 2010: 96). Thus, the term ‘refugee community’ is difficult to 
pin down to one exact, coherent and all-encompassing interpretation.  
 
Nevertheless, UK service providers support the formation of RCOs based on 
shared traits, assuming that refugees would come together in order to serve 
the ‘greater good’ of all community members. The formation of RCOs is 
mediated by top-down policies, which manage and control refugees arriving in 
the UK. Communities to do not arise in a political, social and cultural void, but 
are embedded in the context and prevalent power structures (Shaw, 2008: 34). 
Bhutanese refugee communities are inevitably influenced by the policies in 
which refugee resettlement takes place. National governments, aid agencies 
and service providers set “the parameters within which refugee groups may 
legitimately organise to represent their interests” (Sigona et al., 2004: 8), and 
thus, communities are actively created and organised by policy, rather than by 
the refugees themselves (Shaw, 2008: 34). Therefore it is all the more 
important to understand the political, social and cultural context in which these 
                                            
36 Appadurai’s theories on community are (similar to Anderson’s imagined community) criticised for 
locating belonging merely to “feelings”, rather than recognising that sameness is also created through 
active socio-cultural practices, (internal and external) interactions and investments (of e.g. time and 
resources) (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 3521).  
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RCOs emerge (Sigona et al., 2004: 7). My thesis thus attempts to shed light on 
Bhabha’s (2004: 32) justified query:  
 
“How do strategies of representation or empowerment come to be 
formulated in the competing claims of communities where, despite 
shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of 
values, meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and 
dialogical, but may be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even 
incommensurable?” 
 
Following Shaw (2008: 24), I aim to unpack the “politics of community” to shed 
light on both the challenging and positive character of community and 
community development in refugee resettlement. Migration and community 
development encompasses complex, continuous processes of labelling 
(Chapter 5), negotiations of multiple identities and boundaries (Chapters 8 and 
9), the “manipulation of myth” (Chapter 9), and social power and control 
(Chapter 8) (Colson, 2003: 1-2). Refugees are under the authority of national 
and international policy and funding regimes, and subject to various 
administrative and political structures that require negotiations, and the 
adoption of both old and new practices (ibid.: 8). In the following section, I 
explore the complex relationship between anthropological research and 
policies that affect my informants, and argue that the anthropology of forced 
migration necessitates a critical engagement with the political structures and 
policies that determine refugee resettlement.  
 
 
Anthropology and Policy 
 
 
As Baba (2013: 3) states, an ethnography on migrants and refugees is 
inevitably an anthropology of policy, defining policy as a means to “codify 
social norms and values and articulate conceptual modes for organizing 
society”. Policy is perceived to be the “ghost in the machine”, which brings to 
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life legislative and bureaucratic apparatuses (such as nation states, 
international organisations and conventions), having tangible consequences 
for the subjects of policy (Shore and Wright, 2003: 4-5). Governing (national 
and transnational) organisations classify, shape and order people, who 
construct themselves according to these top-down ‘labels’ (Shore and Wright, 
2003: 4-537, see Chapter 5). Moreover, policies shape relationships and 
activities, normalizing “certain behaviours and actions”, whilst limiting others 
(Baba, 2013: 3). Governments control notions of citizenship, ‘integration’ and 
immigration, and create policies that determine the relationship between the 
individual and the state (ibid.).  
 
Two issues emerge in this discussion: firstly, as I show in Chapter 5, policy 
makers and service providers in the UK apply convenient ‘ethnic’ 
classifications to migrant groups, in order to manage the diverse population of 
Great Britain. Secondly, this simplification leads to the assumption amongst 
these governmental bodies that internal differences within a migrant 
community are suspended in favour of community cohesion. However, as I 
show throughout this work, the service providers’ neglect of internal 
antagonisms puts the assumed utility of the RCO project into question.  
 
Although ruling bodies portray polices as “politically and ideologically neutral”, 
anthropologists analyse policies as embedded in the culture, history and 
ideology from which they originate (Shore and Wright, 2003: 5). Ethnographies 
are able to show that migrations are not random events, but occur due to 
unique patterns of, for example, nation building (Chapter 2). Moreover, 
Malkki’s work (1992 – 2002) shows that anthropology is best equipped to 
conceptualize and challenge accepted forms of ‘humanitarianism’ in which 
refugee and migrant policies operate (Colson, 2003: 2). Anthropological 
research is able to tease out the various “intersecting and conflicting power 
structures” (Abu-Lughod [1990] in ibid.: 10), analysing policies as “cultural 
texts, rhetorical devises, discursive formations [and] narratives” (ibid.: 11-12).  
 
                                            
37 Following the instrumentalist view of governance and policy in anthropology (see Foucault, 1989).  
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Therefore, the study of forced migration is multi- and interdisciplinary (Chatty, 
2010: 23), and necessities a critical engagement with policy research, 
governmental documents, historical sources and various literature stretching 
from social sciences to international development. Anthropologists study the 
‘policy nexus’, looking at the how multiple (political) actors interact and relate to 
each other over time (and history), uncovering the divergences between 
people, cultures and contexts (Baba, 2013: 7). The aim is to examine the 
effects of policy on the people or ‘clients’ of national and transnational 
regulations, critically reflecting on the contexts and interactions of policies on 
the ground, and how refugees cope with policies (Baba, 2013: 5). 
 
More importantly, long-term ethnographic fieldwork allows an understanding of 
the continuous fluctuations in policy, public and media discourses, and 
responses by refugees (Williams, 2006: 877). Policy research is mostly reliant 
on “tangible, quantifiable aspects”, focusing exclusively on “structural and 
organisational elements of the system” (Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 520). In 
contrast, anthropological studies show that all actors involved in migration 
have their own political agenda, bestowing refugees with the agency to 
challenge and resist policies (Colson, 2003: 1; 4). My study highlights how 
forced migrants themselves use policies to legitimize their status and residency 
in resettlement (Baba, 2013: 7). This is a critique of the assumption by some 
aid agencies that refugees – as individuals in a state of liminality – lack the 
ability to reflect on their situation38. I demonstrate that migration is not a one-
way process, but that Bhutanese refugees are (to an extent) able to vocalize 
and actively participate in various political processes. 
 
What distinguishes ethnographic research from, for example, quantitative 
surveys and questionnaires, is that anthropologists take into account both 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour (Alasuutari, 1995: 16), and present data from 
an emic perspective, which acknowledges that often each individual of a group 
has different perceptions and experiences of the same action or event 
                                            
38 See Mortland’s (1987) study on refugee camps in the Philippines, in which refugees’ criticism of aid 
provision was not taken seriously and dismissed by aid workers as something “refugees do” for no 
other reason than “to complain” (ibid.: 399-400).  
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(Fetterman, 2010: 20-1) – in other words, the “voice of refugees” (Baba, 2013: 
5). Anthropology has the advantage of recording these multiple perspectives of 
realities, which are all crucial to understand why people think, feel and act the 
way they do (Fetterman, 2010: 21). Anthropologists acknowledge that 
meanings can change over time and in various contexts, showing the 
impermanence of our lives (Tideman, 2009: 1). Thus, we assume that the 
ethnographies we produce are not ever-valid accounts of reality, but that any 
social science research (including quantitative surveys) only captures a 
community and their perceptions in a particular moment in time in a particular 
context.  
 
However, anthropologists working with refugees enter a “loaded political field 
where they have to be very much aware of the effects their arguments may 
have” (Turton, 2005: 277). This is all the more relevant in the “century of the 
refugee”, in which anthropological research gains more and more significance 
outside of academia, rather than being confined to academic settings (Colson, 
2003: 13). Yet, we should keep in mind Turton’s (2005: 277) advice that the 
“role of academic knowledge should be to reflect critically upon, not to confirm 
and legitimize, the taken for granted assumptions upon which policy making is 






As mentioned above, my research is based on a 14-month ethnographic 
fieldwork in Manchester39, which combined participant observation with 
interviews. During my fieldwork, I also assisted my informants with the 
Bhutanese Refugee Film Project40 (BRFP), and in course of this project, 
                                            
39 Including research with children and young people, who are indeed “competent social actors”, and 
provide insight into the refugees’ lives (Spicer, 2008: 494).  
40 I was very closely involved in this project initiated by Takin, and I am a co-producer of the film. 
However, TA holds the copyright of the content, which I have permission to use in this thesis 
(referenced as BRFP).  
31 
 
conducted 23 semi-structured interviews in Nepali41. Informed consent was 
obtained from all research participants, and an ethical checklist has been 
completed prior to fieldwork (see Appendix 3). I have changed the names of all 
informants in this work42, but use the original names of Bhutanese RCOs, as 
they can easily be identified by the reader through a simple Google search. 
Moreover, I have consciously chosen to emphasize that most of my informants 
live in Manchester, rather than ‘inventing’ a city for anonymity-purposes. This 
allows me to present accurate data on the demography of the city, which is 
important to understand my informants’ experiences of resettlement43.  
 
 
Welcome to Manchester 
 
Greater Manchester is a populous and vibrant city in the North of England (see 
Figure 244), famous for being the centre of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th 
century, and for their two football teams Manchester United and Manchester 
City45. According to the 2011 Census (ONS, 2011; 2012a), Greater 
Manchester has a population of 2.7 million46 people divided over ten main 
areas47 (see Figure 348). I experienced Manchester as a lively and welcoming 
city, full of friendly people. During my fieldwork, there was always something 
“going on” (as my informants and I referred to it), especially in the city centre 
“triangle” between Dean Square, Piccadilly station and Victoria Square. The 
large shopping malls in Trafford or Arndale are magnets for people on the very 
common rainy days, including my informants.  
 
                                            
41 Although my language skills in Nepali are limited, recording data in the respondents' native language is 
of significant advantage, and allowed me to understand how ideas are formed and structured. Several 
of my informants assisted me in the translation and elaboration of Nepali terms and concepts.  
42 Both first and surnames have been selected at random, and are not a reflection of e.g. caste.  
43 I also believe that in the age of the internet, any attempt to anonymize the location of our (Western) 
fieldsite (and indeed, our informants) is futile, although it is, of course, an ethical requirement of social 
science research to protect our informants.  
44 From http://www.ichstm2013.com/travel/ [Accessed: 23 May 2013].  
45 Both of whom have a strong fan base amongst my informants of all ages and both genders. 
46 In comparison to 64m total population in the UK (ONS, 2012a).  
47 The area of Manchester City Centre has a population of about 500k. I emphasize that when I use 
‘Manchester’ in this work, I refer to Greater Manchester, as my informants (and myself) live across the 
wider area, rather than being concentrated in the city centre.  









Manchester is spread over a wide geographical area, and has an extensive 
public transport network with buses, trains and trams. It often took me more 
than two hours to travel from my area (Stockport) to meet Bhutanese refugees 
(in e.g. Bolton or Bury), who are spread across almost all areas of Greater 
Manchester (see map above). They are mostly concentrated in Bolton and 
Rochdale – the latter due to the Christian community, which has a community 
venue there. Bhutanese refugees were settled depending on availability of 
accommodation, and about 150 of the 400 Bhutanese refugees were settled in 
the nearby towns of Leeds, Sheffield and Bradford. I sometimes travelled with 
my informants to these other locations, visiting Bhutanese refugees, and 
attended several events organised by these smaller, local communities. 
However, as I did not have extended contact with these groups, this thesis is 
about Bhutanese refugees in Greater Manchester, rather than in the UK in 
general. Yet, most Bhutanese refugees residing out of Manchester either 
migrated (or will migrate) to the city to seek employment and better educational 
facilities (see Chapter 6), or are involved with the community in the city  
 
Figure 2: Map of the UK 
Figure 3: Map of Greater Manchester 
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Manchester is a highly diverse city, with more than 15 percent non-white 
residents – nine percent of whom are South Asian migrants or self-identify as 
British South Asian49 (ONS, 2011; 2012a). As Bromley (2000: 2-3) elucidates, 
instead of “passive” migrants who fully assimilate into the British host culture, 
immigrants have “actively transformed” the UK by creating new and diverse 
“cityscapes” – Manchester just being one example of these transformed urban 
centres. In areas of Manchester, such as Longsight (Manchester City), Salford, 
Bolton, Bury and Rochdale, the migrant population from across the world 
created a multi-cultural urban space, pulsating with culture, music and art. 
There are small South Asian markets and shops dotted across the city, 
allowing my informants to purchase familiar groceries and products. The 
several Hindu temples (mandir) in Manchester are well-attended by my older 
Hindu informants, whereby Takin members favour the Gita Bhavan Hindu 
Temple in Chorlton (Manchester City). Bhutanese refugees travel across the 
city to access schools, jobs and governmental and non-governmental facilities. 
All my informants expressed their happiness to live in Manchester, which they 





My informants – as most refugee populations – come from all social, cultural, 
educational and economic backgrounds, showing that they are not one, 
homogenous community. For example, some of my older informants over the 
age of forty never went to school and are illiterate, whilst others have university 
degrees and professional work experience. Some come from a family of 
farmers and labourers in Bhutan, whilst others descend from high status 
government officials or religious leaders. Older informants were born in 
Bhutan, whilst almost all under the age of twenty were born in Nepalese 
refugee camps. Almost all of them lived in refugee camps in Nepal for nearly 
twenty years, and arrived in the UK in between 2010 and 2013. As they 
resided in various refugee camps, many of my informants did not know each 
                                            
49 In comparison to 13 percent migrant population across the UK, 9 percent of which are (British) South 
Asians (ONS, 2012a).  
34 
 
other before arriving in the UK. I had informants from both genders, and I 
spent time with newborns and toddlers, children and teenagers, young adults, 
and middle aged individuals up to the age of eighty. Some spoke English, 
some only a little, and a few none at all. Most refugees lived with their 
extended families in terraced or semi-detached houses throughout the city 
(rather than in ‘enclaves’), making it difficult to visit all of them at all times.  
 
During my fieldwork, most of my informants were unemployed, and fully reliant 
on benefit and welfare payments (see Chapter 3). Bhutanese refugees arrived 
in the middle of an economic downturn50, which had an impact on their 
employment prospects (together with other factors, see Chapter 4). Since 
autumn 2008, unemployment in the UK increased from 5.5 to 8.5 percent. 
During my fieldwork in April 2013 the unemployment rate was 7.9 percent, and 
even higher for 16 to 24 year-olds, with more than 21 percent of young people 
out of work (ONS, 2013a, 2013b). According to economists, the 
“unemployment levels across Greater Manchester remain[ed] higher than the 
national average” (Begum, 2013). As one of my informants complained: “There 
are no jobs [in Manchester], whatever you do”. However, many Bhutanese 
refugees, engage in illegal, so-called 'cash-in-hand' work, mostly in Asian 
businesses, such as restaurants and shops51.  
 
Therefore, much of my fieldwork was spend in ‘timepass’ (see Chapter 7), 
making and eating food, sharing tea, watching television, playing cards and 
being part of conversations. Most are busy during the day (limiting my time 
with them), attending school or language classes, going to (legal and illegal) 
                                            
50 Neither the UNHCR, nor the British BA could foresee the persistence of recession across the UK, and 
in this regard, the resettlement programme may not be held responsible for the high rate of 
unemployment and decreased service provision and funding experienced by my informants.  
51 These jobs are normally acquired through 'connections': one refugee knows a business owner, who 
hires one of the refugees, and in turn, through the snowball-effect, hires other refugees through these 
connections, showing the importance of social capital which I discuss in Chapter 8. However, it is 
illegal to pay employees in cash without “deducting tax and National insurance contributions” (HMRC 
a), and employees who commit this PAYE fraud– similar to tax fraud – risk losing benefit payments, 
and have to pay taxes themselves (HMRC b). Yet, cash-in-hand practices are necessary subsidies to 
their welfare payment, which sometimes do not cover all the necessary living-costs to support a 
family. Scott (2008: xvi) argues that this is an “everyday form of peasant resistance”. Bhutanese 
refugees engage in these highly risky practices: to be caught may mean trouble in the future, but not 
to work for cash has real consequences in the present. Therefore, the benefit outweighs the risk, and 




work, training or work experiences, picking their children up from school, and 
finishing household chores.  
 
My role in the field was both that of a friend and of a support worker52. For my 
informants, I represented some form of advocate, who could improve their 
‘situation’ with small “favours”, such as helping with their CV and job 
applications, teaching them more English, and advising them on practical 
matters, such as applying for funding. Some of my informants jokingly 
introduced me as their “manager” to non-refugees. I never experienced 
problems due to my gender or age, and the fact that I am migrant myself 
improved my rapport (see Chapter 5). Throughout the following chapters, I 
introduce some of my informants in detail, and refer to my own experience of 
becoming a community member, as I moved from being a guest (pahuna) to 
become a friend (sathi) and ultimately a member of the family (pariwar) and 
some small, local communities (samaj). I make use of some Nepali (and 
Dzongkha) terms throughout this thesis, but mostly use English translations of 
conversations and interviews53. A full list of Nepali (and Dzongkha) terms can 
be found in Appendix 154.  
 
 
Limits of research 
 
Anthropologists are critical about the limits of their research competence, and 
reflect upon the limits of their studies (Colson, 2003: 13). Therefore, I 
                                            
52 I have to mention, that my research presented here was only devised by me in my second year of my 
PhD. During my Masters course and first two years of my PhD, I worked on a project on Gross 
National Happiness in Bhutan, but failed to get access to this highly restrictive nation (also see 
Chapter 2). On the one hand, this limited my preliminary knowledge on the topic at hand and 
significantly impacted on both my time and financial resources (as a largely self-funded student). On 
the other hand, the failure to gain access to Bhutan (my ‘Bhutan Odyssey’, how I refer to it) was 
perceived as a common denominator for many of my informants. On several occasions when 
discussing this issue with Bhutanese refugees, they emphasized that we both have been “wronged” 
by Bhutan, increasing my rapport with them.  
53 Many quotes in this thesis are exactly as my informants’ stated them in English, containing spelling- 
and grammar mistakes. In order to preserve the emic component of this work, I did not correct these 
mistakes.  
54 The spelling of Nepali words in this work follows dictionary spelling, rather than the spelling my 
informants used. As one of my Nepali migrant informants remarked, Bhutanese refugees often 
misspell Nepali words, as most of my informants are illiterate in Nepali (see Chapter 7). For example, 
my informants write the word ‘friend’ as sati, rather than sathi, or bahini (younger sister) as bueni – 




emphasize that what is absent in this thesis are, unfortunately, the voices of 
aid agencies, policy makers (both national and international) and UK service 
providers. I was not successful in engaging with these non-refugee bodies. 
Rather, I found these agencies to be particularly critical of my presence 
amongst Bhutanese refugees (see Baba, 2013 for a similar experience). 
Therefore, interactions between Bhutanese refugees, service providers and 
British institutions (e.g. Home Office) are only told through my informants’ 
stories and by using comments by service providers from private 
correspondences.  
 
Service providers who facilitate refugee resettlement (e.g. Refugee Action UK 
in Manchester) were merely interested in my access to refugees, and the 
potential quantitative data my research may produce (although I highlighted 
that I am conduction a qualitative study), whilst being less inclined to reflect on 
my critical questions on service provision. Furthermore, my repeated requests 
to Refugee Action UK, the British Home Office and the IOM to provide me with 
reliable numbers on Bhutanese refugee resettlement were met with silence, 
under the guise of “data protection”. In addition, I was not successful in 
obtaining access to state facilities, such as the Job Centre, health services and 
schools55, as researchers need to obtain research permission for these 
settings – a lengthy process that was beyond my ability whilst in the field.  
 
In the detailed ethnography in Chapter 6, in which I describe the arrival of 
refugees at Manchester airport, I emphasize that we met two IOM workers who 
manage refugee resettlement in Manchester. One of them questioned me on 
who “allowed” me to conduct research with Bhutanese refugees. I retorted that 
I obtained consent from my informants. Without any response the man 
frowned, turned around and whispered with the young woman next to him, who 
gave me another disapproving look, and both refused to speak to me 
thereafter. After this meeting, my informant Bikram remarked: “You see now! 
                                            
55 Job Centres in Manchester have security guards who prevented non-clients to enter the facilities; 
health services are under the data protection act and doctor-patient confidentiality, and schools in the 
UK require a significant bulk of paperwork and permissions (including a criminal records check) in 
order to enter facilities with minors.  
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This is what they do – they think we are stupid.... You are dangerous, because 
we tell you they are not good to us…You help us – you listen”.  
 
From the very start of my fieldwork, it became obvious that the reason why I 
gained such intimate rapport with Bhutanese refugees in the UK, was that they 
perceived me as an independent researcher, unaffiliated with any 
governmental and non-governmental body that could impact on my informants’ 
lives. They trusted me exactly because I established relationships with them 
independently of service providers.  
 
Despite lacking access to service providers, my fieldwork experience revealed 
the underlying problems that tinge both policy research and academic works. 
For example, when preparing a publication for a workshop, the reviewing 
peers gently steered me away from a critical analysis of social policy and 
service provision, cautioning not to be “too critical” of UK service providers, as 
to “not close the doors” for future collaborations with these official bodies. 
Further, they argued that as an early career researcher, I lack the leverage to 
have my criticism “taken seriously”. My analysis of policy and services was 
‘removed’ from the publication, and with it, a necessary critical elaboration on 
the practice-policy gap. Similarly, after an academic conference, during which I 
presented my research on RCO divisions, addressing the lack of involvement 
of UK service providers, I was approached by several audience members, 
complimenting my “courage” to talk about these issues. One researcher 
working with Bhutanese refugees in the USA explained that he observed 
similar internal problems of community divisions amongst his informants, but 
that his sponsors urged him not to publish on this topic, as it “undermines 
refugee service provision”. Reliant on funding bodies, he had no choice but to 
disregard his data about community divisions. He expressed his discontent 
with this situation very strongly, and encouraged me to publish on these 
issues, so others would follow suit.  
 
Moreover, as addressed above, I have been advised by a few anthropologists 
that I should not address policy at all, as it is not “the job of anthropology to 
analyse and critically reflect” upon these external factors. I fundamentally 
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disagree with this position, as it is exactly these policies that tinge every aspect 
of my informants’ daily lives. My informants themselves critically reflect on 
immigration policies, and express their dissatisfaction with service provision. 
As ethnography is an endeavour to present the world from our informants’ 
perspective, I have the duty to address these highly problematic issues. 
However, I emphasize that the thesis at hand is perhaps not a ‘classic’ 
ethnography focusing purely on informants, but juxtaposes policy with the real-
life experience of the subjects of these policies. 
 
I found myself surprised by the reactions described above, as my literature 
review suggests that there are indeed many social science researchers who 
critically address these issues, amongst them (but not limited to) Kelly (2003), 
Muggah (2005), Malkki (1997), Zetter and Pearl (2000) and Zetter (2007). In 
this work, I emphasize that anthropology has to become more relevant outside 
of academia, following Colson’s (2003) call to make our research increasingly 
accessible for non-academic and non-anthropological audiences. As it is my 
interest to seek a future career outside of academia, preferably in the policy 
sector, I cannot stress enough that my choice of research topic, literature and 
critical engagement is deliberate, and – as I strongly believe – highly relevant 
for my informants. However, I also find myself between pleasing (future) 
gatekeepers and potential employers in the policy sectors, whilst remaining 
committed to critical, independent research.  
 
On a final note, as will become evident throughout the chapters, I was 
subjected to ‘othering’ by Bhutanese refugees during fieldwork: since I 
affiliated myself with TA members (as my initial gatekeepers), rival Bhutanese 
RCOs were not keen to work with me, and their members did not invite me to 
their homes. I attempted to (and partially succeeded in) overcoming these 
problems, but I have to stress that most of my ethnography derives from 
members of a specific RCO (Takin). Therefore, it is not my intention to 
generalize my qualitative data to be applicable to all Bhutanese refugees in the 
UK, or indeed, across the world. Moreover, many of my informants requested 
to read and comment on my thesis and publications – a promise I have 
maintained, as the feedback I receive from these informants is invaluable and 
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opens up new avenues of exploration. Many Bhutanese refugees are highly 
educated individuals, who have the agency and capacity to critically reflect 
upon my and other scholars’ research. However, as I stressed in many 
conversations with my informants, I may not be able to fulfil their expectations 
to “publicise our story”, and therefore miraculously “improve” their lives.  
 
 
Thesis Overview  
 
 
In this work, I explore the relationship between people, communities and 
organisational elites such as nation states and aid agencies (Shore and 
Wright, 2003: 4). In the following chapters, I follow my informants’ journey from 
Bhutan to the UK, and thereby illustrate the complexities of a community-in-
transition.  
 
Both voluntary and forced migration occur due to varying reasons and within 
complex contexts, and thus we have to study both the refugees’ experiences 
and the historical and political circumstances of migration (Colson, 2003: 2-3). 
Therefore, in Chapter 2, I explore the ‘othering’ that occurs on the macro-level 
of a nation state such as Bhutan, to assure homogeneity in order to secure 
sovereignty during nation-building. I trace the Bhutanese Nepalese’s story of 
settlement in Bhutan, showing that they are a diverse community-in-transition 
for many generations, rather than a geographically bounded, homogeneous 
community.  
 
In Chapter 3, I follow Bhutanese refugees to the refugee camps in Nepal, and 
learn about the struggles and difficulties of living in a protracted refugee 
situation for almost twenty years. Here, I show the internal problems amongst 
refugees in the camps in search of a durable solution, leading to disunity, 
fights and even violence against one another. Again, I show that Bhutanese 
refugees are not a homogenous community, but that ‘othering’ is a common 




In Chapter 4, I explore the external influences on Bhutanese refugees during 
their time in the refugee camps. Here I show that aid agencies maintain power 
over refugees by means of political ideologies in the global North, which are 
embedded in liberal, humanitarian principles (Chatty, 2010: 28). Through 
social re-engineering, refugees are made into easily resettle-able individuals 
by means of the community development approach, which is then adopted by 
resettlement agencies in the UK. Here I also reflect critically on the optimistic 
functions of RCOs ascribed by UK policy makers and service providers. 
 
In Chapter 5, I highlight that the notion of community and the process of 
‘othering’ is linked to the creation of a cultural identity. These identities are not 
only by refugees, but by policy makers, service providers and the public. I 
explore how national and international policies control migrants through the 
use of simplified, homogenous classifications, which make them subjects of 
policy, revealing the “political in the apolitical” (Zetter, 2007: 188). However, I 
also demonstrate that labels give legitimacy and agency to refugees, who use 
these categories for their own advantage. Moreover, similar to notions of 
community, these classifications are subject to transformation and change, 
and Bhutanese refugees have several hybrid identities which they adapt 
according to context and experience (Chatty: 2010: 54). Here, I conclude that 
migration is a ”reciprocal process in which nation and refugee reflect back on 
each other” (Gemie, 2010: 30).  
 
In Chapter 6, I outline how life is “beginning” for Bhutanese refugees on arrival 
in Manchester and highlight the role of samaj and RCOs in resettlement. I 
discuss how, due to marginalisation (e.g. from the labour market) and 
unfulfilled hopes, many refugees are disillusioned with resettlement, and have 
to learn to manage their expectations. It is here where community comes into 
play and acts as a reliable support network, fulfilling the positive functions 
ascribed to communities.  
 
As mentioned throughout this work, the development and maintenance of 
community is based on both the creation of similarity and difference. In 
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Chapter 7, I explore the notion of sameness by outlining my informants’ 
understandings of community as samaj, which are built on mutuality and trust. I 
show that rather than being merely ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 2006) or purely 
‘symbolic’ (Cohen, 1985), samaj is embedded in social interactions. However, I 
demonstrate that Bhutanese refugees alter their meanings and values through 
aid intervention and resettlement.  
 
In Chapter 8 I juxtapose samaj with community as formalized RCOs. I outline 
the bureaucratization of communities and hierarchies in order to comply with 
service providers’ assumptions about the role and meaning of community. But I 
emphasize the agency of Bhutanese refugees, who find new opportunities as 
liminal experts, by accumulating various forms of capital and skills, showing 
that migrants and refugees find “surprising, never before imagines solutions” 
(Colson, 2003: 2-3) to the complex issues arising in resettlement.  
 
In Chapter 9, I turn to the negative side of community, and show ‘othering’ in 
the microcosm of Bhutanese refugee communities in Manchester. Again, I 
demonstrate that Bhutanese refugees are not one homogenous community 
working together for the benefit of all, as service providers envision. I trace the 
origin of divisions in a narrative of ‘othering’, and illustrate the effects of 
internecine conflict by exploring the constant battle for members in order to 
comply with funding regimes. I emphasize that Bhutanese RCOs in 
Manchester are British, rather than Bhutanese Nepalese communities, created 
within resettlement policies.  
 
I conclude the work by arguing that migration is a complex process involving 
(forced) migrants, nation states and transnational bodies influencing one 
another. It may be difficult not to fall prey to the ideal that social science 
research should and must challenge and improve policy. This work does not 
attempt to radically transform UK immigration policies, but rather serves as a 
response to Colson’s (2003: 12) call that “[w]hat is perhaps most needed is a 
synthesis of what is being learned about the impact of radical transformations 
in human expectations as they are subject to warfare, civil unrest, economic 
upheavals, natural catastrophes, and resettlement among strangers”  
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Although the history of Bhutan and the conflict leading to the expulsion of 
Nepalese Bhutanese, is not the main focus of this thesis, an understanding of 
the historical context is essential to gain an insight into Bhutanese refugees’ 
lives in the present. As I explore in Chapter 5, refugee-ness is a very important 
classification of my informants, and is used to legitimize their place in the UK. 
“Being a refugee” was an outcome of “Bhutan’s nationalist policy”56, as I heard 
in many speeches my informants gave during events addressing non-
Bhutanese refugees. The history of Bhutanese refugees was summarized in 
one sentence: “Bhutan adopted ‘One Nation, One People’ [see below], so we 
fled Bhutan, and lived in refugee camps in Nepal for twenty years”. It is this 
refugee-ness that creates sameness between them (in their eyes) – a shared 
history of exile, life in the camps and resettlement. This was important to 
distinguish refugees from non-refugees – both internally and externally. That 
is, not all Nepalese Bhutanese are considered to be Bhutanese refugees by 
my informants; and those who are, see themselves as distinct from other 
refugees (e.g. sub-Saharan or Middle Eastern refugees who live in Britain) and 
migrants (e.g. Nepali and South Asian migrants) who came to the UK 
voluntarily. In turn – as I explore in this thesis – these notions of sameness and 
difference are of utmost importance for Bhutanese refugees in order to create 
a community – both as samaj57 and as refugee community organisations 
(RCOs). 
 
In order to understand the Bhutanese government’s move to expel Nepalese 
Bhutanese, we have to apprehend the internal and external influences that had 
an impact on Bhutan's rulers’ views of Nepalese Bhutanese. The conflict in 
Bhutan did not occur 'overnight', but in various stages, often with opposing 
policies towards the Nepalese Bhutanese, stretching from attempted 
                                            
56 See definition of nationalism further below.  
57 See Introduction and Chapter 7, samaj is the term my informants use to denote community. 
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assimilation to forceful eviction. The history of Bhutan cannot be explored 
without consideration of Bhutan's unique position in the Himalayas.  
 
The conflict between Bhutanese drukpas (see below) and Nepalese 
Bhutanese is defined as an 'ethnic conflict' by external observers (see e.g. 
Hutt, 2007 and Joseph, 1999). The refugee issue originated in the imagined 
differences between two (and more) social and ethnic groups living in Bhutan, 
which were used as a justification to expel the 'other' - that is, what the ruling 
elite (the Ngalongs – see below) perceived as non-Bhutanese or non-native - 
in order to maintain power. More importantly, ethnicity in the Bhutanese 
context is equated with culture, in which only one (ethnic) culture is deemed as 
'authentic' and ‘native’ by the Bhutanese ruling elite.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of providing this historical background, 
throughout my fieldwork, my informants did not speak about Bhutan often, 
except when explicitly asked or presenting their “story” to external audiences 
during events. They place emphasis on their experience of 'being refugees' in 
a host country very different from both their country of origin (Bhutan) and 
Nepal, rather than on history. Only refugees over the age of forty remember 
their lives in Bhutan, whilst others are too young to recall details from their lives 
before living in the refugee camps in Nepal. Furthermore, most young refugees 
under the age of twenty were born in Nepal having no recollections of life in 
Bhutan, and refer to it as “the country of our parents”58.  
 
When asked about life in Bhutan, my older informants evoke details about how 
much land they owned, and how they cultivated it. Most Bhutanese refugees 
who were born and lived in Bhutan were agricultural labourers or land owners, 
planting apples, oranges, cardamom, betel nut, wheat and rice. “It was a 
simple life”, as one of my informant’s once remarked. “We worked at home, 
helped our family with the harvest and worked on the farm”. When I asked 
about the conflict that lead to their expulsion from Bhutan, they recalled the 
                                            
58 It was not common amongst my informants to talk about Bhutan, or maintain connections to the 
country through story-telling. This distinguishes them from other refugees in ethnographic studies, 
such as observed by (amongst others) Chatty (2010) and Malkki (1992), whose informants 
continuously recalled their lives in their native countries through shared narratives and story-telling. 
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police and army, requesting documents to “prove the citizenship” (outlined 
further below), the threats of torture and murder by Bhutanese officials, as well 
as the flight from Bhutan to Nepal.  
 
There is hardly any political activism amongst my informants in Manchester, 
calling for repatriation to Bhutan or compensation (for e.g. property, land, etc.) 
from the Bhutanese government. This distinguishes my informants from, for 
example, many Bhutanese refugee groups in resettlement in the USA, who are 
actively involved in creating awareness of “their story”. One of my informants, 
an educated man in his early twenties, explained: “Why should I care about 
Bhutan? It’s no good to think about the past and the history, when we can’t find 
a job here [in the UK], can’t buy a car or a house, and have no money. This is 
more important, you know, live here in England, not think about Bhutan”. 
 
In this chapter, I outline the ‘making of Bhutanese refugees’ by tracing their 
steps from being Nepalese settlers in the Himalayan region (18th century) to 
becoming Nepalese Bhutanese (19th and 20th century) in Bhutan, as well as 
the ethnic conflict in Bhutan (1980s). Rather than presenting the history of 
Bhutan and Bhutanese refugees in a chronological fashion, I examine the 
history thematically, and focus predominantly on the reasons for the expulsion 
of Bhutanese Nepalese from Bhutan to Nepal, where they lived in refugee 




Narratives of history and conflict 
 
The conflict in Bhutan has been widely discussed by other researchers (e.g. 
Hutt, 2007; Joseph, 1999; Evans, 2009; De Varennes, 2009) and has been 
outlined in detail in literature by the UN, Amnesty International (AI), various 
human rights organisations, and the popular media (e.g. international 
newspapers and online resources). However, there are differences between 
the Bhutan's government’s and the refugees' views on the conflict - as Evans' 
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respondents (2009: 117) explained, there are "two sides to the river" - leading 
to inconsistent views of history.  
 
The narration of Bhutanese history is divided amongst several lines: the 
Bhutanese ruling elite, the 'politically active' Nepalese Bhutanese and the 
'innocent'59 refugees. In her PhD research with Bhutanese refugees in 
Nepalese camps, Evans (2009: 10) concludes that refugee narratives “present 
refugees as the totally innocent victims of a cruel and repressive [Bhutanese] 
government. It leaves no space for the suggestion that refugees faced threats 
and violence from their own people”. On the other hand, the Royal 
Government of Bhutan (RGB) portrays the Bhutanese refugees as ngolops 
(DZ, 'rebel' or 'mutineer', here: 'anti nationals'), portraying all Nepalese 
Bhutanese as guilty by (ethnic) association, who committed violent acts in 
order to overthrow the Bhutanese government (see Hutt, 2007). The following 
discussion of the history of the Bhutanese conflict only reflects narratives from 
specific points of views depending on the literature, which is often biased, and 
either entirely 'victimises' (in some refugees' accounts) or wholly blames (in 
RGB statements) the Nepalese Bhutanese. Although researchers attempt to 
impede bias in their work, many authors have a strong tendency to favour 
narratives of refugees, fostering the notion of victimhood.  
 
As anthropologists, we acknowledge that history is a collective representation 
of a group of people (mostly the ones in power) with aims and obligations. 
Appadurai (1981: 201) states that the "past is a boundless canvas for 
contemporary embroidery". Hutt (2007: 25) follows Appadurai and maintains 
that "a cultural consensus must exist between which kinds of authority, 
continuity, time-depth and inter-dependence with other pasts are required to 
provide a particular version of the past with credibility". Evans (2009: 56-7) 
                                            
59 Here, 'innocent' is not an indicator of legality, but is used in the sense of 'innocent' bystanders', which is 
explored in great detail by Evans (2009). During her research with Bhutanese refugees in Nepali 
camps, she discovered that many refugees were caught in between two sides of the conflict in two 
stages. Firstly, between the Bhutanese government and the Nepalese Bhutanese insurgency (during 
the 1980s and 90s), leading to violence, and secondly (during two decades in refugee camps) 
between pro- and anti-resettlement refugees in the 2000s (see Chapter 3). Many politically 'inactive' 
refugees, who attempted to remain 'neutral' throughout both conflicts, were either forced to participate 
for one side (by e.g. forcefully obtained 'donations' to insurgencies) leading to retributions by the other 
side, or found themselves rendered powerless in light of the conflicts, losing land-rights, property and 
some of them their lives.  
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goes further by arguing that "history can be considered a 'construction of 
pastness' " and the "present influences our ideas about the past and ... such 
imaginations of earlier times shape identity-formation and underpin political 
action in the here and now".  
 
The Bhutanese conflict is important for the self-representation of refugees in 
resettlement, as it plays a part in the formation of both samaj and RCOs. My 
informants emphasize their “innocence”, highlighting that the Bhutanese 
government acted without good reason, simply expelling them for their 
“culture”. Similar to the notion of refugee-ness, victimhood60 is an essential 
means to distinguish themselves from other migrants in the UK, and creates 
sameness to other refugees, and, in turn, fosters a sense of community 
amongst them, as I explore in the subsequent chapters.  
 
The following section explores the history of Bhutan by looking at the constant 
flow of migration within the Himalaya region, which created a multi-ethnic 
Bhutan in which elite power holders were keen to cement their authority by 
means of nationalist policies. I also explore political activism amongst 
educated Nepalese Bhutanese to gain more political influence in Bhutan. 
Thereafter, I focus on the Bhutanese government's policy of 'One Nation, One 
People', which in turn transformed Nepalese Bhutanese into 'illegal immigrants' 
without citizenship, leading to the expulsion and emigration of approximately 
100,000 Nepalese Bhutanese in the early 1990s.  
 
 
From Nepalese Bhutanese to Bhutanese refugee 
 
 
In order to understand this complex history of migration, I briefly explore the 
migration of Nepali people in the southern Himalayan region in the two 
centuries leading up to the ethnic conflict in Bhutan. Thereafter, I provide a 
                                            
60 I explore the notion of the deserving vs. the undeserving refugee in Chapter 5, but it is important to 
note that Bhutanese refugees laid all blame on the RGB, which, in their view, stereotyped and 
victimized all Nepalese Bhutanese.  
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brief outline of Bhutan’s history, its multi-ethnic composition of population, and 
the Bhutanese ruling elite’s fear of a loss of power, resulting in the removal of 





Nepali migration is defined as the migration of Nepalese people out of Nepal, 
who then settled all around North India and the low-lands of the Southern 
Himalayas. Nepali migrants are known as Prabhashi Nepali (NP), literally 
meaning 'immigrant Nepalese' (Joseph, 1999: 35). Nepali migration in the 
Himalaya-region occurred in three main stages (see Joseph, 1999: 45), 
although historians assume that due to the unique geography of the region, 
migrant herding, trade and migration was common long before British 
explorers and envoys recorded the movement of people. Some Western 
historical references claim that Nepalese settlers arrived in Bhutan as early as 
the 17th century, which is widely disputed by Bhutanese historians. Here, Hutt 
(2007: 25) notes that "a struggle over historical truth commonly arises when 
people become refugees", and that disadvantaged people often "exaggerate 
the long-term nature of their communities' and families' presence in that 
country". He goes on to argue that history is "an important part of the displaced 
[Nepalese Bhutanese] 'mythico-history', constructed in opposition to another 
version of the same past" (ibid.: 27). When my older informants talk about 
Bhutan, they indeed stress their long-term presence, which underscores their 
legitimacy of refugee-ness. As one of my informants highlighted: “My great 
great grand-father was born in Bhutan. We lived in Bhutan for five 
generations”. In turn, it is Nepalese Bhutanese-ness, defined by long-term 
settlement in Bhutan (whilst retaining ‘Nepali culture’) that underpins the 
mutuality between Bhutanese refugees (i.e. a shared experience and history), 
determining legitimate membership in their communities. 
 
The first historical records describing Prabhashi Nepali come from British 
envoys, who stated that in the 18th and 19th century internal conflicts in Nepal 
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lead to out-migration. After the Anglo-Nepalese War ('Ghorkha War', 1814–16) 
Ghorka feudal lords ruled Nepal, demanding high taxes in either cash or kind 
to fund their empire, and citizens were forced to supply labour services (jhara) 
to the kingdom. Many peasant farmers were enslaved by feudal lords, and 
land was taken away from previously land-holding and self-reliant 
agriculturalists. Newly developed land (i.e. 'cleared' of jungles and wild animals 
by the British) and paved trade-routes (built by the British) opened up new and 
better ways of agriculture and trade outside of Nepal, leading to out-migration 
in the southern Himalaya region (Hutt, 1996: 400-1; Hutt, 2007: 23-4; Joseph, 
1999: 35).  
 
With the growth of the tea industry in West Bengal in the 1840s, the British 
Empire and the East India Company required a vast labour force for the 
labour-intensive work required to plant and harvest tea. The local population of 
West Bengal was too sparse to provide the labour-force needed. Large 
numbers of migrant labourers were 'imported', primarily from Nepal. Nepalis 
were said to be 'hard-working' and 'strong', and coming from a similar climate, 
adaptation to tea hills should be unproblematic. Tens of thousands of 
Nepalese people are said to have emigrated to West Bengal and Sikkim (see 
Figure 461), to work on British-led tea plantations, road- and building- 
construction, and the development of infrastructure (e.g. schools and health 
facilities) (Hutt, 1996: 401; Hutt, 2007: 24; Joseph, 1999: 36, 44). References 
                                            
61 From: from: http://homepages.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~poyntz/India/images/Bengalmap8bit(4).JPG) 
Figure 4: 1839 Map of the Southern Himalayas 
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from ambassadors of the British Empire claim that most Nepalese settlers 
moved into southern Bhutan62 after the so-called Anglo-Bhutanese War (1864-
5). The south was fertile, but 'untamed', with jungles stretching over large 
areas, filled with 'wild beasts', being a breeding-ground for diseases, such as 
malaria63 (Hutt, 2007: 34; Joseph, 1999: 44-5, 48-9).  
 
In the early 20th century, the first king of Bhutan set out to provide modern 
infrastructures (e.g. schools, medical facilities, roads) to his people. However, 
similar to West Bengal, Bhutan lacked the manpower for these projects. As 
Hutt (2007: 141) states: "Bhutan is … described as the only South Asian nation 
which suffers from a shortage of labour". Following the British Empire’s 
envoys’ advice, Bhutanese officials recruited Nepalese migrant workers - 
called tangyas (DZ, ‘contractual workers’) - for development projects in Bhutan. 
Migrant labourers were issued with work permits, strictly regulating their stay in 
Bhutan. Yet, with the lack of controlling bodies, many migrant labourers 
brought their families and settled in Bhutan permanently (Hutt, 2007: 47, 140-
1; Joseph, 1999: 46, 58, 120). 
 
Refugees argue that it was through Nepalese settlers’ labour that Bhutan's 
south was transformed into one of the wealthiest and fertile areas of the 
country64 in the first decades of the 20th century65. In comparison to rural, self-
reliant agriculturalists in north Bhutan, Nepalese settlers found themselves with 
a significant surplus profit, earned by the lively trade in salt, betel nut, tobacco, 
                                            
62 Before the Anglo-Bhutanese war (1864-5), the Southern area of Bhutan was sparsely populated by 
"Indian ethnic groups" (Joseph, 1999: 44), and Bhutanese seasonal herders (Hutt, 2007: 41). Locals 
were unhappy with the Nepalese’s arrival, as previously 'free' land they used for pastoral herding was 
suddenly occupied by Nepalese farmers or herders, who now settled in Bhutan permanently.  
63 This ‘untamed’ landscape was one of the reasons why the British Empire never invaded and took over 
these fertile areas for e.g. tea plantation.  
64 Due to its proximity to India, the south of Bhutan received most attention for development constructions 
(e.g. schools, health care facilities, roads, warehouses, hydro power stations). This led to internal 
conflicts amongst ethnic groups of Bhutan. The east, predominantly inhabited by the Sharchops (who 
consider themselves distinct from other ethnic groups in Bhutan, see below), has been largely 
neglected throughout development programmes, leading to "discontent" amongst the Sharchops, who 
felt excluded from the Bhutanese mainstream (also see below) (Hutt, 2007: 141-5; Joseph, 1999: 98). 
65 In the early 20th century, Bhutan was changing economically, politically and socially. Feudalism was 
largely removed, and land reforms meant that peasant farmers could obtain property. Other changes 
included the slow move from barter to cash economy, the introduction of modern education (and thus 
an increase in literacy and political participation), and finally the introduction of citizenship in the early 
1950s. The latter is of specific importance for the Nepalese Bhutanese, and was followed by an 
unprecedented attempt to fully assimilate Nepalese Bhutanese into the drukpa mainstream (Aris, 
2005; Hutt, 2007; Joseph, 1999).  
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cheap cloth (from India) and cotton, and created the main trading hubs 
between India and Tibet in Bhutanese border towns (to India) such as 
Phuntsholing. As more and more Nepalese settlers arrived in the early 20th 
century, the notion of 'Nepalese Bhutanese' emerged, and with it a sense of 
belonging and loyalty towards Bhutan. Bhutanese refugees emphasize this 
history as a legitimate reason why the land is 'theirs' (Hutt, 2007: 46-50). 
However, Nepalese Bhutanese were charged high taxes, and felt excluded 
from the political mainstream. Nepalese agriculturalists in the south soon 
organised themselves against the legal and fiscal 'discrimination' by the 
Bhutanese rulers66, which in turn led to conflict between the ruling Ngalongs 





Today, the Kingdom of Bhutan is a small nation in South Asia, located south-
east of the Himalayas. It shares its borders with the Indian states of Sikkim, 
West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in the South, and the Chinese 
province Tibet in the North (see Figure 5 and 668). Bhutan currently comprises 
almost 700,000 inhabitants. Its capital is Thimphu, with roughly 100,000 
inhabitants. Only eight percent of Bhutan is arable due to its mountainous 
topography (Bhattacharya, 2001). The main source of income and most of the 
labour market revolves around agriculture. In recent years, the private sector 
(and thus, white collar labour) established itself in urban areas, such as 
Thimphu, Paro, Ha and Tashigang. 
                                            
66 The population reliant on agriculture traditionally paid tax in kind (livestock or grain), whilst the 
Nepalese settlers (now engaged in trade) paid the Bhutanese rulers in cash (Hutt, 2007: 46). 
67 Earthquakes, fires and floods have destroyed most of Bhutan's historic records, which have been 
housed in the dzongs (Buddhist fortresses, used for both defence and worship). It is important to note 
that this section bases on 'official' outlines of Bhutanese history, which, of course, implies the notion 
of a 'collective memory' and creation of a unique Bhutanese identity, in order to strengthen Bhutanese 
culture today, which has been significantly shaped by the Wangchuck dynasty's power. A lot of 
Bhutan's history has been 'rewritten' with the emergence of monarchy (since 1907), and due to the 
loss of reliable historical records, it is difficult to find 'objective' accounts of Bhutanese history (see 
Joseph, 1999). 
68 From: http://www.tourbhutantravel.com/bhutan_map.html and 







Bhutan's official language is Dzongkha, written in Ucän – both originating from 
Tibetan language and script. However, due to the inaccessible landscape that 
characterises Bhutan, more than 19 major dialects exist in remote areas of the 
country. In recent years, English became the lingua franca for those who enjoy 
formal education and live in urban centres. Until the 1980s, Nepali was taught 
Figure 5: Bhutan's Location in Asia 
Figure 6: District Map of Bhutan 
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in most (southern) schools. Bhutan's traditional religion bases on Mahayana 
Buddhism, originating in Tibet. Bhutanese Buddhism is mingled with Bon - an 
ancient, animist and shamanistic religion, which is prevalent across the 
Himalayas (Nestroy, 2004: 339; Wangchuck, 2006: 3; 11-2).  
 
Since the 13th century, the Bhutanese have called their country Druk Yul, the 
Land of the Thunder Dragon. The Bhutanese recognize the year 1616 as the 
founding year of Bhutan, when Ngwang Namgyal, an exile from Tibet69, 
entered Bhutan (which was, until then, divided amongst rival feudal lords) and 
united it under a common religion: the Durkpa (Drukpa Kagyuppa) sect of 
Mahayana Buddhism. He founded a dual theocracy with himself as the secular 
ruler - the shabdrung70  - and the je khenpo as the (Buddhist) religious leader 
(elected by the powerful monk body). The theocratic system, combined with 
feudalism, existed in Bhutan until Ugyen Wangchuck was crowned the first 
'dragon king' (druk gyalpo) of Bhutan in 1907 (Aris, 2005; Nestroy, 2004; 
Wangchuck, 2006). 
 
Since the 1950s, and with the financial and technological help of India, Bhutan 
began modernisation and development projects by using, in common with its 
larger neighbour, 'Five Year Plans'. Until that time, Bhutan has been regarded 
as locked in a ‘medieval state'71 and lacking any modern development. Bhutan 
in the 21st century is a constitutional monarchy, largely self-sustained72, deeply 
interconnected with India, and still 'poor' if measured by GDP. Powerful 
families close to the king (called chöje - 'lords of religion') are still the main 
landholders and political participants in Bhutan, despite severe land- and 
political reforms. De facto, the king has no political power, but he is a potent 
symbol in Bhutan, and still participates indirectly via representatives. He is one 
                                            
69 He had to flee from the Dalai Lama, the head of the rival Gelugpa sect of Mahayana Buddhism 
70 Lit. 'at whose feet one prostrates/submits'; often called dharma raja in Western historic sources. (i.e. 
'religious/holy king') 
71 Slavery and feudalism were only abolished in the 1950s 
72 Bhutan adopted Gross National Happiness (GNH) as an alternative development strategy in the 1970s, 
which regards human and socio-cultural well-being as more important than (economic) development 
(see e.g. Bates, 2009). GNH is based on 'sustainable development', in which the pace of 
development is adapted (and if necessary slowed down) to specific socio-cultural needs.  
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of 'the Three'73 that make Bhutan - the tsawa sum74 - which consists of the king 
(the government), the country (the nation) and the people (the citizens), and is 
one the most important elements of the Bhutanese state, which ‘has to be’ 
protected. Researchers argue that Bhutan is divided between traditionalists 
and modernists, and the more globalisation stretches out its hand, the more 
the RGB follows a conservative path, leading to the expulsion of more than 




'Multi-ethnic' Bhutan and nation-building 
 
Gellner (1983: 1) defines nationalism as a “political principle, which holds that 
the political and national unit should be congruent”, by assuring that “ethnic 
boundaries do not cut across political ones”. In this sense a nation state is a 
geographical and political territory under the authority of one distinct ethnic 
group, whose “ethnic markers (such as language and religion)” are “embedded 
in the official symbolism and legislation of the state” (Chatty, 2010: 37). That is, 
in this case, the Bhutanese nation under the authority of one particular ethnic 
group – the drukpas – whose language (Dzongkha) and religion (Mahayana 
Buddhism) are the official symbols of the Bhutanese state75. 
 
However, Joseph (1999: 23) emphasizes that "[l]ike other countries in South 
Asia, Bhutan is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious 
country". Until China's occupation of Tibet in the 1950s, the borders of South 
Asian countries in the Himalayan region were not well-defined, with a 
widespread commercial and socio-cultural trade and exchange between 
                                            
73 The number three is important in Buddhism, as they mark 'The Three Jewels' (tiratana). The three 
symbolise (a) the Buddha, (b) the dharma (i.e. the Buddha's teachings) and (c) the sangha (i.e. 
Buddha's followers).  
74 When receiving citizenship, one has to take an oath, proclaiming not to commit any acts against the 
tsawa sum. Breaking this oath by "act[ing] against the King or speak[ing] against the Royal 
Government or associates with people involved in activities against the Royal Government" (Joseph, 
1999: 219) can lead to the loss of Bhutanese citizenship even today, and severely limits the 
Bhutanese people’s political activism across all ethnicities.  
75 In the past, anthropology defined a nation as being comprised of one uniform culture. Anderson (2006: 
6), changed this assumption and argued that a state is an “imagined political community” and an 
ideological construction that seeks to create links between “self-defined social and cultural groups” 
and a nation state (Chatty, 2010: 37). 
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Himalayan communities. Many semi-nomadic herders moved freely between 
Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, and have been fully assimilated in a 
‘Himalayan’ culture spanning over various kingdoms and countries. Therefore, 
the notion that Bhutan is comprised of one, unique socio-cultural and ethnic 
group is, to follow Anderson (2006), ‘imagined’.  
 
Joseph (1999: 23) identifies four 'main' ethnic groups in Bhutan: firstly, the 
Ngalongs (with Tibetan origin) have dominated western Bhutan since the 10th 
century, and form the "social and ruling elite" (Hutt, 1996: 398). Although only 
about 20 percent of the total population, the Ngalong’ language (i.e. 
Dzongkha) and their culture became what is today known as 'Bhutanese' 
culture’76 both internally and externally. The Wangchuck dynasty and most 
figures in higher political and religious positions are Ngalongs.  
 
Secondly, the Sharchops are said to be the earliest settlers in Bhutan and their 
ancestry can be traced back to Burma and North India. The Sharchops form 
about 30 percent of the Bhutanese population77, have a distinct language 
called Tsangla, and their own traditional attire, which is mainly black and white 
(in comparison to the multi-coloured dress of the Ngalongs). Thirdly, another 
'early settler' group of Bhutan are the Khengs, a small group (about 15 
percent) whose ancestry cannot be traced back to any specific origin (Joseph, 
1999: 23).  
 
Together with smaller ethnic groups78, these three groups are classified as 
'drukpa' - the 'Bhutanese' – by the RGB, and therefore 'true Bhutanese'. 
Having said that, only the Ngalong culture is portrayed as 'authentic 
Bhutanese' by the Bhutanese government (Hutt, 1996: 398). Non-Ngalong 
languages and local dialects are not taught in school, and the other ethnic 
groups’ traditional dress cannot be worn during official duties in public. In fact, 
                                            
76 For example, the gho and kira are Ngalong dress, and since the 1980s it is obligatory for all people in 
Bhutan to wear these clothes in public.  
77 Sharchops insurgencies supported the Nepalese Bhutanese uprising in the 1980s as they felt 
oppressed by the ruling elite. Many Sharchops were forced to leave Bhutan during the 90s (Hutt, 
2007: 141-5; Joseph, 1999: 98). However, there were no Sharchops amongst my Bhutanese refugee 
informants in the UK.  
78 Joseph (1999) mentions Adivasis, Birmis, Brokpas, Doyas, Lepchas and Toktop, which only make 
about 5 percent of the total population. 
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any other ethnic group is as 'suppressed' as the Nepalese Bhutanese, which 
have formed the fourth ethnic group (more than 30 percent) in Bhutan prior to 
the 1990s. Although mainly Hindu, Nepalese Bhutanese follow a variety of 
faiths, including Buddhism and Christianity, as well as including traditional Bon 
practices. Similar to Sharchops, Nepalese Bhutanese are bound together by a 
common language distinct from Dzongkha: Nepali79 (Joseph, 1999: 23; Hutt, 
1996: 400).  
 
Until the 1980s, intermarriage between all ethnic groups was common, and 
indeed, encouraged by the Bhutanese state (by e.g. providing cash-
incentives). The RGB assumed that this would foster socio-cultural assimilation 
(Hutt, 1996: 402). However, many Nepalese Bhutanese sought marriage-
partners outside of Bhutan, mainly due to religious reasons. My older 
informants confirmed that they found marriage partners amongst the 
widespread Nepali diaspora in the Himalaya region.  
 
In the second half of the 20th century, Ngalongs in power began to fear the 
Nepalese Bhutanese. Joseph (1999: 171) claims that the Ngalongs’ anxiety 
stems from what he calls the ‘Sikkimisation complex’. Bhutan’s Ngalongs 
maintained close relation with Sikkim’s Buddhist royalty, which was further 
strengthened through intermarriage. However, in Sikkim, Nepalese settlers80 
surpassed the Sikkimese population in the 1970s, and ousted the Sikkim king 
(ibid.: 44). The Nepalese Sikkimese signed a treaty with India, and Sikkim 
became a state of India which bestowed political power to the Nepalese. The 
Ngalongs feared the same trend for Bhutan. In 1974, Das wrote:  
 
                                            
79 Nepali is an Indo-Aryan language with Tibeto-Burman influences. In comparison to Dzongkha, which 
uses an ancient Tibetan script called Ucän, Nepali uses Devanagari script, which is also used in Hindi 
(India) and Sanskrit.  
80 Ambassadors of the British Empire advised and encouraged Sikkimese rules to 'import' Nepalese 
workers for development in Sikkim since the early 19th century. This was later criticised by the (then) 
Bhutanese Foreign Minister in a speech to Bhutan’s National Assembly: "Sikkim …strongly opposed 
induction of Nepalese settlers. The British, however, forcible brought Nepalese settlers into Sikkim …. 
In no time the Nepali population increased through high birth rate and through regular immigration 
from Nepal and soon they formed 80 percent of the population. Today …Sikkim is governed by the 
Nepalese majority, and the original Sikkimese people are a small minority in their own country" (Hutt, 
2007: 24, 197). 
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"If Sikkim … could become a Nepalese dominated state due to 
demographic changes, what was there to stop the southern 
Bhutanese to do the same in Bhutan, claiming then to be more than 
fifty percent of the population" (cited in Joseph, 1999: 170).  
 
The Ngalongs perceived Nepalese Bhutanese as a threat to their power, 
justifying Bhutan’s laws in the 1980s and 90s by referencing Sikkim: the 
sovereignty of the nation was (seen to be) in danger, and in need of protection. 
By claiming that Ngalong culture is truly 'authentic', and the only acceptable 
cultural representation of Bhutan, the Ngalongs secured their supremacy and 
maintained their power not only over the Nepalese Bhutanese, but over all 
other ethnic groups. This nationalist turn is not unusual in times of uncertainty, 
modernisation and globalisation, in which national borders become ever more 
porous (Barth [1969] in Chatty, 2010: 38, see Introduction). The construction of 
Bhutan as a sovereign nation-state in South Asia is closely linked to similar 
histories, in which nation-building is paired with the creation of a homogenised 
society, whereby a citizen's identity is shaped by emphasizing (imagined) 
nationhood and a homogenous, ‘authentic’ ethnicity (see e.g. Agamben, 2004; 
Appadurai, 1996).  
 
Tensions between the Ngalongs and the Nepalese Bhutanese surfaced 
several times. When the first Ngalong king of Bhutan was crowned in the early 
1900s, he stressed that in order to become a nation, “ethnic pluralities” have to 
be removed in order to create a "homogenised 'national community'” (Joseph, 
1999: 19). The king highlighted in several speeches that albeit development, 
Bhutan must not forget its ‘cultural heritage’, and has to ‘preserve its traditions’ 
and its distinct 'Bhutanese culture', which is unique in comparison to China 
(and Tibet), India and Nepal. (Aris, 2005). Tambiah (1997) states:  
 
"The time of becoming the same is also the time of claiming to be 
different. The time of modernising is also the time of inventing 
tradition, as well as traditionalising innovations; of revaluing old 
categories and re-categorising new values; or bureaucratic 
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benevolence and bureaucratic resort to force; of participatory 
democracy and dissident civil war" (cited in Hutt, 2007: 161).  
 
Imagined differences are also what divide Bhutanese refugees in resettlement, 
albeit not based on ethnicity. This shows that ‘othering’ is an essential element 
of community building, both for nation states and small, local networks. The 
Bhutanese government employed ‘othering’ on the macro-level of the nation 
state, whilst my informants use it on the micro-level of both samaj and RCOs. 
Moreover, Nepalese Bhutanese-ness is used as a means to distinguish 
themselves from others, such as Nepalese or South Asian migrants, as my 
informants were always quick to remark that they are “Nepalese Bhutanese” or 
“Bhutanese Nepalese”, rather than “Nepali”. As is clear in the above 
discussion, ethnicity and (imagined) differences between ethnic groups lend 
themselves readily to conflicts during community- and nation-building. The 
creation of a nation as a sovereign state is an important element of this 
homogenisation, as I explore in the following section.  
 
 
Nation-building: Bhutan’s sovereignty81 
 
In order to understand the reasons for the expulsion of Bhutanese Nepalese, I 
now return to the formation of Bhutan since the 16th century. As Weiner (1995, 
cited in Chatty, 2010: 33) states, forced migration often occurs due to nation 
states’ interest to “achieve some cultural homogeneity or, at least, of asserting 
state dominance and control over particular social groups”. Since the 
unification of Bhutan in 1616, the Bhutanese had a strong sense of maintaining 
its sovereignty as an independent kingdom and later a nation state in between 
India and China. Even before China occupied Bhutan's northern neighbour 
Tibet (with whom Bhutan had close ties) in the 1950s, China was a threat to 
stability within the small nation. When the British took over India in the 18th 
                                            
81 Sovereignty is broadly defined as the authority of an independent nation state to govern itself and 
maintain its geographical borders, within which the nation state can operate autonomously. The 
scope of this thesis does not allow for a detailed, critical discussion on the problematic notion of 
sovereignty in a globalized world. See e.g. Agamben (2004) and Appadurai (1996 & 2004) for 
anthropological discussions.  
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century, and finally arrived at Bhutan's gates after taking over Sikkim and West 
Bengal, the fear of being assimilated by the British Empire was a real one. Yet, 
Bhutan is one of the few South Asian nations (along with Nepal and 
Cambodia) that has never been a colony of a Western or any other nation 
(Nestroy, 2004: 339).  
 
The British’ interest in Bhutan was limited to two areas: firstly, to use Bhutan - 
as a 'sovereign' state protected by British India - as a 'buffer' between China 
(and Russia) and British India, and secondly, to use trade routes through 
Bhutan, to maintain the valuable trade with Tibet (and thus, China). The 
empire attempted to gain influence in Bhutan through a diplomatic approach, 
rather than a military one (Aris, 2005). However, the Bhutanese rulers feared 
that British India would push the Bhutanese to the most northern margins of 
Bhutan and out of the fertile low-lands in the south. Territory in the north, which 
is mainly characterised by mountainous landscapes, is not cultivable, and 
makes even pastoral herding a challenge (see Figure 782). Therefore the 
Bhutanese stressed their right to remain a sovereign nation, and to maintain its 
southern borders as secure as possible (Aris, 2005, Nestroy, 2004).  
 
                                            
82 From: https://fr.123rf.com/photo_10768807_bhoutan-shaded-relief-map-colores-en-fonction-de-l-
altitude-avec-de-grandes-zones-urbaines-comprend-.html [Accessed: 27 June 2012].  




Nevertheless, the British colonial power had a significant impact on the 
formation of Bhutan. Until the beginning of the 20th century, Bhutan has been 
divided between regional princes, and the British intended to bring the divided 
country under some form of British control without interfering with its 
autonomy. Through diplomatic interventions, the British assured that in 1907 
Ugyen Wangchuk, a powerful and popular local ruler, was elected the 1st druk 
gyalpo (king) of Bhutan, whose main task was the unification of the divided 
country under a hereditary kingdom. Bhutan became a de facto protectorate of 
British India, whereby all foreign relations were handled via the British in 
India83. With British India pushing from the south, and China from the north, 
the move towards a hereditary monarchy provided the stability it needed to 
remain sovereign, and secured its position amongst smaller Himalayan nations 
(Nestroy, 2004: 341-3). 
 
In order to assure the international recognition of Bhutan as a sovereign state, 
Bhutan became a member of the UN in 197184. The UN membership provided 
a “gateway to the world” (Jamtsho, 2008), and more importantly, paved the 
way for Bhutan to receive technical and financial development aid from various 
UN institutions. India also increased its annual development aid, in order to 
secure Bhutan’s steady development. From now on, Bhutan’s administration 
could solely focus on internal issues and improvements. In order to maintain 
their power, the ruling elite in the capital aimed to not only declare Bhutan as 
an autonomous nation-state externally, but also to foster homogenisation 
internally, which – as we shall see further below – resulted in the expulsion of 




                                            
83 India continued to handle Bhutan's foreign relations until the 1980s, and since then influences Bhutan’s 
foreign policy its embassy in New Delhi. 
84 Other countries made use of the UN in similar ways: for example, during the collapse of communist 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Slovenia sought membership with the UN the moment violent conflicts 
broke out in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. By securing membership in both the UN and the EU, 
Slovenia was thus protected from the serious clashes in former Yugoslavia, and received military 
protection from Germany. 
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Political activism amongst Nepalese Bhutanese 
 
In the early 1920s, Nepalese Bhutanese became the 'Nepali problem' amongst 
the Ngalong elite. By then, the Bhutanese had to deal with the second and 
third generation of former Nepalese settlers, who now considered themselves 
(to a certain degree) 'Bhutanese', with rights and obligations. The latter was 
dutifully met: Nepalese Bhutanese paid high taxes in cash, provided labour 
and generated revenue, and therefore fulfilled their 'obligations' towards the 
state. However, their political rights (e.g. self-governance), land-ownership85 
and free movement within Bhutan86 was limited by the ruling elite. Within the 
Bhutanese public and political discourse emerged a stereotype of Nepalese 
Bhutanese as ‘land-grapping’, who 'destroy' the ‘native’ population and the 
land87 (Hutt, 2007: 75-80). Nevertheless, most former settlers and their 
children began to feel connected to the land they cultivated in south Bhutan, 
and opted to stay (rather than migrate to India or Nepal) despite the high 
taxes, political oppression and prevention to join the police and army. As the 
work and taxes of Nepalese settlers assured a constant cash-flow to the 
Ngalong leaders in the capital, they were forced to make concessions to the 
Nepalese Bhutanese, such as minor political representation and residential 
status bound to land-holding (Hutt, 2007: 86-9; 92; Evans, 2009: 112).  
 
Political movements amongst educated Nepalese Bhutanese88 began to stir 
from the early 20th century onwards. They demanded equal rights and 
                                            
85 Land was predominately in the hands of the feudal (Ngalong) drukpa elite and in the 1920s it became 
illegal for Nepalese Bhutanese to buy land from drukpas (Hutt, 2007: 60). 
86 Nepalese Bhutanese were only permitted to settle in the south. Laws were established to fine both 
Nepalese Bhutanese and drukpas if they settled within the other's 'territory'. By using 'natural borders' 
(rivers and mountains), the south was (to an extent) both geographically and politically separated 
from the North. Leaders were elected locally, and taxes were paid to a local headman rather than a 
central government or institutions (Hutt, 2007: 61-2) 
87 It was argued that the 'shifting cultivation' practices by Nepalese farmers would destroy land. In 1943, 
B. Gould (the British Officer in Sikkim) stated that it is the "natural instinct" of the "100,000 Nepalese” 
in South Bhutan to "fell and burn forest, cultivate the very fertile soil, … and then move on to another 
area as soon as the soil shows signs of exhaustion or become over-grown with jungle" (cited in Hutt, 
2007: 60). Ironically, British officers fuelled this misconception (whilst previously advising to ‘import’ 
Nepalese settlers for development projects) by warning the Bhutanese rulers that because of the 
Nepalese settlements, the Bhutanese are a "dying race" (Hutt, 2007: 80). 
88 Joseph (1999: 170) argues that education plays a pivotal role in political activism: as the south is close 
to India, wealthy Nepalese Bhutanese sent their children to be educated in British missionary schools 
(Hutt, 2007: 121). Due to the north's isolation, most drukpas were uneducated, poor and politically 
inactive. However, this does not mean that all drukpas supported the ruling Wangchuck dynasty 
(Rose, 1977: 109). Also see Scott’s (2008: xv) work, who argues that political activity is the “preserve 
of the middle classes and intelligentsia”.  
61 
 
opportunities for Nepalese Bhutanese, threatening the stability and hierarchies 
of the Ngalongs, who began to evict Nepalese Bhutanese due to the 'illegal 
clearing' of forests in the South in the 1940s (Evans, 2009: 112-3; Hutt, 2007: 
116-7; Joseph, 1999: 119). In response, Nepalese Bhutanese formed the first 
political party in Bhutan in 1952: the Bhutan State Congress (BSC)89 
demanded “political rights and opportunities for the Bhutanese of Nepali origin 
on par with other Bhutanese", as well as complete democratic reform in the 
Bhutanese government (Joseph, 1999: 119). Soon, they organized satyagraha 
(NP) - "civil disobedience action" - against Bhutan (Hutt, 2007: 121.). However, 
the BSC was not able to mobilise the broad masses and engender public 
support in south Bhutan after the newly crowned king introduced land reforms 
and offered citizenship to land-owners in the late 1950s. The BSC depended 
on the frustration of the Nepalese Bhutanese, but as their demands were met, 
further "diffuse and utopian" (ibid.) aims of the BSC, such as the establishment 
of a democratic political system in Bhutan, were not attracting public support 
(Hutt, 2007: 125). Rose (1977: 112) elaborates that "since most members of the 
community had acquired land to cultivate, [they] were not inclined to support 
political activities that might endanger their rights to land". As Huntington 
(1968, cited in Hutt, 2007: 125) writes, revolutions occur if the people's 
"conditions of land ownership, tenancy, labour, taxes, and prices become … 
unbearable", but land reforms and thus secure food sources can "quickly turn 
peasants from a potential source of revolution into a fundamentally 
conservative force".  
 
However, I believe this to be an over-simplification, which does not give credit 
to the role the BSC played in the citizenship reforms of 1958. The BSC and 
their civil actions did reach the capital Thimphu, and put enormous pressure on 
the drukpa elite to introduce citizenship to Nepalese Bhutanese in the 1950s. 
Yet, the decline of political activism can be observed for refugees in 
resettlement: whilst Bhutanese refugees were active to fight for repatriation to 
Bhutan whilst in Nepalese refugee camps (see Evans, 2009), their political 
movement severely declines as resettlement progresses. As mentioned above, 
                                            
89 The BSC was formed by Nepalese Bhutanese activists in Assam rather than Bhutan, inspired by and 
supported by Nepalese Indian movements in North India (e.g. Jai Gorkha) (Hutt, 2007: 116).  
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almost none of my informants in the UK actively participated in political 
movements against the Bhutanese government or for any other political 
causes. 
 
Nevertheless, in 1959, free immigration by Nepalese settlers was made illegal, 
to impede further migration to the area. Only Nepalese Bhutanese who could 
prove that they owned land prior to 1958 were allowed to stay, and in most 
cases, received citizenship (Hutt, 2007: 136). Therefore, Nepalese Bhutanese 
were subdued – for now.  
 
 
“Unbecoming Citizens” 90: ‘One Nation, One People’ 
 
As demonstrated above, problems between Ngalong power holders and 
educated Nepalese Bhutanese existed for some time. But as the RGB 
enforced stricter regulations and laws limiting other ethnic groups than 
Ngalong, the tensions between the drukpa north and the Nepalese Bhutanese 
south grew, leading to the escalation of the ethnic conflict in the 1980s. It was 
under the rule of King Jigme Singye in the 1970s, that Bhutan "began to push 
for a national identity that promoted the idea of a 'united and homogeneous’ 
Bhutanese populace" (Whitecross, 2009, cited in Evans, 2009: 114). The RGB 
reasoned that by creating a singular population with one 'distinct' culture - 
which can be differentiated from other nations, such as India, China and Nepal 
- Bhutan's national sovereignty would be fortified and secured, rather than 
“destroyed” as in Sikkim (see above). The various Bhutanese ethnic groups 
were inhibited by enforcing the so-called ‘One Nation, One People’ agenda, 
which made Driglam Namzhag (DZ, traditional Ngalong dress, behaviour and 
etiquette) the only ‘authentic’ Bhutanese culture and history that was allowed 
public representation. Moreover, Bhutanese conservatives argued that foreign 
workers have to be stringently restricted, whilst Nepalese Bhutanese Hindus 
(as well as Christians and Muslims) should be converted to Buddhism, in order 
to ensure a homogenised population (Joseph, 1999: 139). 
                                            
90 This is the title of the most wide-read and influential book on Bhutanese refugees by Michael Hutt 




In 1977, the Bhutanese government reversed the Nationality Law of 1958 by 
means of the Citizenship Act (BCA) of 1977, which "intended to complicate the 
eligibility of getting citizenship" 91 (Joseph, 1999: 136). This was followed by 
the Bhutan Marriage Act (BMA) in 1980, in which Bhutanese citizens marrying 
non-Bhutanese92 "shall be restricted from enjoying... privileges and other 
benefits" (§ 2-7.; RGB, 1980: 9, OAG Bhutan) and face severe restrictions and 
"punitive measures" 93 (Hutt, 2007: 148). If an individual could prove land-
holding and residency prior to 1958 (as stated in the BCA 1958) - by means of 
holding tax receipts - citizenship cards in both English and Dzongkha were 
issued. This physical document was meant to appease Nepalese Bhutanese to 
a certain extend (Hutt, 2007: 151).  
 
In 1985, the RGB passed a new Bhutan Citizenship Act. Similar to European 
laws in the 1930s and ‘40s, people now had to prove their descent was ‘pure’ 
Bhutanese: they had to be born within Bhutanese territory to parents who are 
both Bhutanese. This BCA also introduced a new category of 'person': the 
Lhotshampas (DZ, lit. 'Southern border dweller'94), signifying people living in 
south Bhutan, who speak Nepali and are predominantly Hindus (Hutt, 1996: 
400; see Chapter 5).  
 
The first people to experience the effects of the 1985 BCA were migrant 
labourers. The RGB claimed that due to modernisation and provision of public 
                                            
91 Land-owning people who could not prove that they have been born on Bhutanese soil, could apply for 
citizenship through naturalisation. But the minimum proof of permanent residence was raised from ten 
to twenty years, required a test in Dzongkha literacy and the history of Bhutan. Moreover they had to 
“observe the customs and traditions of the people of Bhutan” which was a Buddhist Ngalong culture 
(Joseph, 1999: 216-9; Hutt, 2007: 147).  
92 For example, if a Bhutanese woman had a non-Bhutanese spouse, both her husband and children are 
not Bhutanese, and non-Bhutanese women marrying Bhutanese men were not automatically qualified 
to receive citizenship (Joseph, 1999: 217-8). For many Nepalese Bhutanese this must have appeared 
as a direct assault on their marriage practices, and these restrictions play a part in who had to flee in 
the 1980s and 90s.  
93 These measures include: government employees are denied promotions, and if working for the 
Defence and Foreign Department of the RGB are "discharged from said department" (§ 2-6.; RGB, 
1980: 9). They are not entitled to receive government support, such as loans or land-allocations, have 
to repay all loans and subsidies received from the government prior and after the marriage, and when 
studying abroad, the RGB "shall send an intimation to the country sponsoring the student to withdraw” 
provided expenses, such as student loans (§ 2-8.; RGB, 1980: 10). Human rights lawyers and 
activists across the world criticise Bhutan for breaching the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which Bhutan signed when becoming a member of the UN (see De Varennes, 2009). 
94 From Dzongkha: lho (South); tsham (border); pa (adjective) (in Evans, 2010: 40).  
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services (such as healthcare and education), there was a vast influx of 'illegal 
immigrants' from India and Nepal. Numerous 'imported' unskilled labourers 
employed for development projects were expelled. The skilled labour force 
from India, including engineers, scientific advisors and other highly qualified 
workers, were 'gently' pushed to leave Bhutan, by either demoting or retiring 
them, or limiting their residential rights (Joseph, 1999: 138-40). The RGB hired 
trucks, rounded up migrant labourers and their families, and transported them 
to the Indian border, where they were told to leave Bhutan permanently. 
However, many of these labourers now felt that they were Bhutanese, as one 
of Hutt's (2007: 152) informants recalled: "We do not know Nepal [….]. We 
were born in Bhutan, and we have no land in Nepal" – a comment mirrored by 
many of my older informants, who emphasize that as Bhutanese Nepalese 
they have right to be in Bhutan.  
 
In order to assess the population of Bhutan, the RGB commissioned a census 
to be carried out in 198895. Thereafter, new citizenship cards and IDs were 
developed. But whilst people in the north of Bhutan simply received their new 
citizenship cards (without certificates), people living in the south had to provide 
documentation. Any person entering Bhutan after 1958 was automatically 
considered an 'illegal immigrant', and their older (state-issued) citizenship 
cards were rendered invalid and were confiscated. Now, Nepalese Bhutanese 
had to produce tax receipts from before 1958, as well as a 'Certificate of Origin' 
which had to be collected from the place of birth. However, 1958 tax receipts 
were in the name of grandfathers and fathers, and in the absence of official 
records of birth, many individuals were unable to prove their (kin) relationship 
with the person named on the 1958 tax receipt. Moreover, the 'Certificate of 
Origin' was not easily obtained (due to lack of record-keeping or being born 
abroad), and those who could not produce this document were thus 
considered 'illegal immigrants' and expelled from Bhutan (Hutt, 2007: 152-4).  
 
From 1988 until 1992, Southern Bhutanese were classified in seven different 
categories by repeated censuses (Hutt, 1996: 155-4, 403; Joseph, 1999: 141): 
                                            
95 The census was carried out by Ngalong civil servants from the Bhutanese Home Ministry in Thimphu 




F1 Genuine Bhutanese citizen 
F2 Returned migrants (people who left Bhutan but returned) 
F3 'Drop-outs' (people who were not present during the census) 
F4 Non-Bhutanese woman married to Bhutanese man 
F5 Non-Bhutanese married to a Bhutanese woman 
F6 Adoption cases (legally adopted children) 
F7 Non-nationals (migrants, illegal immigrants, illegal settlers) 
 
Bhutanese refugees later reported that if complaints were voiced or brought to 
the census officials’ attention, individuals would suddenly find themselves 
being classified as F7, despite documentation. In 1991, the RGB stated that 
the 1988 census revealed that south Bhutan hosted approximately 100,000 
“illegal immigrants” and, in 1993, the RGB argued that "the silent invasion" of 
illegal Nepalese immigrants was due to the local population, who actively 
supported the influx of more Nepalese settlers (cited in Hutt, 2007: 157-8). 
Most Nepalese Bhutanese were declared ngolops (DZ: 'anti-nationals') – that 
is, one was ‘guilty by association’ (ibid.: 225).  
 
The army and civil militias (comprised of drukpas) were deployed to the south 
to oversee the departure of all ‘non-nationals’. Schools, shops and hospitals 
were closed, and officials knocked on the doors of each house in south 
Bhutan, demanding documentation. Public congregations were made illegal, 
Hindu temples and Christian churches were vandalised, and people were 
threatened with torture, imprisonment and rape on a daily basis96 (Joseph, 
1999: 148). Most Nepalese Bhutanese in the south (including most of my 
informants) - despite being able to produce documentation of residence and 
land-ownership – were classified as F7, and made to sign so-called “voluntary 
migration forms”97 declaring that they leave Bhutan on their own accord and 
that they are “not being expelled. [Their] land has not been confiscated. [They] 
                                            
96 The Bhutanese government encouraged Bhutanese Nepalese to “spy” on each other, resulting in 
widespread misgivings even in resettlement, in which my informants refer to those Nepali Bhutanese 
who stayed in Bhutan as “traitors”. Consequently, Bhutanese refugees create rigid boundaries 
between themselves and those who remained in Bhutan, despite being from the Nepali minority (see 
Chapter 9).  
97 Also see Rizal’s Torture: Killing me softly (2009a) and From Palace to Prison (2009b).  
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had not been threatened or coerced. The government…. wants him to stay: 
indeed, it has tempted him with money” (Hutt, 2007: 222). These forms were in 
Dzongkha, which most Nepalese Bhutanese could not read, and some of my 
informants claim that they were forced to sign these forms at gun-point without 
being allowed (or able) to read them, whilst the army raided their houses and 
burned down their fields. One of my oldest informants recalled:  
 
“In 1992 the government of Bhutan told us that we will not be 
allowed to live in Bhutan anymore and we are not the people of 
Bhutan. The government deployed the army to evict us. Some 
people were paid compensation of land, and government officials 
came. They brought video cameras, and forced us to smile and took 
photos” (BRFP).  
 
In the Bhutanese media and the public discourse, their departure was 
“something incomprehensible”, as Nepalese Bhutanese had “no reason to 
leave the country as they have not been mistreated by the local authorities, 
the government or the security personnel. The real reason is that they have 
no love or loyalty for the country” (in Hutt, 2007: 222). One of my informants 
old enough to remember Bhutan emphasized: 
 
“We have vivid memory of our country because the Bhutanese soil 
is not our enemy but the Bhutanese government turned out to be 
our enemy. I was asked by the Bhutanese government to produce 
1958 receipts or proof of resident in Bhutan to enable me to remain 
in Bhutan. When I handed in 1958 proof, the government official 
said that this certificate of origin is issued by a Nepalese official 
and it cannot be valid. We fled at night with our small siblings 
through the thick forest and risked our life…. We let loose our 
livestock; didn’t bother to harvest maize when we fled from 




Others, such as my informant Unnayak98, who worked for the RGB Agriculture 
Ministry, voluntarily left his government position and fled from Bhutan with his 
family - all of whom had been classified as F7 despite providing 
documentation. He explained that he felt discriminated against, as he missed 
out on promotions and job-training abroad, which he believed was due to the 
fact that he is a Nepalese Bhutanese.  
 
Every informant (who remembers Bhutan) has similar stories to tell, and 
emphasises that they are Nepalese Bhutanese, and that their rights, properties 
and livelihoods have been forcibly taken away due to ethnic discrimination by 
the drukpa elite. They are, as one of my informants remarked, “the lost 
generation”, who spent most of their adult life confined in refugee camps in 
Nepal, and who have no hope for their lives in resettlement. One of my 
informants remarked with a sad sigh: “we always keep remembering Bhutan. 
Sometimes, we even dream about Bhutan”. When I asked one of my older 
informants if he would like to visit Bhutan in the future, for example for a 
‘holiday’, he replied in a sad voice: 
 
“We don’t go to our own country on holiday [informant’s emphasis], 
but I would like to. But whatever we had in Bhutan – our property, 
our land - is not there anymore. There is nothing like a native land, 
where we were born, where we grew up, where we went to school 
and where despite of hardship we lived well. Who wouldn't like to go 
to such a native land? …. It is not that we didn’t want to go. We 
fought in vain to go back from Nepal. But we did not succeed. There 
are many factors, and the politics in Bhutan, which is quite beyond 




                                            
98 Unnayak is in his mid-40s, and was one of the earliest arrivals in the UK (August 2010). Almost all of 
his extended family lives in the UK now, and he serves as TA’s chair (see Chapter 8). He will feature 





The RGB’s (and Ngalongs) project to homogenise the country, and to silence 
and ultimately remove everyone who may threaten their power, led to the 
expulsion of almost 110,000 people between the 1980s and 1990s, who fled to 
Nepal via India, where the Nepalese government (together with the UNHCR) 
founded seven refugee camps. Most remained in these camps for almost 
twenty years until resettlement was initiated in 2006 – an experience I address 
in the following chapters. No Bhutanese refugee has been allowed to return to 
Bhutan. Bhutanese officials, and most Bhutanese people believe and 
emphasize that these refugees do not exist, but that they were illegal migrants 
from Nepal and India. Non-Bhutanese researchers, journalists and human 
rights activists who publish and talk publicly about Bhutanese refugees face 
being put on a blacklist in Bhutan (such as Hutt, or myself), and are not 
allowed to enter the country (even as a tourist). By controlling the media, 
education sector, private and public infrastructures and ultimately the 
government, the Ngalongs secured their power in Bhutan – politically, 
economically and culturally.  
 
It is these historic circumstances and personal experiences that create 
mutuality amongst my informants, and thus a sense of community, as I explore 
in the subsequent chapters. Regardless of whether or not this history is 
narrated in resettlement or shared with the younger generations, it is the 
common denominator that defines them as Bhutanese refugees. As I explore 
in chapter 9, those who do not share this history are not considered Bhutanese 
refugees, and are therefore not automatically a member of samaj. However, 
the experience in the refugee camps, as well as organized resettlement is also 








“In the early 1990s, nationalist policies led to a political crisis in our 
homeland Bhutan, and many of us Southern Bhutanese of Nepali 
origin were forced to leave Bhutan and flee to Nepal, where, with the 
help of local Nepali citizens, we settled on the banks of the river Mai. 
Due to a lack of health services, proper food and clean water, many 
… died from diseases there. By 1992/93, the UNHCR began to 
construct camps for the refugees in the Jhapa and Morang districts 
of East Nepal. In the almost 20 years of our settlement in Nepal, we 
became used to living in the seven different UNHCR-administered 
refugee camps. There have been many different agencies, such as 
the as LWF99, AMDA100, WFP101 and Caritas, which have helped 
with camp maintenance, food distribution, health, education and 
other programmes and facilities. In 2007, the UNHCR and the IOM 
… initiated third-country resettlement” (Thapa and Ghimirey, 2013: 
193).  
 
Ajay Thapa, a teenage Bhutanese refugee, summarized the Nepalese 
Bhutanese’s history since the 1990s for a special edition of the EBHR (2013) 
on Bhutanese refugee resettlement, following a conference at SOAS 
(London). During the workshop a handful of my informants were invited to 
speak about their experience of resettlement to a group of academics, 
researchers and service providers. Ajay, born in one of the Baldangi refugee 
camps (see below), was barely 14 years old when he arrived in the UK in 
2010, and lives in Bolton with his parents and younger siblings. He took the 
exercise to present a written piece in front of a professional audience very 
seriously, and consulted me in the exact wording of his essay, the above 
being only an excerpt from it. He acquired the content by researching online, 
                                            
99 Lutheran World Federation 
100 Association of Medical Doctors of Asia 
101 World Food Program 
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and asking his older family and community members about details, and the 
above is a reflection of a shared narrative of life in the camps. 
 
As researchers, such as Chatty (2010) and Malkki (1997, 2002) describe, a 
shared narrative is an important element of the creation of a communal 
identity amongst refugees102. Bhutanese refugees are no exception, as the 
collective memory of history creates their Bhutanese refugee-ness, and 
therefore establishes mutuality103 between them, and is decidedly relevant for 
my informants’ conception of refugee-ness (Chapter 5). The account above is 
just one example of the creation of a shared narrative that serves Bhutanese 
refugees in resettlement. However, this is not a reflection of a unified refugee 
community in the camps who shared the same views - especially on 
resettlement. As I explore in this chapter, the Bhutanese refugee community 
was diverse, with strong divisions evident amongst them in the camps: they 
may have shared refugee-ness, but not the same views on how to resolve it.  
 
The notion that all Bhutanese refugees “are the same”, then, is a narrative my 
informants construct in resettlement, in order to exhibit unity to UK funding 
bodies. In reality, life in the camps was a struggle creating a divide between 
Bhutanese refugees that resulted in violent protest and internal displacement. 
Although I do not argue that these issues were imported to the UK, the 
factionalism in the camps is an indicator of a community that may share 
certain traits (e.g. a language and ethnic background), but may be internally 
divided to a point of violent conflict.  
 
By drawing on predominantly Evans’ (2010), Hutt’s (2007), and Muggah’s 
(2005) work104, as well as my informants’ recollections from their time in the 
camp, I address everyday camp life, before exploring the search for a so-
called “durable solution” that would resolve the refugee crisis in Nepal. I utilize 
Evans’ (2010) ethnography on the internecine fights between pro- and anti-
                                            
102 However, as mentioned above, Bhutanese refugees do not engage in story-telling about their 
‘imagined homeland’ Bhutan, and thus do not reproduce and re-establish “continuity with the place of 
origin” (Turton, 2005: 275-6). I explore the notion of shared narratives of ‘othering’ in Chapter 9.  
103 Mutuality is one of four important elements for the creation of community (samaj) (see Chapter 7).  
104 There are not many ethnographies (and research) on Bhutanese refugees in the camps, and I 
therefore have to utilize the very limited resources available.  
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resettlement groups in the camps, to demonstrate that within the camp, there 
was no Bhutanese refugee community that shared values, norms and traits 
entirely. Lastly, I briefly address the Gateway Protection Programme which 
facilitates refugee resettlement in the UK.  
 
I also draw on several theoretical discussions addressed in the Introduction, 
and foreshadow some of the analytical topics discussed in the subsequent 
chapters, in which I explore, for example, the impact of aid intervention in the 
camps and in the UK. Both within the camp and in resettlement, aid agencies 
and service providers assume that refugees who share a narrative of refugee-
ness (that is, Bhutanese refugee-ness) would create a cohesive, all-
encompassing community. As we see in this chapter, this is far from reality, 
and indeed impacts negatively on the Community Development Approach 
(Chapter 4) in resettlement.  
 
 
Bhutanese Refugee Camps in Nepal 
 
 
Following on from the previous chapter, Nepalese Bhutanese who were 
expelled from Bhutan fled across the border to India, where the Indian army 
ushered them on to Nepal. As Ajay summarized above, when the influx of 
refugees from Bhutan reached almost 100,000 people in Nepal - who settled 
in temporary huts near rivers - Nepal petitioned the UNHCR for support, due 
to increased malnourishment, diseases and crime. Together with international 
organisations, Nepal established seven refugee camps (see Figure 8105 with 
population) in the east of the country: Beldangi I (20 percent of the total 
refugee population in Nepal); Beldangi II and Beldangi III (35 percent); 
Sanischare (20 percent); Khudunabari (10 percent); Timai (8 percent) and 
Goldhap (5 percent).  
 
                                            
105 Image from http://rcamp.yolasite.com/master-plan.php  
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The number of people in the camps posed a challenge to Bhutanese 
refugees, who generally came from rural areas in Bhutan, where scattered 
communities lived in small villages with no more than a couple of hundred 
inhabitants. For example, camps such as Beldangi II – the most populous 
camp over the years – housed more than 15,000 Bhutanese refugees in a 
small area. All three Beldangi camps hosted more than 35,000 Bhutanese 
refugees in comparison to the closest Nepali town Damak (around 40k in the 
mid-90s106), which led to tensions between the refugees and the local 
population (Gautam, 2013). Bhutanese refugee camps with rows and rows of 
huts closely packed together, became city-like spaces (see Figure 9107), with 
                                            
106 Damak is a growing city in Nepal: in the 1990s, Damak had about 40,000 inhabitants, and was 
steadily growing with the latest numbers from 2011 indicating that the population almost doubled to 
about 75,000 (From: https://www.quandl.com/data/CITYPOP/CITY_DAMAKMECNEPAL-Population-
of-Damak-MEC-Nepal)  
107 Image by TB Chhetri – Available at: http://tbchhetri.com/2012/02/02/photos-for-reference/#jp-carousel-
688 [Accessed: 17 October 2015].  




infrastructures growing within and around it108, such as roads, shops, schools, 
or health facilities (Mortland, 1987: 375; Malkki, 2002: 354). This created new 
forms of hierarchies and communities, as I explore in the following Chapter 4 
when outlining aid-intervention.  
 
Some refugees settled either in Nepal or India, if they had family-ties and 
enough financial means to cover visas and other costs. Many highly educated 
refugees (e.g. doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc.) with sufficient financial 
means109, fled to Western countries, such as the UK, where they applied for 
asylum. A few Nepalese Bhutanese were allowed to remain in Bhutan. The 
Bhutanese government either regarded them as valuable assets (e.g. highly 
educated) or Nepalese Bhutanese lived in inaccessible areas (which could 
not be reached easily by the police and army). My informants in the UK were 
highly suspicious of those who remained in Bhutan, and often referred to 
them as “traitors”. Not all Nepalese Bhutanese are Bhutanese refugees, and 
                                            
108 Agier (1996, in Malkki, 2002: 354-5) argues that refugee camps are “spaces of ‘urban sociability’”, but 
remain merely a “potential”, in which “nothing develops”, because the camp is “socially and 
juridical…a space of exception” (ibid.: 353). Similarly, referring to Palestinian refugee camps, Petti 
(2013) states that the camp is an “anti-city” devoid of democracy, whose residents are denied their 
“political rights” – also see Chapter 4.  
109 This is referred to as “brain drain” (Zeus, 2011: 260), whereby those who are educated, skilled and 
wealthy leave camps, leading to “adverse effects on the pool of human resources” (ibid.) in refugee 
camps. That is, educated refugees are more prone to leave refugee camps to seek asylum in 
Western nations, rather than organising themselves politically in order to achieve durable solutions, 
such as repatriation 
Figure 9: Beldangi II Refugee Camp 
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my informants emphasize this distinction (see Chapter 9). Moreover, those 
who did not reside in the camps but left for India or Western countries are not 
considered to be Bhutanese refugees by some of my informants in 
Manchester. They argue that these individuals did not share the same 
“experience of camp life” (which I outline in the following section) and 
organized resettlement, which is an important characteristic in the creation of 
Bhutanese refugee-ness for some of my informants. In turn, this lack of 
experience of camp life was one of the major factors leading to RCO divisions 
in Manchester (see Chapter 9).  
 
 
Everyday camp life recalled in resettlement 
 
My informants always remark that conditions in the refugee camps were 
largely “miserable”110. Diseases (such as cholera and tuberculosis) were rife, 
which Bhutanese refugees blamed on the lack of sanitary facilities and clean 
drinking water, as well as malnutrition. Access to facilities outside of the 
camps was severely limited, because, in theory, refugees were not allowed to 
leave the camps, although many did (illegally) for work and study. Some of 
my informants worked throughout Nepal or India, and used the funds to send 
them to the camps. My informant Janak111, for instance, worked as a servant 
for a “rich family” in the Kathmandu valley, sending most of his salary to his 
family in the camps, which he only visited once or twice a year. The same 
applied to Pravati112, who worked as a stone-cutter outside of the camp to 
support her family, merely returning to the camp during monsoon. Similarly, 
some refugees moved to India to seek employment in the emerging service 
industry. For example, my informant Raja113 worked in an office in Gurgaon 
(near New Delhi). One of my older informants remarked that “we did what we 
                                            
110 Terminology in English (such as the word “miserable”) and a shared narrative about camp life are part 
of “social re-engineering” of refugees in refugee camps (see Chapter 4) 
111 An educated man in his mid-50s, Janak arrived in the UK in early 2013 together with his wife and two 
daughters.  
112 Pravati is in her late 30s, and the wife of Kavi, TA’s chairperson (see Chapter 8), with whom she has 
two sons, one of which was born in Manchester in early 2013. 
113 Raja is in his mid-30s and arrived (with his family) in 2013, and will feature again in later chapters.  
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had to do”, in order to overcome hardship, lack of funds and resources, and to 
support families in the camps114.  
 
In the camps, refugees lived in bamboo huts, thatched with palm leaves, 
without electricity or running water. Families (often with more than ten 
individuals) shared one hut, which was comprised of one big room with a 
fireplace (for cooking and heating). Each section of the camp had outhouses 
and one water pump serving as both drinking water and washing facility. If 
one survived disease and malnutrition, fire was a constant hazard: due to the 
unsafe fire places, fires were common, and once started, could engulf whole 
sections of a camp.  
 
According to my informants, life in the camps was a time of “waiting”, of “sitting 
around” and “doing nothing”115. This is contrasted with life in Bhutan, as 
recalled by my older informants. Being predominantly agricultural labourers, 
land owners or professionals, their free time in Bhutan was limited. There was 
no time for anything, as Daya recollected when discussing her early childhood 
in Bhutan. Agricultural labour was demanding, and for those working the land, 
‘timepass’ – Bhutanese refugees’ expression of free time (also see Jeffrey, 
2010) – was spent with local family and friends chatting or ‘hanging out’, 
sharing food, tea (chai) and betel nut (paan)116, playing cards, watching 
football on the village’s single television, or engaging in collective crafts such 
as cloth- and basket-weaving, crocheting and sewing. There was hardly any 
time for travelling, and visits to distant relatives were limited to religious 
festivals. 
 
In the camps, on the other hand, with only limited access to the labour market 
or land (to continue agricultural practices), previously busy workers suddenly 
                                            
114 My informants categorize individuals as “refugees” or “non-refugees” depending on actions in- and 
outside of the camp, as I will discuss in further detail in Chapters 8 and 9 
115 See Jeffrey’s (2010: 80) work on ‘timepass’ and times of ‘waiting’ and ‘doing nothing’ in India. Similar 
to Jeffrey’s student informants, ‘waiting’ for Bhutanese refugees was not a “pleasurable distraction”, 
but due to a lack of “leisure activities” and employment opportunities (see Chapter 7).  
116 Paan is commonly used amongst my male informants and chewed on a daily basis. Paan has an 
important communal element when men come together: some bring the nuts, others cut them up and 
distribute them within a group. Amongst young people paan is less popular and is replaced with 
alcohol, tobacco and cannabis (ganja). 
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had “nothing to do”. Hari, who came to the UK as an asylum seeker long 
before resettlement began117, once confided to me that life in the camps made 
the refugees “lazy” and “dependent”, expecting “someone else to do it for 
them” as they are “capable, but lack direction”. Hari saw this as a direct result 
of “doing nothing” in the camps. Chatty (2010) describes similar “despair and 
apathy” amongst Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, who live in camps for 
more than fifty years. Malkki’s (1995) Hutu refugees in Tanzania were 
“warehoused” in camps without solutions in sight, creating long-term 
dependency on aid agencies, allowing little control over their future, creating 
wide-spread frustration resulting in violence and substance abuse (in Colson, 
2003: 9-10).  
 
In the same way, having “nothing to do”, and the resulting boredom118, 
frustration and powerlessness amongst refugees in the Nepalese camps, were 
cited as the main factors behind increased domestic abuse and alcoholism, 
especially amongst men (see Evans, 2010: 24; Chase et al., 2013a). Aid 
agencies not only provided all basic necessities of life (food, housing, basic 
education and health care), but also initiated programmes and workshops to 
create awareness of what they called “harmful social practices” (Evans, 2010: 
222; Chatty, 2010: 459), including gender or caste discrimination, as well as 
substance abuse and domestic violence. As I address in the following Chapter 
4, this was part of the Western agencies’ aim to “re-engineer” (Muggah, 2005) 
refugees in order to create one cohesive, educated community, which could be 
controlled and thus prepared for durable solutions.  
 
Nevertheless, from what I gathered from some of my informants, life in the 
camps was a vibrant social environment. Many of them recalled that the close 
proximity to one another lead to new relations being established and fostered 
on a daily basis. The bamboo or plastic huts in the camps were built so close 
together that sometimes a mere plastic sheet served as a wall between 
                                            
117 Hari is in his early 40s, and arrived in the UK in the early 2000s together with his wife Anusha, living in 
Sheffield with their five-year-old son. Both are highly educated and work in white collar jobs (Hari as a 
college teacher, and Anusha as a social worker for Doncaster City Council). We will meet both of 
them in later chapters, as their arrival in the UK before resettlement was a divisive factor for the 
Bhutanese RCOs.  
118 See Mortland (1987: 396-7) for a study on how refugees perceive time in the camps.  
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different families’ huts, leading to very close interactions between neighbours 
(also see Evans, 2010). Within the camps, one family – spanning over three 
generations (grandparents, parents and children) would share one bamboo 
hut. Families spent most of their free time together, hanging out with their 
neighbours and other camp residents. This created a samaj (see Chapter 7) 
which was not quite the same as in Bhutan. New hierarchical structures and 
social practices emerged, largely influenced by Western relief agencies, as I 
explore in the subsequent Chapter 4.  
 
Furthermore, the schools in the camps allowed for children and young people 
to establish close relations with one another, spending most of their extra-
curricular time with closely knit cliques (see Figure 10119). Children engaged in 
various activities, such as essay and poetry writing, painting, publishing a 
camp newsletter, and playing sports such as football, cricket, volleyball and 
badminton (see Evans, 2010). Those who were teenagers in the camp recalled 
how they “sneaked out” of the camps to smoke and drink secretly. Some 
young couples used to ‘date’ in the camp, although these “sweethearts” (my 
informants’ term) were chaperoned by other peers or older community 
members.  
 
Men of all ages would hang out, drink alcohol, share paan, and play their 
favourite card game for the little cash they had. Women, on the other hand, 
would share their daily household-chores, such a washing clothes and 
                                            
119 These images from a camp are the property of my informants in Manchester, and used here with their 
permission.  
Figure 10: Young people in Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal 
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cooking, as well as cooperate in the small allotments within the refugee camps. 
Some of my female informants spoke fondly of the shared time with their 
(female) friends and relatives, being engaged in crafts learnt in Bhutan. These 
skills were passed on to the next generation, and included learning to sing and 
dance. Nacha, for example, recalled the many hours her mother taught her 
traditional Nepali and Bhutanese dances, which she now performs at events in 
Manchester.  
 
As access to televisions was limited, many people listened to small radios, 
especially to stay informed about international football, as well as cricket. 
When Western service providers offered facilities to screen Bollywood or 
Nepali movies, people from across the camp would flock to it, gathering in 
large crowds. When the weather permitted it, many refugees went swimming in 
the adjacent rivers (such as the Teli river), or gathered mushrooms, herbs and 
fruits from the nearby forests. The latter resulted in story-telling about 
encounters with dangerous animals such as wild elephants or tigers, often 
embellished and acted out to the amusement of the gathered community in the 
UK.  
 
Many young refugees (under 25) recalled this time in camps fondly, especially 
the relationships and bonds forged during this time. Sameer summarised (also 
see Figure 11120): 
 
“In the camp, it used to be fun. Life was miserable, but there were 
lots of friends and relatives, and we lived together. We were free! .... 
We had friends, we used to go to school. During holidays we used to 
go to work outside“ (BRFP). 
                                            
120 These images from Beldangi II camp are the property of my informants in Manchester, and used here 




Some of my older informants dismissed the young refugees’ nostalgic memory 
of the camp, and argued that the young ones do not remember the “struggle” 
and “suffering” like adults do. The long years of waiting, the inability to work, 
and being under the constant watchful eye of Western relief and aid agencies 
took its toll on many Bhutanese refugees. Raja summed up the experience of 
many of my older informants: 
 
“Our condition in the refugee camp was miserable and pathetic. We 
always lived in a thatched hut … We were scared about different 
disasters such as storm and heavy rain. We spent our life always in 
sadness … We have been … deprived of many things in the camp in 
Nepal though we had the same language like people in Nepal. … We 
could not grab any opportunity, although we were eligible and capable. 
We were undermined … and prevented from applying for jobs. We had 
to hide our refugee identity while looking for jobs. I work as a simple 
teacher. The school where I have worked, Nepalese citizen were paid 
more than the refugee teacher even though they have less ability. What 
to do? We were compelled to work in low wages” (BRFP).  
 
The refugees’ experiences in Bhutan as well as the life in the camp – and thus 
the segregation from the Nepali people around the camp – embittered many to 
a point of complete lethargy (and substance abuse), whilst others initiated and 
joined political movements both within the camps, as well as within Nepal, 
resulting in conflict within the camp, as I explore in the following section.  
 




The Search for Durable Solutions  
 
 
Throughout the refugees’ time in the camp, the UNHCR aimed to find a so-
called ‘durable solution’ for Bhutanese refugees, which they considered a 
“major protracted refugee situation” (UNHCR, 2006: 107; 117; henceforth 
PRS). In PRS refugees are said to:  
 
“find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. 
Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential 
economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after 
years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free 
from enforced reliance on external assistance” (UNHCR, 2004: 1-2).  
 
Once this situation exceeds a population of 25,000 and refugees live in “exile” 
for more than five years without a “prospect of a solution”, it becomes a “major” 
PRS, such as that of Palestinian refugees in the Near and Middle East since 
the late 1940s (UNHCR, 2006: 106-8). They may not be driven by immediate 
dangers (to e.g. their lives, properties, etc.) or emergencies, but their present 
and near future is described by the UN and researchers as a “limbo”. Refugee 
camps are "liminal zones", a space of waiting for a resolution that may never 
come (see Chatty, 2010; Harrell-Bond, 1996; Harrell-Bond et al., 1996; Malkki, 




Refugee camps and their inhabitants are in-between, neither part of the nation 
state (Nepal) in which they are situated, nor subject to ordinary legal definitions 
and rules, as Malkki compellingly argues throughout her work over the last 
twenty years (also see Chapter 5). Williams (2006: 876) goes further and 
claims that refugees have no control of their lives, or, in Mortland’s (1987: 378; 
380) words “[t]his is the limbo where you are nobody”, submitting oneself to the 
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“general authority” (Turner, 2000: 360) of service providers and camp 
administrators, such as the UNHCR. Refugees’ liminality is “institutionalised”, 
and produces dependency on aid and relief agencies as well as donors 
(Geertz, 1983; in Mortland, 1987: 384-5). These institutions, however, are not 
‘neutral’ bodies, but also intend to change their refugee ‘clients’ from their 
previous ‘primitive’ state into a ‘civilized’ person that can be resettled to 
Western nations (ibid., see Chapter 4).  
 
Moreover, within the liminal environment of the camps, refugees begin to 
question and restructure the status quo and social hierarchies, and new 
affiliations, networks and cultures emerge (see Chatty, 2010; Mortland, 1987). 
This is a dual process engendered by both, the refugees themselves and the 
institutions who operate within the camps. Amongst refugees, political, legal 
and economic differentiations (such as caste121) are eroded. However, this 
liminality does not result in a communitas of equal persons (contrary to Turner, 
2000: 360, see Chapter 7), but rather creates and maintains new systems of 
social stratifications. Although the caste system may have lost importance 
through intervention by Western agencies (see Evans, 2010; Muggah, 2005), 
and status may no longer depend on gender or property, other traits become 
emphasized and elevate some individuals above others. As I explore in 
Chapter 8, this restructuring of hierarchies is still taking place in the UK, in 
which social and educational capital (e.g. language skills) become the new 
signifiers of status and authority, impacting on the development of community 
amongst Bhutanese refugees in Manchester.  
 
The refugee camp was not a space devoid of socio-cultural meaning. Their 
location in Nepal – a country and culture with which Bhutanese refugees share 
many traits, such as religion and language – was beneficial for my informants, 
as they often recalled in resettlement. Yet, Bhutanese refugees were subject to 
                                            
121 Most Bhutanese refugees are Hindus, and would thus follow the strict rules attached to caste ranking, 
and this was something I expected to find before entering the field. However, due to the experience of 
exile and resettlement and the social re-engineering by Western agencies, the caste system is not 
visible amongst my informants in the UK. Rules that differentiate between castes lost importance and 
are not upheld in the UK. Caste as a determining factor for marriage also lost relevance, although 
acceptable marriage-partners are still exclusively sought within the refugee or Nepali community. 
Because caste is not talked about or relevant for my informants (according to them), I do not discuss 
this system of hierarchy in this thesis. 
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the politics of Bhutan, Nepal and Western nations, which was, as Hari states in 
Chapter 2, “beyond their control”. The UNHCR (2006: 106, 107) writes:  
 
“The nature of a protracted situation will be the result of conditions in 
the refugees’ country of origin, the responses of and conditions in 
the host countries and the level of engagement by the international 
community”.  
 
Bilateral talks between Nepal and Bhutan 
 
From 1992 onwards, the UNHCR mediated bilateral talks between Bhutan and 
Nepal in order to resolve the PRS and find a durable solution. Some of these 
meetings included representatives from the Bhutanese refugee community122. 
But as the RGB considered the political parties Nepalese Bhutanese have 
founded (e.g. the Bhutan People’s Party) as “anti-national” (see Chapter 2), 
the RGB did not welcome affiliates of these groups during the talks, and the 
meetings often ended without consensus (Hutt, 2007).  
 
The most-welcome durable solution (by both the UN and refugees) is 
repatriation to the refugees’ country of origin (Wright et al., 2004: 6) – in this 
case Bhutan. Whilst the Nepalese government supported this resolution, the 
RGB rejected it, arguing that Bhutanese refugees are not refugees from 
Bhutan, but citizens of Nepal, who entered Bhutan as illegal migrants. 
Therefore the RGB saw no obligations to offer repatriation or compensation to 
the camp residents. Inspired by the Maoist movement in Nepal politically active 
refugees participated in “peace marches” and protests in the mid-90s (Hutt, 
2007: 261). The Bhutanese government understood these activities as 
‘evidence’ of the Nepalese Bhutanese’s aggression against the RGB. Bhutan 
responded with further changes to their laws to silence and control those 
Nepalese Bhutanese who remained in Bhutan, and rejected all proposals to 
repatriate Bhutanese refugees (ibid.). The UNHCR (2008b: 2) regards 
repatriation as  
                                            
122 For detailed research on the political movements within the camp in Nepal, refer to Evans (2010) and 




“a process which involves the progressive establishment of 
conditions which enable returnees and their communities to exercise 
their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on that 
basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives. Sustainable 
reintegration is crucially linked to the willingness and capacity of the 
state to reassume responsibility for the rights and well-being of its 
citizens”.  
 
As the RGB was not willing to offer these rights and re-integrate Bhutanese 
refugees in Bhutan, the UNHCR’s hands were tied. They could not forcefully 
implement this strategy, although most of my informants agree that repatriation 
would have been their preferred solution whilst in the camp.  
 
Conscious of the socio-cultural and linguistic similarities Bhutanese refugees 
share with the Nepali population, the UNHCR proposed the second durable 
solution: local assimilation in the country of first asylum (Wright et al., 2004: 6) 
– in this case, Nepal. This durable solution is built on three foundations 
(Fielden, 2008: 1), the first of which – adaptation and assimilation of local 
“social and cultural processes” (ibid.) was already fulfilled. Now, the UNHCR 
attempted to ensure the other two dimensions of this durable solutions could 
be provided by the Nepalese government. Firstly, the attainment of legal rights 
for refugees (ibid.), for example permanent residency-rights within Nepal; and 
secondly, economic sustainability for refugees in the host community (ibid.) by, 
for instance, allowing refugees to work legally within the country. The UNHCR, 
together with other international aid and relief agencies would assist the 
Nepalese government legally and financially, if the solution could be 
implemented. Local assimilation was welcomed by Bhutanese refugees, and 
many informants stated that they would have preferred to stay in Nepal, rather 
than resettle “to the other side of the world”, as one of them remarked. 
However, due to internal political unrest in Nepal at the time123, in which the 
government and Maoists engaged in the ‘People’s War’, the Nepalese 
                                            
123 I do not discuss these internal political issues in Nepal in this thesis. Refer to Evans (2010) and Hutt 
(2007) for detailed references on the issue.  
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government had neither time nor resources to allow for local integration of 
more than 100,000 people (Evans, 2010: 8).  
 
The following 15 years were marked by political unrest and protest by 
Bhutanese refugees124 within a politically unstable country, including several 
attempts to return to Bhutan. The frustration led to outbreaks of violence in the 
camps, and in May 2007 Bhutanese refugees attempted the so-called “Long 
March Home” 125 (Evans, 2010: 178; 304). More than 70,000 Bhutanese 
refugees congregated near Mechi Bridge (Kakaribhitta, East Nepal), 
attempting to cross the Nepali-Indian border in order to walk back to Bhutan 
via India. The Indian army awaited them on the other side of the bridge, and 
when violence broke out, two Bhutanese refugees (both young men) were 
killed by Indian soldiers, and many hundreds were injured (ibid.).  
 
These events created solidarity amongst Bhutanese refugees, who began to 
self-identify as one unified group since they were targeted by the Bhutanese 
government in the 1980s and 90s. As I explore in the following Chapter 4, 
camp life created the notion of membership to a community that has been 
“mistreated by an oppressive political regime” and exiled, and therefore all 
Bhutanese refugees share a “collective history of suffering” (Evans, 2010: 229; 
232), which becomes all the more relevant in resettlement to create refugee-
ness. This commonality and agreement between Bhutanese refugees – that is, 
the collective urge to “go back home” – was used to put pressure on the 
Bhutanese government. But as I explore further below, not all refugees agreed 
with the violent tactics of some factions within the camps (ibid.).  
 
In the early to mid-2000s, it became increasingly obvious that no solution could 
be found between Bhutan and Nepal, and the UNHCR proposed to initiate 
                                            
124 Within just a few years in the camps in Nepal, educated Bhutanese refugees formed more than ten 
political parties, operating from within Nepal to fight for repatriation, compensation and political 
change in Bhutan. Often, these parties were affiliated with Maoist movements in Nepal (see Evans, 
2010). 
125 People arrested during the march or found guilty of supporting (and harbouring) Maoists, faced severe 
repercussions in resettlement later on. Some of my informants who applied for countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand were turned down – some ascribed that to their “political activity”, such as 
Ram, whose father was very active in the efforts to be repatriated to Nepal, and therefore (so Ram 
believes) their family’s application for Australia was rejected by the Australian government.  
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third-country resettlement for Bhutanese refugees – the third durable solution 
for PRS, which I explore in the following section.  
 
 
The long road to resettlement  
 
The refusal of both the Bhutanese and the Nepalese government to support 
either of these two solutions lead the UNHCR to consider third country 
resettlement, which is defined as the  
 
“selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have 
sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them – 
as refugees – with permanent residence status. The status provided 
ensures protection against refoulement and provides a resettled 
refugee and his/her family or dependants with access to rights 
similar to those enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with 
it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the 
resettlement country” (UNHCR, 2011a: 3). 
 
The UNHCR together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
proposed to initiate resettlement to a “third county for permanent settlement” 
(Wright et al., 2004: 6), such as the USA, Australia or the UK. Evans (2010: 
182) argues that growing tensions in Nepal led to a “sense of urgency for long-
term solution” amongst refugees, the Nepalese government and the UNHCR. 
The UN urged Western countries to “share the burden” by offering resettlement 
places (UNHCR, 2013b). Third-country resettlement is presented as “tangible 
expression of international solidarity and a responsibility sharing mechanism, 
allowing states to help share responsibility for refugee protection, and reduce 
problems impacting the country of asylum126” (UNHCR, 2011: 3-4; UNHCR, 
2013b). 
 
                                            
126 The impact of refugee camps on the countries in which they are located is said to be immense, such 
as pressure on the economy, the environment, resources, the labour market, housing and safety 
concerns (Gautam, 2013: 8-9; Evans, 2010: 182). 
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In 2005, the USA made an official offer to resettle refugees, and information 
about resettlement began to flood the refugee camps (Evans, 2010: 13). 
However, relief agencies could not have foreseen the consequences of this 
proposal, as the Bhutanese refugee community within the camps became 
divided between pro- and anti-resettlement, leading to an outbreak of severe 
violence, as I outline below.  
 
 
Repatriation versus resettlement 
 
Community divisions were common in Bhutanese refugee camps, and never 
more so than when third-country resettlement was suggested. The conflict that 
emerged between pro- and anti-resettlement factions within the camp lead to 
widespread outbreaks of violence, as Evans’ (2010) work demonstrates. This 
underpins my argument that rather than viewing a refugee group, such as 
Bhutanese refugees, as one coherent, all-encompassing and homogenous 
community, with a shared set of traits, values and practices, these networks 
are operating by creating sameness and difference.  
 
In this section, I make use of Evans’ (2010) ethnographic study of political 
conflicts inside the Beldangi refugee camps, as well as my informants’ 
recollections of that time. Evans arrived in the camps shortly after resettlement 
was first proposed to refugees, and she closely observed the tensions arising 
in the camp. When news of the US-offer to take Bhutanese refugees spread in 
the camps, two factions emerged: the ones who were welcoming this durable 
solution, seeing it as an opportunity to move on; and those who regarded 
resettlement as a defeat, leaving no option to be repatriated to Bhutan (ibid.: 8; 
168). Evans argues that members of the Community Party of Bhutan (CBP) – 
comprised of disenfranchised and frustrated youth and young adults - were 
most vocal and outspoken against resettlement (ibid.: 10-1). Inspired by the 
Maoist movement in Nepal127, they intended to return to Bhutan to introduce 
“radical political change” by transforming Bhutan into a “communist nation” led 
                                            
127 Evans claims that members of CPB received military training, financial support and “ideological 
guidance” from the wide-spread communist parties and movements across South Asia (ibid.: 169).  
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by a working class party (ibid.: 234; 251-2). Pro-resettlement refugees, on the 
other hand, argued that anti-resettlement proponents offered “false hope” of 
repatriation, and that refugees must give up their “impossible dreams to return” 
to Bhutan. For them, only resettlement could offer the possibility to acquire 
citizenship in “democratic, capitalist states” (ibid.: 11).  
 
Anti-resettlement groups resorted to wide-spread violence and intimidation of 
refugees who expressed their wish to resettle. Evans witnessed several arson-
attacks, beatings and even assassinations by the CPB during her fieldwork, 
and had to disguise her own views on durable solutions in order to prevent 
attacks directed at herself. The assaults by anti-resettlement groups were a 
“warning” against all pro-resettlement supporters, including dignitaries from 
resettlement nations, who were perceived as bideshī dalāl (foreign agents) of 
the “US/Bhutanese conspiracy” who aimed to protect the Ngalong regime in 
Bhutan (ibid.: 15; 169; 173; 176). Moreover, CPB claimed that Bhutanese 
officials infiltrated the camp and paid refugees to promote resettlement. This 
sowed pervasive mistrust within the camps, leading to further violent 
incidences between the two factions.  
 
In order to amplify this distrust and discourage applications for resettlement, 
CPB began to spread terrifying rumours that “refugee women will be forced to 
perform public sex acts with American men; older people will be ejected from 
planes en route to America128; [and] refugees will be sent to fight in Iraq 
alongside American soldiers” (ibid.: 300). Many of my informants confirmed this 
gossip in the camps, deriding and dismissing it in hindsight, although some 
admitted that they feared that some of these stories about resettlement nations 
may be true. Nina Dawadi, a young, outspoken Christian woman living in 
Rochdale with her husband and two children remembered: 
 
“Before we [were] processed and came here, some people used to 
say that it is not good in foreign countries, people will scold and beat 
                                            
128 This was a favourite story of some of my younger informants in Manchester, who mocked this rumour 
with ferocity. However, some of my older informants over 50 admitted that they were scared 
throughout their whole flight to the UK that they would be “thrown off the plane” as they “heard in the 
camps”. This shows the weight these rumours carried before resettlement.  
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us … I was scared before arriving here. … People in Nepal used to 
say that our women are discriminated against in foreign countries, 
which isn’t true” (BRFP).  
 
When the USA offered 60,000 places129 for Bhutanese refugees (and other 
Western nations followed suit), and the UNHCR established the Bhutanese 
Refugee Resettlement Co-ordinating Committee (BRRCC) in early 2007, anti-
resettlement groups intensified their activities (for example attacking an IOM 
bus), leading to many pro-resettlement refugees fleeing the camp to protect 
themselves from assaults, which left them without UNHCR support (ibid.: 171; 
180). When resettlement began in 2008, pro-resettlement refugees under 
threat by rival factions were the first to apply and leave to third countries.  
 
Within a few months, almost half of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal applied for 
resettlement due to success stories from resettled refuges in the West (ibid.: 
15; 182). Again, Nina summarized the experience of many of my informants, 
explaining the rationale for their resettlement application:  
 
“It was all around dusty and unhygienic surrounding [in the camp]. It 
was difficult to go for work. … The supply of ration in the camp was 
reduced. While we continued to live, my brothers got resettled in 
Norway. They told me it is better in the foreign countries and a good 
opportunity for the future of our children. It was difficult and insecure 
to live in the camp because there used to be killing of people. … 
[When] we thought it was impossible to live in the camp, we started 
the process for resettlement” (BRFP).  
 
Many informants stated similar reasons for agreeing to resettle. For example, 
my informant Dhilip130 disclosed that he was active in the CPB in the late 90s, 
                                            
129 Evans (ibid.: 171) quotes a UNHCR staff member who claimed that the USA used 60k as a base-
number, whilst having no official limit on how many refugees they would take. The informant told 
Evans that “this is partly so that the Nepal government cannot accuse the US government of cherry 
picking refugees and so that no one can ask what will happen to the refugees who do not fall into this 
number”.  
130 Dhilip is in his early 40s, and arrived in the UK with his wife and three children in early 2011. He is 
very active in Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester, and at the time of fieldwork sought higher education, 
which he could not access during his time in Nepal.  
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and shared their conviction that repatriation was the only “fair solution” for 
Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. However, when resettlement was proposed, he 
distanced himself from CPB, and supported resettlement. By that time, many 
refugees were disappointed and frustrated, and as ‘donor fatigue’131 set in, and 
rations and infrastructures in the camps were reduced (Evans, 2010: 153), 
many refugees abandoned political ideologies in favour of pragmatic solutions. 
Dhilip revealed that he was “tired of living in the camps”, and if repatriation was 
not possible, other solutions have to be found. He explained:  
 
 “[M]any people took [resettlement] negatively in the beginning. But 
I took it positively. It would be fine if we were in Bhutan, but we had 
to leave Bhutan. If there had been programmes for repatriation to 
Bhutan from the refugee camp, then we would be happy to accept it 
as our first priority. … But this is impossible, so I applied for 
resettlement” (BRFP). 
 
Evans confirms that when she returned to the camps in early January 2009, 
CPB had lost much of their support, and most refugees now applied for 
resettlement. Violent attacks against pro-resettlement individuals became 
sporadic, and even anti-resettlement refugees began their application process 
for resettlement.  
 
Other countries than the USA began to offer places for Bhutanese refugees, 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Denmark, Norway and 
The Netherlands. In November 2015, the UNHCR celebrated the successful 
resettlement of exactly 100,000 Bhutanese refugees. Craig Sanders, the 
UNHCR spokesperson for Bhutanese refugee resettlement stated that “this is 
one of the largest and most successful programme of its kind” in the history of 
the IOM and UNHCR (Himalayan Times, 2015; UNHCR, 2013).  
 
Observers argue that the success of this programme is due to the concise 
administration of Bhutanese refugee camps since their establishment in the 
                                            
131 Donor fatigue is a common feature of PRS, in which donors who previously supported groups or 
charities become desensitized and lose interest in providing further funds and resources.  
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90s, and therefore the availability of reliable data, allowing the resettlement to 
progress with limited logistical problems (IRIN, 2013; Himalayan Times, 2015). 
Moreover, the unique cooperation by international aid and relief agencies, local 
service providers in resettlement countries and the government of Nepal, 
allowed for the resettlement project to run efficiently (ibid.). In late 2015, the 
UNHCR and IOM extended their gratitude to resettlement nations, who took in 
Bhutanese refugees, emphasizing that the ‘success’ of Bhutanese refugee 
resettlement is due to the collective ‘sharing of burdens’ (also see above), and 
the “strong humanitarian cooperation between eight resettlement countries, 
Nepal, UNHCR and IOM” (Himalayan Times, 2015). 
 
The table shows the current estimates of 
refugees across the resettlement 
nations134, and the graphic below shows 
the distribution of Bhutanese refugees 
across the world135. The UK only began to 
offer places in 2010, and as the data 
below shows, only took a small number of 
Bhutanese refugees, which I discuss in 
further detail in the following section. 
 
   
                                            
132 From Himalayan Times (2013), which draws on UNHCR data.  
133 From Himalayan Times (2015), drawing on UNHCR data in celebration of the resettlement 
programme. It is assumed that approximately 10,000 – 15,000 Bhutanese refugees remain in the 
camps in Nepal, and at the time of completing this thesis, the Nepalese government, the IOM and 
UNHCR are holding talks to decide the fate of these remaining refugees, who are now grouped 
together in only two (of seven) refugee camps in east Nepal (the other camps have been closed 
down).  
134 Note that the number of refugees is debatable, because refugee children born in the UK are still 
categorised as Bhutanese refugees (rather than UK citizens), and are often included in resettlement 
numbers in official publications.  
135 Data on world map from Himalayan Times (2015), graph by Yamen Albadin, commissioned by the 




USA 66,134 84,819 
Canada 5,376  6,500 
Australia 4,190 5,554 
New Zealand 747 1002 
Denmark 746 874 




UK 317 358 
































































The Gateway Protection Programme  
 
 
According to Bhutanese refugees in the UK, most aimed to resettle in the US, 
where to date about 70,000 refugees resettled in. However, the process and 
documentation to come to the UK was popular, because it was reasonably 
fast: within three to six months from the application date, many of my 
informants found themselves in a plane from Kathmandu (Nepal's capital) to 
Manchester.  
 
In 2004, the UK initiated the Gateway Protection Programme (GPP), which 
facilities refugee resettlement from across the world to Great Britain. The GPP 
is funded by the British Home Office, and operated by the UK Border Agency 
(UKBA) in cooperation with various organisations, such as the UNHCR, the 
IOM, Refugee Action (RAUK), Refugee Council (RCUK), and other 
governmental and voluntary organisations. Each financial year, British 
ministers set a quota, depending on international resettlement needs and 
available national resources, which at the time of my fieldwork was 750 per 
year (Hoellerer, 2013; Platts-Fowler and Robinson, 2011: 4; RC, 2004; 
UNHCR, 2001: 2-3, Wright, 2004: 13-4). Similar to other resettlement nations, 
the UK conducts interviews, as well as security and health screenings prior to 
offering places to refugees136. Most of my informants described this time of 
waiting as “tense”, as they “sat in refugee camps and waited for the decision”. 
This process can take months, and in some cases even years, in which 
refugees are watching family members and friends depart from the camps. 
 
Once the assessment was complete, and applications approved, leaving-dates 
were discussed and approved, and Bhutanese refugees were prepared for 
their departure. Firstly, they embarked from Damak to Nepal's capital 
Kathmandu, where refugees received Cultural Orientation and English 
                                            
136 In addition to being a ‘recognized refugee’ according to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol, the individual may not (a) be in a polygamous marriage and/or (b) committed political or 
non-political crimes (UNHCR, 2001: 8; Wright, 2004: 14-5).  
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Language Training classes (henceforth COELT - see Chapter 4) preparing 
them for their new lives in the West. These should provide refugees with 
background information on the UK and its systems of employment, finance, 
health care and education (Wright, 2004: 8, 37; RAUK et al., 2008: 10; 
UNHCR, 2001: 8). Moreover, local service providers and the general public in 
areas of resettlement in the UK should have been informed about the arrival of 
refugees. After three to seven days in IOM camps in the capital (which they 
were not allowed to leave), Bhutanese refugees embarked on their final 
journey to their resettlement nations. IOM caseworkers escorted applicants 
from Nepal to the UK with special travel documents (EU UFF) outside the 
regular UK Immigration Rules137.  
 
On arrival, resettled refugees receive the Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR), 
which allows them to stay in the UK indefinitely. The ILR status means that 
resettled refugees enjoy the same rights to live, work and study in the UK as 
any other resident, as well as claim benefits and welfare payments138. 
Moreover, the ILR allows individuals to apply for citizenship after five years of 
permanent residence in the UK (UNHCR, 2001: 8-9; Wright et al., 2004: 15). 
 
Once in the UK, refugees are welcomed by IOM and RAUK support workers, 
who transport new arrivals to their new accommodation – either governmental 
(council) housing or privately rented - and ensure that their primary basic 
needs (e.g. food, clothing, toiletries) are met with, for example, food and 
toiletries ‘care packages’ (containing essentials). I outline this arrival and the 
role community plays in Chapter 6, by offering a detailed ethnography of an 
arrival scene at Manchester Airport. In the first few weeks Bhutanese refugees 
have a full programme, including opening a bank account, signing tenancy 
                                            
137 Refugees arriving in the UK under the GPP travel on a one-way European Union Uniform Format 
Form, approved by local British diplomatic posts prior to resettlement (UNHCR, 2001: 8-9), and which 
is a completely separate procedure than the standard application for asylum (or immigration) in the 
UK. This differentiation is important, as it allows resettled refuges to access more facilities than for 
example asylum seekers or voluntary (economic) migrants (see Chapter 5).  
138 Most Bhutanese refugees in the UK are entitled to claim Job Seekers Allowance (JSA), a state-benefit 
for people who are out of work (but able to work), which in 2013 was a minimum of £56 per week. 
Working-age (18 to 64) British residents have the right to apply for JSA, but must demonstrate an 
active interest in looking for employment. If they miss a ‘signing on’ session at the Job Centre, refuse 
to take part in work programmes and trainings and do not apply for the minimum number of jobs per 
week, they lose their benefits and are prevented to re-apply for benefits in between three months and 
three years (HM Department of Work and Pensions, 2013: 4; 8-9).  
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agreements, going to the Job Centre, registering at medical facilities and 
attending orientation courses – all with the help of case workers from RAUK or 
RCUK.  
 
The first period of intensive support is followed by a second, forward-looking 
period of support, in order to address long-term needs. After approximately six 
months, Refugee Action and Refugee Council (who manage resettlement) 
adopt an exit strategy, in which support is gradually withdrawn and support is 
outsourced to mainstream (public) services. The UK adopts a Front-End 
Loading (FEL) approach, which aims to provide support and resources only 
during the first stages of resettlement, “in the expectation that less support … 
would be needed in later stages as (economic) self-sufficiency is attained” 
(Duke et al., 1999: 166). The underlying principle of FEL is that refugees avoid 
dependency and obtain self-sufficiency shortly after arrival, in order to 
successfully ‘integrate’ into the mainstream society (Wright et al., 2004: 25). It 
is expected that after approximately six months, resettled refuges have 
obtained sufficient language- and socio-cultural skills in order to operate 
independently, seek employment or further education, and communicate with 
mainstream (public) services. One strategy of FEL is the implementation of the 
Community Development Approach (CDA). That is, the formation of RCOs 
from within the refugee community, to which support can be outsourced once 
service providers exit.  
 
As I show in the following chapters, this optimistic vision was not realized for 
Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, and my informants strongly criticise both 
the GPP and FEL, as they feel abandoned by the very agencies that brought 
them to the UK. Left to their own devices, fissions within the community have 
become exaggerated and ultimately led to the division of Bhutanese RCOs in 
Manchester. In turn, this has adverse effects on the aims of GPP – that rather 
than being a durable solution to overcome liminality and uncertainty, new 
ambiguities are created. Ultimately, the search for a durable solution for 








This chapter has demonstrated that even whilst in the refugee camps, 
Bhutanese refugees were a diverse, heterogeneous group of people, with 
different political understandings and views. They were forced together by 
political circumstances, and they may otherwise have nothing in common but a 
shared narrative of exile and refugee-ness  
 
As I show in the chapters that follow, both in the camps and in the UK, service 
providers make use of a “one shoe fits all” approach, in which refugees from 
across the world are treated exactly the same, without paying attention to 
socio-cultural differences, and, more importantly, internal divisions. The 
UNHCR assumes that a durable solution implies that their “clients’” lives will 
run smoothly from the moment the strategy is realized. After all, refugees are 
no longer in “limbo” as in the camps. And yet, uncertainty persists in 
resettlement, and the communal factions experienced in Nepal are recreated 
in third countries, albeit being based not on anti- and pro-resettlement, but 
other, more immediate and pragmatic issues, such as funding for projects.  
 
In the following chapter, I outline how aid and relief agencies actively promoted 
“social re-engineering” in the refugee camps, in order to prepare refugees for 
durable solutions, and ensure a smooth transition, and ultimately the full 
‘integration’ of refugees into the host community – be it in Bhutan (through 
repatriation), Nepal (through assimilation) or in third countries (through 
resettlement). However, this deliberate restructuring of people’s ideas, values 
and practices has a significant impact on how my informants perceive the 
world in resettlement, how the establish communities (samaj) and RCOs, and 









On an icy Sunday morning in February, I made my way to Longsight to visit the 
Gadal household, in whose house the Takin Association UK139 Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) was held. When I arrived, there were already plenty of visitors 
crammed on the sofas in the Gadal’s lounge. A huge white board leaned on 
the wall, and Takin’s chairperson Unnayak meticulously wrote down the 
agenda of the meeting, copying from a scribbled on piece of paper. His father, 
Buddhi, sat on the sofa next to him, listening to the lively conversation 
amongst the 15 or so men that have assembled (see Figure 13140). Even Hari 
and Ved were present: these two Nepalese Bhutanese in their forties, who 
arrived in the UK as asylum seekers long before resettlement, lived with their 
families in Doncaster, and supported Bhutanese refugees across the UK (see 
Chapter 9). The kids were upstairs playing video games and watching films on 
the internet. The women were in the kitchen, chatting and sharing chai, 
although some young women popped in once in a while.  
 
                                            
139 As mentioned in the introduction, Takin is one of three Bhutanese RCOs operating in Manchester, 
with Unnayak (see below) as Takin’s chair, Kavi as his secretary, and Ram as their treasurer (see 
Chapter 8 for a detailed outline of RCO organisational structures).  
140 These images are my own and included here with permission of my informants.  
Figure 13: Takin UK meeting in Longsight 
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There is – originating from Nepal and Bhutan – the strong conviction amongst 
my informants that political decision-making is in the hands of adult men. 
Women told me that they find these meetings “boring”, but I believe Evans 
(2010: 161-2) provides us with a clue, when she argues that girls are 
prevented from speaking in public, by means of gentle coercion, such as the 
fact that men “tease” them when they do speak in meetings141. 
 
Unnayak knew that today was an important meeting. But he was always well 
prepared and organized, keeping detailed records in his leather briefcase he 
carried most of the time. Today, Takin members had to decide if they would 
become an official refugee community organization (RCO), with all its 
advantages, limitations and dreaded bureaucracy. The decision was important: 
only highly formalized RCOs are able to apply for certain funding – such as the 
National Lottery community grants – and money was needed to organize 
events for the Bhutanese refugee community to come together.  
 
Two hours went past, chatting with one another – especially as some of the 
refugees have not seen each other for a while142 – whilst we waited for more 
Takin members to arrive. People popped in and out of the living room, chai 
was brought in and the men shared paan. Unnayak then gathered the visitors, 
and everyone sat down in the lounge. Unnayak was standing in front of the 
white board, whilst I sat next to Hari who was taking the minutes of the 
meeting. After a welcome, Unnayak informed the congregation about updates 
on the Takin website and with the organisation logo design. He then moved on 
to share news about personal events in the community, such as Kavi’s wife 
having given birth to a baby boy. Unnayak also mentioned the SOAS 
workshop, which he, Ved, Hari, and three refugee youths would attend 
together with me in May (see Chapters 3 and 5). Then, the agenda moved 
towards the serious business of accounts, with Unnayak meticulously 
                                            
141 As previously mentioned, due to the limitations of this work, I am unable to discuss gender in decision 
making in detail. See Evans (2010) for further discussions on Bhutanese Nepalese women’s 
involvement in decision making. 
142 I mentioned in the Introduction, that Bhutanese refugees live across Greater Manchester, which is a 
large geographical area. Dependent on public transport, and busy with appointments and (illegal) 
employment, it was often difficult for Bhutanese refugees to meet on a regular basis (and complicated 
my fieldwork).  
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explaining what the Takin funds (from a bank account) have been used for, 
how much has been collected, and how much the membership fee should be 
for the following year. 
 
Thereafter, Unnayak posed the very serious question of whether to become a 
formalized RCO – this entails advantages, such as being able to apply for 
funding from official governmental and NGO funding bodies. The formalization 
requires a certain level of bureaucratization, such as a formal constitution, and 
an elected board comprised of chair, secretary and treasurer (Takin already 
had these positions filled with Unnayak, Kavi and Ram – see Chapter 8). 
However, RCOs are required to prove all expenses made from the 
organisation’s bank account. This meant that Takin would not be able to assist 
individual members of the community in case of an emergency, such as 
covering costs of a funeral, as this would not count as an official RCO expense 
allowed by official bodies who offer funding. As Unnayak posed the question, 
discussions began amongst the men, until finally, Buddhi spoke, and everyone 
fell silent to listen. Buddhi – the oldest member present – explained that whilst 
it is good to support one another in times of hardship - such as helping out with 
the costs for funeral - it is also important to become “official”. Buddhi argued 
that if there is an emergency, all Takin members can collect funds personally, 
and give it as a personal favour from everyone, rather than paying it out of the 
RCO bank account. However, it was Buddhi’s last point, which won the vote: 
he explained that Bhutanese refugees have to maintain a community that 
works together, and preserves their social network – and RCOs can obtain the 
funding to hold events and projects that would benefit all. He argued that this is 
also positive for children, so they would not lose touch with one another. 
Everyone agreed by raising their hand, and it was voted that the Takin board 
should ensure that all necessary documents are created, and the accounts 
brought in order, so the RCO can apply for funding.  
 
This was a pivotal moment for Takin, and resulted in a successful application 
for National Lottery funding, as well as other small grants, which they used for 
projects (such as the BRFP), community events (e.g. on Nepali New Year), 
and day excursions, such as a trip to Scotland, Scarborough or the Lake 
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District. The bureaucratic formalization of the community thus represents a 
means to create spaces for Bhutanese refugees to come together with their 
samaj (Chapter 7), rather than following the functions service providers ascribe 





As discussed in the previous chapters, Bhutanese refugees have been a 
community-in-transition for the past two centuries, and their relationships and 
networks have been subject to many alterations in space, hierarchies, values, 
norms and practices. Bhutanese refugee communities in Manchester are not 
reflections of ‘traditional’ social networks established in Bhutan, but are a 
continuation of aid-intervention in Nepalese refugee camps and refugee 
resettlement policies in the UK (see below). Therefore Bhutanese refugee 
communities in the UK are not Bhutanese or Nepali social groups, but are 
unique social networks created through what Muggah (2005: 158) calls “social 
re-engineering” of refugees who reside in UNHCR-led refugee camps. In turn, 
this re-engineering serves the durable solution of resettlement, because it 
makes refugees more easily ‘integrate-able’ in Euro-American resettlement 
nations. As I discuss in this chapter, relief agencies have power over their 
refugee “clients” to transform them into ‘new persons’ (Mortland, 1987: 375-6). 
However, these aims are “unattainable projections of the ideals of another 
society” (ibid.) – in this case, Euro-American norms and values imposed on 
Bhutanese refugees in Nepalese refugee camps. Moreover, my study 
questions the assumption that once refugees have been resettled in a third 
country, they could be seamlessly assimilated, and achieve emancipation from 
the control of aid agencies and service providers. 
 
Communities to do not arise in a political, social and cultural void, but are 
embedded in the context and prevalent power structures (Shaw, 2008: 34). 
The formation of RCOs is mediated by top-down policies143, which manage 
                                            
143 As discussed in the Introduction, anthropology views policies as “classificatory devices with 
contextually-encoded meanings; as narratives that justify certain courses of action while disabling 
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and control refugees in the UK. National governments, aid agencies and 
service providers set “the parameters within which refugee groups may 
legitimately organise to represent their interests” (Sigona et al., 2004: 8), and 
thus, communities are actively created and organised by policy, rather than by 
the refugees themselves (Shaw, 2008: 34). Hence it is all the more important 
to understand the political, social and cultural context in which these RCOs 
emerge (Sigona et al., 2004: 7). 
 
Relief agencies in the refugee camps and resettlement organisations in the 
UK adopt a Community Development Approach (CDA) as a means to assure 
‘social re-engineering’. In the camps, CDA aims to give refugees the 
possibility and ability to manage the camps themselves (Muggah, 2005), 
whilst CDA in the UK calls on refugees to found refugee community 
organisations (RCOs) in order to outsource governmental support. Based on 
particular social science approaches (such as Rex, 1996), service providers 
across the global North regard community development as “integral” for 
refugees and asylum seekers, “in order [for refugees] to feel supported, 
develop a meaningful sense of social life and identity … and satisfy basic 
needs” (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 91; 94). According to these studies, 
service providers argue that participation and membership in a community 
organisation improves the refugees’ “wellbeing” (ibid.: 95), which in turn eases 
resettlement, and therefore the burden on governmental and non-
governmental services. Moreover, the British Home Office, which manages 
immigration and refugee resettlement, emphasizes the importance of 
formalized RCOs in promoting ‘integration’ from within a refugee community 
(Williams, 2006: 877) 
 
In this chapter, I explore aspects of this policy of intervention on Bhutanese 
refugees, starting from the refugee camps to refugee resettlement. I address 
the idea of refugee-ness as a ‘rite of passage’ by making use of the concept 
of liminality. I also discuss the highly problematic notion of ‘integration’ – both 
                                                                                                                              
others; and as discursive formations that empower some voices, while silencing others” (Baba, 2013: 
3). That is, the laws and regulations governing refugees and their formalized organisations are not 
neutral tools functioning in the interests of migrants and their communities (Shaw, 2008: 31).  
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from the perspective of UK policy makers and the experience of refugees 
themselves. I illustrate the UK service providers’ approach to RCO 
development vis-à-vis my informants’ rationales for creating them. For 
Bhutanese refugees, RCOs are mostly a means to maintain samaj. In 
Chapters 7 and 8 I juxtapose the value bestowed on samaj and the functions 
of RCOs in maintaining samaj. This is necessary in order to understand the 
impact RCO rivalries have on Bhutanese refugees, as explored in Chapters 8 
and 9.  
 
 
Social Re-engineering in Bhutanese Refugee Camps 
 
 
Both Evans (2010) and Muggah (2005) show that Bhutanese refugee camps 
are highly regulated spaces, controlling their inhabitants by external Nepalese 
law, internal ‘camp rules’, socio-cultural norms imported from Bhutan (e.g. 
caste system and gender segregation), as well as Western norms and values 
imported by aid and relief agencies (such as the UNHCR) and their personnel 
who were present in the camps. Although agencies working with refugees 
across the world are, in principle, politically neutral, they do employ strategies 
to impart "a set of values, norms and principles associated with human rights, 
gender equality and democratisation144" (Muggah 2005: 161). The aim of aid-
intervention and social re-engineering, as Muggah (2005) and others (e.g. 
Evans, 2010: 62) argue, serves to make refugees more ‘Western’, and 
therefore more easily controllable and manageable by relief agencies. Evans’ 
(2010) research in the Bhutanese refugee camps demonstrated that relief 
agencies actively controlled the residents’ socio-cultural practices, by for 
example strongly discouraging gender and caste discrimination. This served 
the aid agencies’ aim to reshape refugees and their norms, values and 
practices.  
 
                                            
144 Based on ideas of the Euro-American Enlightenment - the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (see 
Chapter 5) is one example of this. See Crewe and Axelby’s (2012) and Mosse’s (2005) work on 
development aid for a detailed discussion.  
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Malkki (1992: 34) goes further and argues that the refugee camp symbolizes 
“a technology of ‘care and control’” of space, people and movement145. Here, 
we are reminded of Foucault’s (1991) disciplined body146 that is made “docile” 
by regulating space and activities over time, in order to create bodies imbued 
with a sense that submission to authority is ‘natural’. Here, we should be 
reminded of Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of hidden processes of power, whereby 
institutional practices – such as humanitarian relief and aid intervention – may 
seem “benign, progressive, … disconnected from … central apparatuses of 
[nation] state power, but may nevertheless be covert forms of control and 
domination” (Barfield, 1997: 374). Humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR 
have the “hegemonic monopoly of power” within the camps (Colson, 2003: 6), 
and the control and standardization of routines and behaviours are tools to 
effectively manage the large numbers of refugees in the various camps 
(Chatty, 2010: 459). The camp is therefore not simply a space of refuge for 
displaced people who are in between citizenship and nation states (see Malkki, 
1992). Rather, Western humanitarian intervention reinforces the refugees’ 
dependency and powerlessness by exercising control over space, time, 
mobility, and possessions (Mortland, 1987: 375). Consequently, refugees are 
prevented from personal and communal development both within and outside 
of the camps (Zeus, 2011: 257), leading to wide-spread frustration, as 
observed by Evans (2010: 201-2), who quotes one of her Bhutanese refugee 
informants: “We have no right to demand the actual needs. Instead, we have 
to depend on the helping agencies. A refugee is like a beggar enjoying no 
choice”.  
 
One way to avert frustration resulting from this intervention and dependency, is 
the UNHCR’s adoption of a participatory approach, which replaces top-down 
service provision with self-sufficiency and self-management by treating 
refugees as “agents rather than subjects” (Muggah, 2005: 153). In Bhutanese 
                                            
145 This also corresponds to Arendt’s (1968) claim that refugee camps create residents that can be made 
into citizens by means of coercion and control of space, dominated by Western liberal ideas (see 
Petti, 2013).  
146 The limited scope of this work does not allow for a detailed elaboration on Foucault. I do not argue 
that the refugee camp is a panopticon. Rather, I contend that similar to a prison, refugees are 
controlled and made into disciplined bodies through aid intervention. For further discussion see 
Foucault (1992), Arendt (1968) and Agamben (1998).  
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refugee camps, the UNHCR employed the Community Development 
Approach147 (CDA) to reach this aim, as I discuss below. However, I illustrate 
in this chapter that this project also served other purposes: to make refugees 
into liberal, democratic citizens, who are self-reliant, and in turn, relieve aid 
agencies and donors of their (financial and logistic) burdens, especially in 
resettlement.  
 
What the UNHCR does not fully consider is what community means for their 
‘clients’. Community for Bhutanese refugees is based on mutuality, trust and 
reciprocity, and is reinforced through social interaction, rather than being 
focused on group management and self-sufficiency. I discuss these emic 
understandings of community (samaj) in Chapter 7, but it is important to 
highlight the discrepancy between aid agencies’ conceptualizations and uses 
of the notion of community and the refugees’ perspectives. CDA is not focused 
on strengthening community ties, but rather on the creation of manageable, 
top-down organisations modelled on Western associations. This is all the more 
visible in resettlement in the UK, as I demonstrate in Chapters 8 and 9 when 
shedding light on RCO development in Manchester.  
 
 
Community Development Approach in the refugee camps 
 
The UNHCR is not a development agency as such, but a Western 
humanitarian organization safeguarding vulnerable people and their 
‘enshrined’ human rights (Muggah, 2005: 154; 158). The UNHCR operates 
within a specific agenda, with two main objectives. Firstly, they encourage their 
‘clients’ to promote and express their political views, with particular emphasis 
on the contribution of previously disregarded groups, such as women and 
children, which were largely absent in the political discourse in Bhutan148. 
                                            
147 This approach was adopted by the UNHCR in 1994, after which they moved from a top-down 
management and care system to inclusive and progressive forms of refugee camp administration 
(Muggah, 2005: 153).  
148 To an extent, women are still marginalised form decision-making in resettlement, as I briefly 
addressed in the initial ethnographic example. See Evans (2010) for a detailed discussion on 
Bhutanese women.  
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Secondly, the agency endorses “self-reliance through democratic decision-
making structures” (ibid.: 161), which is based on participatory tactics.  
 
As Muggah (2005: 153-5) demonstrates in his study on aid intervention in 
Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal, the UNHCR employed CDA as a tool to 
achieve these aims. The overarching principle of CDA is “ownership” – that is, 
the refugees’ right to self-improve, enhance their skills, and manage 
themselves. The CDA has four targets: “(a) [s]trengthening refugee’s initiative 
and partnership, resulting in ownership of all phases of programme 
implementation; (b) [r]einforcing dignity, self-esteem of refugees … (c) 
[a]chieving a higher degree of self-reliance; and (d) [i]ncreasing cost 
effectiveness and sustainability149 of UNHCR’s programmes” (UNHCR, 2001: 
2).  
 
Muggah’s (2005: 159) research illustrates that the CDA was largely successful, 
insofar as Bhutanese refugees were running basic services (health centres, 
schools, markets, etc.), managed conflict-resolution by establishing mock 
courts (for minor offences and disputes), and were closely involved with the 
camp administration. The daily coordination of the camps was in the hands of 
“camp management committees” run by an elected refugee body150 with 
complex hierarchical structures151 (ibid.: 157). Muggah stresses that the 
“management of the camps by the refugees is exemplary”, and praises the 
“cleanliness and order of the camps” (ibid.: 158). The efficient adoption of the 
“donor language” allowed the Bhutanese camp administration to efficaciously 
obtain financial support from international donors once the UNHCR decreased 
its funding (ibid.).  
 
                                            
149 The reduction of costs for agencies in both the camps and in resettlement in the UK is a major factor 
behind community development.  
150 In 2001, the total number of elected committee members was 636 (Muggah, 2005: 157), the vast 
majority of which were male (as highlighted by Evans, 2010: 161).  
151 The CMCs are elected annually in each camp, consisting of camp secretary and deputy, sector heads 
and sub-sector heads, whereby at least half of CMC-members must be female (although as Evans 
[2010: 161] showed, women are less vocal in meetings). Bhutanese refugees also established a 
Bhutanese Refugee Women Forum as well as a Bhutanese Refugee Children Forum, concerned with 
issues pertaining women and children (Evans, 2010: 153).  
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For the UNHCR and donors, Bhutanese refugee camps may be exemplary – 
a textbook model of self-administrating refugee camps. However, my 
informants (and many of Evans’ [2010] respondents) often recall their 
dissatisfaction with the UNHCR service provision, such as lack of access to 
medical and educational facilities. Moreover, a few refugees in Manchester 
claim that the camp committees were not unbiased representatives, but 
nepotistic and opportunistic cliques, who used their positions to gain 
enormous power over camp residents. This was all the more problematic, as 
these elected bodies represented “their community vis-à-vis the international 
agencies and to resolve intra-community problems” (Evans, 2010: 243). The 
question of who claims to ‘speak for’ Bhutanese refugees, and represent them 
to funding bodies is of continued relevance in resettlement, as RCO board 
members are elected to ‘speak on behalf’ of the Bhutanese refugee 
community (Chapter 8).  
 
As Evans (2010: 234) shows, many Bhutanese refugees pursued a different 
form of empowerment, not focused on camp life and its management, but on 
the continued “struggle” for repatriation. As stated in the previous chapter, the 
Communist Party of Bhutan (CPB) argued that Bhutanese refugees can only 
be empowered socially and politically by being allowed to return to Bhutan 
with full citizenship and assurance that they can live free from persecution by 
the drukpas (ibid.: 235). For them, the camp, funding, and the organisation of 
daily activities should always be focused on the ultimate aim of repatriation. 
The political parties that formed in the camps actively participated in camp 
committees, using their position to spread (these and other) party politics.  
 
For example, Shaan Mali – the chair of Welfare Association, one Bhutanese 
RCO in Manchester (see Chapter 8) - was one of these elected committee 
members in the camps, who, according to some of my informants, collected 
“donations” from refugees. Shaan was a key member of a Nepali political party 
in Bhutan, the Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP), which was involved in the uprising 
of Nepalese Bhutanese in the late 1980s, when Bhutan introduced the ‘One 
106 
 
Nation, One People’ policy152. According to my informants, he gained fame in 
Bhutanese refugee camps, especially in the Beldangi camps, where he and his 
extended family lived. As one of my informants recalled: 
 
“[Shaan Mali] flees to Nepal and makes politics there. He started to 
collect money from the poor people in the camps, and says ‘we will 
build a big house in Kalimpong [India]’. But then he takes the money 
and runs to Germany. He takes all the money. Where is the 
money?”153 
 
In 2005, Muggah warned of the possible negative consequences of the CDA 
on durable solutions, arguing that it may impede repatriation to Bhutan (rather 
than resettlement). The RGB may not be keen to allow “more democratically 
inclined” (ibid.: 162) Nepalese Bhutanese to return. In addition to the Maoist 
movements within the camps, liberal and emancipated returnees may attempt 
to overthrow the government.  
 
It is, of course, difficult - if not impossible - to assess the theoretical impact of 
CDA on repatriation. However, I argue that CDA in the camps and in 
resettlement benefits the relief agencies and (UK) service providers, rather 
than being exclusively focused on the benefits for refugees. CDA in Nepal 
fostered the creation of “new persons”, which can be easily integrated in 
Western countries (if resettlement occurs), whilst significantly reducing the 
costs of running the camps for the UNHCR. In the same way, the development 
of RCOs in the UK does not only serve the ‘wellbeing’ of refugees, but also 
allows the British government to outsource services to RCOs under the 
pretence of ensuring self-sufficiency, whilst saving money and resources on 
refugee resettlement. CDA is therefore, I contend, a tool to maintain control 
over refugees (as well as funds and resources) both in the camps and in 
                                            
152 Shaan’s role in the BPP can only be deducted from my informants, as I could not find official 
documentation. But as per my informants if he was closely involved in the political protests in Nepal, 
once the refugee camps were established. The BPP was affiliated with the socialist and Maoist 
movements in Nepal, and worked in union with the Maoist rebels operating throughout Nepal in the 
early 1990s (see Hutt, 2007).  




resettlement, rather than a humanitarian intervention leading to empowerment, 
as often asserted by service providers.  
 
To understand the discrepancy between policy intention and real-life effect, I 
explore the ‘social re-engineering’ of refugees, and outline the rationale of 





As we have seen above, the CDA should empower Bhutanese refugees to 
live self-sufficiently within the confines of the camp, under the general 
authority of aid and relief agencies, subject to ever dwindling donations. With 
the offer of resettlement in 2005, the focus shifted towards making the ‘docile’ 
camp dweller into an immigrant, who can easily integrate in the host society to 
which s/he is sent. The dominant idea perpetuated by resettlement agencies 
is that refugees can be transformed before leaving for third countries, and that 
this process of transformation “will allow them to be successful in the 
promised land” (Mortland, 1987: 400).  
 
As I explored in the Introduction of this thesis, some researchers use Turner’s 
(and Van Gennep’s) conceptions of rite de passage – especially the notion of 
liminality - to describe the refugee experience as 'neither here nor there'. 
Although the rite of passage-correlation may not fully apply to Bhutanese 
refugees, some elements of separation, liminality and assimilation ring true 
when considering the preparation of refugees for resettlement. Mortland (1987: 
385) extensively references Turner to describe the transformation of the camp 
resident into a “viable migrant” – or, as he calls it, the “ideal refugee which 
should exist ‘after’ the time of transformation”.  
 
The three phases of rite de passage appear obvious: firstly, the separation 
from the camps by sending Bhutanese refugees to processing centres in 
Kathmandu (see Chapter 3); secondly the phase of liminality in which refugees 
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are re-made into ‘migrants’, which I discuss below, resulting in the last phase 
of ‘integration’ in the Western host country. The process of re-making the 
liminal ‘migrant’ requires from the refugee to disengage from what s/he has 
known, accumulate knowledge and skills (through e.g. language classes) and 
adapt to new values, norms and practices of resettlement nations (Mortland, 
1985: 385). This reminds us of Turner’s elaboration (1977: 95) of neophytes 
during the liminal stages of rites of passage, in which individuals are 
remodelled: 
 
"It is as though they are being reduced or ground down to a uniform 
condition to be fashioned anew and endowed with additional powers 





In order to transform the refugee into what “they need to be” in resettlement, 
aid and migration agencies make use of a “deliberate methodology and a 
specific product” (Mortland, 1987: 380; 385). In the Bhutanese refugees’ case, 
this method and product were the Cultural Orientation and English Language 
Training (COELT) classes offered to refugees in the IOM processing centre in 
Kathmandu. Mortland (1985: 379) – who studied processing centres for 
Philippine refugees in Indonesia and Thailand in the late 1970s – argued that 
these orientation classes  
 
“begin what will be a lifelong process of confronting the differences 
between their own traditional explanations of life and the world 
around them with those of the new society they are about to enter”  
 






"In Nepal's camps, UNHCR continues to provide information to 
refugees about resettlement. ... The agency organizes regular 
information sessions, focus groups and individual counselling. ... 
Refugees are also offered English language classes and vocational 
and skills training to help prepare for the lives in a new country" 
(UNHCR, 2011).  
 
A captivating documentary (‘Bhutan’s forgotten people’, 2014) about 
Bhutanese refugee resettlement shows COELTs in Kathmandu, teaching the 
refugees what happens during air travel (for their journey to resettlement 
countries) and that the USA is a country with liberal laws and a democratic 
system (also see Stadler, 2013). This is contrary to the experience my 
informants recall, perceiving these orientation programmes as inadequate. 
Some Bhutanese refugees in the UK compare COELTs to a “lottery” – classes 
depended on which refugee camp they resided, how many IOM volunteers 
were present, and how much these officials knew about the resettlement 
nations. Some refugees only received a two-hour presentation about the UK, 
whilst others had intensive orientation and language classes for two full weeks. 
Yumi – a Nepalese Bhutanese who moved to the UK some twenty years ago 
with her British husband, and who served as a support worker during the initial 
stages of resettlement (see Chapter 8), was adamant about the lack of 
preparation: 
 
"[The UN] are lying to you and everybody. The UN is doing nothing…. 
They don't help [the refugees], they don't prepare them … they arrive 
not speaking a word of English”. 
 
My own fieldwork confirmed that whilst most young refugees under the age of 
25 had an intermediate command of English on arrival, due to camp education, 
most older refugees only spoke basic or no English, and hardly received 
language training in Nepal. Mortland (1987: 375; 387) also addresses these 
inadequacies, arguing that COELTs do not serve independence from relief 
agencies, service providers and governmental support. Rather, they perpetuate 
the refugees’ state of liminality and emphasise the remodelling of the person, 
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rather than the acquisition of practical skills. Refugees are not yet ‘Western’ 
and have to be taught to become so. Relief agencies depict the ‘ideal’ Euro-
American as economically self-sufficient and independent of government aid, 
who strongly believes in democracy based on mutual equality, and freedom of 
choice and speech154 (ibid.: 375; 401). Thus, in order to transform refugees into 
“well-adjusted” members of Western countries, refugees have to learn to live as 
independent individuals, obtain financial security through entering the labour 
market (rather than relying on governmental welfare payments), be punctual 
(submit to the authorities’ time-regimes), hard-working and “happy”. 
Resettlement agencies assert that if refugees adopt these characteristics, they 
will be fully assimilated, achieve economic stability, and fulfil for themselves the 
‘American dream’ (ibid.: 375; 384; 400-1).  
 
The reality of resettlement, however, is often very different. For example, in 
Manchester, the high rate of unemployment and the lack of unskilled jobs 
meant that even if Bhutanese refugees want to become financially 
independent, they are unable to enter the labour market, and thus continue to 
be dependent on governmental aid in the form of welfare and benefit 
payments. Even if refugees find employment, inflated property prices make it 
impossible to buy their own houses or other goods, such as cars. Contrary to 
the assumption of equality and the value of education, Bhutanese refugees 
who benefited from higher education in Bhutan, Nepal or India find that their 
qualifications are not accredited in the UK, and that access to schools and 
universities is increasingly unaffordable. Access to free English language 
classes in Manchester is limited, and contrary to reassurances made by 
agencies in the camps, older refugees are not offered literacy classes in the 
UK. In Chapter 6 I address how the community has to help their members to 
manage expectations on arrival.  
 
                                            
154 Here, Mortland (1987: 401) is particularly critical of resettlement programmes portraying all members 
of Euro-American societies as having strong views on equality, whilst refugees who arrive in for 
example the US quickly learn that within the host community they are perceived as having a lower 
status, rather than being treated as equals. This is reflected in my own fieldwork, whereby my 
informants often remark that British people do not live “by their own rules”, and understand that 
inequality and marginalisation from the mainstream society and services are common features of 
everyday life for thousands of British residents.  
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Evidently, the attempt to make refugees into “new beings” is at odds with relief 
agencies’ declarations to treat refugees as ‘agents’ rather than ‘subjects’. 
Social re-engineering of refugees implies that they are not fully ‘complete’ 
persons, who would not ‘survive’ in Western nations. But my (and Mortland’s) 
respondents are adamant that they are not in need of changing as persons in 
order to succeed in resettlement. The time in the refugee camp did not make 
them fully reliant on “values, norms and technologies, which lie beyond their 
own means of production and control”, as Turton (2005: 260) argues. They 
rather make use of these newly acquired norms and systems in order to gain 
advantages. This is contrary to the view that refugees are victims (Turton, 
2005: 278; see Malkki, 1995, and Introduction and Chapter 5). Refugees 
“already see themselves as competent, rational and adaptable; in need of new 
skills rather than reformation” (ibid.: 402). My informant Krishna complained:  
 
“They teach me about history in England in Nepal. ... Why I need 
this? I want English lessons … and learn to get job. I don’t care 
about English kings, .... this is not important.” 
 
As Mortland (1987: 401) states “refugees have not been ‘transformed’ into 
viable self-sufficient [Westerners]; rather their liminality [and] dependent status 
will remain with them certainly through the first, and likely into the second, 
generation”. I observed the same for Bhutanese refugees in resettlement in the 
UK, and the RCO approach adopted by British service providers accentuates 
these issues even further, as I explore in the following section. Rather than 
addressing the root causes for problems such as unemployment, and providing 
solutions, CDA in resettlement (similar to COELTs) reinforces the refugees’ 
liminality. There is a discrepancy between service providers’ views of what a 
community is and what its functions are, and my informants’ understandings of 
community development and maintenance. This leads to widespread problems 
within the social network refugees create and rely upon, undermining the 
rationale for the CDA, which I discuss in the next segment focused on RCO 





Community Development in Resettlement 
 
 
Humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR propose that refugee resettlement 
is characterised by a transition from small, rural and traditional societies (such 
as Bhutan or Nepal) to comparatively large, complex and industrial societies, 
such as the UK or the US (Mortland, 1987: 375). This shift is accompanied by 
a transition of the refugee him/herself – from a passive, dependent subject to a 
self-sufficient agent (Muggah, 2005: 153). Once resettled in host countries 
such as the UK, service providers continue with the agenda of social re-
engineering by adopting community development programmes based on Euro-
American organisational structures and democratic decision-making. The 
rationale for this approach is the doctrine that social networks and community 
participation improve refugees’ wellbeing, foster social inclusion, and provide 
practical assistance and support from within the community, rather than relying 
on service providers (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 95; Spicer, 2008: 493). 
CDA in resettlement is essential for service providers, especially during a time 
in which governmental and NGO services are reduced due to lack of funds, 
because support can be outsourced to RCOs (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 682).  
 
In this section I provide a detailed outline of this rational for the adoption of 
CDA in resettlement, and outline its hypothetical functions as defined by 
service providers and policy makers in the UK. I juxtapose these assumptions 




CDA in the UK 
 
Refugee resettlement in the UK is organised by several service providers. In 
Manchester, these organisations are Refugee Action UK (RA) and Refugee 
Council UK (RC), which are mostly funded by the government. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the Front End Loading approach adopted by these service 
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providers only offers support for the first six months after arrival. Thereafter, 
assistance is outsourced to smaller NGOs such as Manchester Refugee 
Support Network (MRSN) and Refugee Youth UK (RYUK) and local charitable 
services such as Salford Forum and Northmoor Community Centre (NCC)  
 
As outlined in further detail in Chapter 8, governmental services encourage the 
formation of RCOs with the help of professional community development 
workers, who advise refugees how to create an organisation. Policy makers in 
the UK define RCOs as the “ties to [the refugees’] ethnic social network” which 
serves as a “social buffer and informational translator”, bridging “ethnic 
communities’ public and private spheres by providing culturally tailored 
services” (Wright et al., 2004: 28). The overarching aim of the CDA approach 
in resettlement155 is to “develop a more cohesive community, where 
differences are accepted and there is respect, trust, cooperation and 
compassion between people in their daily interactions” 156 (Mitchell and Correa-
Velez, 2010: 97-8). More importantly, service providers argue that RCOs run 
for and by refugees themselves have a better understanding of the refugees’ 
needs, and are therefore able to provide more adequate support (Sales, 2002: 
470; Griffiths et al., 2006: 884). In turn, this self-support may engender 
empowerment (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 104) – one of the aims of 
resettlement – reminding one of the old proverb “give a man a fish and you 
feed him for a day, teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime”.  
 
Once officially established, these RCOs could provide free-of-charge support 
for refugees that is tailored to their specific socio-cultural needs, values and 
norms. Service providers have the conviction that RCOs - by integrating 
                                            
155 RCOs are enshrined in the UK’s Immigration Act of 1999 by giving them a major role in the support 
network provided for refugees (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 676). In the 1990s, the British Home Office 
placed emphasis on the development of social networks within a “co-ethnic” group in order to assure 
support, dissemination of information and finally, ‘integration’ (Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 520). 
However, in the 2000s, the political and public discourse shifted from a multicultural to an 
assimilationist approach in favour of networks between refugees, migrants and local and host 
populations, reflecting critically on CDA as “anti-integrative” (detrimental to ‘integration’, increasing 
segregation and extremism, and limits access to employment) (ibid.: 521; Zetter and Pearl, 2000). 
Successful ‘integration’ is now measured by the social connections migrants have with their own 
community, other communities (both migrant and host), and “institutions of power and influence” 
(Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 520), such as the Home Office, Refugee Action or the Job Centre.  
156 This reflects some kind of understanding on the side of service providers –, mutuality, trust and 
reciprocity are the most important factors for the formation of samaj amongst my informants (see 
Chapter 7).  
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formalised, bureaucratic organisational structures with informal networks 
(Sigona et al., 2004: 4) – are the most important tool  
 
“providing advice and information for new arrivals, provide a safe 
meeting place where people can speak their own language and 
celebrate their own culture, provide formal or informal support to 
members seeking employment in local ethnic business and in 
gaining access to housing” (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 684).  
 
For the refugees themselves, RCOs’ main function is to obtain funding from 
donors, in order to sustain and foster their samaj. This community is highly 
diverse, and the formalization of organisations resulted in the exasperation of 
personal animosities within the Bhutanese refugee community, as I show in 
the subsequent chapters. In the following section I outline these functions of 
RCOs and the optimistic assumptions of service providers, and the reality of 
implementation in the refugees’ daily lives.  
 
 
Functions of RCOs 
 
The UK think tank Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR) who 
advises UK policy makers and service providers, draws on various social 
science studies – first and foremost Rex’s157 work on community development 
amongst ethnic minorities in the UK - to outline the importance of CDA and 
RCOs for migrants (Wright et al., 2004: 28).  
 
RCOs as a support network 
 
Service providers (ICAR; RA and RC, 2008; Spicer, 2008: 493) acknowledge 
that refugees arriving in the UK suffer from various problems, such as a 
language gap and a lack of access to education, the labour market, housing, 
                                            
157 John Rex – a well-known South African sociologist – wrote extensively on ethnicity and migrants in 
the UK, and explored the problem of ‘race’ in sociological theory. His most well-known and cited work 
is Key Problems of Sociological Theory (1961).  
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child and elderly care, legal representation and facilities158. According to ICAR 
(Wright et al., 2004), RCOs can prevent and overcome the refugees’ “social 
isolation” and “social problems”, as they ensure that members of a refugee 
network are included in a formalized network of support. For service providers, 
this is a dual process: refugees arriving in a new country (such as the UK) 
should first and foremost be tied in to their ‘own’ community, following the 
assumption that refugees from a specific locality (e.g. all Bhutanese refugees) 
establish mutuality and solidarity with one another (Spicer, 2008: 493; 502). 
Therefore, these communities are the perfect support network to overcome 
issues, as the “come together and solve problems in an organised way with 
goals for the future … to make changes in their lives” (Mitchell and Correa-
Velez, 2010: 97-8). Community is “where you go to get support, learn new 
ideas and share with others’ (ibid.: 96). In turn, engagement in and with RCOs 
further increases trust and social bonds with others159, impeding 
marginalisation, and therefore amplifying the refugees’ sense of certainty, 
safety, confidence and self-sufficiency (ibid.: 94; 105).  
 
This is further enhanced by networks established with local residents (both 
refugees and non-refugees). Neighbourhoods are important centres for 
creating social bonds, especially with immediate neighbours, with whom my 
informants often shared a chat across the fence. When arriving in Salford, the 
Piya family received significant support from their British neighbours, such as 
household items and clothes, free rides to shops and facilities, and free-of-
charge English language tuition. John – the Piya’s next-door neighbour, once 
remarked: “[Bhutanese refugees] are in our neighbourhood now…they are part 
of our community, we have to help each other”. Most of my informants 
remarked that they felt welcome and supported in their local community, both 
by refugees and non-refugees. Due to the language gap, interactions with 
British people is limited, although I observed a steady increase in these 
                                            
158 Including “acculturation stress”, defined as “the reduction in mental health and wellness that occurs 
among ethnic minorities during the process of adaptation to a new host culture” (Lueck and Wilson, 
2010 cited in Benson et al, 2011: 540). 
159 Social bonds are defined as “a sense of belonging to a particular group or community” by service 
providers (RA et al, 2008: 1).  
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relationships as my fieldwork progressed, especially amongst young refugees 
who attend school.  
 
Furthermore, Spicer (2008: 502-3) argues that migrants often form social 
bonds with other “minority-ethnic communities” with whom they share socio-
cultural similarities as well as the experience of (forced and voluntary) 
migration. This is certainly accurate for Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, all 
of whom formed close relations with the South Asian and British Asian 
communities, first and foremost the Nepali and Indian communities. Similarly, 
Laksamba (2012) noted that Nepalese (voluntary) migrants engage 
predominantly with the already existing Nepalese (or Gurkha) community in the 
UK160. British Asians are long-established in the UK161, and this allows my 
informants to access facilities such as local Hindu temples (mandir) and South 
Asian supermarkets (to purchase familiar goods). The British Asian community 
is also the main employer of Bhutanese refugees, offering positions in their 
various businesses (restaurants, shops, warehouses, etc.), and serves as one 
of the main external support networks in everyday life.  
 
Most of my informants remark positively on their relationship to other migrant 
groups, and they felt “at home” in ethnic neighbourhoods. Those Bhutanese 
refugees who have language skills and young people and children in formal 
education, established close relationships with non-refugees (British and other 
migrant networks), and actively participated in their local community. Nacha, 
for example, is a member of an Afro-Caribbean dance group in Salford, and 
teenage boys in Bolton and Rochdale are members of local football clubs. In 
this regard, it is the local and ethnic communities that provide Bhutanese 
refugees with a sense of inclusion, which may indeed prevent marginalisation 
(Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010:105). However, all of these networks are 
informal, rather than formalized social networks, which arise through personal, 
and often spontaneous social interactions.  
                                            
160 For example, Namaste UK, a community support group which hosts several events for Nepali people 
in the UK. 
161 Never more so than in Longsight – a predominantly South Asian neighbourhood in central 
Manchester, with more than 50% of residents self-identifying as (South) Asians (ONS, 2011). The 
nearby area of Rusholm hosts the well-known ‘Curry Mile’ of Manchester, with numerous South Asian 




Communities are often defined as being “characterised by a high degree of 
personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and 
continuity in time” (Nisbet, 1967, cited in Kelly, 2003: 40), and UK service 
providers happily adopt this definition for formalized RCOs. However, although 
Bhutanese refugees are personally and emotionally invested in their social 
networks, there was hardly any commitment to maintain a consistent 
community or reliable RCOs. Nevertheless, as I illustrate in detail in Chapter 6, 
samaj remains a constant and reliable support network for Bhutanese 
refugees. Again, it is informal social networks, rather than formalized 




ICAR expects RCOs to serve as a “group interest protector (similar to a trade 
union)” (Wright et al., 2004), serving two purposes: firstly, as mentioned above, 
to assure that services are provided to individuals within the refugee 
community, and secondly to assure ‘integration’ and prevent discrimination 
and marginalisation from the (British) host community and service providers. 
The latter assume that the UK government’s aim of ‘integration’ can only be 
achieved via acculturation, whereby migrants gradually come to terms with the 
host society’s values, beliefs and behaviours, and assimilate some of them into 
their own ‘native culture’ (Benson et al., 2011: 540). These notions are based 
on the idea of multiculturalism, popularized in the UK since the 1960s162, which 
emphasises that “individuals can maintain their individual identity and their 
membership of a minority group, whilst at the same time becoming part of the 
wider society” (Kelly, 2003: 38). RCOs are seen as the bridge between the 
two: the (British) host society and the (refugee) migrant community (Griffiths et 
al., 2006: 883). Consequently, by fostering this kind of ‘integration’, refugees 
                                            
162 In recent years, the public discourse in the UK evolved around the notion that migrants are ‘unwilling’ 
to integrate’ and therefore, multiculturalism is portrayed as a “threat to ‘western core values or 
democracy’ itself” (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 93). Baba (2013: 2-4) and Sigona et al (2004: 8) 
argue that the decline of the multiculturalism-idea is (in part) a result of the public angst about the 
corruption and loss of imagined ‘native’ cultures and identities due to increased immigration from non-
Western no Western nations, and the tabloid-media’s perpetuation of ‘undeserving’ migrants ‘abusing’ 
the asylum and welfare and benefit system (also see Chapter 5).  
118 
 
are said to gain a sense of security and belonging, increasing their self-worth 
and wellbeing (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 94). However, what does 
acculturation and ‘integration’ mean and how can it be achieved? 
 
When conducting research with refugees or migrants, a whole thesis could be 
written on the concept of ‘integration’163. The UK Home Office defines 
integration as (a) individuals obtaining employment, housing and education; (b) 
individuals being “socially connected” of their own and other communities, 
services and the state; and (c) individuals having satisfactory competence in 
the local language and culture164, including “shared notions of nationhood and 
citizenship” (Ager and Strang, 2004). It is “a long-term, two-way process 
between refugees and the receiving society … in a number of different social, 
economic and political arenas” (Griffiths et al., 2006: 894).  
 
In reality, RCOs often do not have the resources to assure and foster 
‘integration’ of its members through for example education or training (Griffiths 
et al., 2006: 894). Some researchers assert that the RCOs positive contribution 
to ‘integration’ is “more often asserted than fully demonstrated” amongst policy 
makers and service providers (Sigona et al., 2004: 5).  
 
For instance, Western policy makers assume that employment is one of the 
main factors leading to ‘successful integration’, as it allows migrants to gain 
economic independence and establish relations with members of other 
communities (Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 521). Especially after residing in 
Nepalese refugee camps for twenty years, prevented from entering the labour 
market, gaining employment is the highest priority for all my informants of 
working age. English language skills play an important role, as fluency and 
literacy are often a pre-condition to gaining work and communicating 
effectively with service providers and the host community (ibid.: 523). Yet, 
Bhutanese refugees arrived in the UK in the midst of an economic downturn 
                                            
163 ‘Integration’ has to be distinguished from assimilation – that is, the refusal to maintain relationships 
with one’s original ethnic group in favour of seeking networks exclusively with the host population – 
and marginalisation, which refers to a migrant having no social networks at all – neither with their 
ethnic group nor with the host society (Berry, 1997, in Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 519). 
164 That is, gaining a shared understanding of ‘British culture’, history, values, rules and laws (Mitchell 
and Correa-Velez,2010:  97-8) 
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with high unemployment within the British population, and a lack of unskilled 
and semi-skilled jobs (see Introduction).  
 
Migration often leads to downward mobility, as refugees’ qualifications are not 
accredited, and work experiences in refugee camps are limited (Cheung and 
Phillimore, 2013: 521-2). For example, my informant Unnayak, is a qualified 
veterinary doctor with a decade of experience in horse-breeding (in Bhutan). 
However, his university degree – which he obtained in Bhutan and India – is 
not accredited in the UK. The accreditation course he would require is not 
funded by the British government, and therefore Unnayak is unable to use his 
qualifications to seek employment. Unnayak’s story is just one amongst many 
– professionals with qualifications and experience are marginalised from their 
area of expertise through lack of accreditation, and therefore only find un- or 
semi-skilled employment, leading to a loss of social and economic status. Due 
to their lack of funds and facilities, Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester are not 
able to provide organised training or support to gain employment, and are 
therefore completely powerless to prevent the marginalisation of Bhutanese 
refugees from the labour market. Similarly, although RCOs did attempt to 
provide language training to their members to improve English language skills 
and literacy amongst those who have no access to formal education in the UK, 
the lack of funds and resources prevent any organized projects.  
 
As researchers (Cheung and Phillimore, 2013; Sigona et al., 2004, etc.) have 
pointed out, there is a “lack of precision” over what the term ‘integration’ 
means, and how it can be realized (Griffiths et al., 2006: 893). ‘Integration’ is 
portrayed as a linear process – a path on which the migrant can steadily 
progress towards ‘full integration’. But as Stuart Hall (amongst others) has 
repeatedly demonstrated throughout his work (e.g. 1992; 1996), ‘integration’ is 
everything but a unidirectional process. Rather, it is an “on-going negotiation 
between past and present … wherein social networks are developed or 
maintained and identity is contested and shifting” (Bhatia and Ram, 2009; cited 
in Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 520). More importantly, what is this ‘host 
society’ that one can integrate into? Is there such a thing as a uniform ‘British 




Service providers and policy makers create assumptions with asserted 
meanings, rather than offering precise definitions or theoretical explorations of 
the terminology and concepts they are using. But if notions such as 
‘integration’, ‘community’, ‘wellbeing’ or ethnicity’ are not clearly defined, how 
can RCOs aim to incorporate or achieve them?  
 
Migrants are not passive receivers and assimilators of new ideas and values, 
but actively “negotiate the intersection” between themselves and others (ibid.: 
895). Bhutanese refugees perceive ‘integration’ in their own way, each 
‘adapting’ to their new lives and environments. In theory, they follow the 
rhetoric of service providers. When I attended a workshop for teenagers 
hosted by Welfare, the speaker Dr. Sharma (a Nepalese Bhutanese doctor 
working in Sheffield, see Chapter 9) said:  
 
“From a refugee’s perspective, integration requires the 
preparedness to adopt to the lifestyle of the host society, without 
having to lose one’s own cultural identity”.  
 
RCOs are encouraged to represent their community members’ interests, but 
service providers caution RCOs not to demand ‘special treatment’ (Zeus, 2011: 
258). For example, when attending a refugee information event hosted by 
Salford Forum at Salford University in June 2013, service providers advised 
refugees of their right to express their socio-cultural traditions and the freedom 
to worship their respective religions. At the same time, however, refugees were 
warned that the UK is following secular laws and regulations, limiting certain 
socio-cultural practices. In a private conversation with a social worker after the 
presentation, he explained that some RCOs attempted to exclude women from 
positions in the board (e.g. chair, etc.), citing “tradition” as a rationale, which 
was quickly dismissed by the respective community development worker. This 
demonstrates how social re-engineering and the prevention of “harmful social 
121 
 
practices” are continued in resettlement, fostering a “new being” that is 
following liberal Euro-American ideals and laws165.  
 
Most Bhutanese refugees believe that they are ‘integrated’ by having an 
intermediate command of English, by being employed, by having a few British 
friends, and, as one young Bhutanese man remarked, by being able to “follow 
the rules and laws”. Whether their perception of ‘integration’ corresponds with 
service providers as well as the British public is difficult to determine exactly 
because of the elusiveness of the term in public and political discourses. In 
Chapter 5 I return to this problem by exploring Bhutanese refugees’ sense of 
identity.  
 
Within political and public discourses, ‘integration’ is perceived as a dual 
process of assimilation (of values in the host community) and continuity (of 
‘culture’). Here, it is assumed that a group of refugees from a specific 
geographic location (such as Bhutan/Nepal) are a coherent, all-encompassing 
group that shares values, norms and practices – that is, an ‘ethnicity’, 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In the following section, I elaborate on the 
diversity and contradictions of these ever-changing networks Bhutanese 
refugees create, and show that the service providers’ notion of continuity (of 




UK policy makers claim that RCOs can assure continuity (and thus an ‘escape’ 
from liminality) by affirming “cultural beliefs and values” (Wright et al., 2004: 
28; Sigona et al., 2004: 4). This is based on the assumption that individuals 
who experienced forced migration create “new roots in imagined places in 
order to maintain and sustain social coherence” (Chatty, 2010: 55). That is, 
refugees are said to reproduce “the old life they have lost” (Williams, 2006: 
870), and maintain their roots through engaging in formalized (RCOs) and 
informal communities (Chatty, 2010: 468). 
                                            
165 However, at the same time it shows how ‘culture’ (glossed as ‘tradition’) may be used (amongst 




Critics of this view, such as Mitchell and Correa-Velez (2010: 96), caution that 
although refugees may have common experiences, a shared language and 
country of birth, they may not perceive themselves to be part of one, all-
encompassing community and culture, that is replicated in resettlement. 
Baumann (1996: 17-8), for example, criticises the assumption that all those 
who share certain traits can be broadly defined as one ‘community’ with 
shared interests, who ‘naturally’ come together in one community organisation, 
promoting the same social, cultural (what ICAR terms) “beliefs and values” 
(see Chapter 5). He is also critical of the generalisation that individuals with a 
South Asian background share one, uniform ‘Asian culture’, or, that despite the 
various national and cultural backgrounds there is a ‘Muslim culture’ to which 
all Muslims in the UK conform to (ibid.: 23). Similarly, Kelly (2003: 38) outlines 
in her work on Bosnian refugees in the UK, that service providers assume that 
migrants from a particular geographical area “will be members of a community 
that is culturally defined and has clear boundaries”. She goes on to argue that 
official bodies follow an entirely optimistic approach of communities as 
expressions of collective ‘interconnectedness’ and ‘commonality’ sharing the 
same values, beliefs and goals (ibid.: 40).  
 
Nevertheless, service providers aim to maintain the idea of ‘multiculturalism’, 
urging refugees to maintain their ‘tradition and culture’ to assure continuity, 
and thus wellbeing (Wright et al., 2004: 25). For example, Bhutanese refugees 
are encouraged (by community development workers) to include the 
“preservation of heritage” in their RCO constitution. As stated in the TA 
constitution166: 
 
“TAUK aims to preserve and promote culture, heritage and 
language, and to generate awareness of the Bhutanese and 
Nepalese culture amongst the host population. TAUK commits 
                                            
166 From: http://www.takinassociation.com/2013/01/about-us.html (also see Appendix 2) - similar quotes 
can be found in the constitutions of both BWA and HNC.  
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• To safeguard the mother tongue and bilingualism, and to 
take steps to impart it to the younger generation through 
direct teaching and other possible methods 
• To foster cultural heritage such as music, dance, dress, etc.; 
and to create awareness of our traditions amongst the host 
population”  
 
These ‘commitments’ are used in order to comply with the requirements of 
service providers and funding bodies. In reality, when re-drafting the TA 
constitution at the beginning of my fieldwork, the RCO leaders forgot to include 
this section until the designated community development worker from RAUK 
pointed out that ‘cultural maintenance’ was missing. The section quoted above 
is taken word-by-word from the draft constitution provided to RCO leaders by 
RAUK. Takin’s chairperson and members did not regard this point as relevant 
for their RCO, arguing that samaj is the main arena for socio-cultural 
continuity.  
 
The emphasis on “culture and tradition” in these RCOs is a means to be 
competitive for funding bodies (see Chapters 8 and 9). Similar to what 
Baumann (1996) and Kelly (2003) observe, Bhutanese RCOs mostly serve 
one purpose: to obtain benefits and gain favours from governmental and non-
governmental bodies only available to formalized associations. Kelly (2003: 
41) suggests that her refugee informants formed what she termed ‘contingent 
communities’, defined as a “group of people, who will … conform to the 
expectations of the host society in order to gain the advantages of a formal 
community association”. Rather than serving ‘abstract’ interested of an ‘ethnic 
group’, these communities are formalized in order to access benefits only 
available to RCOs (ibid.: 41-2).  
 
In Kelly’s case, personal relationships between her informants were limited and 
not regarded as relevant for everyday interactions. In contrast, amongst my 
respondents personal affiliations with other Bhutanese refugees are of utmost 
importance. I would not go as far as Kelly arguing that RCOs serve no purpose 
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in everyday life; but I do find the definition of ‘contingent communities’ useful to 
describe key characteristics of Bhutanese RCOs. Similar to Kelly’s informants, 
Bhutanese refugees formed official RCOs mainly to obtain funding. Funding 
means that RCOs can host events, and thus bring together friends and 
families scattered across Manchester and other cities nearby (see Chapter 7).  
 
Bhutanese refugee communities – both as samaj and RCOs - establish a 
sense of belonging and identity (Chapter 9). Yet, they are not continuations of 
‘“traditional notions of community” (Kelly, 2003: 38) and hierarchies established 
in both Bhutan and Nepal. The very structure, hierarchy, decision-making 
process and aims of RCOs (Chapter 8) are more in line with British 
bureaucratic requirements, rather than reflecting Bhutanese or Nepalese 
communities. Official government bodies (see e.g. Wright et al., 2004: 29) 
acknowledge that the “formation of constitutional organisations for social 
mobilisation is a particular Western, if not British concept, which has been 
imposed on refugee communities in efforts to integrate them into the 
organisational structures of British civil societies”. Therefore, in the following 
section I highlight that rather than benefiting the refugee community, RCOs 
mostly serve official bodies, in order to outsource their support, and thus, save 
funds and infrastructures.  
 
 
Critique of CDA 
 
 
RCOs and local social networks are the main arenas in which ‘integration’ is 
encouraged, whilst at the same time allowing migrant communities to maintain 
their socio-cultural idiosyncrasies. RCOs are thus somewhere in between 
service providers, the host population and refugees, bridging the RCO/NGO 
nexus by linking informal and formal refugee groups with local communities, 
whilst establishing and maintaining relations with service providers and NGOs 




For example, RCOs are the main point of reference for service providers when 
attempting to enter a dialogue with a group of migrants. Rather than contacting 
individuals within the Bhutanese refugee community, it is more convenient to 
contact the RCOs’ chairpersons, who then relay information to the rest of the 
community. For example, when RA initiated a health campaign highlighting the 
dangers of using betel nut, flyers were sent to Unnayak, who then distributed 
them amongst TA members. When the BBC filmed a diversity event in 
Manchester, they contacted the board members of TAUK and BWA to 
recommend performers in the community, who would be filmed dancing, 
singing or speaking on stage.  
 
RCO leaders do not only serve as an authority in “dialogue with the state” 
(Kelly, 2003: 39), but their role also strengthens their authority within the 
community. Community leaders have the power over the dissemination of 
information, and to whom and how this information is presented (Chapter 8). 
This “personal status and respectability” of leaders arises not only due to their 
RCO membership, but due to their claim to speak for the whole community, as 
well as a liaison between community members and official bodies (Baumann, 
1996: 64). But as I show in the following chapters, the resulting struggle for 
authority in RCOs exasperates internal divisions in the community.  
 
Moreover, RCOs are not only created to maintain one’s culture and serve as a 
support network, but are formed “through the inadequacy of existing services 
to meet potential and material needs” (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 681). In a time 
in which service providers and NGOs had up to 80 percent of their government 
funding cut167, services are stretched to the absolute limit, and RCOs must 
take over the role of official support. RCOs have become “essentially 
‘defensive’ - gap-filling and meeting essential needs - rather than being 
actively engaged in the development of individual and community resources” 
(Griffiths et al., 2006: 894).  
 
                                            
167 Due to the economic downturn since 2008, resulting in a cut in government spending (private 
correspondence with NGOs and RAUK).  
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Within this context of reduced service provision, Bhutanese RCOs are unable 
to deliver support to refugees, as they lack both funding and know-how. For 
example, one of the main issues Bhutanese refugees experience is access to 
affordable housing, further limited by the introduction of the UK government’s 
spending cuts. RCOs and their board members have neither the knowledge 
nor resources to provide adequate assistance or information on the bedroom-
tax168, the ‘right-to-buy’ scheme, and how to access council housing. 
Furthermore, the investment of time in RCOs steadily decreased during my 
fieldwork, as more pragmatic issues took centre-stage: unemployment, lack of 
access to infrastructures and education, health problems and financial 
hardship were far more pressing concerns for my informants, that required 
solutions on an individual, rather than on a communal level. As RCO board 
members entered the labour market or full time education, involvement in RCO 
matters declined, reducing the available support network on an RCO level. 
 
Moreover, the NGO and RCO sector is unbalanced: larger organisations are 
better mobilized than small RCOs and attract more funding (Sigona et al., 
2004: 3; also see Chapters 8 and 9). As Zetter and Pearl (2000: 675-6) state, 
due to these external factors on which refugees have no influence, “RCOs, like 
the communities they serve, will remain on the margins” of official structures 
and networks, and thus are unable to serve their ‘clients’ as intended by policy 
makers (ibid.: 682). Griffiths et al. (2006: 895) criticise that “far from promoting 
the integration of refugees, this [RCO] framework may rather perpetuate a 
condition of institutionalised marginality for refugee groups”, and put into 
question the utility of RCOs in the mobilisation and ‘integration’ of migrant 
communities. 
 
‘Social problems’ cannot be resolved with the help of RCOs, contrary to the 
service providers’ mission to outsource support to RCOs. Therefore, 
Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester do not provide the functions policy makers 
and service provider envision. Rather, it is samaj and informal social networks 
                                            
168 According to the Welfare Reform Act 2012, residents receive less housing benefits if they have spare 
(that is, unoccupied) bedrooms. The aim is to assure that receivers of benefits move to smaller 




between refugees with varying economic, social and educational capital, who 
served as a support network addressing these issues, regardless of their 
position within the RCOs (Chapter 8). Moreover, localized social networks 
irrespective of RCO affiliation provided childcare for women, and access to the 
labour market. Aadit, for example, a Nepali student living in Manchester, who 
is not a refugee and had no significant role in any RCO, was the number one 
contact person for many refugees across the various RCOs to gain 
employment. Aadit had a large network of contacts in the catering industry 
throughout Manchester and Liverpool, having worked in several Indian and 
Nepali restaurants. His recommendations with employers, support with CVs 
and references allowed many Bhutanese refugees to find both legal and illegal 
employment in the industry. In turn, this increased the status of internal and 
external individuals (myself included), shifting authority and influence away 
from RCOs and their leaders (also see Chapters 8 and 9).  
 
The latter point is of particular importance, as it puts into question the internal 
and external hierarchies, exercising force on the RCO in how it is lead and run. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I explore my informants’ understanding of community, as 
well as the structure of Bhutanese RCOs, and show how the policies and 






In the public discourse in the UK, ‘multiculturalism’ and immigration policies are 
largely perceived as a failure (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 680). Similarly, the 
community development approach, which shifts responsibilities, support and 
political representation to (refugee) community organisations, has been 
criticised as insufficient to deal with the vast numbers of both voluntary and 




Moreover, in the context of a financial downturn in the UK, and reduced public 
spending since 2008, the British government and service providers seek 
efficient and cheap service delivery (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 688). Projects 
fostering ‘integration’ are severely limited, localized in urban centres (rather 
than accessible across the country), and largely reduced to the voluntary 
sector (Sales, 20002: 456). Zetter (2007: 185) claims that the UK’s immigration 
policies (which includes CDA) have become means to “mediate the interests of 
the state”. As public spending is reduced, service provision for forced migrants 
in the UK “becomes more an instrument of marginalisation than reception, of 
community fragmentation than consolidation, of short-term dependency rather 
than long-term self-sufficiency” (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 680).  
 
RCOs operate in between the state, service providers, charities, funding 
bodies and their own community members, rather than allowing migrants to 
“define their own needs” (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 104). In Chapter 9, 
for instance, I demonstrate that Bhutanese RCOs adapt and define their 
community aims to fit the funding bodies’ agendas.  
 
The CDA in both the refugee camps and in resettlement mostly serves service 
providers and aid and relief agencies, rather than providing immediate 
advantages to their refugee ‘clients’. As I demonstrated in this chapter, social 
re-engineering is a tool of Western agencies to create ‘integrate-able’ persons 
for third country resettlement, which can be easily managed and controlled. 
Thereafter, governmental support can be conveniently (and cost-effectively) 
outsourced to RCOs, under the cover of ‘cultural continuity’ and the ‘advance 
of wellbeing’, assuming that refugees from a specific geographical background 
would overcome difference in order to form one cohesive organisation for the 
‘good of all’. However, my study confirms Zetter and Pearl’s (2000: 686) 
findings that RCOs across the UK do not effectively cooperate and network, 
but rather prevent the realization of projects through internal fights. As I show 
throughout this work, the importance of RCOs in the literature is 
overemphasized (Sigona et al., 2004: 6), whilst ignoring internal conflicts 
preventing communities to achieve their aims. The problems are often silenced 




In the following chapter, I address the notion of ‘Bhutanese refugee-ness’. I 
argue that similar to CDA, this form of cultural identity and labelling is based on 
political and public discourses, rather than originating from Bhutanese 
refugees themselves, and are used to define, and thus to manage and control 









In the introduction to this thesis, I state that I use the terms Nepalese 
Bhutanese or Bhutanese refugees to denote my informants, rather than using 
the Dzongkha term Lhotshampa ('Southern border dweller') which is often 
used in academic (e.g. Evans, 2010; Hutt, 2007), humanitarian (e.g. see 
Davis, 2013) and journalistic works (e.g. see Mishra, 2013). My informants 
never refer to themselves as Lhotshampas, and similar to Hutt’s (2007: 6-7; 
400) observations in the refugee camps, use the term 'Bhutanese Nepalese' 
(bhuṭani nepaliharu).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the term Lhotshampa was created by the drukpa 
government as a category for the 1985 Bhutan Citizenship Act (Hutt, 1996: 
400), to signify Bhutan’s “acceptance of the [Nepalese] as a distinct cultural 
and linguistic unit” (Thinley, 1993 cited in Joseph, 1999: 139), and Lhotshampa 
still stands for "the legal and loyal Nepali-speaking community” resident in 
Bhutan today (Hutt, 1996: 400). Thus, the classification Lhotshampa is a 
politically loaded term, which serves as a tool of ‘othering’ for Bhutan’s 
government.  
 
During my second visit to Manchester, for example, Unnayak, the chairperson 
of TA whom we have met in previous chapters, complained about academic 
works and the international media referring to Bhutanese refugees as 
Lhotshampas. He explained: “Lhotshampa can be everybody living in the 
South of Bhutan, even Chinese, Indian, Tibetan, drukpa, Nepali”. My 
informants’ rejection of the term led to a discussion during the SOAS workshop 
on Bhutanese refugee resettlement in May 2013, which I attended together 
with Unnayak, Ved and other Bhutanese refugee representatives in the UK. In 
a speech to the (academic) audience, both Unnayak and Ved emphasized that 
researchers, journalists, governments and service providers should refrain 
from using the term Lhotshampa, and instead adopt other, more accepted 
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terms to refer to Bhutanese refugees. One researcher, who conducted 
fieldwork, from a legal perspective both in Bhutan and in Nepal, dismissed the 
refugees’ demand as a “petty issue”, and argued that the rejection of the word 
is “impractical”, as the term offers a “useful” and “simple” categorisation, 
allowing easy identification. Audience members with a social science 
background found these comments highly problematic, and a long debate 
ensued about whether or not the term Lhotshampa could, and more 
importantly, should be applied to refer to Bhutanese refugees. Unnayak and 
Ved were vocal in repeating their demand, and it was concluded that 
regardless of the expediency of the term Lhotshampa, researchers present at 
the workshop would refrain from using the word in the future.  
 
The comment from the researcher in the example above highlighted the 
importance of simple classifications in political, public as well as in academic 
discourses. But, clearly, this simplification is not unproblematic: as I attempt to 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, policy makers and service providers make 
use of these ‘practical’ generalisations, and thereby group diverse, 
incongruous and multifaceted people in one easily identifiable category. For 
example, as highlighted in Chapter 2, in Bhutan, all Nepalese Bhutanese were 
classified as ‘anti nationals’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ by the drukpa government, 
regardless of their background and political involvement. In the UK, service 
providers believe that Bhutanese refugees overcome differences and form a 
single RCO with the intention to serve the ‘good of all’. But as I show 
throughout this thesis, Bhutanese refugees are a diverse and fragmented 
social group, comprised of individuals, who may have nothing in common 
except the shared experience of refugee-ness.  
 
Categorisations such as Lhotshampa (or ‘refugee’, see further below) are 
important tools for the creation of similarity and difference. By inventing the 
term Lhotshampa, the Ngalong rulers of Bhutan amplified ‘ethnic’ distinctions 
between Nepalese Bhutanese and the drukpas, and made it into a 
bureaucratic category that can be used to classify, manage and control the 
‘other’ (Joseph, 1999: 139). More importantly, it fostered the idea that all 
Nepalese Bhutanese are one all-encompassing group that can be easily 
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identified. However, as my informants confirmed, Nepalese Bhutanese in 
Bhutan did not perceive themselves as a coherent, homogenous group that is 
significantly distinct from other drukpas169. My informant Prabesh recalled that 
in Bhutan “we were all different, but we were all Bhutanese. Suddenly, they 
call us Lhotshampa, and say we are not the people of Bhutan”. The term 
Lhotshampa does not originate from the categorised people themselves, but 
was invented and imposed from above (the state), similar to the creation and 
adoption of the category ‘refugee’ in Western political and public discourses 
(see further below).  
 
However, although the term may have been used for the creation of difference 
by the Bhutanese government, it also engendered an (imagined) commonality 
of Bhutanese Nepalese people, nurtured through their shared experience of 
refugee-ness (see below). A highly diverse group of people from all social, 
economic and education backgrounds suddenly found themselves gathered 
together in refugee camps in Nepal against their will. This shared experience 
of forced displacement from Bhutan certainly fostered solidarity and a sense of 
mutuality and sameness between them, but did not (as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3) result in a communitas (Turner, 2000: 360) of equal individuals who 
share the same views. These divergences surfaced when durable solutions, 
such as resettlement, were proposed, resulting in conflicts and violence within 
the camps.  
 
Moreover, my informants’ shared experience of organized resettlement and life 
in the UK produces both similarity and difference: on the one hand, they 
portray themselves as a homogenous group towards non-refugees (for 
examples, in speeches to non-refugee audiences) with a collective history of 
refugee-ness (see below). On the other hand, the subsequent chapters show 
that Bhutanese refugees actively use ‘othering’ within their own community. 
Similar to the term Lhotshampa, the categories determining ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
(for example, RCO affiliations) within samaj are imagined (Anderson, 2006), 
                                            
169 With the exception of language: Nepalese Bhutanese retained their Nepali language, although it 
became a mixed with Dzongkha, Hindi and English.  
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and embedded in historical, political and, most importantly, institutionalized 
discourses and contexts (Hall, 1996: 3-4).  
 
However, the creation of difference necessarily requires an understanding of 
sameness, or an ‘us’, because, as discussed in the Introduction, social 
relationships also depend on notions of mutuality, especially within samaj 
(Grossberg, 1996: 93-4; also see Chapter 7). Here, I evoke the notion of 
belonging and identity. For example, on our return to Manchester after the 
SOAS workshop mentioned above, I discussed the Lhotshampa debate with 
some of my informants. Unnayak remarked: “This is about respect, you know. 
It’s a question of what I am”. Here, Unnayak emphasizes the notion of identity 
– of who (or what) he is. For him, the Lhotshampa debate was not about the 
terms’ utility as a simplified classification in political and academic discourses. 
For him, it was about personal identity.  
 
As I explore in this chapter, identity is not a fixed and distinctive “sense of self”. 
Rather it is embedded in social relationships, interactions and discourses, and 
is subject to various factors that lie outside rather than within the individual 
(Hall, 1996: 2-4). As discussed below, who Bhutanese refugees are, is 
determined not only by my informants, but also by historical, political and 
relational factors. This, what I call ‘Bhutanese refugee-ness’, is not the identity 
of a singular ego, but one that is constructed through relations and discourses 
with others and their ‘culture’, and is therefore a cultural identity (Voiscu, 2013: 
162-8).  
 
Cultural identity is a matter of political significance, and is reworked in political, 
public and media discourses (Zetter, 2007: 173). It is therefore subject to 
representation – that is, how they represent themselves and how others 
categorize them (Hall, 1996: 4). On the one hand, Bhutanese refugee-ness is 
“subjects of policy” - in which bureaucratic processes, such as aid intervention 
and resettlement, transform cultural identities (ibid.). On the other hand, as I 
show further below, my informants use the ‘refugee label’, representing 
themselves as ‘victims’ of nationalist drukpa policies in order to legitimize their 




In this chapter I demonstrate that Bhutanese refugee identity is, in Hall’s 
(1996: 4) words, “multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and 
antagonistic discourses, practices and positions”. As it is influenced by internal 
dynamics of change, as well as by the experience of migration, policy and 
bureaucratic intervention, Bhutanese refugee-ness is a “hybridized” identity 
that is adapted to the context in which they find themselves in. But Bhutanese 
refugee-ness is a contested category, and, in common with the notion of 
community, this cultural identity is subject to ‘othering’. As there are 
disagreements over what this Bhutanese refugee-ness is, identity became one 
focal point of the community divisions I discuss in Chapter 9.  
 
Therefore, rather than focusing on a permanent sense of self, I explore identity 
as created out of contextual discourses (also see Foucault, 1989; Grossberg, 
1996: 90) by utilizing various anthropological and social science resources. I 
focus on how Bhutanese refugee-ness emerges out of particular discourses 
both within and outside the refugee community, influenced by social re-
engineering, policy and individual preferences. I argue that Bhutanese 
refugees create (rather than re-create) identity based on these discourses, 
which they then use to legitimize their residency in the UK, as well as to 
differentiate themselves from other refugees and non-refugees. I conclude that 
these multiple cultural identities are an important factor of community 
membership. What binds my informants together in both samaj and RCOs is 
their specific definition of refugee-ness, which is based on a shared history of 
exile from Bhutan, life in refugee camps in Nepal, and the collective 
experience of resettlement within the resettlement programme.  
 
 
Bhutanese Refugee Identity 
 
 
In postmodern anthropological discourses, identity is divorced from its 
subjective meaning, in which the individual is the “centre of a 
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phenomenological field” (Grossberg, 1996: 98), rejecting the general 
understanding of identity as a “fact of being who or what a person or thing is” 
and a “distinct personality” (Voiscu, 2013: 161). Rather than addressing 
identity as a “unique sense of self” (ibid.) that is permanent over time and 
bound to the individual, social scientists perceive identity as a process of 
becoming (Bromley, 2000: 9; Frith, 1996: 109-10), shaped by various, often 
contradictory contexts, cultural meanings and social settings (Grossberg, 1996: 
99; Hall, 2010: 449-50).  
 
However, discourses in the social sciences, as well as amongst policy makers 
and the public, ascribe fixed nationalities, identities and cultures to people, 
“into which they are born”, and are “rooted” (Malkki, 1992: 29). Forced 
migrants are often perceived as “uprooted”, making them into a social, political 
and moral problem that has to be resolved through aid intervention and 
‘integration’ (in resettlement) (ibid.: 32). In the same way, some argue that 
refugees ‘lose’ their identities, as Zygmunt Bauman (2003: 347) asserts: 
 
“Having abandoned or been forced out of their former milieu, 
refugees tend to be stripped of the identities that milieu defined, 
sustained and reproduced. Socially, they are ‘zombies’: their old 
identities survive mostly as ghosts – haunting the nights all the more 
painfully for being all but invisible in the camp’s daylight.” 
 
As ‘zombies’ who fall outside of clear national borders and categories, 
refugees are portrayed as being a danger to “national security”, symbolizing 
polluting “matter out of place”, and in need of “therapeutic intervention” 
(Harrell-Bond et al., 1996: 1077; Malkki, 1992: 34; also see Douglas, 1966). 
Social re-engineering in refugee camps and in resettlement serves as the 
‘transplanting’ of these roots (see Chapters 3 and 4), to manage these 
‘zombies’ and transform them into ‘rooted’ individuals, who can be controlled 
within the confines of a nation state such as the UK (ibid.). Thus, aid 
intervention and refugee policies not only serve to make refugees more 
‘integrate-able’, but also to bestow the “nationless and cultureless” (ibid.) with 
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new identities and a strong sense of belonging – in this case, belonging to 
British society.  
 
I argue that the notion of rootedness presumes that before becoming refugees, 
these groups were coherent communities with a single social, cultural and 
national identity. Rather, as I maintain throughout this thesis, Bhutanese 
Nepalese have always been a community-in-transition, with various, multi-
dimensional, multi-cultural and multi-national identities (also see Chapter 2). 
Their expulsion from Nepal and resettlement did not “destroy” their identity and 
sense of belonging, but added new dimensions to their already hybridized 
selves. Although experienced in different levels of intensity, Bhutanese 
Nepalese have always been part of what Bhabha (2004: 12) calls “global 
cosmopolitanism”170, locating the self in a “world of plural cultures and 
peoples”. As I explore in the following section, identity is not conceived as a 
single root that is bound to a specific location, culture or nation, but as a “root 
moving toward and encountering other roots” (Glissant, 2005, cited in Voiscu, 
2013: 165).  
 
This exploration of identity accentuates one of the main points of this thesis 
(also see Introduction): there is no all-encompassing Bhutanese Nepali-ness 
or Bhutanese-refugee-ness as a culture, identity or community that has 
remained unchanged since Bhutan and Nepal. Their identities and 
communities are “no museum piece sitting stock-still in a display case, but 
rather consists of the endlessly astonishing synthesis of the contradictions of 
everyday life” (Boddy, 1995: 17). As discussed in the Introduction, similar to 
identity and community affiliations, culture is highly adaptable and continuously 
changing. It becomes a “deterritorialized culture” (Bromley, 2000: 14), which 
“displaces itself, loses itself in, resists to, and mixes with, the receptive [British] 
culture” (Voiscu, 2013: 173). Individuals can be members of various 
communities and cultures, and thus employ several, so-called ‘hybrid’ identities 
(Anzaldúa, 1999; Baumann, 1996: 23; Grossberg, 1996: 91). Thus, cultures, 
identities and communities of forced migrants, such as Bhutanese refugees, 
                                            
170 Appiah (cited in Bromley, 2000: 16) refers to this as “rooted cosmopolitanism”: individuals may feel 
they have roots in specific geographic, cultural and national locations, but “dwell in the world at large”. 
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become an infinitely malleable “mosaic with porous boundaries” (Lavie and 
Swedenburg, 2001: 3).  
 
 
Hybrid identities  
 
One of the most striking quotes from my fieldwork came from Arun, a sixteen-
year-old, who arrived in the UK with his mother and younger brother in early 
2013. Within a few months of living in Salford, Arun shifted from a shy, devout 
Christian to an outspoken, highly critical young man, who abandoned 
religion171 in favour of intensive education in the natural sciences. In one 
conversation, Arun stated:  
 
“I’m really proud to be English. I finally feel like I’ve found my own 
identity”.  
 
I was curious what he meant with ‘being English’, to which he replied that it is 
about being educated, and holding secular, democratic values. He found it 
more difficult to define what he means with ‘identity’:  
 
“I am Bhutanese because my fathers are born there…. I am Nepali, 
because this is my culture, my language….and now, I am British172 
too, you know, because I live here now and integrate, and study and 
learn, not follow religion.” 
 
Arun’s comment was mirrored by other Bhutanese refugees throughout my 
fieldwork. One refugee woman in her thirties once explained: “I am not 
Bhutanese, I am Nepali. I am born in Bhutan, but I am Nepali”. Others are 
more uncertain:  
                                            
171 Gellner et al (2012) and Laksamba (2012) describe the socio-cultural changes amongst the Nepali 
community in the UK, noting a significant generation-gap in the practice of (any) religion in the Nepali 
diaspora. There is a strong tendency to become more 'secular' amongst the second generation of 
Nepalese in the UK (ibid.), and these processes are also at work amongst the Bhutanese refugees 
who resettled to the UK, especially children and young adults. 
172 Many of my informants do not distinguish between England and Britain in everyday language, and use 
it interchangeably, although they are aware that England is only a part of Britain. This is not a 




“My great-grandfather came to Bhutan and the family lived there for 
generations. But we kept our Nepali culture, religion and language. I 
am not Bhutanese, but I am also not Nepali”.  
 
Niraj summed up the wide-spread confusion over national and cultural 
belonging:  
 
“Who am I? I really don’t know. I’m not Bhutanese, cause I’m no 
drukpa. The government in Nepal says we are no Nepali people, but 
I speak this language. Here in England, I’m different, no? I’m not 
English, I’m a refugee …. maybe I’m everything, maybe I’m nothing, 
I don’t know.” 
 
These comments demonstrate that for my informants, identity is not an innate 
and unique sense of permanent and individual self, but rather that Bhutanese 
refugees fashion multiple cultural identities (Chatty, 2010: 55; Malkki, 1992: 
36-7, also see Hall, 1996 and below). Contrary to assumptions of some social 
theorists, who argued that migrants suffer from an “identity crisis” (Erikson, 
1968), Bhutanese refugees occupy what Hall (2010: 449) calls a “third space”, 
bridging cultural and social boundaries. This is not, however, a “linear 
progression” from one culture to another, but a complex interplay of multiple 
identities and cultures, which change over time (Clifford, 1997, in Voiscu, 
2013: 174; Mohan, 2002: 98). For example, my informants’ insistence on 
referring to themselves as Bhutanese Nepalese signifies a biculturalism – a 
dual national and cultural identity (Bromley, 2000:4). By the time I began 
fieldwork in 2012, those who arrived in the UK in 2010 were already conceiving 
themselves as “British Bhutanese Nepalese refugees”, who created social 
networks within and outside of the Bhutanese refugee community, which 
shaped their perceptions and representations of cultural identity.  
 
As I exemplify in detail below, these hybrid identities are fluid, highly dynamic 
and sometimes even contradictory (Voiscu, 2012: 165), and “may be stressed 
and asserted, or subordinated and played down, according to the political and 
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economic circumstances within which they live” (in Hutt, 2007: 5). Bhutanese 
refugees negotiate and perform identity by a “transculturalisation of cultural 
translation”, in which they actively pick-and-choose from various local, national 
and transnational cultures and identities, ‘translating’ and mingling it cultures, 
identities and practices acquired in Bhutan, Nepal and the UK (Bromley, 2002: 
2; 10). As Zetter (2007: 187) summarises:  
 
“Simultaneously cohering to different social worlds and communities 
is part and parcel of the contemporary social life for refugees and 
other migrant groups in an increasingly globalised world.” 
 
 
Hybrid identities and social networks 
 
Hybrid identities are created not only through the interplay of various cultures 
and (political, historical) practices, but also through the relationships that 
people establish. Robins (1996: 79) clearly articulates the question at hand: 
“isn’t it through the others that we become aware of who we are and what we 
stand for?” Thus, identities are closely entwined with the social networks to 
which individuals feel (or do not feel) they belong. These networks can be 
comprised of Bhutanese refugees, which I discuss in detail in the subsequent 
chapters, and of non-Bhutanese refugees, such as the British host population 
(see below).  
 
However, in social relationships with non-Bhutanese refugees, my informants 
become – in Goffmann’s (1990) sense – performers of their culture (in Frith, 
1996: 125). Bhutanese refugees ‘perform’ for their own community (samaj, see 
Chapter 7) by acting out culture literally, such as during religious festivals, 
traditional Nepali dances and songs, language and fashion. But my informants’ 
performances are also directed outwards (towards non-refugees), especially 
by means of the refugee label (see further below), and by proclaiming that they 
are Nepali, South Asian, migrants, refugees, and, as shown with Arun’s 




For example, when interacting with Nepali migrants in the UK, my informants 
place emphasis on their Nepali-ness, characterised by shared values, 
language and social practices. The affiliation goes both ways, as one of the 
Nepali migrant friends of a Bhutanese refugee family remarked: “we are only 
friends, but actually, we are family – we are the same people” (also see 
Chapter 7). These relationships are further fostered through intermarriage – in 
the absence of Bhutanese refugee marriage partners, Nepali migrants are 
popular choices. Some of my young (male) informants even flew to Nepal after 
receiving (refugee) travel documents, to marry Nepali girls.  
 
This territorial affiliation is expanded when they fashion social networks with 
the South Asian community resident in Britain, accentuating a wider ‘South 
Asian identity’, sharing practices such as religion or commensality of food (also 
see Chapter 7), South Asian popular culture (e.g. Bollywood) and shared 
values. “We are the same - Indian people and us – we all come from the same 
place, we look the same, pray the same, eat the same food”, as Kavi once 
explained whilst shopping in Longsight. The owner of the shop, a Pakistani 
migrant, laughed when he heard Kavi, and jokingly remarked “we are the same 
brown people”, showing that South Asian migrants welcome Bhutanese 
refugees in their communities, as I have observed time and again during my 
fieldwork. Bhutanese refugees often work in Asian businesses (also see 
Chapter 8), and have reliable social networks and close friendships in the 
British Asian community.  
 
When communicating with other (non-South Asian) migrants, my informants 
stress their ‘migrant-identity’, characterised by unfamiliarity and ambiguity 
towards the host society, and latent criticism of British policy makers. For 
example, on my first visit to Manchester, my key gatekeepers discovered that I 
am not British, and therefore an “immigrant like us”, as Bikram put it. They 
ascribed me with a ‘migrant-identity’ based on shared experiences of 
immigration: “You are not English, you understand us”. Migrants – regardless if 
voluntary or forced – are perceived by my informants to share the same 
difficulties arising due to migration. This is something that (in their eyes) British 
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people lack, and therefore they feel closer connections to migrants than to the 
British host population.  
 
Refugee-ness, on the other hand, is adopted when communicating with other 
forcibly displaced people, such as the Somali, Congolese (DRC) or Iraqi 
refugee community in Manchester. Bhutanese refugees assume that they 
share a common experience of refugee-ness (see below), albeit significant 
cultural, historical and political differences. This was also expressed in the 
wide-spread sympathy with Syrian refugees during my fieldwork. Some 
informants asked me to show them (on a map) where Syria is, and how the 
conflict came about. After exhausting my limited knowledge on the issue, one 
of them exclaimed, outraged: “Why nobody help the people in Syria? The king 
[sic – referring to president Assad] kill people, like the drukpa kill us, and 
nobody helps, like in Bhutan, people don’t care! We should help them, you 
know”. Indeed, HNC collected some funds for Syrian refugee camps in 
Lebanon, and displayed solidarity on social media.  
 
At the same time, most refugees under the age of 40 forge social networks 
with British people in schools and workplaces. In resettlement in the UK, 
Bhutanese refugees attempt to adopt ‘British-ness’173. My informants argue 
that ‘being British’ is about ‘rational’, secular values, education, employment, 
economic self-sufficiency and being an active member of the community by 
attending national celebration, waving the Union Jack. I often experienced how 
some of my informants in the UK distinguish themselves from Bhutanese 
refugees in other resettlement nations, such as the US or Australia, 
emphasizing how “proud” they are to be in Britain rather than in other nations, 
and that they look forward to receiving citizenship of this “dream land”, as Arun 
once emphasized. They adopt a form of “cultural mimicry”, in which Bhutanese 
refugees imitate what they perceive to be ‘British’ (Shoat, 1993, cited in 
Bromley, 2000: 8). For example, they hardly wear ‘Nepali’ clothes (such as 
saris or kurtas) except during cultural festivals (such as Deepawali). Young 
refugees (under 25) spend large sums of money on branded clothing and 
                                            
173 Used in quotation marks to highlight the fact that this is what my informants perceive to be ‘British’ or 
‘Western’, rather than stating it as a general fact.  
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fashion items, such as jewellery and sunglasses, as well as on the best and 
newest smart phones. Most also closely follow daily news by watching 
television news channels, informing themselves on current affairs, often 
discussing them amongst themselves. Many of my informants compare their 
Nepalese Bhutanese with the British community, as one of them explained:  
 
“British community is where there is stable and good governance 
and it is highly developed comparing to Nepal. People here always 
seem to be in their own track which means they do not care a lot 
about what somebody is doing, especially neighbours and relatives, 
whereas in Nepal, people stay communal with their friends, families, 
neighbours and relatives. Despite that, British are tolerant and they 
have more willingness and eagerness to tolerate other people who 
are not like them”. 
 
On the one hand, Bhutanese refugees may criticise the ‘British community’ for 
being alienated from one another, whilst being convinced that such a ‘multi-
cultural’ society is better equipped to deal with ‘difference’, and show more 
tolerance towards the ‘other’. My informants’ assumptions of ‘British-ness’ is 
that of an ‘advanced’ society, vis-à-vis the Bhutanese or Nepalese community, 
as one of them highlighted: “after arriving, I learnt that we [and Nepal] are a 
hundred years behind the British people”. It is this comparison between 
‘developed’ Britain versus ‘undeveloped’ Nepal (or Bhutan), that engenders 
change amongst young Bhutanese refugees. For example, as I exemplify in 
Chapter 7, young people emphasize their desire to live independently “like the 
English do”, rather than with their extended family (as it used to be the case in 
Bhutan and Nepal). Similarly, they adopt English as the lingua franca even at 
home (rather than Nepali, also see Chapter 7), adopting a strong Mancunian 
accent. These performances of British-ness are important representations of 
themselves as both Bhutanese Nepali and ‘Western’174. Bromley’s (2000: 19) 
work on migrants in the UK mirrors this perception, paraphrasing his 
                                            
174 In turn, some argue that RCOs are merely products of performances of diverse actors and their 
interests (Griffiths et al, 2006: 895), confined on a stage set by international and national policies and 
humanitarian agencies.  
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informants’ views: “[t]o be fully 'human' is to be Westernised”, reflecting the aim 
of social re-engineering by aid agencies discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
These examples show that Bhutanese refugees live an “everyday 
cosmopolitanism”175 (Chatty, 2010: 32; 443), through which they maintain 
social networks with individuals outside of their refugee community, and 
actively participate in, interact with, adopt (but not completely assimilate) and 
intermingle multiple socio-cultural practices and norms.  
 
However, as mentioned above, identities are also subject to social and political 
discourses and representations (Chatty, 2010: 55; Malkki, 1992: 36-7). In the 
following section I demonstrate that my informants adopt and use the ‘refugee-
label’ when communicating with service providers and funding bodies, in order 







Durable solutions (or indeed, any support for refugees) only apply to 
individuals who are recognized as ‘refugees’ according to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention176 (UNHCR, 2010 [1951]). This convention (and the UN itself) is a 
direct result of the events during WW II, and was developed and ratified by the 
UN and its members in 1951. It is intended to protect people from 'human 
rights abuses', such as torture, imprisonment and execution, and begins with a 
definition of refugees as individuals who (UNHCR, 2010: 14):  
 
                                            
175 In brief, cosmopolitanism (Greek ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’ - city, citizens) refers to the notion of the ‘citizen 
of the world’, in which all people belong to one single community, based on shared values, and equal 
political and economic relationships (Chatty, 2010: 304). I follow Chatty’s (ibid.: 32, 443) use of the 
term as an everyday social practice, through which people are conscious of and accept a multiplicity 
of different cultures, values and practices. Also see Hannerz (1990) Butler (2004) and Gilroy (2005). 
176 The latest (2010) version of this convention includes (a) the 1951 Conventions relating to the status of 
refugees, (b) the 1967 (updated) Protocol relating to the status of refugees, and (c) the 1967 
Resolution 2198, all of which were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.  
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"owing to the well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion177, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it”. 
 
A person is able to claim refugee-status, if s/he has crossed an international 
border to seek asylum from persecution in their 'home' nation (Harrell-Bond et 
al., 1996: 1076). This refugee-status allows them to “transcend nation states” 
and be subject to distinct international laws and institutions (Turton, 2002: 27). 
 
Refugee resettlement entails the organised migration of these recognised 
refugees, which is of particular importance for the public discourse, in which 
there is an ongoing debate about “genuine” and “phoney” refugees178 
(Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000: 103). Bhutanese refugees are not asylum 
seekers or voluntary (e.g. economic) migrants179. The distinction entails very 
different rights and duties. Refugees have many rights, whilst asylum seekers 
do not: in fact, the latter are classified as ‘illegal’ immigrants, until they are able 
to prove their refugee status. Recognized refugees, such as Bhutanese 
refugees, have the right to be unified with their family (in their country of 
refuge), a right to housing and a right to receive an Indefinite Leave to Remain 
in the UK. On the other hand, asylum seekers are housed in detention centres, 
and have no right to live and work in the UK until their status is approved or 
                                            
177 These loaded concepts are not defined in the convention, and leads to criticism that what constitutes 
a refugee is solely based on Western ideas and values (e.g. amendments in 2008 to include LGBT 
individuals). See Harrell-Bond et al (1996: 1076-7) for a critical discussion.  
178 At the time of writing this thesis (2014-15), residents in the UK (and Europe) debate whether people 
crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe are refugees or migrants, reflecting these debates in 
current public and media discourses (see Baba’s [2013: 2-4] discussion on “public angst” towards 
immigrants). Also, in 2014 I met an anthropologist who conducts research with North Korean 
refugees, some of whom successfully resettled to the US after claiming that they are Bhutanese 
refugees. It was unclear to both the researcher and me, how North Korean refugees accomplished 
that, but it shows the importance of the refugee label (the researcher consented to include her 
statements, but to retain her anonymity).  
179 See Richmond (1994, cited in Chatty, 2010: 30-33): reactive (refugee) migrants have to flee due to 
political circumstances beyond their control, whilst proactive (voluntary) migrants actively decides to 
migrate due to economic, educational or social mobility. 
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they are send back to their country of residence180 (Sales, 2002: 464-6; also 
see Mitchell, 2006; UNHCR, 2013). This categorisation – or labelling – as a 
refugee is of significant importance, as I discuss in the following section.  
 
 
The use of the refugee-label 
 
In late 2010, the Pathaks and Sinhas arrived in the UK, and were settled in 
Bury. At that time they were identified by their white British neighbours as 
“Pakis”, resulting in a graffiti on the Sinha’s fence reading “Pakis181 go home”. 
Refugee Action intervened, and held an “awareness event” in the Bury 
neighbourhood, explaining to the residents who Bhutanese refugees are, and 
why they are in the UK. These service providers attempted to replace the 
neighbour’s assumption of ethnic identification (also see below) – ‘Pakis’ or 
South Asians – with a more convenient label: refugee-ness, which carries with 
it the supposition of ‘victimhood’ and ‘involuntary migration’. Thereafter, the 
Sinhas never experienced abuse from their neighbours again – in fact, the 
Sinhas claim that the white, British community in their area began to support 
them after the event, offering assistance (such as car rides to supermarkets or 
other facilities) and goods (e.g. toys and clothes for children).  
 
These powerful identification markers were immediately adopted by my 
informants, whereby they emphasize their “right to be here”, as they were 
“victims of the Bhutanese government”, as expressed by the chairpersons of 
RCOs during various speeches to non-refugees. Bhutanese refugees make 
conscious use of the notion of refugee-ness to gain advantages, whereby they 
portray themselves as one cohesive community, who shares the experience of 
‘victimhood’. This allows them to access facilities, funding and other 
                                            
180 Research (e.g. Sigona et al, 2004: 8; Spicer, 2008: 493; Zetter & Pearl, 2000: 696) suggests that 
asylum seekers are more prone to social exclusion from both the society and services, due to 
restricted rights and entitlements (in comparison to refugees), as well as discriminating media 
coverage.  
181 Paki’ is an abbreviation of ‘Pakistani’ and often used derogatorily to describe individuals with brown 
skin or dark complexion, based on the assumption that individuals with these physiological traits are 
from a Pakistani or South Asian migratory background 
146 
 
governmental and non-governmental allowances, which are exclusively 
reserved for recognised ‘ethnic’ social groups (also see Chapter 8).  
 
This refugee-label has to be distinguished from identity construction, although 
both are shaped “within institutionalized regulatory practices” (Zetter, 2007: 
173). But whilst cultural identity is based on the negotiation of shared socio-
cultural values and practices, the refugee-label is based on negotiations of 
classifications between refugees and Euro-American governmental and non-
governmental institutions (Malkki, 2002: 356). Bhutanese refugees have 
learned to adopt the label in conversation with institutions and non-refugees, 
and adapt it to their own needs in a “masterful manipulation of their marginal 
status” (Gemie, 2010: 31). These labels have consequences in everyday life, 
especially in the context of refugee resettlement and integration (Colson, 2003: 
2; Zetter, 2007: 179).  
 
Here, I employ Ian Hacking’s (2006: 2) take on labelling theory182, 
demonstrating how national and international institutions, such as the UN or 
the British government, create “new kinds of persons” through bureaucratic 
labels183. Refugees can be perceived as “moving targets”, as labelling impacts 
on people, “and since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of 
people as before” (ibid.). Bhutanese refugees may not have any impact on the 
classification ‘refugee’ itself, but nevertheless make conscious use of it within 
certain frameworks in which labelling takes place (ibid.: 5, also see Mead, 
1934).  
 
Firstly, labels do not operate in a vacuum, but are created, shaped and utilized 
by institutional and bureaucratic bodies (Zetter, 2007: 180; 184). The refugee-
                                            
182 Labelling theory originates in the work of Durkheim (1952 [1897]), who argued that labels allow 
societies to categorize and thus to manage and control (especially “deviant”) individuals. This was 
later further developed by other sociologists and social theorists, such as G.H. Mead (1934) who 
postulated that an individual’s self emerges out of interactions with others. In turn, labelling is a dual 
process: although we are categorized and labelled by others (who then expect certain behaviours 
from the labelled individual), we are aware of this process, and are able to adopt and adapt multiple 
labels depending on the context and social interactions in which we find ourselves in.  
183 Although Hacking looks at the ‘scientific classifications’ of medical conditions (such as autism) by the 
medical establishment, his theories can be translated into the context of the refugee-label. 
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label is applied to those who fit into the Refugee Convention184, making them 
‘targets’ of aid and humanitarian intervention (see Chapter 3). In turn, nation 
states adopt the Refugee Convention definitions, using ‘experts’ to advise, 
regulate and control the labelled individuals by means of national policy (e.g. 
the UK Immigration Act). These labels are then debated and reflected upon in 
the wider public discourse and the media. Consequently, funding bodies, 
NGOs and RCOs adopt these labels and operate within this social policy and 
the public discourse (Hacking, 2006: 2-3). The refugee-label and the 
subsequent legal differentiations between the ‘deserving’ refugee and the 
‘undeserving’ asylum seeker and migrant, serve the interests of nation states 
to assign privileges or punishments to individuals depending on whether they 
fall within or outside of these categories. Whilst the refugee label ‘merits’ 
protection and inclusion, the latter two categories are subject to punitive 
measures by the government, and stigmatized in public discourse (Baba, 
2013, 2-4; Malkki, 2002: 356; Sales, 2002: 4734). 
 
Thus, labels are not neutral classifications of people, but create powerful, 
“convenient images”185, which are adopted by humanitarian agencies and 
liberal public discourses, portraying the refugee as a “helpless victim” of 
nationalist governments (e.g. Bhutan), war and conflict, or natural and 
environmental disasters (Malkki, 2002: 356; Zetter, 2007: 173; 176). They are 
“victims in need of humanitarian aid”, as they have been forcibly removed from 
their homelands, cultures and communities (Chatty, 2010: 56-8). Social re-
engineering in refugee camps perpetuate this assumption by creating 
dependency on relief agencies (by, for example, not allowing refugees to leave 
the camp and solely rely on agency hand-outs), fuelling the humanitarian 
paradigm of aid intervention as a response to people “in need” (Hitchcox, 
1990; cited in Colson, 2003: 10). 
 
                                            
184 Zetter (2007: 176; 188) is most vocal in criticising the inadequacy of the refugee-label, which reduces 
the complexity of forced migration and displacement into a single, all-encompassing category. 
185 Here, I compare the refugee-label to the term ‘Lhotshampa’ discussed at the onset of this chapter, 
which (similar to the refugee-label) served the interest of the Bhutanese nation state in order to define 
the ‘other’.  
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Harrell-Bond (1996) and Malkki (1997: 224) caution against this victimisation, 
as it denies refugees their agency and ability to challenge as well as utilize 
national and international systems of power. In fact, my informants very 
actively use the refugee-label in discourses with public institutions and non-
refugees, in order to highlight their protective status, as one Bhutanese 
refugee once explained: “I am a refugee, I deserve help from the government 
and people”. Ownership and the use of labels is not a one-way, top-down 
process, but the labelled individuals interact, refashion, adopt and use 
classifications for their own purposes (Gemie, 2010: 31; Hacking, 2006: 5; 
Zetter, 2007: 186). This harks back to my earlier discussion (Chapter 3) on my 
informants’ acquisition of terminology such as “miserable” to describe the 
refugee camp. For example, in conversations with non-refugees, Bhutanese 
refugees use the following narratives emphasizing this victimhood:  
 
“We came to Nepal and had to live in the refugee camp. This is a … 
sad and pathetic story with lots of trouble and hardships.” 
 
“We are deprived of our birth rights and have to live as refugees, 
and our life is a miserable plight.” 
 
“It is difficult to lead the life of a refugee.” 
 
Bhutanese refugees adopt different identities depending on the context and 
the ‘audience’, and the refugee-label serves them when they communicate 
with non-refugees (Malkki, 1992: 35). Rather than portraying refugee-ness as 
a “spoiled identity” (ibid.), the label becomes a highly-valued status, and even 
a commodity, which serves both, those who created the label, and those who 
claim the label (Zetter, 2007: 186; 188). For aid agencies, as well as for 
charitable organisations in the UK, the ‘victim-narrative’ serves to attract 
funding and donations from governmental and non-governmental bodies. For 
Bhutanese refugees, the refugee-label allows them to claim a status of the 
‘deserving’ migrant, who has to be protected, and has the right to stay in the 
UK. The consequences are immediately visible: as we saw in Bury, the British 
neighbours began to support Bhutanese refugees. In Longsight, the refugee-
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narrative was used by my informants to obtain increased support from their 
local community centre. Desiree, the manager of Northmoor Community 
Centre (NCC) asked Niraj186 to explain what happened to Bhutanese refugees, 
so she could tailor their support to them. Niraj printed out images from Nepali 
refugee camps showing desolation, destruction and their “miserable” living 
conditions, confiding to me later, that he deliberately chose “bad pictures” to 
show “how bad it was” in the camps. When I met Desiree and asked her about 
NCC’s services for Bhutanese refugees, she explained:  
 
“I never knew what happened to them [the refugees]. [Niraj] gave 
me these pictures, and I began to understand. Their lives were so 
hard. And you can’t understand and help people if you don’t 
understand their background… most people don’t know what 
happened to them. They don’t know that they lived in camps for 20 
years, and in what conditions they had to live…. They don’t know 
about the refugees. But I understand now, and can help them 
much better.” 
 
After the meeting between Niraj and Desiree, NCC offered further free services 
to Bhutanese refugees, including support that they do not normally provide 
(such as help with their RCOs). In Chapter 8, I elaborate on the financial 
benefits of adopting the refugee-label by appropriating “humanitarian 
discourses” (Zetter, 2007: 172; 188).  
 
Both Hacking (2006: 10-12) and Zetter (2007: 183; 189) argue that labelled 
individuals may resist categorisations, and take ownership and control over 
labels by means of their own institutions (RCOs) and experts (chair persons). It 
may be true that some labelled persons attempt to resist the ‘process of 
normalisation’, by which divergent individuals are encompassed into easily 
identifiable categories. Labels engender restrictions and may result in 
                                            
186 One of the four Bagale brothers (Ram, Bal, Bikram and brother of Daya mentioned above) Niraj is in 
his mid-twenties, and at the time of my fieldwork was unemployed, working (illegally) at a few South 
Asian businesses, whilst attending a higher education course in Business and Management in 
Manchester. He was one of my closest informants in the field, and was very active in Takin UK. 
However, he struggled to deal with being disappointed with resettlement in the UK (also see Chapter 
8), resulting in alcohol and substance abuse during my time in Manchester.  
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additional burdens to the labelled individuals, such as the difference between 
refugees and asylum seekers in British policy and discourse. Bhutanese 
refugees, on the other hand, use the label, rather than resist it, quickly 
adapting to the fact that the refugee-label brings with it vital advantages, 
especially by using the narrative of victimhood187.  
 
However, there is a gap between how institutions and policies fashion and use 
labels (i.e. as a means to control ‘migrants’ and foster ‘integration’), and how 
refugees themselves perceive the label (Zetter, 2007: 189). Bhutanese 
refugees use the refugee-label exactly because of the inherent victim-
narrative, which they use to legitimize their residence in the UK to non-
refugees. However, internally (amongst Bhutanese refugees) their own 
definition of the refugee-label is a powerful tool to ensure and foster a sense of 
mutuality (or difference) between them (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). Here, the 
emphasis is not on the Refugee Convention definition. Rather, most of my 
informants define their Bhutanese refugee-ness through their shared 
experience of forced migration from Bhutan, their lives in the refugee camps in 
Nepal, and their experience with organized resettlement. However, as I 
explore in Chapter 8, this interpretation of Bhutanese refugee-ness is 
contested amongst my informants, and creates a rift between them, and one is 
of the reasons for the split between the three different RCOs in Manchester. 
Therefore, labels have become tools for internal differentiations.  
 
But, Bhutanese refugees’ shared history also creates mutuality and fosters 
samaj in resettlement. Here, the emphasis is on Bhutanese Nepali-ness (rather 
than refugee-ness), which is, as I explore in the following section, defined as 





                                            
187 Also see Scott’s [2008] work on the ‘weapons of the weak’ for a detailed analysis of the everyday 
resistance of disenfranchised people.  
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Bhutanese Refugee-ness as Ethnicity 
 
 
The refugee-label and the term Lhotshampa are, as I showed above, created 
in a political and historical context, and are derived from various public and 
political discourses. This necessitates a critical look at the problematic notion 
of ethnicity. Baumann’s (1996: 10-1) research with communities in Southall 
(London) is a good example of the gap between official government 
publications and social sciences concerning the notion of identity and ethnicity:  
 
“[T]he term [culture] seems to connote a certain coherence, 
uniformity and timelessness in the meaning system of a given group, 
and to operate rather like the earlier concept of ‘race’ in identifying 
fundamentally different, essentialized, and homogenous social units 
(as when we speak about ‘a culture’)”.  
 
Cultural identity is often attributed to a ‘unique’ ethnicity in public and political 
discourses, and is assumed to be based on similar physical, cultural, linguistic 
and religious traits – a ‘culture’, which is perceived as permanent and 
homogenous within a ‘cultural community’ (Baumann, 1996: 13). This 
‘dominant view’ permeates social policies affecting refugees, especially when it 
comes to the community development approach (ibid.). 
 
When discussing the SOAS workshop with my informant Hari, he criticised 
some refugees’ self-identification as Lhotshampas, especially when filling in 
forms for resettlement and later residency in the UK. In 2011, before my 
fieldwork began, the British government conducted a national census188, to 
quantify and measure its population. Referring to this, Hari explained that 
many Bhutanese refugees were not sure what to put in the ethnicity section 
                                            
188 The 2011 Census was the first in the UK to include national identity as a question. In the ONS 
publication (2012b: 10), it is claimed that the inclusion of this data is due to “an increased interest in 
'national’ consciousness and demand from people to acknowledge their national identity” (ibid.: 2). 
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(see image189). According to Hari, almost all 
Bhutanese refugees he knew filled in “Nepali” 
or “Bhutanese Nepali” in the C. Any other 
Asian background section. However, there 
were a few who wrote Lhotshampa instead. 
Hari angrily exclaimed: “They put there 
Lhotshampa as ethnicity – don’t they know 
what ethnicity is?” 
 
These comments, as well as the debate at 
the SOAS workshop demonstrate the 
problematic nature of categorisation based on 
ethnicity and labels such as refugee-ness. 
Questions of ethnic classifications continue to 
arise not only due to the 2011 census, but on 
a daily basis when filling in official documents 
(e.g. registration with a GP, etc.) requiring 
ethnic classifications. In the following section 
I attempt to discern why these simplified 
categorisations are so compelling for policy makers and service providers, and 




The ‘dominant discourse’ 
 
Ethnicity190 can be broadly defined as a “sense of belonging to a group, based 
on shared ideas of group history, language, experience, and culture” (Chatty, 
2010: 44). But rather than seeing it as a biological fact or “primordial 
                                            
189 From http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/how-our-census-works/how-we-took-the-
2011-census/how-we-collected-the-information/questionnaires--delivery--completion-and-return/2011-
census-questions/index.html Page 8. [Accessed: 25 September 2013].  
190 The scope of this work does not allow for a critical discussion of the term ‘ethnicity’ in public, 
academic and anthropological discourses. Here, I merely use the term as a referential category of the 
dominant discourse. For further reading on ethnicity see Eriksen (1993), Gellner (1983), Rex (1996), 
Turton (2002) and Westwood and Phizacklea (2000).  




attachment” into which someone is born in, as Geertz (1963:109) has done – 
the ‘dominant discourse’ adopted by policy makers and service providers in the 
UK – ethnicity in this context is better understood as a social construct. 
Following Barth’s (1998: 14) notion of “situational ethnicity”, ethnic identity is 
created by social groups in order to “mark out a differentiated self-identity to 
create social and physical boundaries” (in Chatty, 2010: 45).  
 
As explored in Chapter 2 when outlining the history of Bhutan leading to the 
expulsion of Bhutanese Nepalese people, notions of ethnicity and nationalism 
are interrelated. In times of uncertainty or transition, ethnic identities (however 
‘imagined’) are re-invented and stressed (Chatty, 2010: 35-8). This is a dual 
process: on the one hand, nation states use ethnicity to dispossess and expel 
those who do not ‘belong’ to the mainstream ethnicity (the Ngalongs). On the 
other hand, those who are displaced adopt an identity to stress their mutuality 
in order to create a strong unified community.  
 
However, I follow Baumann's (1996) call to be cautious about reducing social 
groups to cultural and ethnic identity. Baumann (ibid.: 17; also see Barth, 
1998: 11) criticises this view as 'biological reductionism'. In Western public and 
political discourses, Baumann argues, “social complexities” are “reduced ..., 




Figure 15: The Equation of Ethnicity, Culture and Community in Public Discourses in 
the UK 
 
                                            






This equation of culture with ethnicity is applied to any person with an 
assumed “common identity”192 (ibid.: 29), such as Bhutanese refugees 
(Appadurai, 1996: 13-14; Amit et al., 2002: 463). Within political and public 
discourses in the UK, migrants are grouped into communities “based on [their] 
regional origin or migratory history”, which transcends differences between 
them (Baumann, 1996: 23; 79). Consequently, it is convenient for service 
providers to ascribe all Bhutanese refugees in the UK with the same identity, 
based on their shared origin (Bhutan and Nepal) and history of displacement, 
whereby their migratory background becomes a signifier of social and cultural 
cohesion that are fixed in time. That is, the assumption that because 
Bhutanese refugees share a specific history, they thus have a homogenous 
culture which is shared across difference, and therefore form cohesive 
communities.  
 
As Dresch (1995: 66) argues when looking at US population surveys, ethnic 
groups are comprehensive and enduring classifications, into which every 
individual within a nation state can be “conveniently pigeonholed”. The 
ethnicity-section in the UK census (see above) is an equally pragmatic 
simplification of ethnic classifications: population surveys (such as the 2011 
census) are used in policy making and in public discourse - including refugee 
resettlement policies193 - to determine, and thus to manage and control, 
diverse populations within the British nation state. 
 
However, even if individuals self-identify with a categorisation – such as 
Bhutanese refugee-ness - research with, for example, South Asian 
communities in the UK suggests that rather than adopting one “homogeneous” 
Asian culture and tradition (Richman, 2010: 446-7), migrants (and 
descendants) actively “combine and rework images, values…from what they 
see as their multiple cultural worlds, transforming each system and themselves 
in the process, and in so doing creating rich, novel forms of public culture” 
                                            
192 Gilroy (1987) and Morris (1968, both cited in Baumann, 1996: 15, 29) argue that this “stereotype of 
uniform commonality” is a “colonial construct”, based on discourses in the British Empire since the 
19th century.  
193 The ONS (2012b: 13) does, however, caution about the use of this data: “It is important to note that 
assumptions should not be made about a particular ethnic group, there are some people in ethnic 
minorities that could (or wish to) belong under any of the ‘Other’ categories.” 
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(Mines and Lamb, 2010d: 403-4). As I highlight through this thesis, the strict 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – as implied by ethnic classifications – are 
neither simple, nor static, but highly malleable and contextualized. In this 
sense, cultural identity is not fixed, but ‘syncretic’ and bound to historical and 
personal circumstances, changing and developing “like a living organism” 
(Baumann, 1996: 13), and cannot be easily grouped into convenient ethnic 
categories.  
 
Nevertheless, as I explore in the following section, these categories and labels 
have an impact on how people are perceived (within the political and public 




Bhutanese refugees as an ethnic identity? 
 
Population surveys, such as the 2011 census, allow individuals to tick a box 
that resembles their “cultural backgrounds”. This self-identification is closely 
tied to how people perceive themselves when faced with the question of ethnic 
classifications, and is thus related to “identity making” (Dresch, 1995: 70).  
 
First and foremost, my informants stress their Nepali identity, by means of 
shared values and norms (see Chapter 7); language (Nepali194), and social 
practices (e.g. dietary habits; celebration of Nepali New Year, rather than 
Losar, the Bhutanese New Year). This is not to say that they evoke a national 
identity195, which signifies belonging to a specific national territory (e.g. Bhutan 
or Nepal) and a common national history and culture (Voiscu, 2013: 171). 
Rather, my informants’ experience of (forced) migration created a 
“hyphenated” and “deterritorialised” identity - Bhutanese Nepalese-ness – 
which is not tied to any nation state (Bromley, 2000: 14; Kalra et al., 2005: 33). 
That is, they perceive themselves as distinct from the Nepali (and Bhutanese) 
national identity and ethnicity through a shared history of ‘refugee-ness’. 
                                            
194 A particular form of Nepali which was re-worked during 200 years of life in Bhutan.  
195 Which has to be distinguished from nationalism, as defined by Gellner (1983) – see Chapter 2.  
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Therefore, commonality for my informants is situational rather than an a priori 
biological fact based on ethnicity (Barth, 1998: 14). Their Bhutanese refugee-
ness is not only determined by the characteristics they share with Nepali 
people – and which distinguishes them from drukpas – but more importantly by 
the particular situations and circumstances they found themselves in since the 
1980s. However, these similarities do not make them a distinct ‘ethnic group’ 
comprised of easily classifiable individuals who share a common culture and 
nationality.  
 
Bhutanese refugee-ness is not an ethnic category. However, the self-
identification as a Bhutanese refugee suffices to generate a sense of 
belonging that is highly symbolic - albeit imagined196 – creating a sense of 
mutuality between them. Their common identity is shaped by various external 
and internal forces within the context of displacement, camp life, aid 
intervention, and resettlement (Bromley, 2000: 6-8), and thus produces new 
forms of identifications that are “somewhere in-between” (ibid.: 3), rather than 
being bound by a particular locality and socio-cultural affiliations (Mohan, 
2002: 98-9).  
 
Nonetheless, through social re-engineering in the refugee camps in Nepal and 
their experiences with service providers and the public through resettlement 
and in the UK, my informants quickly adopted the ethnicity label (although they 
may not use the word ‘ethnicity’ in English or Nepali), portraying Bhutanese 
refugee-ness as a unique aspect of their ‘imagined’ ethnicity, and therefore 
securing advantages (such as funding) reserved for these social groups (see 
Chapter 8), making them what Kelly (2003) calls a “contingent community” 
(see Chapter 4). As such, ethnic classifications are not merely Western 
categories applied from above, but are used by social groups themselves to 
adapt and respond to state politics (Amit et al., 2002: Loc 939). However, the 
conscious adaption of these dominant public and political discourses, and their 
portrayal of themselves as a unique Bhutanese refugee community is directed 
                                            
196 That is, although the more than 100,000 Bhutanese refugees may never meet face-to-face, nor have 
anything in common on an individual level, and do not inhabit one geographical nation state, they 




outwards in conversation with official governmental and non-governmental 
bodies, rather than employing these classifications amongst themselves.  
 
In the following section, I show that, contrary to policy makers’ and service 
providers’ assumptions, samaj and RCOs are not ethnic communities. My 
informants may employ this notion in order to be eligible for funding (see 
Chapter 8), demonstrating that (forced) migrant communities make use of top-
down classifications in order to gain advantages.  
 
 
An ethnic community? 
 
As discussed above, the normalisation of streamlined ethnic classifications in 
political and public discourses allows the stereotypical, oversimplified 
categorisation of groups as for example a “Black” or an “Asian community” 
(Baumann, 1996: 15). These groups then adopt these notions to portray 
themselves as one cohesive social group vis-à-vis the white British host 
population197. Bhutanese refugees consciously use the refugee-label and 
emphasize their “unique” community in public discourses, in order to portray 
themselves as a small, cohesive group in need of protection and support from 
the British host community and policy makers. 
 
At the same time, the ‘white majority’ creates ethnic communities different to 
their own, in order to make sense of the extensive diversity of migrants in the 
UK. Within this public discourse ‘community’ becomes a “polite term for ethnic 
minority” (ibid.), classified by either physiological commonalities or common 
geographical origin (e.g. South Asia). Similarly, the CDA in Bhutanese refugee 
camps and in resettlement requires an equally simple equation198:  
                                            
197 E.g. see Hall (1996) and Baumann (1996) on the adoption of term “Blackness” amongst Afro-
Caribbean and South Asian migrants in the 1950s and 1960s.  




Figure 16: Equation of Bhutanese refugee-ness with Bhutanese community 
 
As Ignatieff (1992, cited in Baumann, 1996) argues:  
 
“Community is a dishonest word. … It is invariably a party to pious 
fraud. Ethnic minorities are called ‘communities’ either because it 
makes them feel better, or because it makes the white majority feel 
more secure”. 
 
Membership of a community (as a social group or network) does not depend 
on behaviour, but on constructing and agreeing upon shared sets of histories, 
symbols and values within certain boundaries that determine who is and who 
is not a member (Rapport et. al. 2000: 62-3). It is, to remind us of Cohen 
(1985), symbolic, as it serves to represent something or someone, rather than 
being ‘factual’ and the “result of a natural process” (Voiscu, 2013: 171).  
 
What a Bhutanese refugee is, and who can claim this classification, and thus 
belongs to samaj and RCOs, is changing and adapted to the context in which 
my informants find themselves (see Chapter 7). It may be emphasised – for 
example, in comparison with other refugees – or downplayed, for instance, 
when young refugees attempt to “fit in” with the British mainstream society, as I 
demonstrated above. That is, Bhutanese refugees may share certain traits, but 
this does not mean that they share an identity, or sense of belonging, and 
therefore create one cohesive social group, or a Bhutanese refugee 
community. Rather, as I show throughout this work, communities also operate 
my means of ‘othering’ and the establishment of boundaries that determine 




















However, Baumann (1996: 159, 161) outlines how community leaders in 
Southall (London) must assure that they represent their community as a 
“monolithic body of lifestyles and convictions … shared amongst all their 
constituents” (my emphasis) in order to be eligible for funding. Bhutanese RCO 
leaders in Manchester have to adopt the same dominant discourse, portraying 
their RCOs as inclusive, harmonious support networks that unify and celebrate 
their ‘unique’ Bhutanese Nepali-ness (see Chapter 9). RCO board members 
must demonstrate that they can speak for the whole community199, regardless 
of internal differences. However, leaders are not always representative of the 
community they supposedly serve, or are able to fulfil the multiple wishes of all 
members (Griffiths et al., 2006: 892; Baumann, 1996: 66), as I discuss in 
Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
Nevertheless, when it comes to RCOs, Bhutanese refugees have to adopt and 
comply with the dominant discourse in order to be eligible for funding. 
Therefore, they have to adopt the notion of a bounded, homogeneous ethnic 
group. This is emphasized in the RCO constitutions (see Chapter 8 and 
Appendix 2), which stresses the inclusiveness and distinctiveness of 
Bhutanese refugees in the UK, with ‘culture’ as the ultimate axiom. This is 
mirrored in Baumann’s (1996: 15) work, in which members of social groups 
opportunistically use the notion of ethnicity in public discourses, exploiting the 
general public’s and media’s perception of community as a purely positive 
force, implying “interpersonal warmth, shared interests and loyalty”. However, 
as I show in Chapter 9, internal problems between Bhutanese refugees in 
Manchester emerged exactly because some members criticised the 
assumption that everyone shares the same socio-cultural characteristics and 
practices. 
 
Here arises the question of ‘authenticity’ of ‘unique’ ethnic cultures which 
RCOs strive to represent. For example, Boddy (1995: 30) describes the severe 
pressure her Sudanese refugee informants (in Toronto, Canada) experience, 
to define and reiterate an ‘authentic’ Sudanese culture that is distinct from 
                                            
199 As Baumann (1996: 64) argues, this representativeness further increases the social capital leaders 
obtain – see Chapter 8.  
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other cultures, and is therefore in need to be protected (by means of e.g. 
funding). The wording my informants employ in their constitutions and on 
funding applications – for example, to celebrate “Bhutanese culture” – is 
ambiguous and vague, reflecting the notion that in public discourses in the UK, 
terms such as ‘culture’ and ‘community’ mean ‘everything and nothing’, and 
that ‘authenticity’ is subject to shared discourses, rather than based on ‘facts’.  
 
Baumann (1996: 192) understandably criticises the “hegemonic language” and 
bureaucratic practices migrants must comply with, in order to be eligible for 
support. Ultimately, the external representations of RCOs say more about the 
bureaucratic landscape and the dominant discourse in the UK than it does 
about Bhutanese refugees, emphasizing my argument (see Chapter 9), that 
Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester are formalized British organisations with non-






In this thesis, I explore the importance of community – both as samaj and as in 
relation to RCOs – for Bhutanese refugees in the UK. As I have shown in this 
chapter, community membership is tied to creating and re-inventing identities 
over time and across difference (Bromley, 2000: 5). The complexity of these 
processes is demonstrated by my informants’ use of Bhutanese refugee-ness 
as an ethnicity (rather than the term Lhotshampa) vis-à-vis other refugee- and 
migrant groups in the UK, in order to portray themselves as one, cohesive 
community distinguished from other migrant groups, such as other South 
Asians.  
 
As I illustrated above, the creation of the refugee-label is an important 
classification, especially in comparison to non-refugees. The adoption of labels 
engenders advantages for the community, such as funding or access to 
facilities (see Chapter 9). However, these processes occur within a specific 
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local context in the UK, and are therefore not reflections of ‘traditional’ 
Bhutanese Nepalese identities (if there ever was such a thing). Similar to 
‘community’, ‘identity’ and a sense of belonging to a social group is tinged by 
external influences and specific histories. As Voiscu (2013: 163-4) so aptly 
states: 
 
“[C]ultural identity is a…. matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’. It 
belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something 
which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. 
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But like 
everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation”. 
 
In the following chapter, I explore this transformation by providing a detailed 
ethnography of arrival, in which life (in the UK) is “beginning”. It illustrates the 
practical notions of community as support network, but also highlights that 
contrary to my informants’ hopes, their expectations may not be fulfilled in 
resettlement. It is here where community becomes a tool to ensure support. 
However, the arrival in the UK also marks the initiation into both samaj and 
RCOs, and the inherent creation of similarity and difference within the divided 










In late 2011 and early 2012, Refugee Youth UK200 – a British charity 
supporting young (under 25 year olds) refugees and asylum seekers in the UK 
– invited Bhutanese children and teenagers in Manchester to participate in a 
film project in order to create a five-minute short film about their lives in the UK. 
By working closely with professional film makers, Bhutanese youth in 
Manchester were urged to film their experience of resettlement in the UK, 
juxtaposed with young British people, in order to illustrate the differences (and 
indeed, similarities) between life in Bhutan, the refugee camps in Nepal, and in 
the UK. My teenage informants stressed that they chose the title “Life 
Beginning” for their short film themselves, and, as stated in the film, the title 
signifies that the film “is about our new lives in the UK” (Life Beginning, 2011).  
 
The choice of the title carries with it a lot of meaning, expressed by all my 
informants in the UK. For most, arriving in the UK felt as if a new life was about 
to begin – a life expected to be full of happiness, wealth and comfort. However, 
as Williams (2006: 869) argues, newly arrived migrants quickly realize that 
there are barriers to their hopes and aspirations for a “better life”. When I 
began fieldwork in Autumn 2012, the Bhutanese refugees’ sense of excitement 
was not yet diminished, but severely bruised: many – especially the young and 
educated – had high expectations on arrival, but only a few of these were 
realized in practice, even after staying in the UK for two years. It then became 
the role of the Bhutanese community – both samaj and the formalized RCOs – 
to help newly arrived refugees manage these expectations, and to make them 
understand that some presuppositions may not come true. When Bhutanese 
refugees arrive in the UK201, as I will illustrate further below, it is the Bhutanese 
                                            
200 See http://www.refugeeyouth.org/about-us/  
201 Or did arrive: Bhutanese refugee resettlement via the UK Gateway Protection Programme officially 
ended in December 2014, and the UK does not accept any further Bhutanese refugees via the 
resettlement programme. The last new arrivals came to the UK in Summer 2014. However, according 
to my informants, Bhutanese refugees already in the UK have the possibility to apply for family 
reunion – that is, they can petition the UK government (Home Office) to allow resettlement from Nepal 
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refugee community that provides support to new arrivals – a term coined and 
used by my informants to describe those refugees who just arrived in the UK202 
– and it is here where the role of RCOs is both most relevant as well as 
contested.  
 
Refugee resettlement is a significant, life-changing event in the lives of my 
informants. Similar to their expulsion from Bhutan in the late 80s and early 90s, 
they have to gather their belongings once more, carefully deciding what to take 
with them203, and bid farewell to a camp that may have been “miserable”, but 
nevertheless was “home” for the last two decades. From here, they embark on 
a day-long plane journey (for almost all of them their first) to settle in a new 
country with unfamiliar customs, technologies and weather. Most refugees had 
never set foot in an urban space such as Nepal's capital Kathmandu, and the 
prospect of moving to an urban centre somewhere in the global North was 
daunting for many. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, all Bhutanese refugees arriving in the UK are 
settled in the North of England, and almost without exception arrive at 
Manchester Airport204. This allows the Bhutanese refugee community in 
Manchester to “welcome the new arrivals” at the airport, although the arrival is 
facilitated by the IOM and service providers such as Refugee Action UK. The 
refugee welcome party cannot do more than say hello, before social workers 
usher the new arrivals to their new homes. The ethnographic case study 
outlined below will provide a glimpse of the kind of experience that Bhutanese 
refugees typically have when they arrive in the UK for resettlement.  
 
But whilst for the new arrivals during my fieldwork certain facilities and 
                                                                                                                              
for family members. However, the bureaucratic process is highly complicated and requires legal 
documentation, something that Bhutanese refugees may find hard to attain. 
202For clarification of terminology used by my informants: “new arrivals” are all refugees who arrive from 
refugee camps in Nepal up to three to six months in which they still receive governmental or non-
governmental support from resettlement agencies. Once this support is phased out by service 
providers, refugees undergo what could be termed a rite of passage, and are considered “established 
refugees”, who have the skill, experience and know-how to live without support from outside of the 
community. To be an 'established refugee' also means to have higher social and often economic 
capital, which results in a higher social status within the refugee community (see Chapter 8). 
203 According to my informants, they were only allowed to bring a bag of 23kg per person.  
204 The largest airport in the North of England, with many international flights.  
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communities were already in place, the 'pioneers' of resettlement who arrived 
in late summer and autumn 2010 did not have these elements available, and 
their experiences differed greatly from the new arrivals in 2012-13205. They 
were the ones who truly arrived at the unknown and the unfamiliar. The 
support network new arrivals find in Manchester creates a sense of certainty, 
but also attunes them to the divisions that exist in the Bhutanese refugee 
community. Regardless of their views and opinions of these RCO divisions, 
new arrivals have no choice but to surrender themselves to the authority of 
'established refugees' and their history of arguments and animosities.  
 
Indeed, it is 'Life Beginning' in resettlement, but within constraints created not 
only by British law and society, but also by their own refugee community. New 
arrivals have to confront both internecine arguments, and the realities of life in 
the UK. Therefore, in this chapter I illustrate the experience of arrival, settling 
in, and lastly managing their aspirations - the “cultural forces that drive people 
to build and rebuild their worlds in the face of often daunting challenges” 
(Bunnell and Goh, 2012: 1). Here, I illustrate how Bhutanese refugees frame 
their expectations within limited ‘opportunity structures’ (see further below), 
and how established refugees assist new arrivals with the management of 






On a chilly morning in January 2013, Niraj and Bikram invited me to come 
along to welcome their didi (elder sister) at Manchester airport. Niraj bought a 
cheap mobile phone and prepaid SIM card for them, and during our journey 
from Longsight, saved the “most important” phone numbers of family and 
friends already in the UK onto the new phone. Niraj mentioned whilst typing on 
the phone that he saves these numbers on the phone in order that new arrivals 
may call him “when they are in the house and the people [social workers] go 
                                            
205 As I outline in Chapter 9, the division between Bhutanese RCOs has its origin in an arrival scene in 





Once we were in the international arrival hall of Manchester airport, we saw 
two people – an older British man and a young woman – with International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) T-Shirts already waiting at the barriers, eyes 
fixed on the automatic door through which arriving passengers step. We 
exchanged a few greetings (also see Introduction), although Niraj later 
remarked that the IOM team normally ignores the welcome committee from the 
Bhutanese community:  
 
“We come here, always, when new arrivals come, you know. We 
bring flowers and give phone. They [IOM team] don't like it. Why 
don't like it? All of us – we are refugees, you know, we have to help 
[new arrivals]. You are scared when you come here, it's all new, and 
very big. Nobody speak Nepali, only English. …. 'No time, no time' 
they say, but my eyes are tired. ... But they don't care, you know, 
they only want [us] to shut up. It's stupid”. 
 
My informants' experiences and rhetoric about service providers such as the 
IOM was not new to me. Yumi (a native community support worker, see 
Chapter 8) described the arrival as an “assembly line system”, not allowing 
new arrivals time to adjust: “these people arrive after a 13-hour flight, they are 
exhausted ... and jet-lagged. But [service provider] don't give them a break”. 
 
The (perceived) lack of service provision is not the only problem on arrival in 
the UK. At the airport, Bikram quickly turned our conversation from criticising 
British service providers to RCO divisions:  
 
“Welfare comes here, you know, and the Christians too. When we 
[Takin] come here, and they are here, they don't talk with us… and 
when [new arrivals] come, they tell them Takin is bad. So we tell 
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them that Welfare is bad. But people know about Mali 206, people 
talk”.  
 
This suggests that the divisions between Bhutanese RCOs and the importance 
of community membership are already relevant on arrival in the UK - although, 
on this occasion no other RCO spokesperson was at the airport. Bikram 
explained that the other RCOs know that these particular new arrivals are kin 
of Takin members, and therefore “don’t care”.  
 
Waiting in the arrival hall, it intrigued me once more that the RCO divisions are 
persistently talked about amongst my informants, even on such a joyful 
occasion as the arrival of a family member. I began to wonder what impact 
these divisions and debates may have on new arrivals. As stated by Yumi, 
refugees arrive exhausted after what is for most their first flight, experiencing a 
new country, and are immediately in the midst of community divisions, in which 
each of the three RCOs woo for the new arrival to become a member. As RCO 
affiliations have an impact on relationships for Bhutanese refugees in 
Manchester, the decision to join (or not join) a particular RCO during their first 
weeks in the UK is an important one, although the affiliation may change, and 
membership can be revoked or taken on at any given time207.  
 
Therefore, the arrival is more than just an arrival in a new country, but also an 
arrival in a new community of Bhutanese refugees, and decisions made in the 
first days after arrival can determine the long-term experience with samaj. On 
the surface, Bhutanese refugees emphasize equality, sharing the same 
historic, social and cultural experience of refugee-ness and resettlement. This 
‘imagined’ sameness leads to the assumption that they are one coherent and 
all-encompassing community. In reality however, differences persist: 
education, gender, religion (Hinduism and Christianity) and personality have an 
impact on hierarchical structures amongst Bhutanese refugees. After arrival, 
                                            
206 He refers to events in the refugee camps prior to resettlement, involving the Mali brothers being 
accused of embezzling money. This forms part of the community division between Takin and Welfare, 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
207 Yet, “people talk”, as Bhutanese refugees always remind me, and to attempt to join all RCOs or switch 
between them is frowned upon by my informants (see Chapters 8 and 9).  
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the acquisition of social and cultural capital, as well as linguistic skills, 
determine one's position within the community (Chapter 7).  
 
On this January morning, only Takin members welcomed the new arrivals. The 
other RCOs were aware that the new arrivals are kin of the Gadal family, who 
are part of the founding of Takin. Moreover, the Gurungs are Hindus, and 
therefore of no interest to the Christian RCO at this point. Therefore there were 
no BWA and HNC members welcoming the Gurungs208. Thus, unbeknown to 
the family arriving in the UK, their community affiliation has already been 
decided by the established refugees in Manchester, before they even touched 
down on British soil. 
 
As I pondered these questions and listened to Niraj and Bikram's conversation, 
the plane landed, and we eagerly waited for the Gurungs to exit. Niraj's 
anticipation was palpable – he had a long friendship with his cousin Durba, a 
few years his junior, but could not maintain the relationship in resettlement, as 
Durba had neither internet nor phone access on a regular basis. Whilst Niraj 
entered education in the UK, and supported his family by working in Asian 
restaurants, it was said that Durba developed a taste for alcohol and drugs in 
the camps, and quit camp school. Tapping his foot on the banister in front of 
the exit door, Niraj remarked  
 
“I can't wait, you know. [Durba] needs our help! We need to guide 
him, help him, so he can help the family. ... He must have 
responsibility now, and make his life here in England. Everything is 
here, so he can get better. ... It's good he comes here, ... but I hope 
he lives not far away.”  
 
Niraj touched on several important points with this statement. Firstly, he 
regards it as his duty to support the new arrivals, and as having the necessary 
know-how to advise his peer about what is 'proper' here in the UK. Almost all 
my informants emulated this sense of providing support, which is often driven 
                                            
208 According to my two companions on the day, if different RCO representatives are present at the 
airport, they try their utmost to “ignore” each other.  
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by the insufficient service provision by governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. In turn, these support-networks create and foster social bonds 
for both samaj and RCOs (Spicer, 2008: 504).  
 
Furthermore, Niraj’s statement shows that young people are under mounting 
pressure to support their families. It was widely assumed amongst my 
informants that children and young people find resettlement less difficult than 
older generations, becoming ‘liminal experts’ (Chapter 8). The teenaged Durba 
was supposed to take over a similar supporting role once he arrives in the UK. 
These expectations are taken-for-granted assumptions for all my informants, 
although the new arrivals may not be aware of it before coming to the UK. This 
put pressure on young refugees who just arrived from the camp.  
 
Moreover, Niraj's comment summarises the general perception of the UK and 
life in the UK: “everything is here, so he can get better”. Most of my informants 
perceive resettlement as highly positive, and England or the West in general is 
seen as “modern”, “advanced”, “free” and “full of possibilities”. However, as I 
explore further below, these expectations may not always be fulfilled.  
 
Lastly, Niraj hoped that the Gurungs would not live “far away”. Arriving at 
Manchester Airport did not automatically mean that refugees would be settled 
in the city, but may be sent to Leeds, Sheffield or Bradford, depending on the 
availability of housing and services. Due to my lack of access to service 
providers and policy makers, I never discovered exactly how and why the 
decisions are made to resettle refugees to specific places, and whether to 
place them in e.g. council houses or privately rented accommodation209.  
 
Whilst it was common for service providers to inform at least a few Bhutanese 
refugees of new arrivals, and sometimes even provide exact arrival times, the 
established refugees were never told where the new arrivals would be brought 
                                            
209 Personal conversations with RAUK volunteers (who would not reveal much of the actual procedure) 
suggest that these decisions are mainly based on availability and funds. If cheap housing is available 
in Manchester, it was often attempted to settle Bhutanese refugees within the city. However, service 
providers were struggling for funding during my fieldwork, and it was often cheaper to settle refugees 
in smaller towns rather than urban centres.  
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to. When we asked the IOM worker at the airport, he apologized that due to 
“data protection” he is not “allowed to tell” us210. Niraj asked if we could come 
with them to the new house, which was again denied: “For insurance purposes 
we can't take you on our bus, I'm sorry. … You have all day to visit them later”. 
 
When the door finally opened and the Gurungs stepped out to be greeted by 
the IOM workers, Niraj and Bikram hardly had time to welcome them. The 
Nepali IOM support worker, who travelled all the way from Kathmandu with the 
Gurungs, quickly ushered them on, ordering them to sit down on the benches 
in the arrival hall, be silent and wait. What surprised me at first was that Durba 
and his much younger brother (five years old) and sister (seven years old) only 
wore T-Shirts and flip-flops, despite the freezing temperatures outside. Mrs. 
Gurung wore a red sari and a worn-out woollen 
jumper, whilst her husband sat down shivering in 
khaki trousers, T-shirt and sandals. These five 
people only carried three large bags, and each 
carried a white plastic bag with the IOM logo 
printed on in bright blue211 (see Figure 17212). The 
Nepali IOM worker (who was wearing a thick 
jacket and heavy boots, well equipped for a chilly 
January day in the UK) urged them to wait for the 
other case workers, folded his hands in a farewell greeting and walked away. 
Mr. Gurung was visibly confused, whilst his wife exchanged brief formalities 
with Niraj and Bikram. Durba seemed more awake and aware of the new 
surroundings. A skinny teenager with spiky hair, he looked around with a 
beaming smile, and was eager to listen to Niraj, who handed over the mobile 
phone and explained how it works, and what he would have to do once the 
case workers were gone. In Nepali, Niraj whispered that they should not worry 
                                            
210 As per a later private correspondence with a volunteer at RAUK, this “data protection” should 
safeguard families in case of conflict and arguments that may have been “imported” from the country 
of origin (or the refugee camp), especially for “vulnerable individuals”, such as women and children 
who fled from abuse.  
211 The plastic bag contained only one thing: the refugees' lung x-rays. All refugees are obliged to have 
their lungs x-rayed before resettlement to proof that they do not carry tuberculosis. Those who do 
suffer from TB are not allowed to resettle until they are “cleared”. Refugees have to show these x-rays 
at immigration on arrival. Most of my informants said that they threw them away after arriving, as they 
are not obliged to keep them, and have no need for it. 
212 From http://liberia.iom.int/iom-logo-iom-oim-iom-blue-2/ [Accessed: 10 May 2015].  
Figure 17: IOM Logo 
170 
 
if they don't understand everything the case workers explain as “we will come 
later, and help you”.  
 
A few minutes later, the IOM support worker urged them in English: “Get up, 
come on now, we have to go, our bus is waiting”, and handed each of the 
family members a bottle of water. The Gurungs stared at him unmoving, clearly 
not understanding a word he said, until Niraj translated and assured them that 
we would visit them later. They were ushered outside, where a fierce breeze of 
cold air greeted the new arrivals. It was obvious that they were very cold, and 
even Durba rubbed his naked arms to warm them213. 
 
 
Welcome to Manchester 
 
This detailed ethnographic anecdote demonstrates several relevant points. 
Firstly, established refugees perceive new arrivals as in need of support. It 
reveals the commitment of my informants to advise and assist them in what is 
perceived as a “very difficult” situation on arrival. It is exactly because 
governmental and non-governmental service provision are regarded as 
inadequate and “rushed” by my informants, that established refugees feel the 
need to support new arrivals214. As they have been in similar situations on 
arrival, established refugees know exactly what difficulties new arrivals are 
facing, and often mention that they “know better than the NGOs” who facilitate 
resettlement.  
 
The perceived lack of empathy or care by service providers leads to RCOs 
feeling obliged to provide extra support, whilst still maintaining that assistance 
depends on kinship relations and community membership. As outlined above, 
the Gurungs were only received by us, rather than by other RCO 
                                            
213 Bikram complained later that the IOM should tell people that “in England it's very cold, you must wear 
good clothes when you go, give your children good clothes”. We only discovered later that the 
Gurungs had winter clothes packed in their luggage, as they have not been advised prior to their 
departure that it may be very cold in the UK in January. 
214 Support of new arrivals begins before resettlement by sending remittances to Nepal, which is only 
possible if established refugees acquired the economic means to do so. For example, the Gadal 
family sent funds to the Gurungs before they arrived in the UK.  
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spokespeople due to the fact that they are related to members of Takin (rather 
than Welfare) and that they are Hindus (rather than Christians). Therefore, 
solidarity, or the much emphasised equality amongst Bhutanese refugees has 
strict boundaries: support is only provided for the benefit of RCO members 
(also see Chapters 8 and 9).  
 
If one does not join an organisation, less or no assistance is given, as was the 
case with Raja, as he later recalled when discussing his arrival in May 2013. 
Raja – whom we already encountered in previous chapters - settled in Bury, a 
suburb of Manchester dominated by Welfare members. A day after his arrival, 
Welfare spokespeople visited Raja’s house, and offered support if – and only if 
– Raja and his household joined Welfare. Raja argued that he does not 
appreciate being “blackmailed” into any RCO, and as he refused to join the 
RCO, Welfare spokespeople did not provide support to him and his family on 
arrival. As a Christian convert, Raja and his family received support and advice 
from the Christian RCO after he joined their congregation in Rochdale. Raja 
has the advantage that he speaks almost fluent English, and that he lived in an 
urban area before through working near New Delhi (India) for many years. 
Therefore, he argues that the adjustment to living in the UK is not as difficult 
for him as for most other Bhutanese refugees, who do not speak English and 
have never set foot outside of the refugee camps in Nepal and who used to 
live in rural areas of Bhutan.  
 
These examples demonstrate that whilst Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester 
emphasize in official and public statements that they offer support for all new 
arrivals in order to allow them to ‘settle in’ to their new lives, kinship relations, 
personal animosities and religion play a part in determining who “deserves” 
support and who does not. Yet, throughout my fieldwork, there was no 
individual or household that was ostracized from all RCOs – sooner or later, all 
Bhutanese refugees become members or affiliated themselves with one RCO 
or another, and receive support from them. The beginning of a new life in the 
UK is also the beginning (or, in some cases, continuation) of new relationships 




The arrival scene also demonstrates that the period of transition from Nepal to 
the UK is not complete when touching down on British soil. The lack of 
language skills, the unfamiliarity with air travel, technologies, the weather and 
'the way of life’ impedes an immediate ‘adaptation’ to the new lives in the UK. 
Life may be 'beginning' on arrival, but as stated by one informant, the new 
arrivals “are like children, we have to patient with them. They are learning”. 
They are not only learning to be in a new community – both the one comprised 
of Bhutanese refugees as well as the (British) host population – but also learn 
how to live this new life in the UK. In the following section I explore some of the 
issues and new experiences Bhutanese refugees have when arriving in the 
UK, and conclude the chapter with an illustration of how previously attained 
expectations about the UK and their lives there have to be carefully managed, 
in order to impede disappointment. In both cases, the Bhutanese refugee 







The arrival of Bhutanese refugees in the UK follows the same schedule and 
programme for service providers: IOM workers collect refugees from the 
airport, and bring them to their new accommodation, which are normally fully or 
partially furnished houses or flats. There they are received and welcomed by 
their case workers from RAUK and a Nepali translator. Firstly, the case 
workers and translator show the new arrivals their house. The refugees are 
inducted in household appliances with emphasis placed on health and safety. 
They are introduced to electric or gas stoves, stressing that the residents have 
to assure that it is off after cooking. They are told that a fridge and a freezer 
are not the same, outlining what belongs in a fridge and what should go into a 
freezer. When talking about her arrival, Daya recalled laughingly that initially 
she put all vegetables in the freezer, being surprised that they are frozen “like 
a stone”. New arrivals are shown how a toilet flush works, and how to switch 
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on the shower and bath. Most have never used a shower before, and some 
older refugees still only take 'bucket showers': filling buckets with water and 
washing themselves with hand jugs. Then they are shown smaller kitchen 
appliances (e.g. kettle, washing machine, microwave), fire alarms and fire 
safety equipment (e.g. fire extinguisher and fire blankets). Last but not least, 
they are instructed in how a boiler and central heating works.  
 
 
“They say 'press the button'” 
 
The excitement about new technologies and appliances is recalled in 
hindsight, but the reality of arrival is very different and overwhelming. Unnayak 
wrote for the SOAS workshop publication: 
 
“Everything was ready for us when we arrived. Washing machines, 
can openers, electric ovens, stoves and central heating were new to 
most of us: in the beginning, we found it somewhat difficult to handle 
the kitchen equipment, particularly the electric stove. It took us a few 
weeks to learn our way around these things” (EBHR, 43: 190). 
 
In a conversation with Yumi, she lingered on the “issue of buttons”: 
 
“[Social workers] do everything quick, like on an assembly line, 
ticking all the boxes 'yes, we have shown and explained all of this', 
then they go home and get paid. The interpreter only translates 
what the social worker is saying. The arrivals are tired, exhausted, 
sad to leave [Nepal], but [the social workers] don't give them a 
break. They say 'press the button', but the new arrivals don't even 
know what a button is. People didn't eat for three days because 
they didn't know how a stove works”! 
 
When I asked Yumi why the new arrivals would not ask questions or mention if 




“They are too shy to speak up and they don't speak English! But 
they are also too grateful! They tell me: 'Yumi, we are so happy! 
[The UK government] give us houses, unlimited stay, so why should 
we complain?' ... So, what do they do? They call us and the 
community. … Now, the community is good, they are organised, and 
they know when people arrive. ... They already buy things, cook and 
have everything ready. When the social workers leave, they go 
there and help them, explain everything again – not quick, … but 
slowly, so they can understand”. 
 
The equation of new arrivals with children was common, and often repeated in 
the field. I often heard my informants recall that they felt like children on arrival 
– tired, exhausted, worn-out, but also excited, happy and curious – and in 
need of learning, acquiring the know-how to live in an English house, urban 
space and community. The need to learn how to live in the UK is what makes 
community so relevant for new arrivals: whom should they ask for help once 
the case workers have left? Established refugees knew about these difficulties, 
as they had similar experiences and thus saw it as their responsibility to 
provide support in these confusing first days after arrival. Kiptinness et al. 
(2011: 84) report the same for Bhutanese refugees in the USA, highlighting 
that new arrivals rely on established refugees to disseminate information, 
especially how to get around the city, where to shop (for familiar groceries) and 
how to access temples and churches.  
 
All informants arriving in the UK during my fieldwork expressed their gratitude 
for this community support provided by all three RCOs or individual refugees. 
They felt more comfortable and at ease to ask their fellow refugees to explain 
the electric stove for the third time, or why they should only boil water in a 
kettle rather than trying to make chai in it. Rukmini – a single mother of two 






“I would have been lost without [the community]. I was so scared 
when I came here, everything was new and our house was so big. I 
didn't like it here in the beginning, because I was so scared of doing 
something wrong. My boys tried everything in the house, but I told 
them to be careful – what if we break something? Will they send us 
back to Nepal or will we have to move out and live on the street? 
But then the community came, and explained everything to me. … 
They are so kind, and explain things slowly, and I was not scared to 
ask when I did not understand. ... I was only happy when they came 
to my house and helped me – I began to feel at home” (BRFP).  
 
Other research (e.g. Williams, 2006) mirrors my findings that refugees trust 
other refugees’ advice and information more than those of service providers. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, within samaj trust is important and indeed 
expected, and therefore, the established refugees’ advice and support is seen 
as reliable by new arrivals.  
 
Similar to Rukmini's family, the Gurungs were visited later that day in January 
by the Gadal and Bagale family, who had already prepared boxes and bags full 
of clothes, crockery, familiar groceries and some other items such as alarm 
clocks215, washing powder and puja216 items. If children are amongst new 
arrivals, the welcome committee would bring toys and notebooks. But the 
arrival and welcome is not only marked by instructions and gifts, but also by 
coming together as a family and community, sitting together sharing memories 
and gossip whilst enjoying chai. New arrivals talk about their journey as well as 
bringing news from the camp. Established refugees share gossip and news 
about the local community in the UK, and bring the new arrivals up to date 
about births, marriages and deaths. 
 
On their arrival day, the Gurungs showed that they were happy about the 
                                            
215 Alarm clocks were important after arrival, as new arrivals have a very strict schedule of appointments 
they have to attend in the first few days and weeks after arrival. If they miss an appointment this could 
have severe consequences for service provision and a delay in pay-out of benefit and welfare 
payments refugees are entitled to in the UK. 
216 Puja are Hindu prayer rituals conducted either at home (at the home-made puja shrine, displaying 
various Hindu god statues) or in mandir (Hindu temple).  
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community visit (which I attended with my informants). Mrs. Gurung even 
dared an almost toothless smile, laughing about the stories and anecdotes told 
during the gathering. The Gadals already cooked meals in big pots, which they 
brought from Longsight to Swindon (where the Gurungs were settled) by taxi. 
Daya heated the food on the stove, slowly explaining to Mrs. Gurung how 
stoves work whilst stirring the vegetable curry. Both Mrs. and Mr. Gurung 
remarked on the rushed welcome at the airport, and the fact that the case 
workers and the translator explained everything too quickly for them to 
understand. 
 
Immediately after arrival, the priorities for new arrivals are to get a UK bank 
account and visit the Job Centre (both with their assigned caseworker), in 
order to get welfare and benefit payments. But because they lack the language 
skills and expertise, and although they have case workers supporting them 
throughout the first weeks after arrival, established refugees still have to invest 
time and in some instances money to support new arrivals (also see Chapter 
8). 
 
Although life may be “beginning’, many new arrivals experience 
disenchantment with the UK, contrary to their initial amazement with 
technology, consumer culture and infrastructures. Bhutanese refugees need to 
learn to manage their expectations on arrival. Often, new arrivals are 
astonished by the lack of property-ownership (none of my informants could 
afford to buy a house or car), as well as the marginalisation from the labour 
market amongst established refugees. They expected that the UK (or the 
global North) would allow all of them to purchase property and goods within 
only a few months, gain well-paid employment, and “have the good life”, as 
one of my informants once joked. In the following section I outline how the 
Bhutanese refugee community – both as samaj and RCOs - attempts to 







Managing Expectations  
 
 
The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1979, cited in Fischer, 2014: 9) asserted 
that economic development and “freedom” is the capacity of a person to 
pursue a life that they deem “worthy”, having the agency and capabilities “to 
act with intention, to envision and make changes in one’s life, to aspire”217. 
Appadurai (2013, in Fischer, 2014: 5-6; 11) goes further by claiming that 
aspirations are signifiers of empowerment and individual agency, to stir one’s 
destiny towards a meaningful and valuable life. But as my fieldwork showed, 
individuals are confined to the environment and economic and social context in 
which they find themselves.  
 
When talking about their arrival in the UK, most Bhutanese refugees speak of 
their anticipations, fuelled by COELTs during the resettlement preparations in 
the IOM compound in Kathmandu (Chapter 4). As one of my informants stated: 
“I was very excited, because it was a new home, new emotions. It was 
different, a new environment, everything was new” (BRFP). In the same breath 
he added: “Yes, it was difficult to go to places, but I got used to it – it is 
interesting! I have made new friends. It’s good now”. Other comments mirrored 
those above: “When we first landed at the airport in the UK, I was nervous, 
because I didn’t know what to do, and where to go. It was all new to us” 
(BFRP). Both expressed the excitement about experiencing novelty – starting 
from flying in a plane for the first time, to arriving on a different continent, a 
different country, with a different language, and different way of life. However, 
both expressed their loss of orientation: they did not know where to go and 
how to do things – all was new and unknown, which is experienced both in a 
positive (by being excited) and negative way (by needing support).  
 
Bhutanese refugees learnt a few elements of British and European history 
during COELT, and apparently their teachers highlighted that the Industrial 
Revolution began in the UK, especially in Manchester. This fuelled the 
                                            
217 Sen in turn defines (economic and material) poverty as the “absence” of these freedoms and the lack 
of choice over one’s decisions (in Fischer, 2014: 9-10).  
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Bhutanese refugees’ expectations, that the UK is an industrial nation, and they 
would easily find a job. For instance, when Niraj and I sat in a park near 
Longsight on a sunny August afternoon, and we talked about Niraj’s prospects 
of employment, he laughed hesitantly, and remarked:  
 
“You know, in Nepal they show us pictures of Manchester – you 
know, old pictures. [The teachers] say that Industrial Revolution 
starts here, and we see picture of big, big factory, … and they say: 
‘You can work in factories when you arrive in England.’ … So, when 
I come here, I expect to see factories, you know, big big factories [he 
stretches his arms in front of him], and I can get job very easy, no 
problem. I come here, and look, and think: ‘Where are factories?’ ... 
Nothing is here, you know, nothing, no factory, no jobs. Where [do] 
people work here?”  
 
Niraj’s comment is reflected in many other statements by Bhutanese refugees, 
and verified my sensation that the UK (and the global North) was ‘oversold’ to 
them by service providers and Western volunteers in Nepal, raising the 
refugees’ expectations far beyond what they actually experience after arrival. 
RAUK highlights this in their guidance literature, claiming that refugees often 
have “unrealistic expectations about life in the UK”, but hopes are not met due 
to the “extremely competitive labour market” in the UK (RA and RC, 2008: 11; 
15). 
 
This shows that although, according to Jackson (2011, cited in Fischer, 2014: 
6), all humans share “existential discontent” which gives rise to hopes and 
aspirations (and thus engenders many of our actions in daily life), the fulfilment 
of these expectations still depends on the individual’s position within a 
society218. Individual aspirations, however much hoped and worked for, are still 
constrained by “opportunity structures”, such as laws and regulations, as well 
as economic circumstances and resources. As Fischer (ibid.) emphasized, 
individuals may have the agency to act on their choices, but these choices are 
                                            
218 Appadurai (2004: 69) states that (for example economically) privileged individuals have greater 
“navigational capacity” and opportunities to realize their goals than more disadvantaged people.  
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structured and constrained by political and economic processes that 
“transcend the individual”, which in turn leads to disenchantment (with, for 
example the UK and refugee resettlement).  
 
Especially when it comes to acquiring property or goods (such as for example 
cars), as well as gaining employment, my informants’ sense of disappointment 
is palpable, particularly in conversations with young, 25 to 35-year-old males, 
who are expected by the community to provide for their families. Lalan is in his 
early thirties, underwent training in health management and nursing by the UN 
during their time in the camps, and has a wife and an infant daughter. Lalan 
finds it very difficult to gain employment in the UK, or to have access to training 
or education allowing him to continue as a health care worker, as he lacks 
formal qualifications, such as GSCEs or A-Levels. With a look of 
disappointment on this face, he remarked: 
 
“Soon after we get resettled in the UK, I thought we will be able to 
get job, earn money, and buy our own house and car, and improve 
our living standard….and prosper to lead a luxurious life. But it 
doesn’t seem so, because it is difficult to find a job” (BRFP).  
 
After a short pause, he then added: “I still hope to get a job in the future, and 
lead a better life”.  
 
Life in the UK may be “new” and perhaps “better” than in the refugee camps in 
Nepal. But their expectations raised before resettlement are not fulfilled – a 
fact which some find difficult. Unnayak – as mentioned before, a trained and 
experienced veterinary doctor– once commented with a bitter tone: “I think my 
working days are over”, referring to the fact that after more than two years, he 
was still unable to gain steady, white collar labour219 in order to support his 
family.  
 
                                            
219 As an educated man, Unnayak aims to obtain employment in the white collar sector, especially in 
veterinary medicine or health care. He held posts as a Housing Officer (for Salford Council), freelance 
translator (for the British Home Office and Border Agency) and community support worker, but until 
the end of my fieldwork was not able to secure steady, contractual employment. 
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For young refugees, who arrived when they were about 18 or 19 years of age, 
life in the UK becomes a struggle to remain optimistic, whilst coming to terms 
with the competitive and demanding UK labour market. Sameer (26), who was 
trained as a Cancer Awareness Officer in Nepalese camps, summarised the 
sentiment of many Bhutanese refugees: 
 
“I imaged that after coming to England, I would be working and 
earning a lot of money [he laughs]. It hasn’t yet come true, but 
maybe it will come true in the future. I am studying at the moment, 
and it takes a while. But back then, I used to think that: As soon as I 
arrive I get a job, have a good job, I thought like that when I was in 
the camp. [He hesitates] But it didn’t happen. I have to learn the 
language first. Hopefully it will be alright in the future” (BRFP).  
 
Anthropologists argue that aspirations are embedded in culture and society, 
rather than the individual. That is, the aimed-for “good life” depends on shared 
socio-cultural values and moral evaluations (Appadurai, 2004: 62, 69; Bunnell 
and Goh, 2012: 1; Fischer, 2014: 7-12). For example, Bhutanese refugees’ 
definition of wealth does not involve a high salary and bank balance, but the 
ownership of property and consumer goods (e.g. mobile phones, branded 
items, clothes). My informants often remarked that whilst they lacked the 
financial and material resources to purchase goods in Nepal, they now very 
much participate in consumer culture, which they also see as a means to 
become (what they perceive to be) “British” (see Chapter 5).  
 
Despite these issues, their agency and capacity to aspire is not diminished 
(Bunnell and Goh, 2012: 2). Yet, to have expectations requires the realistic 
assessments of ability and possibility, compromises and trade-offs (Fischer, 
2014: 2). Here, the Bhutanese community (both as samaj and RCOs) enter the 
stage, in order to manage the refugees’ expectations and help to fulfil 
aspirations where possible. Bhutanese refugees support each other to for 
example purchase necessary items (e.g. computers), access infrastructures 
(e.g. free language classes), and even fulfil larger ambitions, such as when the 
181 
 
whole community across the globe lend funds to Kanchan and Daya to open a 
corner shop in Manchester.  
 
At the same time, however, established refugees remind the new arrivals to 
carefully manage their funds, as they have to keep enough welfare payments 
to cover rent and bills, as well as daily expenses. Some learnt the hard way, 
and recalled later that they spent their whole first welfare payment on 
consumer items, and then had to borrow money from the community in order 
to pay for rent and utilities.  
 
Established refugees emphasize to new arrivals that they have to acquire 
English as quickly as possible, send their children to a “good school”, and work 
“somewhere” (both illegally and temporary). Young new arrivals (under 25) are 
integrated in their peer groups, and urged by them to work in Asian businesses 
to gain “pocket money” for themselves and their families. At the same time, 
new arrivals are reminded that the UK is not what they have been told in 
COELTs, and that gaining steady employment, learning English and 
“integrating” is “not that simple”, but that it can take a long time to obtain a job, 
property and goods.  
 
Established refugees are often unable to offer support beyond advice and 
small sums of money, as they themselves still struggle to manage their 
previously held expectations of “life beginning” in the UK. Nevertheless, new 
arrivals greatly benefit from their long-term experience in the UK. Here, we 
should also be reminded that the more expertise refugees have acquired, the 
higher they are regarded within the Bhutanese community (see Chapter 8). 
New arrivals draw on the advice they receive from these experienced 
community members. For established refugees, support provision to new 
arrivals fosters reciprocity within samaj, and engenders a sense of purpose 
and value (see Spicer, 208: 504), which in turn eases the disappointments 
experienced by many of my informants. As a few informants remarked during 
my fieldwork when talking about their involvement in the community: “at least, 








Resettlement is 'settling in' a place, a nation state, and a culture previously 
unknown, as well as in a new community comprised of both Bhutanese 
refugees and non-refugees. Bhutanese refugees coming from Nepal do not 
arrive into a social vacuum: RCOs, relationships and animosities are already in 
place. They become part of an existing social network, with new hierarchies 
based on social, economic and educational capital (rather than traditional 
signifiers of authority). It is exactly in this time of arrival, in which new alliances, 
belongings and identities are forged220, and with it possible animosities 
between people, as I show in the subsequent chapter.  
 
It appears as if policy makers and service providers assume that resettlement 
(and the assumed liminality of refugees) ends within a few months after arrival 
when so-called 'self-sustainability' is achieved. But the in-betweeness 
Bhutanese refugees experience, as well as their shared history of refugee-
ness does not simply disappear by providing a house and welfare payments. 
The ethnographic vignettes in this chapter show that the phase of liminality 
and uncertainty still persists two or three years after my informants’ arrival in 
the UK. When touching down on British soil, one fact remains: for better or 
worse, this country is their new 'home' now, and they “have to make the best 
out of it”, as one of my informants once remarked. Life is indeed “beginning”, in 
a country where they are allowed to work, to go to school, and pursue 
whatever they wish – within the confines of laws, means, ability, education and 
availability of services and infrastructures.  
 
Resettlement, as stated in a private conversation with a fellow researcher 
working with Bhutanese refugees in the USA, is “unsettling”, especially on 
arrival. Bhutanese RCOs highlight their responsibility to tend to the needs of 
                                            
220 However, I do not argue that refugees arrive in the UK as a tabula rasa – a blank slate on which new 
characteristics, perhaps even British-ness is simply inscribed upon. Each new arrival brings with him 
or her their own individual story about their lives in Bhutan and in refugee camps in Nepal, their 
kinship and personal relations, religion and previous educational or professional expertise. 
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new arrivals, in order to ease their experience of resettlement. In reality, 
however, it is often exactly these organisations that 'unsettle' Bhutanese 
refugees, and add further burdens on new arrivals. The decision to join one 
RCO over the other in the first weeks after arrival may have long-term 
consequences, impacting on Bhutanese refugees' experience of resettlement 
and life in the UK. Nevertheless, these communities provide the necessary 
support new arrivals need in order to settle in, making both samaj and RCOs 
an indispensable support network in refugee resettlement.  
 
In the following chapter, I explore the creation of similarity – of samaj, the 
‘native’ understanding of community. Amit and Rapport (2002: Loc 508) remind 
us that we can only understand formally institutionalised communities, such as 
RCOs, by gaining an insight into personal social networks such as samaj, as 
RCOs draw on these relationships. Only through contextualizing and 
illustrating the various perceptions of community amongst Bhutanese refugees 
are we to understand the complexity of the term, and why community – albeit 
being a contested notion – is still highly relevant for Bhutanese refugees in 
resettlement. I outline that Bhutanese refugee communities are built on notions 
of mutuality and trust. But community is not only an abstract construct: rather, 
it is a lived experience in form of social interactions. However, I also 
demonstrate that similar to notions of identity (Chapter 5), my informants’ 
understandings of social relationships are changing in resettlement. In turn, 










In the previous chapters, I have highlighted that Bhutanese refugees in the UK 
are persons in transition, which brings about new definitions, values, norms 
and social practices. I have explored how Nepalese settlers migrated 
throughout the southern Himalaya region, and through settlement in various 
countries, such as Bhutan, experienced change. The exodus from Bhutan 
marks another phase of transition, and the settlement in the seven refugee 
camps in Nepal brought about further changes, and relationships were again 
re-shuffled. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, my informants’ changing perceptions 
of norms, values and practices, as well as the meaning of community, are 
influenced by the social re-engineering programmes employed by Western aid 
and relief agencies operating within refugee camps. Resettlement to third 
countries disrupted relationships and networks established in the Nepalese 
camps, as Bhutanese refugees were dispersed in the various resettlement 
nations. In the UK, new relationships and networks are created, and through 
the intervention of policy, education and the environment, norms and practices 
are changing once more.  
 
However, as discussed in the Introduction, my informants are not liminal 
persons that are now undergoing ‘re-integration’ in, for example, the British 
host population. Both the flight from Bhutan as well as resettlement to third 
countries did not, as some argue (e.g. Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 91), 
“destroy” relationships, values, practices and people’s identities. I contend that 
my informants have been a community in transition for the past two centuries 
(through migration in the Himalaya region), and they constantly forge, 
refashion and maintain new and old networks, norms and activities. There was 
no unique ‘Nepalese Bhutanese’ community or identity that has been 
dismantled and was then reproduced in Nepal, and which my informants strive 
to maintain and recreate in resettlement. Rather, these aspects of their lives 
were constantly changing in Bhutan, Nepal and now in the UK, and social 
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networks are established and maintained based on their environment. 
Bhutanese refugees’ notion of community as samaj, is highly relevant in 
everyday life. However, samaj is neither a re-creation of old relationships as 
experienced in Nepal or even Bhutan marked by social cohesion (as policy 
makers and service providers would have it), nor is it an entirely ‘new’ 
community created in resettlement. Rather, samaj is a combination of both, old 
values bestowed upon these relationships by them, and new networks created 
with refugees and non-refugees in resettlement – relationships which are now 
informed by social re-engineering, as well as my informants’ experiences and 
personal preferences. What remained constant throughout Bhutan, Nepal and 
the UK is the overall assumption that community exists and is highly relevant. 
As one Bhutanese refugee explained:  
 
“We lived with a community in Bhutan. We also had a community in 
Nepal. We also have our community here. It is not possible to live 
alone without community”. 
 
Here, my informant is using the notion of a community, rather than the 
community. As I explore in this chapter, samaj is a decidedly important notion 
for Bhutanese refugees, and is maintained on a daily basis through social 
interactions. But what this community is, how it is structured, and most 
importantly, who is not part of samaj, is changing in resettlement. Therefore, I 
explore what samaj is from my informants’ point of view, and how it they 
experience it on a daily basis in resettlement in the UK.  
 
The importance of community was most clearly articulated by Kavi during the 
BRFP (see Introduction). Kavi is in his late thirties, married and a father of two 
infant sons221. Kavi summarized my informants’ view of community:  
 
“It is said that we are social animals, we have to socialise in our 
community. … Community is like an organ in our body. Lack of 
                                            
221 Kavi is, in general, an outspoken and highly active person, and enjoys “philosophizing” (as others 
around him sometimes mockingly remarked), which he mainly does in English to emphasize the 
perceived validity of the point he tries to make. This reflects my informants’ notion of ‘being British’ 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
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community is similar to a lack of an organ in our body. ... So it is not 
possible to live alone without the community” (BRFP). 
 
Here, Kavi employs the notion of community as an almost biological fact, 
existing a priori from cultural specificities. He implies that social relations are 
an inherent human quality, and that similar to ‘organs in our body’, we cannot 
exist independently of our social relations. All my informants reiterate that 
community is created through being with one another, sharing and interacting. 
Here, the notion of community is about social interactions, rather than an 
abstract construct, as I explore further below.  
 
For my informants, samaj is essentially based on and created by four 
elements: mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social interaction (see Figure 18222). 
The interplay of these four elements determines the intensity of a samaj, and 
whether or not social networks are maintained. 
 
In times of uncertainty (such as in resettlement), social networks become the 
most important tools of support and indicators of belonging (Chatty, 2010: 
                                            






Figure 18: The Four Elements of samaj 
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466), and are therefore not (contrary to Anderson’s [2006] imagined 
communities – see Introduction) only based on ‘imagined’ similarities, but on 
actual face-to-face interactions. Individuals can, of course, be part of several 
communities simultaneously, and illustrated by the formation of RCOs in 
Chapters 8 and 9. There is not one, all-encompassing samaj of Bhutanese 
refugees in the UK, but several smaller communities which form, overlap and 
change over time depending on individual preferences as well as 
circumstances. Samaj can stretch from the smallest nuclear family, and local 
Bhutanese refugee network, to RCOs in the UK and the global diaspora of 
Nepalese Bhutanese. I argue that similar to other norms, values and practices 
that are changing in a community-in-transition, personal social relationships 
are significantly restructured in the context of resettlement. An understanding 
of my informants’ perception of what samaj is, is relevant to comprehend the 
formation and divisions of RCOs, as explored in later chapters.  
 
In the following section, I outline what samaj means for my informants, and 
how these relationships are created, maintained and experienced on a daily 
basis. I also explore the changes of these experiences brought about through 
resettlement in the UK, and the impact of samaj on RCOs and vice versa. As I 
attempt to disentangle these complexities and changes, we should be 
reminded of Redfield’s (1960) caution: 
 
“As soon as our attention turns from a community as a body of 
houses and tools and institutions to the states of mind of particular 
people, we are turning to the exploration of something immensely 












Samaj is an idiom for personal social relationships amongst my informants. “I 
meet my community/samaj”, or “I spend my weekend with my 
community/samaj” were commonly uttered phrases amongst those I worked 
with. On several occasions I had to clarify whom exactly they meant, and often 
the term ‘community’ (both in English and Nepali) replaced the term pariwar223 
(family) in everyday conversations. When raising this issue during a dinner with 
some informants, they explained that, “of course, family is community”. My 
informant Buddhi, chuckled during our dinner conversation, and remarked in 
the simplest Nepali for me to understand:  
 
“Nicole, pariwar community cha! Sathi community cha! Nicole 
community cha!” [Family is community! Friend is community! Nicole 
is community!]  
 
From Buddhi’s statement, we can see that samaj is an all-encompassing 
term224, comprised of family and friends within the Bhutanese refugee 
community, as well as non-refugees, such as myself, who (as I describe 
below) went from being guests to becoming members of the community.  
 
But communities are not “indefinitely portable and decontextualizable” (Amit 
and Rapport, 2002: Loc 1344). Relationships and communities emerge in 
multiple processes of social interactions as well as personal and socio-cultural 
values, preferences and intimacies (ibid.: Loc 1389). The importance of these 
networks reflect the notion of community as “personal social networks”, which 
are “ego-based”, and emerge out of “particular individuals’ efforts, experiences 
and history” (ibid.: Loc 508). In the context of my fieldwork, these personal 
                                            
223 Or bhitriya or jahan, all meaning family 
224 Later dictionary research revealed that the word samaj originates in words for 'tribe' or caste groups, 
and one's samaj would denote someone's caste affiliation. However, when probing this matter, my 
informants stated that in today's use of Nepali, the word is more often used to broadly mean 'society'. 
As one of my informants stated when discussing the terminology: “Nowadays, community referring to 
caste is shadowed, nobody understands community refers to caste. The concept of people is 
changing according to the change in globalization and modernisation”.  
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efforts are most expressed in the substantial amounts of time and (inter-) 
actions Bhutanese refugees invest in these personal social networks (Colson, 
2003: 5-6; Azarya, 1996: 155). My informants place importance on establishing 
and fostering reciprocity, mutuality and trust within samaj, and it is within these 
personal relationships in which interaction takes place, and the notion of 
community becomes tangible as a lived, social experience.  
 
In this section, I dissect these elements of samaj, and in turn emphasize how 
these notions altered in resettlement in the UK. As I progress throughout these 
elements, I use myself as an example, outlining how I moved from being 
considered a guest (pahuna) to being a friend (sathi) for my informants, which 
then progressed into a mit relation (see below: friendships that gain the same 
relevance as kinship relations), and therefore becoming part of the family 
(pariwar), referred to by my informants as community (samaj). Similar to any 
‘outsider’, including other Bhutanese refugees who did not know one another 
before resettlement, my positioning in the field depended on the same 
concepts of mutuality, trust, reciprocity and interaction. Only through employing 
these elements in daily interactions during my fieldwork was I able to become 
a member of some samaj; or, as I discuss in Chapter 9, failed to become a 
member of another samaj (for example, by being affiliated with a ‘rival’ RCO).  
 
However, the social relationships I describe merely offer a snapshot of my 
informants at a particular time in particular circumstances. Some notions and 
symbolic constructions of personal relationships have been maintained since 
Bhutan and Nepal, and offer a sense of certainty in a time of transition. 
However, meanings of interactions and hierarchies of samaj are adapting to 
the new lives in resettlement, and the novel ideas and values they obtain from 
living in the global North225. As Mines and Lamb (2010b:12) argue by looking 
at South Asian immigrants in the UK, migrants (especially individuals from this 
geographical area) undergo “crucial dialectic processes of interchange 
between … local and global cultural forms”. Moreover, throughout this chapter, 
and indeed, this thesis, we have to be reminded that communities operate 
                                            
225 For example, Euro-American notions of nuclear families (comprising of biological parents and 
children) are different to my informants’ understanding of what constitutes a family – see below.  
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through ‘othering’, and membership in a samaj is determined by creating 
similarity and difference. ‘Othering’ is largely informed by employing and 
reinterpreting the four elements of samaj, which I outline below.  
 
 
Mutuality and the creation of similarity 
 
One informant once remarked that Bhutanese refugees perceive themselves 
to be “all the same”, regardless of the refugees’ background, gender, religion 
and personal history, and therefore have to support one another. As 
mentioned above, some researchers looking at refugee communities (e.g. 
Mortland, 1987) believe that refugees in exile (both in camps and in 
resettlement) create some sort of communitas which “transcends distinctions 
of rank, age, kinship position” (Turner, 1967: 100). From this viewpoint, the 
experience of becoming and being a refugee (refugee-ness, as I call it, see 
Chapter 5), of life in the camps as well as resettlement, removes all hierarchies 
and differentiations in favour of an unequivocally egalitarian community, which 
shares values, norms and practices. On the one hand, this may be true for my 
informants, who feel a sense of mutuality towards all Bhutanese refugees, and 
acknowledge a similarity in experience. Yet, although they share refugee-ness 
(see Chapter 5) and create samaj predominantly with other Bhutanese 
refugees, these relationships are not necessarily equal, without hierarchies 
and internal divergences. Mutuality for my informants does not denote equality, 
but rather a sense of similarity, based on refugee-ness, which is grounded in 
familiarity and reciprocity (see below). But within these mutual relationships still 
exist hierarchies, although as I explore in the following chapters, these 
hierarchies are changing and adapting (see Chapter 8). Moreover, community 
members share ideas, values and norms, which unite them and allow them to 
create boundaries to others who do not share the same ideas and behaviours 
(see Rapport et al., 2000:62-3).  
 
Nevertheless, one pre-condition of samaj is an (imagined) sense of sameness, 
expressed in, for example, the taken-for-granted assumption that similarity is 
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found predominantly in networks of pariwar - (extended) family226 and friends 
(mit-relations, see below). Bhutanese refugees perceive kin as the ‘smallest 
common denominator’ between them227. But as Cohen (1985: 98) argues, 
relationships are “repositories of meaning” based on the social discourse in 
which it emerges. Personal relationships with non-kin are highly flexible and 
alterable, although the relevance given to pariwar and mit relations (see below) 
remains constant. Although social networks in both Bhutan and Nepal have 
been disrupted through (forced) migration, pariwar and mit relations continue 
to be maintained. Even if separated in between the seven refugee camps in 
Nepal, regular visits to family members were common and indeed – as my 
informants often recalled – an obligation, as one of my younger informants’ put 
it: “Family is family - you like them or not, you have to help”.  
 
The importance of community may not be unexpected, as in South Asia from 
where my informants originate (both Bhutan and Nepal), the extended family is 
“the central site of everyday life” and more importantly, the stage on which 
“persons move through life-course passages” such as birth, youth, marriage 
and death (Mines and Lamb. 2010b: 9). Participation in events, such as 
naming-ceremonies for newborns, rites of passages (see below), weddings 
and funerals, is a social obligation for Bhutanese refugees. Attending special 
events is a signifier of mutuality and reciprocity, and they regard non-
participation (except with valid excuses such as work commitments) in these 
events as rejections of personal relationships (see below), which impact 
negatively on the intimacy my informants experience with others. That is, kin 
and friendship affiliations may be based on their ‘imagined’ understanding of 
mutuality, but it still requires the investment of time and resources, in order to 
maintain these relationships.  
 
                                            
226 In the past anthropology regarded kinship as the “recognition of a relationship between persons based 
on descent or marriage” (Stone, 1997: 5). However, Carsten’s (2004) work addressed broader 
conceptions of kinship not based on ‘blood’ relations - that is, biological relatedness – but on, for 
example, shared experiences, actions and living arrangements. Similarly, Bhutanese refugees do not 
necessarily speak about kinship as determined through biological descent, but through mutuality (see 
below and Carsten [2004]).  
227 However the notion of what ‘family’ (pariwar) means, is influenced by Western ideas of the nuclear 
family, which in turn has an impact on how and why these relationships are maintained and lived.  
192 
 
RCOs are, for the most part, extensions of these personal social networks 
based on perceived similarity. As Amit and Rapport (2002: Loc 508) put it, 
although “institutional groupings have a structure that transcends any one 
individual, they are nonetheless fundamentally shaped through the 
relationships and interactions of their members”. In order to understand how 
Bhutanese refugees structure these close personal networks, I offer a brief 
examination of kinship structures and hierarchies amongst Bhutanese 
refugees in the UK, as well as the formation of mit-relations 
 
Pariwar & mit 
 
In my informants’ understanding, pariwar (family) is comprised of three or four 
generations – grandparents, parents, children and (great) grandchildren - and 
normally includes extended kin such as uncles, aunts, cousins and in-laws. In 
most cases, these families are headed by the oldest male or the oldest son. 
These hierarchical structures are continued in institutionalized communities 
such as RCOs, in which educated men hold all positions of power, such as 
chairperson, secretary or treasurer (see Chapter 8). Decision-making powers 
are mostly in the hands of men – whether it be within families, personal social 
networks, or formalized community organisations.  
 
However, in resettlement traditional gender roles are slowly changing228. Men 
engage in domestic duties, such as cleaning and cooking, as well as being 
closely involved in child rearing. Also, women are far more financially 
independent in resettlement in the UK, as they have, for instance, their own 
bank accounts and receive their own governmental welfare and benefit 
payments. This allows women to rely less on their spouses, and leaves them 
to decide for themselves what they want to spend their money on – contrary to 
their lives in Bhutan and Nepal, where men held most financial and material 
resources. This means that a few women in the Bhutanese refugee community 
gain power in their families and samaj, and are highly respected individuals.  
                                            
228 Female empowerment and gender equality is also one of the aims of social re-engineering (RA et al, 
2008: 12-4;31-2; 39-40). As mentioned in the Introduction, much could be written on the changing 
gender roles amongst Bhutanese refugees, but the scope of this work does not allow for a detailed 




The Bagale household is an example of these new hierarchies, in which 
traditional gender roles are changing. Daya and Kanchan (both in their mid-
thirties) arrived in the UK in Autumn 2010, together with Kanchan’s elderly 
parents (70 plus), and their two sons Manendra (15) and Tarun (8). Daya’s 
parents resettled at the same time with Daya’s younger siblings (the Gadal 
household), and both families live in close proximity in Longsight. Kanchan 
fought with alcoholism during their time in the refugee camps, and Daya 
confided in me that their marriage was a struggle throughout the almost twenty 
years in Nepal. She recalled that once they arrived in the UK, she gave her 
husband the ultimatum: “’You stop drink, or I have a divorce.’ I say to him, that 
here [in the UK] divorce is easy, and he lose everything.” Following Daya’s 
ultimatum, I have observed Kanchan drinking beer only on special occasions, 
and he referred to himself as a “house man”, which denotes his role and duty 
in the household, cleaning, cooking and caring for his elderly parents. Daya is 
in charge of the Bagale household in Longsight, and Bhutanese refugees refer 
to their semi-detached house as “Daya’s house”. She is the main tenant, pays 
all bills, attends English classes, and at the time of writing runs a successful 
corner-shop with her husband in the city centre of Manchester. Daya obtained 
her status by being exceptionally fast in acquiring English (in comparison with 
her husband) and by being a very outspoken and confident young woman.  
 
Similarly, young refugees in resettlement demand mutuality from their elders 
and become so-called ‘liminal experts’ in resettlement, gaining authority and 
status within the community (see Chapter 8). For example, young people 
traditionally live with their parents until their wedding day, and in the patrilocal 
tradition, newlyweds move in with the groom’s parents and extended kin, 
whereby it is the eldest son’s and his wife’s duty to care for the parents229. 
However, these practices are changing in resettlement in the UK, and several 
young couples try to resist the patrilocal tradition, and residency became, to an 
                                            
229 Care in this context means elderly care, such as cooking and cleaning for elderly family members, 
helping them with grocery shopping, supporting them in their daily activities, and helping them to the 
bathroom and cleaning themselves. Although throughout my fieldwork, no community member was in 




extent, ambivocal or neolocal, living in their own accommodation separate from 
their parents and in-laws (although staying in close proximity, normally in the 
same area of the city).  
 
For example, Rani eloped with Sudeep in Summer 2013 and married him 
against her parents’ wishes230. Rani and her husband moved to a different 
area of Manchester, neither close to her nor her husband’s kin. The young 
couple Nacha and Bal also resisted Bal’s parents’ call to move in with them, 
and live in their own two-bedroom flat in Salford, about thirty minutes away 
from Longsight where their closest family lives. As Nacha emphasized, she 
wants to have “her own space”. Similar arrangements are reported amongst 
(voluntary) migrants from South Asia across the UK: Kathleen Hall’s (2010: 
453) work on British Sikhs in London outlines the experience of some young 
(educated) informants, who aim to move away from their parents after 
marriage. Hall argues that the “fantasy of moving out on their own” is based on 
her young informants’ wish to “enjoy domestic privacy [her informants] imagine 
exist in British nuclear families”. This notion of creating one’s own space, 
independently of family members was expressed by several, if not all of my 
young informants regardless of the marital status. This does not, however, 
signify that kin-relations are not important or maintained on a regular basis.  
 
Samaj includes not only family, but also friends, which can become so-called 
mit relations. For my informants, mit relations are a practice continued from 
Bhutan and Nepal, and are described by Evans (2009: 159) as special forms 
of relationships in which “unrelated families treat each other as kin”. Similar to 
kin, mit relations are based on mutuality and reciprocity, and therefore 
Bhutanese refugees make no distinction between kin and mit relations. 
Consequently, it was often difficult for me to tell who was (biologically) related 
to whom or married, as my informants behaved the same way with mit as with 
                                            
230 They eloped only ‘in a sense’: Rani’s parents were against the marriage, as they regarded her too 
young to marry (she was 18), and should finish her college education first (she was in her third year of 
college, training to become a hairdresser). However, Sudeep’s parents were in favour of the wedding 
and organised it at a Methodist community centre in Ashton. Members of the (Bhutanese Welfare) 
community attended the wedding, as did Rani’s siblings and other family members (but not her 
parents). Yet, on their wedding day they did visit Rani’s parents in Bury, and by now, their marriage 
seems to be accepted. Note that they are not legally married, according to the law of the UK, as no 
civil wedding took place, nor was an official registrar present.  
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pariwar, and addressed each other in kinship terms regardless of their ‘actual’ 
kinship relation. Close friends are referred to as chhora (son) and chori 
(daughter); baa (father) and aamaa (mother); bhai (brother), didi (older sister) 
and bahini (younger sister); and uncle or auntie. Only when it comes to specific 
events and (Hindu) rituals, such as Bhai Tika231, are kinship relations more 
important and considered more important than mit relations, although even this 
was slowly changing during my fieldwork.  
 
Due to the limited contact with non-Nepalese Bhutanese people in Bhutan and 
Nepal, mit relations were previously only established with other Nepalese 
Bhutanese. In resettlement, however, mit relations are established with 
‘outsiders’ – mostly through creating trust and investing time and resources in 
social interactions. Soon after I began fieldwork, I too was referred to as didi or 
bahini (depending on my age in relation to the person) or chori, and I called 
older people (over 50) aamaa (mother) or baa (father), as well as uncle or 
auntie. My close relationship with Maya and Sameer, for example, resulted in 
me being their witness at their civil wedding in Manchester in summer 2013. I 
moved from being pahuna (guest) to sathi (friend) and ultimately a mit relation 
to some informants, as I explore below. 
 
Moreover, kinship may engender within my informants an automatic feeling of 
mutuality, expressed in reciprocity. However, this mutuality does not inevitably 
generate trust, and therefore pariwar and mit may not always be considered 
samaj, as I illustrate further below.  
 
Becoming a member of samaj 
 
In order for an outsider (non-kin) – for example, a white European woman 
conducting research – to become a member of samaj, mutuality has to be 
established. When I arrived in the field, my informants considered me a guest 
                                            
231 Bhai Tika is part of the Hindu Tihar festival in Nepali Hinduism, whereby sisters apply tika on the 
forehead of their brothers, signifying protection and longevity. Tika is a thick, sticky paste made of 
rice, red powder, and water or yoghurt, which is applied to the forehead. Although, as my informants 
remarked, Bhai Tika is traditionally from sister to brother (regardless of age and seniority), in 
resettlement, siblings apply tika to each other’s forehead, and share small presents.  
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(pahuna), and treated me with the utmost respect and formal hospitality. For 
example, during the first few months of my fieldwork, chai and food were 
always served to me, and I was not allowed to bring my dishes to the kitchen 
after I finished eating. For my informants, pahuna signifies an unequal 
relationship of obligation to serve me, rather than mutuality. However, as 
fieldwork progressed, we established a mutual relationship: Bhutanese 
refugees spent time with me, shared their experiences and everyday routines, 
whilst I assisted them to improve their English, supported them when dealing 
with British bureaucracy (e.g. forms to fill in for case workers or governmental 
agencies), and helped them with their RCOs. By forging a reciprocal 
relationship, I moved from being pahuna to being sathi to some of my 
informants. In a few households, I was allowed to bring my dishes to the 
kitchen, helped making chai or coffee, cleaned the house with them, and even 
served other Bhutanese refugees232 who were visiting households. This was 
the time when I moved from being a guest to being a member of samaj, who 
can move freely in refugee households, and participate in these symbolic 
practices as an equal member of the community.  
 
Sunil - a Nepali migrant who came to the UK as a student and later stayed as 
a labour migrant - experienced a similar movement from being a translator for 
Refugee Action supporting UK service providers with new arrivals, to becoming 
a close friend to some of my informants, and is held in high esteem amongst 
Takin members today. Here, the element of reciprocity plays an important role: 
as both Sunil and I supported Bhutanese refugees, we were reciprocated with 
shelter, food, company and social interaction. As Sunil noted on several 
occasions, the Gadals are his family now, and he calls them mother, father, 
sister and brother. In turn he is referred to as son or brother by the Gadals and 
their extended family233. Sunil took on responsibilities in the household like the 
                                            
232 The commensality of food and drink (paskanu – to serve food – see below) is highly relevant for 
Bhutanese refugees. The kitchen, where food is prepared, is a highly symbolic space reflecting ideas 
of pollution (Evans, 2009: 156-7). For instance, in the past upper caste Hindu refugees had their food 
prepared separately and barely shared food with lower castes or converts (to other religions). 
However, as Evans (2009) outlines, these practices already changed in the refugee camps for 
pragmatic reasons – for example, as the bamboo huts where refugees lived were merely a single 
room with a stone or clay hearth, it was impractical to maintain the idea of the kitchen as a highly 
regulated space. 
233 In 2014, this personal network was transformed into a kinship relationship by the two unmarried Gadal 
brothers Niraj and Bikram travelling to Nepal to marry two of Sunil's first cousins. 
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other family members and helps them with their English language skills. In the 
same way, the Sinha household has a regular house guest in Nitin, a Nepali 
labour migrant. He once explained how the Sinhas are his "UK family, away 
from home". For Bhutanese refugees, these relationships are beneficial: most 
Nepali labour migrants in the UK have excellent skills in English, being able to 
assist with translations, and serve as appropriate marriage partners in the 
absence of suitable Bhutanese refugee community members234. As 
resettlement progresses, most Bhutanese refugees in the UK establish mit 
relations with non-Nepalese Bhutanese, whether they are Nepali, South Asian, 
British or from any other background, although these relationships do not have 
the same importance as relations with other Bhutanese refugees.  
 
The examples above also demonstrate that migrants and refugees do not 
necessary establish social networks as a replica of traditional structures in 
order to “rebuild culture and a sense of ‘place’ in exile” (Williams, 2006: 873). 
Family and mit relations remain the main arena of socialisation and support 
amongst Bhutanese refugees. However, as my informants remarked on 
several occasions, these relationships are not a facsimile of Nepali or 
Bhutanese kinship relations and hierarchies, and are, as I explore further 
below and in the following chapters, influenced by RCO divisions. Whilst samaj 
may be situated in the social network of Bhutanese refugees, it is still highly 
dependent on trust and reciprocity, as well as on an individual’s personal 
preferences and circumstances. This is mirrored in other research: Williams 
(2006: 870), who worked with refugees and asylum seekers in London, and 
argues that rather than focusing on mutuality between migrants as a 
determining factor for the creation of community, her informants place 
emphasis on the “functions…of networks”, which are driven by pragmatic 
considerations (ibid.: 873). Similarly, amongst Bhutanese refugees in the UK, 
mutuality and ‘place of origin’ are not enough to create samaj, but require trust 
as well as practical, reciprocal action and social interaction, as I illustrate in the 
following section.  
 
                                            
234 For example, Nitin (mentioned above) married the Sinha’s youngest daughter Ishita in September 




Community as a support network 
 
Sunil and I became members of a samaj not through biological or socio-
cultural relatedness, but through our investment of time and resources, 
establishing close relations by becoming familiar with Bhutanese refugees, 
their idiosyncrasies, routines, and meaning-making. For my informants, 
mutuality is not enough to maintain relationships – trust is what binds samaj 
together235. Without trust, mutuality is hollow, and samaj is not maintained. 
Bhutanese refugees perceive trust as something that has to be earned, rather 
than an implied and unconditional quality of individuals, even if pariwar or mit. I 
established trust with most of my young informants by keeping secrets – for 
example, not telling the parents of teenagers and young adults that they 
smoke, drink and see their “sweethearts” secretly.  
 
More importantly, however, is the fact that my informants feel that they can rely 
on me, if they need support. As Colson (2003: 5-6) argues, for migrants “trust 
rests on reciprocity, which is a process in time because it requires action and 
response and some possibility of sanctioning breaches of expectations”. 
Research with migrants in the UK (see e.g. Colson, 2003; Mitchell, 1987; 
Williams, 2006) demonstrates that migrant communities “carry a high degree of 
social obligation” to deliver practical support by, for example, offering 
information and money (Williams, 2006: 873-4). The assistance provided to 
one another is what generates trust between community members, whilst 
failing to comply with this obligation seeds mistrust (ibid.; Colson, 2003: 5-6), 
as I explore in Chapter 9 when discussing RCO divisions. That is, despite their 
shared mutuality of refugee-ness, some Bhutanese refugees in the UK do not 
trust each other, creating and exacerbating divisions between them.  
 
                                            
235 The scope of this work does not allow for a detailed discussion of the notion of trust. For my 
informants, trust is a feeling of confidence and reliance towards other people. Similar to Jimenez’s 
(2011) work, I argue that trust does not necessarily depend on its definition, but on “what kind of work 
[trust] does” (ibid.: 179). As I show in this chapter, trust is about both my informants’ shared 
understandings of its value in social relationships, and about (material) reciprocity (ibid.).  
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For Bhutanese refugees, the exchange of information and resources is never 
more important than when they arrive from Nepal, as I demonstrated with a 
detailed ethnographic example in Chapter 6. New arrivals receive support from 
resident refugees during their first weeks and months in resettlement, to 
elaborate on the information received by official service providers. The 
perceived mutuality, such as a shared language and mutual understandings, 
allow new arrivals to feel more comfortable asking questions or requesting help 
from other Bhutanese refugees, rather than solely relying on service providers 
(also see Williams, 2006: 873). There is a supposition of mutuality amongst 
newly arriving Bhutanese refugees, who assume that refugees share the same 
experiences, and are therefore a reliable source of information. As Williams 
(2006: 872) argues:  
 
“[T]his information represents voices of experience, [which] is 
directly relevant to refugees and provides practical information that 
is up-to-date and can be evaluated for reliability by the recipients 
who know its source and so are in a position to assess its value”.  
 
That is, new arrivals perceive the information provided by Bhutanese refugees 
as more trustworthy than that of service providers, with which they feel no 
mutuality. In fact, the mistrust towards service providers was a common 
feature of my fieldwork. Service providers are perceived as presumptuous, as 
one of my informants explained: “they believe that they are better than us”. 
Throughout fieldwork I noticed that service providers often dismissed their 
“clients” as “naïve”, referring to refugees as “children”, who need to be “guided” 
and “constantly supported”, as they lacked the “agency and education” to 
“effectively live their life”236. This top-down notion of refugees by service 
providers as “helpless victims” who cannot exist independently is recorded by 
many other researchers (e.g. see Kelly, 2003; Malkki, 1997), and refugees are 
fully aware of this view. Rather than generating mutuality between them and 
service providers, the narratives of the latter (in e.g. guidance literature and 
                                            
236 All words in quotation marks are direct quotes from various Manchester service providers I have met 
throughout my fieldwork.  
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flyers – see e.g. RA and RC, 2008) position refugees as hierarchically below 
them, which my informants perceive as offensive.  
 
Because of the lack of mutuality, no trust can be established to service 
providers, and therefore their relationship is not one of reciprocity, but one 
similar to business-client relationships, with a strict top-down hierarchy. 
Familiar with the hierarchical regime of aid workers and service providers since 
the Nepalese refugee camps, new arrivals rely on networks within the 
Bhutanese refugee community for practical support (e.g. translations and 
official paperwork) as well as for help with everyday practicalities, such as 
finding shops, temples or churches, or acquiring a job through social networks. 
Bhutanese refugees invested large amounts of their time and resources to 
support new arrivals237. In turn this allows some refugees to acquire social and 
human capital (Williams, 2006: 872): trust is earned through assistance, which 
in turn increases social capital238, which is then used to obtain a higher 
position within the social hierarchy of samaj, making some refugees so-called 
“liminal experts” (Williams, 2006: 876) and in turn altering definitions of 
hierarchies (see Chapter 8).  
 
Furthermore, many Bhutanese refugees move from the initial place of 
residency in the UK to another, for which they require assistance from their 
samaj and RCOs. The most cited reason for this secondary migration is 
reunion with family and friends, as well as employment, which is easier to 
obtain in urban centres such as Manchester (rather that Bradford or Leeds). 
But they have to accept the bureaucratic and pragmatic consequence of 
moving, such as loss of council housing, child care facilities or access to 
English language classes239. Samaj offers a support network to overcome 
these issues, by, for example, offering private child care arrangements240, or 
                                            
237 Here, I highlight ‘invested’ as a past commitment: there have been no new arrivals since the end of 
2014, and the UK does not accept any further refugees from Bhutan.  
238 Following Bourdieu (1997) and Durkheim (1992), social capital are the benefits obtained through 
personal and social relationships and interactions (see Chapter 8). 
239 Refugees are of course allowed to move within the UK, but service providers only offer localized 
services, to which funds are allocated to. If refugees decide to move from e.g. Leeds to Manchester, 
they are (according to my informants) cautioned by service providers that allocated services, such as 
access to free language classes or child care facilities cannot be provided in other locations. 
240 Mothers who are busy with, for instance, English classes can rely on their personal network of family 
and friends to care for their children, in absence of state facilities. 
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making sure that Bhutanese refugees who move within the UK can sign up to 
local English language classes. The support from samaj is necessary, as 
service providers do not offer assistance for secondary migration, as Nina’s 
(see Chapter 3) husband Chandan Dawadi explained: 
 
“I requested case worker to move my home from Bradford to 
Rochdale in Manchester. Case worker took up the matter to his 
manager. … They said it is alright but they can’t provide 
transportation: ‘You will have to pay for the transportation. You have 
to hire a vehicle yourself.’… My brother and our association helped 
me. ... So we were able to move to Rochdale with help of 
community”. 
 
Chandan and his family moved to Manchester, because he and his wife have 
family in Rochdale, and because they want to be part of the Christian 
community of Bhutanese refugees established in Rochdale. From Chandan’s 
example, it is evident that samaj serves as a support network. Again, 
reciprocity and mutuality play a part in the establishment of relationships: it is 
not the governmental agencies who assist with secondary migration, but 
members of the samaj. This signifies the practical importance of community 
affiliations through reciprocity and mutuality, and demonstrates the relevance 
of actively maintaining these relationships. In the absence of personal social 
networks such as pariwar or mit, it is the RCOs who provide support, although 
personal relations are the most important source of support in resettlement.  
 
However, samaj as a support network is not straightforward or unproblematic, 
and trust has to be continuously maintained through reciprocal and social 
interactions. Mit relations are the battleground on which animosities within and 
between RCOs are played out, and whilst some attempt to ignore these 
issues, for many Bhutanese refugees these divisions have become 
unbridgeable. RCOs operate by means of ‘othering’ (Cohen, 1985), and these 
constructions of difference have an impact on personal relationships, and, in 
many cases, fracture them. As we move towards the other interpretations of 




Moreover, families are not always the best support networks, depending on the 
issues an individual is facing. The Roka family arrived on the UK in January 
2013, and have close and extended kin in the UK, who tried to integrate them 
in their personal social network. After serious issues shortly after resettlement, 
such as a visit by the police due to domestic disturbances fuelled by alcohol 
abuse, Mrs Roka did not approach her direct kin to ask for support, but visited 
an ‘unrelated’ household, confided in them, and sought shelter from her 
abusive husband. This is all the more problematic if health services use family- 
and community members to serve as translators during appointments. As 
observed by Williams (2006: 878), this may not be the best strategy to assure 
discretion, preventing (especially young) refugees to address health concerns 
with medical staff. For example, several young female newlyweds expressed 
their “embarrassment” to take someone from the community to their 
appointments at sexual health clinics or their GP to request contraceptives241. 
They rather preferred a non-refugee friend (such as myself) to come with them, 
and keep it “secret” from the community. Some of my informants emphasized 
that it is often "difficult" to seek support from direct family members with 
‘complex’ issues that breach ‘traditional’ norms and values, fearing judgment 
and stigma and the loss of relationships, because, as many of them stressed, 
“people talk”.  
 
Furthermore, personal conflicts are common among my informants, arising due 
to various issues, such as young people eloping against their parents' wishes, 
conversion to Christianity, arguments due to money or housing arrangements, 
and many other minor concerns, ranging from jealousy to personal dislike. 
Samaj is highly sensitive to individuals’ moods, values, personal preferences 
and interactions (see Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 508). Individual animosities 
                                            
241 However, birth control is not a taboo amongst my (Hindu) informants, although openly talking about it 
with other community and family members is experienced as “embarrassing”, as many young women 
told me. Nevertheless, many refugee women who already have children advised younger women to 
delay childbearing (and favour education and career development), and to have less children. In the 
UK, Bhutanese refugees do not have more than two to three children (in comparison to five to eight 
children in Bhutan and Nepal), and all my young informants from both genders highlighted that they 
do not want more than two children, preferably after the completion of studies, and once they have 
reliable employment. To assure this, many couples confided that they make use of contraceptives, 
such as condoms or the contraceptive pill.  
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have an impact on the formation and maintenance of both samaj and RCOs. In 
turn, antagonisms between RCOs exaggerate mistrust, and therefore have a 
negative impact on both reciprocal support and social interaction between 
individuals. For example, regardless of kin- and friendships, support may be 
denied on the basis of RCO affiliation (see Chapters 6 and 9).  
 
As illustrated above, samaj is a complex idea amongst Bhutanese refugees. 
However, it is more than just a notion; it is a tangible, lived experience in the 
form of social interactions. That is, samaj is not merely a mode of self-
identification and a sense of belonging, but a daily experience of being social. 
In this context, the term samaj is used to signify social relations, rather than 




Samaj as social interaction 
 
How people understand and experience social relations on a daily basis 
depends on their understanding of what a community is from their point of 
view. But community is not only a theoretical and ‘imagined’ construct, existing 
purely in the minds of people. It is a real-life, tangible experience of 
interactions between individuals, emerging out of particular circumstances and 
environments (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc. 1254). The notion of community is 
based on and actualized in social practices and interactions.  
 
Samaj is expressed in being social – that is, through daily social interactions 
with members of samaj. For Bhutanese refugees, being social is an important 
element of their daily lives, as they understand themselves as “interdependent 
rather than independent”, giving more importance to the community rather than 
being individual-orientated (Williams, 206: 870). RCOs are relevant because 
they provide the arena and means to be social (through e.g. RCO events). 
Therefore, community membership is not only determined by mutuality and 
trust, but also through active participation in the daily lives of others. 
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Relationships are maintained on an almost daily basis either by means of face-
to-face interactions, or by using mobile and internet communication 
technologies (MCTs and ICTs) to communicate with Bhutanese refugees 
across the various resettlement nations242.  
 
Especially during the initial years of resettlement, marked by unemployment 
and lack of access to education, job training and infrastructures, their 
extensive spare time is used to interact with the local and regional samaj. 
Some social practices from Bhutan and Nepal continue in resettlement, such 
as “hanging out”, chatting and gossiping, playing cards (for money), and 
making music or dancing together. Other practices from Bhutan are revived in 
resettlement in the UK: for example, the availability of gardens with UK 
houses, allows Bhutanese refugees to engage again in agricultural practices, 
even if on a much smaller scale as in Bhutan. Young refugees are invited to 
participate in these gardening activities, learning from the older community 
members how to grow plants from seeds, how to tend to them, and when to 
harvest them243. Women engage in traditional Bhutanese and Nepalese past 
times such as crafts. Crocheting, for example, is especially popular amongst 
young female newlyweds, who participate in these practices learned from their 
mothers, whilst watching TV or chatting with other women. Similar to the 
harvests gathered through gardening, the finished crocheted table-cloths, 
scarves, or blankets are given to other community members as small gifts.  
 
Food as social practice  
 
Paskanu – the serving and sharing of food – is a common, daily practice 
signifying hospitality and respect for Bhutanese refugees. It is important to 
note here that although in Bhutan and Nepal women had the duty to cook, men 
have taken up the practice with so much enthusiasm, that in some houses it is 
                                            
242 However, as some families are scattered in the eight resettlement nations, and not all have access or 
the ability to make use of MCTs and ICTs, and lack travel documents, some relations are now less 
maintained. Relationships with local Bhutanese refugees often gained more importance than with 
relatives living aboard due to locality and proximity.  
243 In brief, gardening in this context is more than a social practice: it also serves as the transmission of 
values and meanings from one generation to the next. The scope of this work is too limited to discuss 
the relevance of gardening in further detail – see e.g. Crouch (2009) and Kingsley and Townsend 
(2006) for further discussions on gardening.  
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now exclusively men who cook. In the many households, young men gather to 
prepare food, and chat and gossip whilst cooking. They explained that they 
picked up cooking in the camps, learning from their mothers, and now in 
resettlement find jobs in South Asian restaurants, where they often work their 
way up from dishwasher to sous chef. Cooking and paskanu are one 
expression of being social, which in turn fosters relationships within samaj.  
 
For example, momo-making244 became a shared social practice (see Figure 
19245): Shortly after fieldwork began, I urged some of my informants in 
Longsight to teach me how to make momos, a traditional and delicious food 
from Nepal.  
Figure 19: Momo-making in Longsight 
 
On the arranged afternoon in mid-October 2012, I found myself in in a kitchen 
with about twenty Bhutanese refugees, all of us closely watching Kanchan - 
whom I nicknamed "momo master" - stuffing and folding momos into the 
characteristic shape, carefully placing them in a tin steamer. Soon enough we 
all tried to copy Kanchan, and children as young as seven were as much 
engaged in it as older women (60+), laughing about misshapen momos, and 
exchanging tips and tricks on the best filling and folding techniques. This was 
only the first of many momo cooking sessions I attended throughout the 
Bhutanese refugee community, and at the end of my fieldwork, I too became a 
"momo master" as some Bhutanese refugees remarked jokingly.  
                                            
244 Momos are dumplings filled with vegetables or meat, and can be steamed or fried. The dumplings are 
normally dipped in a chilly sauce. 





I do not argue that samaj is a 'community of practice' (Lave and Wenger, 
1991). Belonging to samaj is not only determined through participation in 
practices outlined in this chapter. Social practices, such as cooking, are 
relevant as they bring Bhutanese refugees together in a group. Furthermore, 
paskanu is an expression of mutuality and reciprocity for Bhutanese refugees. 
Bhutanese refugees perceive paskanu as a central part of their lives, and the 
cooking and sharing of food entails certain norms, which changed over time. 
For example, whilst in Bhutan higher castes would not share food with lower 
castes, or even allow converts (to Christianity) into their homes, these 
restrictions are not upheld in the UK, because of the small size of the 
Bhutanese refugee community in the UK, which allows them to out aside such 
divisions. As one of my informants argued “these things are not practical 
anymore”.  
 
‘Timepass’ 246  
 
Communal hobbies and ‘timepass’ activities change in resettlement. For 
example, when I began fieldwork, hardly any of my informants owned 
televisions. But as time progressed, more and more people bought TVs and 
paid for cable television, often signing up for 'Asian TV' (e.g. imported channels 
from India and Pakistan). Live streams or online videos (e.g. YouTube), as well 
as watching Bollywood and Nepali films online remains a favourite 'timepass' 
of younger informants (under the age of 25), gathering in crowds up to ten 
people. This has become their preferred practice on weekends: staying awake 
until four or five am, and watching their favourite actors on the small laptop or 
computer screens, singing along with well-known songs, giggling about 
romantic scenes, and indeed even crying during the over-dramatized finale of 
Bollywood films. 
 
                                            
246 Timepass is a common expression of ‘passing time’ – a hobby, practice or event one conducts in their 
spare time. See also Jeffrey (2010), who has written at length about this in relation to educated, 
under-employed north Indian youth, and see Introduction to this thesis, along with Chapter 3.  
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Moreover, Bhutanese refugees enjoy active sports within a group. Almost 
every household owns a football, and when young people come together on a 
sunny day, they gather in the back garden or walk to a nearby park to play 
football, cricket and badminton. Playing and watching football with other 
members of the samaj is a favourite hobby for my informants of both genders. 
Moreover, whilst they went to the rivers and jungles near the refugee camps in 
Nepal, going for walks in suburban forests or visiting parks together with family 
and friends is another way to spend time in the UK. For young people it is a 
way to see their “sweethearts” in secret, or to smoke and drink, whilst older 
people enjoyed the fresh air and company of their fellow walkers. As there are 
hardly any facilities people can use on rainy or cold days in Manchester, such 
as youth clubs or neighbourhood centres, free weekends with bad weather are 
used to visit shopping centres doing windows shopping.  
 
All these timepass activities happen in a group: my informants hardly ever 
engage in any of these activities alone. In fact, 'alone-time' is not valued 
amongst Bhutanese refugees, and it is extremely rare to find refugees by 
themselves, engaging in activities unaccompanied. If they are alone, for 
example on their way to work, they chat with friends and family on their mobile 
phones. When asking some of my informants why they hardly spend any time 
alone, they all remarked that it would be "boring". They are not forced to spend 
time with other people, but my informants actively seek out company. Samaj is 
therefore a lived experience of spending time with each other, and engaging in 
various activities together, some of which have to be learned, as I explore in 
the following section.  
 
Learning to be social 
 
One of the main functions of Bhutanese refugee communities is not 
necessarily to serve as the ‘common good’ as service providers would like, but 
the fact that it serves as “the arena in which one learns and largely continues 
to practise being social” (Cohen [1985] cited in Rapport and Overing, 2000:63). 
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But what these practices are, and what ‘being social’ means to individuals is 
ever-changeable, and situationally adaptable, as I have shown above.  
 
For Bhutanese refugees, samaj serves not only as an arena for timepass, but 
is also a means to acquire language competence in Nepali, to participate in 
community activities, festivals and worships, and to impart ‘traditions’ to the 
younger generations. As a socio-culturally diverse group, spanning over three 
religions (Hinduism, Christianity and Buddhism), intra-ethnic groups, 
generations and gender, what exactly ‘being social’ means is highly dependent 
on family, kin, religion, age and education. However, as the Bhutanese 
refugees’ perceptions of their culture – that is, the meanings they share – 
changed both in the refugee camps and in the UK, practices and behaviours 
are modified according to the new environment in which resettlement takes 
place. Although I do not want to argue that my informants’ socio-cultural 
practices and meanings are disappearing entirely, similar to the notion of 
samaj, they cannot be clearly defined and outlined. This is largely informed by 
resettlement, aid intervention, education and personal preferences, and the 
adoption of Western norms and practices, transforming not only the 
community, but also their practices.  
 
Samaj is the main arena of social interaction and serve to impart and practice 
Bhutanese-refugee-ness247. We have to be careful not to equate practice as 
the main signifier of community membership. However, some practices are a 
necessary pre-condition to create mutuality within a community. For example, 
most informants regard it as important to learn and speak Nepali, the main 
language spoken within samaj, although it increasingly became mingled with 
English. Less importance is placed on learning how to read and write in Nepali, 
and most of my informants, including older refugees, are illiterate in Nepali248. 
However, in practice, Bhutanese refugees in Manchester make no active effort 
                                            
247 As illustrated in Chapter 5 what makes a Bhutanese refugee is a complex set of ideas of a shared 
history of ‘refugee-ness’ and resettlement. Not all Nepali-speaking Bhutanese are considered 
Bhutanese refugees and therefore belong to samaj, and it is highly dependent on individuals’ 
perceptions and behaviours.  
248 Laksamba (2012) observed the same amongst the second and third generation Nepalese migrants in 
the UK. Especially those who are born and raised in the UK have "no skills in reading, writing and 
understanding" Nepali (ibid.).  
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to teach their community members to gain literacy in Nepali, and RCOs in the 
UK do not offer Nepali courses249. Thus, the language in refugee households - 
a curious mixture of Nepali and English - is a colloquial practice. Young people 
and children, who attend school in the UK tend to speak more and more 
English, even at home, which most parents regard as a positive development. 
When I asked a few informants with babies and toddlers if they are worried 
about their children not learning to speak Nepali, parents dismissed the 
concern. In Lalan's words:  
 
"I don't worry about [my daughter] speaking Nepali. She must learn 
English, this is important. The kids grow up here, it's easy to learn 
for them. They don't have problems with language in the future. ... 
Nepali isn't so important, you know, they can learn slowly at home, 
with us". 
 
The same attitude is applied to imparting Hindu practices. In comparison to my 
Christian informants, who place enormous emphasis on teaching their children 
about Christianity and Christian practices at home and in their church, Hindus 
do not actively teach their children about Hinduism. Older Bhutanese refugees 
believe that Hindu religious practice will vanish amongst the young generation 
- a view verified by my own observations. Most young people do not practice 
Hinduism actively, but merely participate in main events and festivals, such as 
Nepali New Year, weddings, Nwaran (name-giving ceremony for newborns), 
Holi (festival of colour), Teej (festival for women), Bhai Tika (also called Tihar - 
sibling ritual), Dashain and Deepawali (Nepali Diwali, the festival of light and 
most important holiday of the Hindu year). 
 
                                            
249 In comparison with refugees in the USA, who offer intensive Nepali courses in their community 




I have never observed older Hindu 
community members imparting their religious 
knowledge (however limited) to the younger 
generation. In fact, especially children do not 
seem very keen to learn about Hinduism, or 
participate in the rituals, if it would not be for 
small presents they receive during 
festivals250. In 2013, when Maya and 
Sameer’s (Hindu) wedding was planned, the 
two youngest boys of the Bagale family, 
Tarun and Sajit (both eight years old), were 
also prepared for their Upanayana ritual (see 
Figure 20251). This ‘rite of passage’ marks the 
initiation of young (male) children into their 
caste and Hinduism in general. The presence 
of Hindu priests for the wedding was a convenient way to initiate these young 
boys, rather than hosting a separate event. For this ceremony, the young boys’ 
heads were shaved – a very dramatic experience for Tarun, who cried and 
screamed during the haircut and later ran off, locking himself in a room. After 
much persuasion through a locked door, Tarun finally let Maya and me into the 
room, and under tears explained that he would be embarrassed to go to school 
with a shaved head: “Everybody will laugh! They make fun of me! Why I have 
to do this? This is so stupid!” Tarun’s family attempted to comfort him, 
explaining to him that the ritual is very important, but Tarun remained 
unconvinced throughout the ceremony. The only comfort for the young boys 
was that they both received presents on the day – in this case, expensive 
Manchester United football kits. When I asked the boys after the event what it 
signified to them, they shrugged and said “dunno”, and Tarun confessed in a 
whisper: “I don’t care, it’s stupid, innit”.  
 
                                            
250 From my informants’ accounts, it can be inferred that this is also the case in Nepal and Bhutan. Also 
see Gellner et al.’s (2012) and Laksamba’s (2012) work on Nepali migrants in the UK (Chapter 5).  
251 Author’s own image, included with permission of the informants and their parents (as they are minors). 




For both boys, the significance of the ritual was irrelevant, and as far as I 
observed, they were not advised about the meaning of this initiation. For the 
boys’ parents, the social aspect of initiating the boys into their Hindu 
community was an important celebration, to be enjoyed with members of 
samaj. The wedding and ‘rite of passage’ were held on the same day, with 
more than one hundred guests celebrating in a pavilion temporarily erected in 
the Bagale household. However, hardly any of the guests paid attention to the 
rituals the Hindu priest conducted with the young boys as well as the bride and 
the groom252, the guest sat around tables, chatting and laughing, sharing food 
and applying tika.  
 
For Bhutanese refugees, festivals are a means to meet one another and 
interact within samaj, with less emphasis on the relevance of rituals or their 
meanings. Religious festivals are photo opportunities, waiting for the perfect 
‘Kodak moment’. When I celebrated Deepawali with the Sinha household in 
Bury there were no rituals (such as puja or deusi songs253) taking place. The 
extended family came together from across Manchester, dressed up in their 
finest saris and kurtas to have photos taken in front of the makeshift puja 
shrine. However, once the pictures were taken, they dressed again in 
comfortable (Western) clothes, and spent the rest of the evening uploading 
pictures onto Facebook, and laughing and chatting with their family, as well as 
exchanging small (mostly cash) gifts.  
 
What appears to be important during these events is self-performance254 within 
the samaj and the receiving of gifts255. The latter is also a reason why more 
and more Hindu households celebrate Christmas. Although they do not 
                                            
252 The wedding rituals were held in the bedrooms of the bride and grooms’ parents, and besides the 
priest and couple, only the parents and older siblings were present. I was the only other person in the 
room, taking pictures for the couple, and observing the rituals. All other guests were in the party tent 
outside.  
253 Deusi are Nepali songs sung during Hindu festivals. The content of the songs can be both religious as 
well as casual, often joking and mocking. During deusi, participants clap, walk in a circle around a tray 
with offerings to the gods (fruit, fake money, spices), or dance in the centre.  
254 In this context, being social was a tool for self-expression: culture became performance (see Goffman 
[1990]).  
255 I believe that in anthropology enough is said about the significance of gift-giving, especially in 
maintaining relationships and creating reciprocity – first and foremost, Mauss’ (2002 [1966]) work The 




concern themselves with why Christmas is celebrated, they buy Christmas 
trees, and indulge in the gift-giving ceremony on December 25th, as well as in 
the feast following this ritual, although they serve Nepali food. What matters for 
Bhutanese refugees are the maintenance and strengthening of community 
ties, expressed through the coming together of family members, the sharing of 
food and gifts, and the social interactions that comes with it256. That is, events 
are opportunities to express mutuality and reciprocity, which maintain samaj. 
But as refugees gain employment, their free time decreases, and opportunities 
to meet distant relations become rarer. This makes RCOs so relevant, as they 
allow refugees to come together for RCO events, such as during Nepali New 
Year.  
 
Another example of the way in which ‘being social’ is learned and is 
transformed in resettlement is the celebration of birthdays. I have often been 
told that birthdays were not celebrated in Bhutan and Nepal, due to scattered 
communities and lack of resources. However, in the UK, every birthday or 
other personal events such as wedding anniversaries, are celebrated with 
samaj. Customs, such as having a birthday cake, are adopted – along with the 
giving of small presents, mostly in the form of cash gifts. But my informants 
make these ‘birthday rituals’ their own, by applying tika on the forehead of the 
individuals celebrating, and by making sel roti, a traditional Nepali, doughnut-
shaped snack especially made for festivals and celebrations. Young people 
over the age of 18 now celebrate with their friends by going clubbing. In this 
sense, “learning how to be social” includes Western (or more specifically, 
British) social practices. But these new social actions do not replace traditional 
activities - they become an adaptation of cross-cultural practices, mixing Nepali 
(and South Asian) functions with new, Euro-American practices. This serves as 
one example of the new, hybrid identities Bhutanese refugees adopt in 
resettlement (also see Chapter 5).  
 
                                            
256 This may be very different for Christian refugees, but due to my lack of access to these households, 
this can only be inferred rather than verified through ethnographic examples. Yet, Christian refugees 
never participate in Hindu rituals, and in some cases, do not even come near a Hindu household 
during festivals such as Deepawali. They attend Hindu weddings, but notably only after the Hindu 
rituals are complete, and only to congratulate (with a hand shake rather than applying tika on the 
forehead of bride and groom) and give presents.  
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It is important to mention that RCOs and affiliations with them have a big 
impact on who socialises with whom. In general, close family members belong 
to the same RCO. Yet, distant family members, such as uncles, aunts, first and 
second cousins and more distant kin may be divided between the rivalling 
RCOs, and therefore disrupt these relationships. It is here, where ‘othering’ 
comes to play a part. Samaj encompasses similarity and difference, locality 
and distance, as well as familiarity and incongruity (Rapport and Overing, 
2000: 63). These boundaries are of symbolic nature - ‘imagined’ in the minds 
of the community members (Chatty: 2010: 54) - and play an important (and 
dividing) role in kin and friendship relations, and change and disrupt their 






Refugee resettlement is an ‘unsettling’ experience. The experience of 
becoming a refugee may dismantle the “community’s identity, values, activities 
and livelihoods and visions for the future” (Chatty, 2010: 465; also see Mitchell 
and Correa-Velez, 2010). Basch et al. (1994, cited in Amit and Rapport, 2002: 
Loc 552) argue that migration entails a “personal emotional cost for the 
individuals involved, who must live daily with the pain and strain of separation”. 
Although serving as a ‘durable solution’ for protracted refugee situations, my 
informants often compare their resettlement in the UK to their experience of 
exile from Bhutan (to Nepal). Relations established in Bhutan suffered 
because of the (forced) migration to Nepal, but the proximity of the refugee 
camps established in East Nepal allowed Bhutanese refugees to maintain their 
kin- and friendship ties by visiting one another in the various camps. 
 
In Nepal, Bhutanese refugees may have been able to maintain their small 
personal communities comprised of kin and mit relations as they were in 
Bhutan, but when resettlement began in 2007, and the first Bhutanese 
refugees left for the USA and other Western resettlement nations, these 
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established and highly valued relationships were dislocated, separating 
families and friends over vast geographical distances, and therefore signifying 
a disruption of samaj they established in the camps. Those who were left 
behind in Nepal often lacked access to MCTs and ICTs to communicate with 
the resettled refugees, and for many this was a deeply sad experience. As 
Griek (2013:22) writes: 
 
“All of a sudden, families faced the prospect of separation … by 
oceans, continents, and a range of migration laws that deterred them 
from travelling for specific lengths of time”. 
 
As resettlement progressed, it became evident that this geographical distance 
had an impact on my informants’ relationships. Whilst kin-relations are 
maintained over all resettlement nations, mit relations and loose friendships 
established in the camps decrease in resettlement, and new relationships – 
and thus, new forms of samaj – are created with Bhutanese refugees (and 
others) who live within the same country, such as the UK. My teenage 
informant Arun explained:  
 
“In camp I have best friend, we do everything together. He moves to 
America, and I come here [to the UK]. We talk, you know, on Skype 
and Facebook, but I’m busy now. … I have new friends here. I don’t 
talk with him many times anymore”.  
 
I observed many friendships across (rather than within) resettlement nations 
decrease in social interaction over time, but my informants do not perceive this 
as a loss. They find friends in their new place of residency, which are actively 
maintained through social interaction. Close kin-relations are maintained 
across nations (by utilizing MCTs and ICTS), and continue to be highly 
relevant in resettlement, although they are limited to once-a-week 
conversations.  
 
Moreover, as discussed above, although samaj is still the main arena for social 
interactions, traditional family hierarchies and living arrangements are put into 
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question. Many young refugees attempt to resist their family duties and 
obligations, such as care for the elderly. As time progressed in resettlement in 
the UK, the notion of nuclear family as a “natural unit”257, has become 
increasingly ingrained in my informants and they mostly engage socially with 
friends rather than their families.  
 
As more and more Bhutanese refugees ‘become Western’ – or what they 
believe to be ‘Western’ (see Chapter 5) - there may be a tendency to adopt the 
Western perception of individual independence, as highlighted by other 
researchers working with South Asian migrants in the UK (see e.g. Baumann, 
1996; Hall, 2010; Mines and Lamb, 2010a-d), having an impact on the 
perception and relevance of samaj. Now it is the individual who has the agency 
to establish and maintain relationships, and “to make the best of complex 
situations, jostling for position and denotation” (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 
389), rather than following ‘traditional’ social structures (see Chapter 8).  
 
My informants, being in a phase of transition, re-establish and re-structure 
relationships and the social hierarchies within their community. Evans (2009: 
156, citing Giddens, 1984 and Ortner, 2006) observed this trend amongst 
Bhutanese refugees in the refugee camps, and argues that rather than viewing 
them as only “bearers of subject positions”, they actively “reflect on their 
situation” and “exercise some control over their circumstances”, and ultimately 
“contribute to changing the social structures influencing power relations 
between individuals and groups”. In turn, this affects the formation of RCOs in 
resettlement, as they are made up of members of pariwar and mit relations, as 




                                            
257 Defined by service providers as “A nuclear family is generally accepted as consisting of spouses and, 
their minor or dependent, unmarried children and minor siblings…. Beyond this, the concept of 
dependency is central to the factual identification of family members” (UNHCR, 2011: 178). With the 
availability of free-of-charge contraception for women, family sizes are significantly decreasing (also 
see above). This is also a consequence of an increasing sense of gender equality amongst 
Bhutanese refugees, fostered by aid intervention in the camps and in the UK.  
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Samaj and RCOs 
 
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, service providers in the UK are making use of Rex’s 
(1987) description of functions of RCOs. However, service providers largely 
ignore Rex’s caution (cited in Griffiths et al., 2006: 894) that  
 
“[F]ormal organisations are only one part of a larger picture which 
includes a vast network of informal, transient, unnamed and 
unofficial forms of social organisation. The degree to which formally 
constituted RCOs are at the centre of refugee networks or peripheral 
to the main sources of community activity is a vital question”.  
 
Therefore it is all the more important to highlight that samaj has to be 
distinguished from formalized, bureaucratic Bhutanese RCOs. RCOs 
perpetuate imagined differences and foster marginality between community 
members (Griffiths et al., 2006: 894), and may impact negatively on samaj 
relationships, and influence social interactions between Bhutanese refugee 
families.  
 
For example, Unnayak's wife Hasita is a cousin of the Sinhas, and therefore 
felt obliged to pay occasional visits to them. As, however, Unnayak is the head 
of Takin Association, and the Sinhas are closely involved with Welfare 
Association, Hasita’s visits to Bury were less and less frequent, reduced to a 
single yearly visit during Deepawali. Hasita recalled: 
 
 "I go to visit, pay my respect, bring small present for the children. 
They give me chai, but I sit in the house, they don't talk with me. ... 
Family is important, you know, it's our community [informant’s 
emphasis]. But they treat me bad, so I don't go anymore. I feel sad, 
because when we are children, we are so close, we play together 
and go to school. … We come here [to the UK] together, and I was 
very happy, ... but now fighting is everywhere, we can't talk, ... they 
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don't talk with me. ... I feel sad sometimes, very sad, ‘cause it's 
family, you know, and family is important". 
 
Hasita emphasised several important points here: samaj serves a symbol for 
family, and relationships between family members are highly valued. Although 
on the one hand, social interactions within pariwar are important, the divisions 
between different RCOs reduce these interactions to an obligation, and social 
relationships are disrupted because of the boundaries that Bhutanese 
refugees created between different RCOs.  
 
It is not only kinship relations that are fragmented; personal relationships 
between close friends are also affected. Before the boundaries between Takin 
and Welfare were exaggerated to a point where RCO members were not 
supposed to talk to one another, Rani was a close friend of Maya (both 
mentioned above), and they considered each other a mit relation. However, 
RCO divisions lead to their friendship disappearing, as Maya mentioned one 
day:  
 
“Rani calls me yesterday, and ask why we not talk anymore. … She 
don’t call for a year and talk bad things in Bury. She don’t come to 
my wedding, and she don’t tell me about [her] wedding! ... Now she 
call, and ask why I never call! … We are good friends, you know, we 
have so much fun. But Welfare say I am bad because of Takin, and 
she stop talking”. 
 
From this quote we can see that attending events – especially personal ones 
such as weddings – is an important condition for social relationships. As a 
friend, Rani was supposed to attend Maya’s wedding, and in turn, Rani was 
expected to invite Maya to her own wedding (I, for example, attended both). It 
is part of their expression of social relationships. However, due to the divisions 
between RCOs, these social obligations – including calling once in a while – 
are not upheld. The divisions between the organisations is too great: due to 
gossip within all three RCOs, and accusations that people “talk bad” about rival 
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members, personal relationships are hardly reconnected once they are divided 
along RCO lines. In turn, this affects who interacts with whom.  
 
However, not all Bhutanese refugees comply with these imagined boundaries. 
The ‘Rochdale boys’, for example, is a clique of teenage boys (16 to 18 years 
old) who meet on an almost daily basis in Rochdale, especially to make music 
together. They met in Manchester in 2010 and thereafter formed a close 
relationship bridging community organisation divisions and religions. 
Dharendra became a self-proclaimed “atheist” in resettlement (often flagged in 
his Facebook posts) investing most of his time in natural science education, 
whilst his good friend Durba, who only joined the group after he resettled in 
2013, is a devout Christian and less studious. Ajay, on the other hand (whose 
piece for the EBHR I discussed in Chapter 3), is from a family of Takin 
supporters (his father being one of the main founders of Takin) and identifies 
with Hinduism, whilst Gatha’s family is closely involved in Welfare, who never 
meet or communicate with Takin members. For the boys, however, their 
personal friendships supersede religious or RCO divisions, which they regard 
as petty issues, irrelevant for their friendships. As much as their parents and 
other RCO members frown upon their relationship, the Rochdale boys cherish 
and maintain their friendship, and move freely between all RCOs and religious 
communities, and participate in events and projects regardless of RCO 
affiliations.  
 
For example, during the film project (BRFP) organised by Takin, the Rochdale 
boys actively participated by providing music (i.e. covering popular Nepali 
songs and playing instruments), despite not being directly affiliated with the 
RCO. Shortly after the filming and recording for this project was completed, the 
chair of Welfare – Pran Mali from Bury (see Chapter 8 and 9) – approached 
me (as the producer and editor of the film) to request that I “remove” the music 
provided by the Rochdale Boys, as they are “not Takin, but Welfare members”. 
The boys themselves denied any knowledge of this attempt, and insisted on 
participating in the project, very much to the detrimental effect of my relations 
to Welfare. Nevertheless, during the premier screening of the film in 
Manchester in May 2014, friends of the Rochdale Boys – regardless of RCO 
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affiliations – attended the event, and cheered on the performers, 
demonstrating that personal relationships may overcome RCO divisions.  
 
Yet, not all Bhutanese refugees are like the Rochdale boys, whose friendship 
transcend RCO divisions. Samaj has become the battleground on which 
organisational animosities are played out, and whilst some attempt to ignore 
these issues, for most Bhutanese refugees in Manchester these divisions are 
unbridgeable, as RCO politics creates mistrust between them, which has a 
negative impact on feelings of mutuality and obligations of reciprocity and 
social interactions. RCOs operate by means of ‘othering’, and this construction 
of difference influences personal relationships, and in many cases, fractures 
them. This also leads to a decrease of social interaction between these rival 
RCO members. In some instances, Bhutanese refugees that are divided along 
RCO-lines do not communicate at all, and do not maintain samaj with them. 
They refuse to provide support to one another, and do not engage in time-pass 






This chapter outlined the perception and usage of the term and notion of samaj 
(community) amongst Bhutanese refugees in the UK, with family and mit 
relations as the focal point. Bhutanese refugees establish samaj in 
resettlement, which are significantly redefined and restructured in the context 
of migration. Samaj is based on real and imagined mutuality, based on trust 
and reciprocity, and is expressed in social interactions between members of 
samaj.  
 
But personal social networks are not immune to the divisions and ‘othering’. 
The creation of boundaries between formalized RCOs influences these social 
relations, and how they are expressed in everyday life. Community is a 
complex notion, and does not denote a homogenous group of people who 
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share common values and meanings across difference. Rather, to return to 
Chatty’s argument (see Introduction) the notion of community remains “fuzzy” 
and difficult to define. In the following two chapters I illustrate how RCOs are 
created, and how new forms of social stratifications emerge within the context 
of resettlement. Within these RCOs, previously powerless individuals (such as 
young people) are able to gain authority in the community through their 
accumulation of various forms of capital. However, as I show in the final 
chapter, ‘othering’ is most visible within RCOs, and puts into question the 









It was almost Nepalese New Year258 (in March 2013) and Unnayak and Kavi 
(whom we have met in previous chapters) were busy. There were many things 
that still needed to be planned for the occasion. Both of Takin’s leaders felt 
obliged to organize an event on this auspicious festival259, during which 
Bhutanese refugees enjoy coming together to eat, sing, dance and chat. The 
biggest concern was – as with every event Bhutanese refugees organized – 
the venue: Where is a convenient venue located, and can it be reached easily 
with public transport for those who do not live nearby? How many people can 
the venue hold? What infrastructures does the venue offer260? Is food included 
in the venue or can RCOs bring their own food261? Is a venue available on a 
date that is convenient for most Bhutanese refugees?  
 
Once these requirements are assessed and met, venues are gauged by 
price262. Unnayak established a good relationship with the owners of a church 
hall in Swindon263, merely a ten minutes’ walk from his house, and received a 
special rate from them264, leading to most Takin events being held at this 
                                            
258 In the Nepali calendar- the Bikram Sambat – the new year starts around March or April.  
259 As stated on the outset of this thesis, I do not discuss Hindu or traditional practices in this work. See 
Gellner (2001) and Jha (1997) for information on Nepali Hindu practices.  
260 The required items are: stage for dances and speeches; a screen and projector for displaying videos 
and images; microphones and speakers for speeches and performances; tables and chairs; kitchen; 
easily accessible bathrooms, etc.  
261 Some venues either do not allow any food to be brought inside, or offer a fixed menu preventing event 
organisers to bring their own food, which is unacceptable for Bhutanese refugees. They always cook 
(Nepali) food and bring it to the venue, catering to vegetarians or for other dietary requirements (e.g. 
diabetics). Venues that serve their own food are immediately dismissed as options. However, 
sometimes events are catered for by Indian and Nepali restaurants (where my informants work). 
Cooking for events is done by a group of about ten refugees (both male and female) in the house 
closest to the venue the day and night before the event. This reflects the importance of paskuna 
(sharing of food) within a community as described in Chapter 7.  
262 Hourly prices in Manchester range from £35 - £170, depending on the size, location and equipment 
the venue offers. Daily rates, that is, for an all-day event (eight hours plus one hour for initial set-up 
and cleaning at the end) range from about £250 up to a stunning £1500. As all Bhutanese RCOs are 
severely underfunded, venue prices are an important consideration.  
263 The venue does not have religious connotations: in my experience it is common to rent a Christian 
church venue for events in the UK. These venues are popular amongst RCOs, charities, youth clubs 
and even for private parties, as they are cheap and spacious, being able to accommodate a large 
group of people. 
264 On this occasion TA was able to rent a church hall including chairs, tables, a huge raised stage, 
screen and projector, microphone and digital sound system and kitchen for £350 for a whole day 
event on Saturdays. 
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venue during my fieldwork (see Figure 21265). In order to support low-income 
families, refugees who live further away (including outside Manchester, such 
as Bradford, Sheffield and Leeds), and the elderly and infirm who find it difficult 
to take public transport, RCOs may choose to organise a shuttle bus or taxi 
service, or provide a refund for travel costs.  
 
RCO events are always free for attendees, with costs being covered by the 
organisation. Most Bhutanese refugees were unemployed during my fieldwork, 
relying solely on welfare and benefit payments to support themselves. 
Consequently, it important for RCOs to secure external funding. Hence, 
refugees in resettlement establish RCOs not solely for the functions assumed 
by service providers (Chapter 4): as both Baumann (1996) and Kelly (2003) 
argue in their work with other migrant groups in the UK, RCOs largely serve as 
a means to obtain funds, benefiting community members. 
 
For these reasons, it is important to create an RCO that is attractive for funding 
bodies. In order to achieve this, RCOs have to comply with the standard of 
other community organisations and charities operating in the UK, emphasising 
their aims and responsibilities in a formalised ‘community association’ 
constitution. These purposes and duties have to fit neatly into what is expected 
from them by external bodies, following the service providers’ assumptions of 
the ‘functions’ of RCOs discussed in Chapter 4. It would, for example, not be 
                                            
265 These images are my own and included here with permission of the informants features in the 
pictures. 




appropriate to state in a constitution that an RCO has been founded merely for 
the purpose to obtain funding. Thus, refugees have to learn and adopt the 
language of policy makers, service providers and funding bodies, in order to 
become a ‘legitimate’ organisation which is eligible for governmental and non-
governmental support and funding. The RCO constitutions (below and 
Appendix 2) are an example of how this ‘language of funding bodies’ is used 
by my informants.  
 
Moreover, RCOs also need to have their own (RCO) bank account and 
detailed financial records, approved by an independent financial advisor. As I 
illustrated at the start of Chapter 4, refugees have to decide what the bank 
account is used for: only official payments requiring receipts can be made from 
these accounts (for e.g. events, projects, etc.), rather than using it for offering 
individual financial assistance (e.g. support for funerals).  
 
Additionally, RCOs need to follow the prescribed rules of its internal structure, 
with an elected board (consisting of chair, vice and treasurer), as well as a list 
of formal members who are eligible to elect and be elected as board members. 
RCOs have to have documented Annual General Meetings (AGMs) attended 
by a majority of members, in order to (re-) elect board members. Decision-
making must be based on a two-third majority in a democratic vote.  
 
Bhutanese RCOs are consequently not ‘traditional’ community organisations 
following structures and decision-making familiar to refugees (in which elder 
males hold all decision-making powers), but are formalized British 
organisations complying with British rules and regulations266. RCOs are not 
necessarily led by “traditional leaders”, who base their authority on traditions 
and custom as a “natural order” of social stratification (Weber, 1922 in 
Calhoun, 2002: 26). Rather than submitting to the traditional authority of elder 
men (as in Bhutan, and in parts in Nepal), Bhutanese RCOs are led by 
                                            
266 RCOs are thus part of British civil society, defined as the total realm of the political with “politically 
active citizens”. Following Hegel (1821), RCOs are “social and civic institutions” that govern life within 
a civil society. However, as I show below (following Gramsci [1929]), Bhutanese RCOs are not 
operating by means of force or coercion, but by creating and maintaining consent within the group 
(both references in Kumar, 1996: 89).  
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‘charismatic’ leaders (ibid.) and ‘liminal experts’ (see below), who obtained 
their status through personal qualities and the accumulation of various forms of 
capital. RCOs are thus a continuation of the Community Development 
Approach (CDA), in which social re-engineering is used to transform refugees 
into ‘Western’ citizens, in order to make them ‘integrate-able’ in resettlement.  
 
In this chapter, I outline how Bhutanese RCOs are structured, and how they 
serve the particular pragmatic needs of refugees, albeit not in ways policy 
makers intend. For example, for Bhutanese refugees, RCOs are mostly a 
means to maintain samaj by sponsoring social events. Moreover, I illustrate the 
power structures amongst Bhutanese refugees that emerge through the 
creation of RCOs, and the impact these new hierarchies have on my 
informants. This is necessary in order to understand the formation of samaj in 
resettlement and the impact RCO rivalries have on Bhutanese refugees, as 
explored in Chapter 9.  
 
 
Function of Bhutanese RCOs 
 
 
“TAKIN ASSOCIATION UK – Connecting Bhutanese in Diaspora 
(TAUK) is a non-profit, community-based organisation for and by 
Bhutanese refugees living in the UK. The association has a [sic] 
approved community constitution, and aims to establish itself as a 
charity in the future.  
TAUK was founded in Manchester in November 2010, and set out to 
be a [sic] association of Bhutanese refugees who have resettled to 
the UK with the Gateway Protection Programme. The aim of the 
organisation is to create a reliable network of support for Bhutanese 
refugees in order to improve the refugees’ lives in the UK” (TA, 




As explored in the previous chapter, service providers compel refugees to 
create RCOs in order to outsource support to them, because, regardless of 
whether refugees created dependable and even formalized support networks 
to take over assistance, service providers stop their provision six months after 
arrival.  
Shortly after the first refugees arrive in resettlement in the UK, community 
development workers as well as ‘native’ support workers267 approach refugees 
who are educated and have a good command of English to create formalized 
organisations. In a free guide to ‘how to set up RCOs’, Thompson (2010: 3) 
offers an overview of the key stages of achievements RCOs should fulfil within 
their first year: 
                                            
267 ‘Native’ community workers are Nepalese Bhutanese who live in the UK for many years (who mostly 
came here as asylum seekers before resettlement), and who were approached by British service 
providers in order to assist with resettlement in the initial stages, such as providing information on 
refugees to support workers, and help with translations. The term is coined by me, rather than official 
sources. See Chapters 8 and 9 for further discussion.  




This outline shows that obtaining funding is a prescribed aim of RCOs 
(according to service providers). It is further assumed that with this funding, 
other main purposes – “aims and objectives” – can be realized. As Takin’s 
mission statement on its website (see above) shows, this rhetoric was adopted 
by Bhutanese refugees in the UK in order to pander to these requirements. 
However, although I have outlined the functions policy makers ascribe to these 
associations, there is no guidance on what these RCOs should actually do in 
practice during these stages. For example, ‘providing support and assistance’ 
is a very broad conceptualization of what can realistically be done for refugees 
on a daily basis, especially if no funds are available to maintain staff. 
Nevertheless, these aims and objectives have to be laid out in a constitution – 




Formalized RCO constitutions 
 
During the first official RCO meeting for any community organisation, which is 
organized with the help of service providers (that is, community support 
workers), attendees are advised to draft a “governing document” – a RCO 
constitution – which states the aims of the organisation, how it is managed and 
how responsibilities are shared (see below), and how its purposes can be 
realized within the (British) legal system in which RCOs operate (Farley and 
Garcia, 2006: 28; 224; Thompson, 2010: 26). The formalization in a written 
document is said to serve “accountability and openness”, and is a pre-
condition to apply for funding, as most funding bodies require a written and 
notarized268 RCO constitution (Thompson, 2010: 26). This allows external 
organisations to assess RCOs, depending on how well they are able to 
implement and realize the objectives outlined in the governing document. As 
Zetter and Pearl (2000: 692) argue, the “role of RCOs in developing good 
                                            
268 Constitutions have to be certified by and official, independent bodies, such as a local community 




practice is crucial” – both for the RCOs themselves (to obtain funding) and for 
service providers (to legitimately outsource support to an official community 
organisation).  
 
As individuals are unable to apply for community funding (from both 
governmental and non-governmental funding bodies), migrant and refugee 
groups have to establish highly formalized associations to be eligible for 
funding (Williams, 2006: 877). As Zetter’s (2007: 287) extensive work shows, 
RCOs mainly serve “advocacy, protecting basic rights, supporting claims and 
filling the increasingly large void left by the withdrawal of state support”. RCOs 
provide the “organisational infrastructure” within which individuals are able to 
seek and provide assistance (Williams, 2006: 869), linking refugees with 
larger, external bodies and the government, as well as assuring internal 
continuity (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 682).Yet, Bhutanese refugees arrived in the 
midst of a financial downturn, in which charities and NGOs experienced a 
decrease in state-funding of up to eighty percent (private correspondence with 
service provider), further reducing the pool of available resources for RCOs 
(also see Zetter and Pearl, 2000).  
 
The comparatively small Bhutanese RCOs in the UK (only about 50-100 
members each) makes it difficult for my informants to compete for the 
increasingly reduced resources269. Sigona et al. (2004: 3) and Zetter and Pearl 
(2000: 675) highlight that the NGO and RCO sector is hardly ‘equal’ or stable: 
large and well established organisations are able to generate more funding 
than smaller RCOs. In comparison to large NGOs, charities and governmental 
organisations270, small and local RCOs often operate outside of legal, 
organisational structures, lacking professional staff, have very limited access to 
funding, and thus often fail to endure over time (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 681). 
                                            
269 Zetter and Pearl (2000: 675-6) also highlight that RCOs are further constraint by policies (emphasizing 
the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act), making it harder for RCOs to provide assistance, access 
resources and infrastructures, and lack professional skills to provide adequate support. My research 
revealed that due to reduced public spending, RCOs are significantly limited.  
270 For example, Refugee Council and Refugee Action, which are partly funded by the British 
government, are the main agencies offering support for newly arrived refugees, offer training and 
provide information and advice before outsourcing to established RCOs. They are also the main 
organisations that encourage community development. However, both agencies operate top-down, 
rather than allowing for mutual cooperation (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 681; 686).  
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Similarly, Griffiths et al. (2006: 895) are critical of the fact that “far from 
promoting the integration of refugees, this [RCO] framework may rather 
perpetuate a condition of institutionalised marginality for refugee groups”, and 
put into question the utility of RCOs in the mobilisation and ‘integration’ of 
migrant communities (also see Zetter and Pearl: 676; 682). For instance, 
Bhutanese RCOs hardly have funds to host events, initiate projects, such as 
English language classes, or offer specifically tailored support as envisioned 
by policy makers. Therefore, RCOs are unable to fulfil their aims, and refugees 
remain on the side lines of official structures and networks.  
 
During the first meeting in 2010 (see Chapter 9), service providers offered draft 
constitutions (of other RCOs) to Bhutanese refugees, and were encouraged to 
copy the aims and objectives, although they were advised to make it “their 
own” by using their “own words” (Thompson, 2010: 26). However, most 
Bhutanese refugees lack skills in English – especially the “language of 
bureaucracy” – to create a document within the required standards. Both 
Welfare and Takin copied and pasted from other draft constitutions, and once I 
entered the field, my informants from Takin asked me to assist them with a re-
drafting of their constitution (see Appendix 2). The wording of Takin’s and 
Welfare’s constitutions is very similar, with four major objectives of both RCOs. 
 
The first of these objectives in both cases is ‘community cohesion’ to “bridge 
the gap” between refugees and the British host population (TA UK, 2013). Both 
RCOs assume that through creating and participating in these networks, and 
through liaising with service providers, NGOs and the general public, 
‘integration’ can be achieved (ibid.). For example, in Takin’s constitution the 
aim is to ensure a “smooth transition towards effective integration and 
harmonious adjustment with the wider community” (ibid.), although neither 
RCO defines what they mean with ‘integration’ (also see Chapter 4). 
 
Secondly, the aim of both RCOs is to increase the refugees’ “quality of life” by 
providing and assisting with access to education and training, developing their 
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skills (e.g. English language), and assist with gaining employment271 (ibid.). 
However, as I discuss further below, in practice RCOs are unable to provide 
effective support for this aim. 
 
Thirdly, both RCOs commit to support community members by organising 
events, to realize projects and recreational activities, as well as to assist with 
“connecting Bhutanese in diaspora”272 (ibid.). As discussed above, due to a 
lack of funding, this aim can hardly be actualized.  
 
Lastly, because RCOs are defined as an interest group based on a shared 
‘cultural identity’ (Thompson, 2010: 5 – see Chapter 5), both RCOs are 
committed to “preserve” their “culture” and “heritage” (TA, 2013), such as 
Nepali language, music, dance and dress, and to create awareness of their 
“culture” amongst the British host population (ibid.). For example, BWA defines 
one of their purposes as to “preserve and promote the religion of interest and 
culture”. What constitutes this “culture”, “heritage” and “religion”, is not defined 
in the constitutions. BWA is comprised of Hindu, Christian and a few Buddhist 
members – but which religion is “preserved and promoted” by Welfare? In 
Chapter 9 I show how disagreements over how these elements can lead to an 
exaggeration of animosities between RCOs.  
 
Bhutanese RCOs are often unable to realize these purposes for their 
community members, both due to a lack of organisation and decreased and 
highly competitive funding. Zetter and Pearl (2000: 693) observe similar trends 
amongst other RCOs in the UK, arguing that “RCOs thus face the prospect of 
both trying to establish themselves with limited or no public resources and 
supporting clients who are widely distributed”. Within these limits, RCOs find it 
increasingly difficult to meet the standards prescribed in their constitutions.  
 
Nonetheless, Bhutanese RCOs succeed in some aspects: for example, the 
main purpose of both Takin and Welfare is to organise social events in order to 
                                            
271 Through, for example, helping with CVs and cover letters for job applications.  
272 Similar to the other aims, there is no concrete plan in the RCO constitutions how to realize this 
purpose. Moreover, ‘diaspora’ remains undefined, although it refers to the global community of 
Bhutanese refugees in resettlement.  
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allow Bhutanese refugees to meet and participate in their “culture” by 
speeches, song and dance, which in turn fosters samaj. These events – about 
3 a year per RCO - are popular and well attended, with a high rate of 
participation, especially amongst young people. Furthermore, due to the lack 
of service provision, RCOs are a source of support for new arrivals coming 
from Nepalese refugee camps, as I outlined in detail in Chapter 6. Due to the 
scarcity of Nepali translators amongst service providers in Manchester, RCOs 
offer free-of-charge translation services to their community members, 
especially for official business such as visits to Job Centres and medical 
facilities. Key members of RCOs (see below) often serve as a point of 
reference and mediator between Bhutanese refugees, service providers, 
official bodies and facilities (e.g. schools), and assist with official documents 
(e.g. tenancy agreements for housing; applications, etc.). Lastly, Bhutanese 
RCOs are able to obtain small amounts of funding for various projects, such as 
the Bhutanese Refugee Film Project (BRFP), or for workshops and events, 
such as the ‘Youth Seminar on Integration’ organised by BWA in August 
2013273.  
 
Nevertheless, my informants reflect critically on service providers, who only 
offer assistance for community development in the early stages of 
resettlement, and do not assess the functionality of RCOs in later stages. 
Whether the aims and purposes of RCOs are met is not necessarily a concern 
for these official services: success is said to be measured in how much funding 
an organisation is able to obtain (private correspondence with service 
provider). It is, to argue cautiously, a capitalisation of community organisations, 
assessing success and failure based on financial means (i.e. how much 
money an RCO has), rather than on the realization of ‘abstract’ goals, such as 
“community cohesion” or “cultural preservation”. This reflects Kelly’s (2003: 41) 
critique of the UK’s adoption of CDA, in which RCOs become “contingent 
communities”, which “conform to the expectations of the host society in order 
                                            
273 The event (which I attended) comprised of about 20 Bhutanese teenagers, and featured four speakers 
from the refugee community (including Dr. Sharma and Dr. Poudel, see Chapter 9), who spoke about 
the education and health system in the UK. The speakers drew heavily on their own personal 
experiences, and emphasized certain socio-cultural values and meanings, such as advising young 
people to remain sexually abstinent before marriage, and not being “caught up” in “peer pressure”.  
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to gain the advantages of a formal community association”, such as access to 
resources and funding (ibid.). For Kelly, RCOs are not a reflection of solidarity 
between and amongst refugees, but rather “an artificial construction 
responding to a social policy based on an assumption that communities exist” 
(ibid.: 46). As outlined in this chapter, Bhutanese RCOs learnt how to adapt to 
this social policy, and made use of bureaucratized language to gain 
advantages only open to formalized organisation.  
 
But Bhutanese RCOs also operate by means of ‘othering’, defining the 
boundaries of membership and non-membership (also see Chapter 9). 
Therefore, in the following section I outline the problems of leadership and 
authority within Bhutanese RCOs, creating hierarchies amongst Bhutanese 
refugees based on social and educational capital. These pecking orders 
stretch beyond RCOs, and permeate samaj, and my informants’ 
understandings of who should be in charge and claim to be able to ‘speak for’ 
all Bhutanese refugees. Thereafter, I unpack the various problems that 




Hierarchies and Leadership  
 
 
One of the functions of RCOs is to mediate between service providers and the 
refugee community. In order to do so, RCOs require leadership: individuals 
who serve as brokers between external parties and the community (Baumann, 
1996: 66; Colson, 2003: 14). This allows service providers to enact control 
over information and resources shared with refugee communities (Baumann, 
1996: 46). A resilient, independent RCO is defined (by service providers) as 
hinging on strong leadership, as Mitchell and Correa-Velez’s (2010: 95) 
informants argue: “Leaders can bring people together. When leaders are 
respected they can solve problems. Good leaders show compassion and are 




However, leadership brings with it dynamics of power-struggles and distribution 
of resources (Sigona et al., 2004: 7), and requires skills and assets from 
leaders (Mitchell and Correa-Velez, 2010: 97). As Shaw (2008: 28) argues, 
“without an adequate understanding of the ways in which power relations 
construct and constrain community life, we are left clutching at the straws of 
idealized and sentimental versions” of community, especially when it comes to 
internal community divisions. Therefore it is all the more important to discuss 
and illustrate who is in charge of Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester, how these 
key players gained authority, and how they are using it. 
 
 
Bhutanese community leaders 
 
As mentioned above, once the first Bhutanese refugees arrived in the UK, 
service providers approached educated Bhutanese refugees who have a good 
command of English to form community organisations. I describe the exact 
events leading up to formation of the first Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester 
(which occurred two years before my fieldwork) in Chapter 9. Here, however, I 
describe why these leaders have been chosen by their community and service 
providers, and how they maintain and have fostered their authority since then.  
 
Weber (1922 – see Weber et al., 1968) argued that because systems of power 
and authority are heteronomous and may arise in plural forms, we have to 
understand these systems within the context in which they are analysed. Here, 
I emphasize the distinction between authority and power. That is, RCO leaders 
do not have absolute power over Bhutanese refugees that would allow them to 
force or manipulate RCO members to do something against their will (Philip, 
1996b: 659). Rather, they have what Foucault referred to as ‘casual’ power 
that is not repressive but productive, gently influencing the members’ 
behaviours and experiences (ibid.: 658). Contrary to Weber’s (1968) 
‘intentional’ use of power, Bhutanese RCO leaders do not actively manipulate 




This theoretical framework is mirrored in my informants’ use of Nepali terms. 
Bhutanese RCO leaders are referred to (by Bhutanese refugees) as neta in 
Nepali, meaning a leader, guide or chief, which has to be distinguished from 
the Nepali title dalpati, referring to a commander or absolute leader. This 
choice of terminology is a reflection of the tangible power these leaders hold 
over community members. Rather than being an authoritative figure with 
absolute control to which everyone has to submit – that is, dalpati –RCO 
leaders are perceived as guides (neta), whose authority and status are based 
on the practical support they can provide. Although RCO leaders manage 
funding and organize projects and events, they have little de facto power over 
individuals in everyday life274. That is, RCO leaders may be consulted by 
individual for non-RCO matters, but their advice may not necessarily be 
adhered to. Here, I use Arendt’s (1960 in Gissurarson, 2003: 39) distinction 
between power as the submission of personal freedom (and decision making) 
through force, and authority that is (relatively voluntarily) agreed upon by both 
sides and allows individual freedom to resist their leaders. RCO board 
members achieve their authority not by forceful coercion (also see Lukes, 2003 
and Lukes, 2004). That is, they are leaders because they already have 
authority, rather than gaining authority through their role as leaders (also see 
below). They are considered neta because they are trusted to have the 
necessary know-how to give advice and lead an RCO, such as language skills, 
education and experience and networks with non-refugees (Philip, 1996a: 42). 
As one of my informants explained: 
 
“Community needs a leader for the effective running, and it is very 
important for leaders to have better ideas, familiarities, knowledge 
and skills to rule the community. What I personally think about being 
a leader, they must have the concentration and attentiveness in 
planning, managing and carrying out the events and activities that 
bring contributions and wellbeing in the lives of people in the 
                                            
274 Gissurarson (2003: 38) distinguishes between de facto authority (a collectively agreed role of power 
due to e.g. traditional systems of hierarchy, charisma) and de jure authority (power that has to be 





However, Arendt (1960, in Gissurarson, 2003) Parsons (1951) and Weber 
(1922, both in Calhoun, 2002: 378) stress that authority and power structures 
are necessary in a social group in order to organize social action and achieve 
collective goals. Despite their relatively ‘weak’ (de facto) power, leadership is 
essential to run an organisation effectively as envisioned by British service 
providers. Therefore, I outline the imposed (by policy) structure of hierarchy 
within RCOs, and their ascribed functions.  
 
All community organisations and 
charities in the UK operate through 
a specific power constellation (see 
Figure 23275). The key power 
holders – chair, secretary and 
treasurer – are, according to TA’s 
(2010) constitution elected by the 
committee of trustees, by a two 
third majority vote276. There is no 
limit to how many terms somebody 
can serve in these roles, and 
throughout my fieldwork, the key 
power players remained the same. Each position has ascribed responsibilities 
– both towards external bodies (the state, service providers, funding bodies) 
and internally towards the community they aim to serve (see below). Moreover, 
leadership over RCOs brings with it high status within the refugee community, 
and the accumulation of different forms of capital, particularly social and 
education capital. Board members are able to access training provided by 
governmental and non-governmental bodies in, for example, RCO 
development, accounting for organisations, and event planning. These training 
                                            
275 Graph by Yamen Albadin, commissioned by the author of this thesis 
276 In reality, there were no trustees for TA. As I was not invited to attend a BWA AGM, I cannot comment 
on how decisions are reached there, but according to my informant Binita, an AGM took place in 
2011, voting for the board without any further elections.  
Figure 23: RCO Structure 
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opportunities are only available for official board members277.  
 
Bhutanese RCOs, as a form of samaj, are based on the same guiding 
principles of mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social interaction278 – or lack 
thereof, as the internal divisions between Bhutanese RCOs demonstrate (see 
Chapter 9). As I discuss in further detail in the following chapter, only 
Bhutanese refugees who arrived in the UK with the resettlement programme 
can serve as RCO board members, and thus mutuality on grounds of a shared 
experience is a given. Pragmatic concerns legitimize the leaders’ position: only 
those who are perceived as being able to provide services, advice, and in 
some instances physical resources (money, goods) as well as event-
organisation279 are considered appropriate leaders by my informants. 
 
The most relevant factor is, undoubtedly, trust. In order to become elected as a 
board member, an individual has to establish trust, especially when dealing 
with funds. However, trust is also earned through the perceived accumulation 
of forms of capital, as I illustrate below. Individuals who have all characteristics 
ascribed to them (mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social networks) are 
bestowed with status within samaj, and with actual power within RCOs. In the 
following section I explore the duties of each board member, and outline how 
individuals gained their status and authority within the Bhutanese refugee 
community. The table below shows the names and positions of each of the 
three Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester, allowing the reader to get an overview 







                                            
277 Other training is available to all RCO members, such as female empowerment workshops organized 
by RAUK for all refugee women across the North of England. 
278 Research suggest the same characteristics of community amongst other refugee communities, such 
as a “sense of security…significance and…solidarity” (in Shaw, 2008: 28).  
279 RCO board members are obliged to organise and run community events, find funds for them, and 
make it overall, a “good experience”, as event attendees remark 
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 TA BWA HNC 
    
Chair Unnayak Bagale 
(2011) 
Shaan Mali (2010-1) 
Pran Mali (2011) 
Pastor (2010-3) 
Binita (2013) 
    
Secretary Kavi (2011) Kush Pathak 
Jibro Pathak 
? 
    
Treasurer Ram Gadal (2011) Binita (2011-3) 
? 
? 
    
Families Bagale Sinha Piyas 















Almost all converts 
 



















The role of chair is the most significant for community organisations, as they 
are the official leaders of associations (Thompson, 2010: 20). They are obliged 
to organize and conduct community meetings, and guide the members through 
the bureaucratic decision-making process (ibid.). They claim to ‘speak on 
behalf’ of all RCO members, meriting political authority over the community at 
large280 (Baumann, 1996: 63-4). Bhutanese community leaders in Manchester, 
Unnayak (TA), the Mali brothers (BWA) and the pastor and Binita (HNC), are in 
                                            
280 As the main mediator between the external and internal community they have the power to define how 
the community is presented externally, creating and reproducing the dominant discourse which 
equates culture with community. By claiming that there is one coherent, all-encompassing, 
homogenous Bhutanese refugee community, leaders may present themselves as presiding over all 
Bhutanese refugees, knowing ‘what is best’ for everyone (also see Chapter 9). 
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charge of their respective RCOs since their formation in 2010-11. These 
individuals, gained their position by having social and educational capital, 
which allows them to effectively communicate with external bodies (see further 
below). As educated individuals, they have the necessary know-how (e.g. 
language, experience with bureaucracy, etc.) to represent RCOs for the 
‘benefit of all’.  
 
But they also need charisma and congeniality within the social network, to gain 
the support of the community (see Baumann, 1996: 64). Pran and Shaan Mali 
have experience in politics (see Chapter 4), and the pastor and Binita are used 
to give passionate sermons – experiences which increases their ability to 
mobilize others for their cause. Unnayak, on the other hand, is perceived as a 
highly educated, approachable, tolerant and respectful individual, albeit not 
being a zealous public speaker. TA members bestow trust on him not because 
of his ability to give speeches (his chair Kavi more than compensated for 
Unnayak’s shortcomings, as I show below), but because of his determination, 
commitment and reliability, engendering trust. However, regardless of these 
talents and skills, RCO chairs rely heavily on their secretaries, who often take 




The secretary of a community organisation actualizes ideas and suggestions 
provided by the chair and the community (Thompson, 2010: 20). Whilst the 
chair runs meetings, the secretary organizes them by finding a venue (normally 
somebody’s living room). Both281 Kavi (TA) and the Pathak brothers Kush and 
Jibro (BWA) are outspoken individuals, assisting the chairs with both practical 
support and political rhetoric. Similarly, Kavi serves as a key orator during 
Takin events, as Unnayak lacks the charismatic skills. Secretaries gain 
authority in the same way as the chairs do - by being ascribed with trust and 
respectability by the community members - and their status within samaj is as 
                                            
281 Due to my lack of access to the Christian community, I am unsure who serves as the chair of HNC. 
Moreover, there was uncertainty about who has responsibility over BWA funds once Binita left, and 




high as that of the actual RCO leaders. Oftentimes, the chair’s and secretary’s 
roles are interchangeable and interdependent, and in the absence of the chair, 
the secretary assumes his/her position. The secretary is in most cases also the 
co-signatory of RCO cheques, paying for RCO expenses, bridging the role of 




The treasurer’s duties include (but are not limited to) ensuring that all 
expenses are paid and the correct receipts are kept on record (for external 
auditing). They monitor the RCO’s bank account, and provide financial 
accounts for funding applications (Thompson, 2010: 20). In Bhutanese RCOs 
funding applications, financial reports (presented to the AGM) and budgeting 
are conducted in liaison with the chair and secretary.  
 
For Bhutanese refugees, the handling of money requires undisputed trust and 
a practical skill-set required for dealing with financial accounts. For example, 
due to the mistrust towards the Malis, based on events stretching back to the 
refugee camp (see Chapter 4), the Christian community insisted on having a 
Christian treasurer in BWA until the final split of BWA and HNC in 2013. Binita 
often remarked that she does not trust BWA with funding, and the issue of how 
to utilize funds was the reason why these two RCOs ended their collaboration, 
as I illustrate in Chapter 9. The position of Binita as the treasurer for BWA 
fostered control and trust of the Christina BWA members.  
 
Both Binita and Ram (Takin) were young refugees (under 20), who became 
‘liminal experts’ (Turner, 1999, in Williams, 2006: 876), through education 
capital282 (see below), and their charismatic and candid personalities. 
Previously powerless young people make use of the accumulation of various 
forms of capital to gain status in ‘in-between’ phases, in which conventional 
structures of hierarchies are replaced with new signifiers of authority. As I 
                                            
282 Resonating with Spicer’s (2008: 500-1) research on migrant children, Bhutanese children, teenagers 
and young adults are convinced that education and job training in the UK will provide them with better 
opportunities in the future. See Spicer (2008) for a discussion on children’s experience of migration in 
the UK.  
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explore below, amongst Bhutanese refugees in resettlement, age and gender 
as a vestige of authority are supplanted by education and personality traits, 
because these skills offer more practical applications in resettlement in the UK.  
 
 
Authority and status 
 
As discussed above, authority amongst Bhutanese refugees does not 
designate absolute power and obedience, but is intrinsically interlinked with 
status, allowing those further up in the hierarchy to act as guides and 
consultants for everyday decisions and activities. Whilst status can exist a 
priori of actions, authority has to be earned through actions and skills (Beteille, 
1977: 18). For example, although BWA leaders attempted to impose their 
views on their community members by dissuading them to participate in Takin 
projects, BWA members (such as the Rochdale Boys introduced in Chapter 6) 
resisted their control. That is, ordinary RCO members can consult their board 
members, but nevertheless make their own, individual decisions, even if they 
are contrary to the advice they have received.  
 
RCO board members are only able to fully exert their control in regards to the 
internal functionality of RCOs, and the realization of projects and events, 
although all three Bhutanese RCO boards consult their members for input and 
suggestions before reaching a decision. RCOs in the UK are, after all, 
modelled on liberal democratic associations, based on majority rule. For 
example, during a day trip to Scarborough organised by Takin (but also 
attended by HNC members) the decision to charter a whole boat (paid for with 
TA money) to go out to sea for a tour, was reached through a group 
consensus, with all attendants raising their hands in the middle of a windy pier. 
Furthermore, due to yearly AGMs, RCO leaders are obliged to demonstrate to 
their members that they run RCOs efficiently, within its means, and “provide 
best value for funders and users” (Farley and Garcia, 2006: 37). Ideally, RCOs 
are “participatory, equitable and inclusive”, with a “shared vision” to support all 




However, as I illustrate in Chapter 9, this idealism is not realized in practice, as 
RCOs operate not only through inclusiveness, but also through ‘othering’. 
RCOs have to compete with one another for reduced funding, and those RCOs 
who are able to attract more external funding are also more prestigious and 
popular amongst Bhutanese refugees. For example, HNC is able to obtain 
substantial amounts of funding from Christian funding bodies unavailable to 
(mostly Hindu) TA and BWA, and therefore are more ‘attractive’ for Bhutanese 
refugees, demonstrated by the high conversion rate of new arrivals (see 
Chapter 9).  
 
Service providers assume that RCO leadership should be based on 
commitment and “a strong moral sense of justice” (Baumann, 1996: 66) rather 
than personal gain. However, once in power, RCO leaders become part of 
what I call a ‘perpetual circle of authority and skills’ (see Figure 24283). 
Bhutanese refugees in resettlement in the UK gain authority and status (both 
within RCOs and samaj) due to their skills (e.g. language) and various forms of 
capital (see below). Once they become board members they have more 
authority and status than an ordinary RCO member. Due to service providers’ 
participatory approach and effort to outsource support, RCO board members 
have access to training and resources to effectively manage RCOs. In turn, the 
development of expertise increases the leaders’ status, legitimizing a re-
election at the coming AGM, because, as one Takin member stated, “they 
know what they have to do already”.  
                                            




Figure 24: Perpetual Circle of Skills and Authority for RCO board members 
 
 
As years go by, TA, BWA and HNC board members hardly change, as they 
accumulate more skills and know-how, and therefore increase their status as a 
‘legitimate leader’. As Williams (2006: 868, 872) argues, knowledge and social 
networks become a currency – a “commodity” (ibid.) which can be traded for 
status and authority within both RCOs and samaj. Here, authority and status 
dynamics are shifting from being determined by age and gender to the 
accumulation of different forms of capital, allowing previously powerless 
individuals (such as youths) to gain status and authority within samaj and 





Social and educational capital284 
 
Becoming a board member in a RCO, and therefore having access to training 
and workshops enhancing ones’ management skills, allows individuals to 
expand their social networks both within and externally to the Bhutanese 
refugee community. TA’s board members had far-reaching networks of 
contacts amongst service providers (e.g. Refugee Action), NGOs (such as 
MRSN), local associations and other (non-Bhutanese) RCOs. Unnayak 
established a close friendship with the manager of Salford Forum, a refugee 
charity offering training and support in Manchester. This relationship initiated a 
snowball effect: Unnayak met leaders from other RCOs, establishing 
collaborative links from Takin members to non-Bhutanese refugees, resulting 
in for example some Bhutanese girls joining the Salford Women’s Dance 
Group organised by a Somali RCO in Salford. Through extending his networks, 
the Cumbria Multicultural Women’s Network and a Chinese women’s 
association invited female Takin members for a day trip to the Lake District in 
April 2013. Welfare leaders similarly established close ties with for instance 
Nepali and Ghurkha organisations in North England, participating in each 
other’s events with song and dance. These networks are of utmost importance, 
as they serve one of the main functions of RCOs: to operate in liaison with 
various social actors and networks (Sigona et al., 2004: 7).  
 
Anthropologist Peter Loizos (2000: 132), working with Greek Cypriot refugees 
in the 1960s, argued that refugees are “social capitalists”, who fashion social 
networks based on shared values, trust and reciprocity, in order to assure 
certainty in a time of transition (Chatty, 2010: 465). Loizos follows Coleman 
(1988, also see Chatty, 2010: 475), who argues that the relevance of social 
capital depends on a shared understanding of its function. Social capital 
“exists in the relations among persons: in the trust and trustworthiness, 
responsibilities, obligations, expectations, norms, and sanctions that tie people 
                                            
284 Theories on the various forms of capital originate with Bourdieu (1997). He defined social capital as 
one of many capitals (economic, human, educational) humans can acquire through social 
connections, which may then be converted into economic (or other pragmatic) capital. Because I 
focus on the adoption of social capital amongst refugees, I do not discuss Bourdieu’s theories in detail 
in this work – see Bourdieu (1997) and Durkheim (1992) for further theoretical discussions.  
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together” (ibid.), and manifests in the tangible support and sharing of 
resources within a social network (Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 523-4). The 
wider and more established a social network is, the greater are the tangible 
functions these relationships provide – at least in the case of Bhutanese 
refugees. Unnayak and the Mali brothers have far-reaching social networks 
within and external to the Bhutanese refugee community, and thus have better 
access to resources and other ‘functions’ social capital can provide, such as 
participation in training and workshops (increasing educational capital).  
 
Moreover, language competency (as educational capital) plays a key part in 
RCO power relations: many new arrivals from refugee camps have poor 
English language skills, and lack understanding of British bureaucracy and 
legal procedures (Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 685). Most adult Bhutanese refugees 
have limited contact with people outside of the Bhutanese refugee community, 
which some of them directly link to the lack of English. This leads to a ‘vicious 
circle’: Bhutanese refugees do not communicate with the local English-
speaking population due their lack of language skill – but because they do not 
speak English with anyone outside of their community (and thus, only speak 
Nepali), they cannot improve their language skills. As one of my informants 
remarked: “I have no English friends, and only hang out with the [Bhutanese] 
community. That’s why I cannot speak English”. 
 
Older members of the community find it particularly difficult to acquire sufficient 
language skills, and rely heavily on children and young people. One of the 
older refugees in the community remarked: 
 
“The kids are in a learning age. But my brain is old, and I cannot 
learn very well anymore. They [children] learn English very quickly, 
and make friends. But we [parents] have problems learning the 
language, and we make many mistakes”. 
 
On the one hand, this puts pressure on young refugees to assist their older 
community members. At the same time, it allows young refugees to gain status 
and authority within samaj. Before resettlement, this powerless group was 
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under the control and authority of elder men within the community. In the UK, 
youth and young adults acquire status within the community, as they become 
‘liminal experts’, discussed in the following section. Liminal experts are an 
authority, because they have various forms of capital, networks and expertise 
which legitimizes their status as neta (guide, advisor), and their advice is 





Bhutanese refugees who acquire English quickly, are highly respected 
individuals within samaj, as they can form social networks with non-Nepali 
speakers, and thus enhance their social capital286. As mentioned above, 
Bhutanese refugees with good language skills and a background in higher 
education were the ones approached by UK service providers to found RCOs, 
as it is assumed that they can effectively serve as brokers between the 
community and external bodies. Unnayak, Kavi, Ram, the Mali and Pathak 
brothers, as well as Binita gained their status because of their ability to 
communicate effectively with non-Bhutanese refugees, and because they have 
the ability to communicate back to the community members. Moreover, 
education and know-how of British bureaucracies increase social status and 
networks (Zeus, 2011: 262) within samaj, and allows those individuals to play 
key roles within RCOs.  
 
But Ram and Binita – as young refugees under the age of 18 – could not have 
assumed these roles before resettlement, in which status and authority was in 
the hands of elder (over 50) men, although Evans (2010) already notices the 
changes of leadership structures in the refugee camps. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, Bhutanese refugees and their social hierarchies are strongly 
                                            
285 However, they are not in authority, which would require a “special institutional role with a co-ordinated 
sphere of command” ((Philip, 1996a: 43). Only RCO board members can claim de jure authority, as 
they hold positions of power within these formalized communities. 
286 This is particularly important than when it comes to employment – the wider the social network 
stretches (especially with the British South Asian community), the more job opportunities become 
available, allowing Bhutanese refugees to access the labour market predominantly through the social 
relations they have established. 
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influenced by the social re-engineering employed by Western humanitarian 
and aid agencies, as well as by British service providers.  
 
From an anthropological perspective, these transitions of power and status 
structures are characteristics of individuals in a liminal phase (see Introduction 
and Chapter 3). This reflects Simon Turner’s (1999) claim that refugees in 
camps question and challenge “traditional hierarchies and understandings” 
(cited in Williams, 2006: 876). As Mortland (1987: 390) argues societies 
operate by “social restrictions which hold people in their classes”, which are 
“formal and explicit, unwritten and implicit, and they are understood by all 
residents”. Individuals operate within these dimensions of hierarchies, and 
research suggests that refugees attempt to replicate these structures in a state 
of liminality in, for example, refugee camps (ibid.: 389). But these internal 
social differences, such as age and gender, are “obscured” by aid and policy 
intervention, rendering all refugees in a camp (or in resettlement) as ‘equals’ 
vis-à-vis non-refugee service providers and agencies (ibid. 389-90). What 
becomes relevant to obtain authority is not the ‘traditional’ status someone has 
within the refugee community (e.g. age, gender), but how effectively an 
individual can communicate with non-refugees and accumulate various forms 
of capital.  
 
Evans’ (2010: 46) research in the Bhutanese refugee camps shows that it was 
predominantly young people who engaged with politics and decision making 
within the camps, which changed the power dynamics both within their families 
and the Bhutanese refugee community as a whole. This allows young and 
previously marginalized individuals to “trespass into new roles” (Turner, 1999 
cited in Williams, 2006: 876) as they “make use of this suspension of social 
structure to change things to their own advantage”, making them into “liminal 
experts” (ibid.). They have the necessary language skills, education, know-how 
and political determination to serve as brokers between refugees and non-
refugees, and thus to assume official roles within RCOs in resettlement. 
Williams’ (2006: 876) research with refugees and asylum seekers in the UK 




“Some young men have considerable power and authority in their 
networks of weak ties that are above and beyond what they could 
have achieved in traditional settings”. 
 
Liminal experts within the Bhutanese refugee community have ascribed status 
by being consulted by individuals for life-changing decisions: should we move 
from Leeds to Manchester? Should I apply for this job? Should I enter 
university? These and other such questions are directed at Ram, Binita, and 
many other young people in samaj, and these liminal experts try their best to 
advise or provide answers, information and even resources, such as money287 
and time. Ram, for example, travels far and wide in Greater Manchester to 
assist individual community members with job applications and CVs, and offers 
free translation for visits to e.g. health facilities. Binita assists families with 
enrolling children for school, and liaising individuals with non-refugee 
Christians. The Mali and Pathak brothers hold workshops for Bhutanese 
refugees, advising them about ‘integration’ (also see above) the British 
education system and “how to live a healthy life”288. Other young refugees visit 
families to assist and advise, especially new arrivals, as the arrival scene in 
Chapter 6 demonstrated. 
 
These ‘liminal experts’ have ‘achieved’ their status within samaj by 
accumulating social, educational, and other forms of capital, and therefore 
increased trust in interpersonal relations. That is, their advice can be trusted, 
because they are experts. The information they provide is considered reliable 
by other Bhutanese refugees, because of the assumed mutuality, following the 
shared understanding that “we are all the same” and “we have to help one 
another”. Social and other capital can be and are used to gain authority within 
RCOs (Philip, 1996b: 660). Liminal experts tend to speak up during RCO 
                                            
287 Research with refugees and asylum seekers across the UK shows that statistically, young refugees 
under the age of 30 find it easier to access the labour market (see e.g. Cheung and Phillimore, 2013: 
530). This allows them to accumulate money – in comparison to those who rely solely on welfare and 
benefit payments. This was reflected in my fieldwork, in which almost all refugees from 18 to 30 were 
in (both legal and illegal) employment, mostly gained through their social networks with South Asian 
communities.  
288 As mentioned above, during the BWA workshop in summer 2013, Bhutanese refugee were advised 




meetings, assist with the organisation of events, and suggest projects and 
activities.  
 
For example, during the BRFP managed by Takin, it was young people and 
teenagers who were keenest to assist ‘behind the scenes’: they asked the 
questions during interviews, and arranged the preparations of the rooms in 
which filming took place. Manendra – at the time of my fieldwork 15 years old – 
took charge of the filming and bossed around participants and onlookers, often 
being very forceful in expressing how and what he wanted, especially to 
refugees many times his age, who (according to Manendra) were “too stupid to 
understand”. Manendra’s behaviour towards older community members was 
often condescending, and I found myself surprised that despite Manendra’s 
insolent conduct, he was a well-regarded and often consulted individual, 
especially for older Bhutanese refugees who lack IT skills. Manendra is the first 
person to contact with any IT issues – from computer hard- and software to 
website design (he designed and manages the Takin website). He acquired IT 
expertise after resettlement, and the Bhutanese refugee community regards 
him as an expert on these matters, earning him respect from both young and 
old refugees. Manendra is aware of this authority, and makes use of his status 
within the community by means of language or requests for resources. He is 
not the exception – Ishita, Ajay, Dharendra and Gatha are all teenage refugees 
who have excellent language skills and expertise in certain areas (acquired 
through having access to formal education in the UK), which they use to gain 
status within samaj, and who are closely involved in Bhutanese RCOs. Ankha, 
an 18-year-old Bhutanese refugee, who completed his A-levels during my 
fieldwork, and worked in several part-time jobs next to his educational 
commitment, highlighted the importance (for him) of getting involved in the 
community, but also the prestige and status that comes with it:  
 
“I would like to do more than what needs to be done for the 
protection and improvement of the community by being a successful 
community worker. Once I make sure I have succeeded in 
everything as planned and aimed, it will be the remarkable moment 
where I will be well-known in the community and this will be the best 
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way to stay in touch with people and hopefully, I will always be 
remembered by the people even when I pass away as the effect of 
the developments I brought for the community will still be touching 
them”. 
 
Similar to Manendra and other young refugees, being involved in the 
community not only serves the support of community members, but also his 
own increase in social status.  
 
These liminal experts have to be juxtaposed with those who used to have 
status and authority, but are losing their position, which particularly affects 
older (over 50 years old) men. In Bhutan, and even in Nepalese refugee 
camps, their authority was ascribed due to their gender and age, having 
expertise in areas that were relevant at the time. Buddhi, for example, was an 
agricultural expert with more than four decades of experience in toiling on the 
land in Bhutan. His children recalled that Buddhi was consulted from all across 
south Bhutan on matters of farming, selling cash crops and investing in 
agricultural tools. This gained him power in the community, and a few refugees 
remarked that Buddhi was a “chief” in the Bhutanese village where he used to 
live with his family. But in the camp, Buddhi’s knowledge was no longer 
relevant, and his status declined to a point where he became nothing more 
than an “old man”, as he once explained, who has “nothing to say”. In 
resettlement, Buddhi’s expertise in farming is equally redundant. Buddhi has 
status in the community and in Takin because of his age and reasoning, tinted 
with an exceptional sense of humour that makes even the most serious visitor 
burst into laughter. But in the UK Buddhi is utterly reliant on his family and 
community members to negotiate his life. Buddhi may be one of the few 
refugees who can read and write Nepali and Dzongkha fluently – which gave 
him status and power in Bhutan and Nepal – but he cannot read Latin/Roman 
script or Arabic numbers (and thus read or write in English), making him 
dependent on others who are literate in English. Buddhi’s prestige as an 
educated expert, with financial means and property (which was confiscated by 
the RGB) only applied to his life in Bhutan, and provided him with status within 
that specific community. In resettlement, his expertise is rendered irrelevant, 
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and other forms of educational, economic and social capital take centre stage, 
bestowing status to those who have the pragmatic know-how to negotiate life 
in the UK. Williams (2006: 876) puts it most succinctly: “[p]eople who were 
previously independent and powerful now have to seek help and assistance 
from those who were their traditional inferiors”, because they find it difficult to 
adapt to their new lives in resettlement.  
 
However, different forms of capital attained before resettlement influence 
structures of authority in resettlement. For example, wealthy, land-owning 
families in Bhutan were able to send their children to English-medium schools 
and access higher education, which has given these individuals a significant 
advantage in resettlement due to their educational capital289. Others benefited 
from the free education in the refugee camps in Nepal, and brought with them 
ideas, values (influenced by social re-engineering) and competences (e.g. in 
the English language) which has allowed them to become liminal experts in the 
UK.  
 
In summary, liminal experts in the UK gain status within both samaj and RCOs, 
through their expedient knowledge and social networks, and therefore 
authority and status dynamics are shifting. These new dimensions of internal 
hierarchies are based on capital that serves pragmatic purposes, can be 
traded within the community, and establishes connections outside of the 
community. As the illustration above shows, this engenders a perpetual circle 
of increased authority and status of those who gain authority through RCOs, 
as they can further expand their capitals by gaining access to training and 





                                            
289 However, due to the loss of land and financial capital when they had to flee Bhutan, hardly any 
Bhutanese refugee brought with them economic resources that would allow them to gain higher 
economic status in resettlement. As time progressed, those who obtained financial resources in 






The CDA and RCO development project in refugee resettlement is said to 
serve the purpose to provide cost-effective, individually tailored services to 
refugees, allowing marginalized people to ‘help themselves’ rather than 
depend on governmental or non-governmental aid. In theory, this participatory 
approach offers refugees the possibility to define their own needs and resolve 
problems from within. In turn, the formalization of RCOs continues the social 
re-engineering of refugees started in refugee camps, making refugees into 
democratic, independent persons, who easily assimilate into the mainstream of 
the host society. In practice, however, RCOs can only serve these functions 
marginally, due to a lack of funding and effective cooperation with service 
providers and other RCOs.  
 
What formalized RCOs do, however, is to create new forms of hierarchies 
within samaj, transforming some refugees into liminal experts. These new 
structures of hierarchies are based on pragmatic advantages, rather than 
‘traditional’ markers of difference, such as age and gender. Therefore, 
although RCOs may not be as effective as anticipated by policy makers and 
service providers, they have a real, tangible impact of how Bhutanese 
refugees perceive themselves and their role within samaj. RCOs also continue 
to be the most reliant support network for Bhutanese refugees.  
 
However, the formation of RCOs impacted negatively on community cohesion 
– one of the main aims of CDA and the RCO project. In the following chapter, it 
will become evident that communities operate by means of ‘othering’, and 
Bhutanese refugees operate within frameworks of similarity and difference, 









In the previous chapters, I explored the notion of community from various 
perspectives. We have seen that both international relief agencies and UK 
service providers tend to take an optimistic view of community as a facilitator of 
support during a time of uncertainty for migrants, employing a Community 
Development Approach (CDA). One outcome of these policies is that the 
differences Bhutanese refugees create between each other is elided and 
therefore given inadequate attention by service providers. As I have 
demonstrated throughout this work, Bhutanese refugees are a diverse social 
group, with varying values and meanings, who are internally divided since the 
refugee camp.  
 
Although I do not argue that these issues have been ‘imported’ into 
resettlement in the UK, internal conflicts between Bhutanese refugees are also 
common in resettlement in Manchester, jeopardizing the assumed (by service 
providers) advantages of the RCO project. Rather than serving as a reliable 
support network on which refugees can draw once service providers cease 
their support, these formalized associations can become battlegrounds on 
which personal and communal animosities are played out, rendering these 
small RCOs powerless to compete in an ever-decreasing, competitive funding 
regime (see below). Here, we should be reminded of Cohen’s notion of 
community as a symbolic construct, operating by creating sameness and 
difference. Community, as Cohen (1985: 12) states: 
 
“[s]eems to imply simultaneously both similarity and difference. The 
word thus expresses a relational idea: the opposition of one 
community to others or to other social entities. Indeed … the use of 
the word is only occasioned by the desire or need to express such a 
distinction. It seems appropriate, therefore, to focus our examination 
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of the nature of community on the element which embodies this 
sense of discrimination, namely, the boundary". 
 
In the previous chapter, I have outlined how Bhutanese RCOs are structured 
and how authority within RCOs are gained. In this chapter, I shift the 
discussion to the internal divisions between Bhutanese RCOs. In order to 
understand this ‘othering’ employed by Bhutanese refugees, I outline the 
formation of RCOs amongst Bhutanese refugees in Manchester. Starting from 
my own experiences with community divisions, I trace the emergence of three 
RCOs amongst Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, and present the ‘origin-
myth’ of Takin Association (TA), which serves to legitimize the RCO’s position 
and power for its board members. By drawing on several ethnographic 
examples, this chapter argues that RCO divisions based on personal 
animosities may have an impact on what RCOs can achieve, and in turn put 
into question the assumed positive attributes of community development 
amongst forced migrants.  
 
 
Fieldwork in a ‘Divided’ Community 
 
 
A few weeks into my fieldwork in 2012, I was invited to accompany a group of 
Bhutanese refugees to London, where they attend the ‘Refuge in Film’ festival 
at the British Film Institute (BFI), Southbank (London), to present their five 
minute short-film “Life Beginning” (see Chapter 6). The festival organizers 
invited all Bhutanese refugee participants to visit London for the premiere at 
the film festival, although they could only provide financial support for this 
excursion to five individuals. Unnayak was asked by the organizers to serve as 
the responsible adult, accompanying the teenage refugees, and prior to the 
event contacted the parents of participants to request permission to take them 




During the event in London, festival 
attendees were able to participate in 
a T-shirt printing workshop. Five 
young Bhutanese refugee boys 
together with Unnayak were keen to 
create shirts with a TA logo they 
created spontaneously (see Figure 
25290). On my return to Manchester 
after the event, I visited the Sinha 
household in Bury for Deepawali 
celebrations, whose two teenage 
daughters participated in the project. As a novice in the field – similar to new 
arrivals of refugees – I had not been aware of animosities between RCOs, 
wrongly assuming that all Bhutanese refugees share one RCO – Takin 
Association UK – with whom I had established first contact when entering the 
field. Therefore I did not question Unnayak on why the Sinha girls were not 
attending the event with them. During the celebrations in Bury, the Pathak 
family visited the Sinhas, as they are related through marriage and live close 
by. Kush, one of the seven Pathak brothers (who is married to the Sinha’s 
oldest daughter) asked me about the London event, and without hesitation, I 
showed them the photos I have made during the event, including ones from 
the T-shirt printing workshop. When images of the TA shirts were displayed, 
Kush took my phone and showed it to everyone around the table with a sour 
look on his face. “They say the film is from Takin?”, Kush asked calmly, to 
which I (in hindsight carelessly) replied that the attendees did indeed advertise 
TA to the audience. A discussion ensued around the table, most of which with 
an angry undertone, remarking on Unnayak and “his” Takin. “You know, we 
are not with Takin”, Rani explained, which puzzled me. The rest of the evening 
passed rather uncomfortably, and I have never been invited to the Sinha 
household again, despite my attempts to meet the Sinha girls.  
 
                                            
290 Image is author‘s own.  




Several weeks later, as I got more involved in the management of TA, helping 
with for example website design and providing free English language lessons, 
my informants in Longsight decided to initiate another film project – the 
Bhutanese Refugees UK Film Project (BRFP) – for which they required 
funding. I offered to help with their funding application, and began organising 
the project with a few TA members. During these planning days, Kavi (the 
secretary of Takin, see Chapter 8) contacted me to emphasize: “I don’t want 
[the Pathaks and Sinhas]. When they are in the project, I don’t want to be in 
the film. I don’t work with Welfare”. After these comments, two of my 
informants sat down with me, and explained that not all refugees in 
Manchester are with TA, but that there is another RCO called Bhutanese 
Welfare Association (BWA), headed by a Mr. Shaan Mali, together with his 
brother Pran, as well as the Pathaks. They explained that the organisations 
are not working together and are “rival” community organisations.  
 
A few months later I found myself again in the centre of the conflict between 
the two RCOs: during the filming of the BRFP, the film crew – consisting of TA 
members – and I were confronted with the Pathak brothers, who denied us 
access to BWA members’ houses291. Jibro Pathak brought it to a point when 
turning to me, exclaiming “we are not part of anything that has the Takin logo 
on it”, followed by “our members can’t do this film with you and Takin”. Indeed, 
the Pathaks have called on all BWA members not to let us into their houses, 
leading to some interested parties cancelling the interviews we have 
scheduled with them. On the very same day, prior to the encounter with the 
Pathaks, we visited Raja and his family. As mentioned in Chapter 6, I got to 
know Raja as a confident, outspoken individual, who would not surrender 
himself to any RCO leader or membership. Before filming the interview, Raja 
explained that he received a call from the chair of BWA prior to our arrival, 
being told that he is not “allowed” to participate in the film project. Raja 
emphasised:  
                                            
291 Interestingly, Mr. Sinha himself – who expressed his interest in participating in the project and 
arranged the interview date with us – was not present, leaving it to the Pathak brothers to cancel the 
interview. As outlined in Chapter 8 this is an example of how power-players (in this case, the Pathak 
brothers on behalf of BWA) ‘claim to speak’ for all RCO members, to a point where ordinary members 




“I told him on the phone: 'who are you to tell me what I should do? 
Are you my king or my father?' Who has the right to tell me what to 
do? I do what I want to do, and I think the project is a good idea. I 
want to talk about our experiences and the suffering. I don't care 
about the organisation, I care about telling my story”.292  
 
These examples demonstrate the internal divisions within the Bhutanese 
refugee community in Manchester, impacting on project participation and the 
realization of RCO aims. The events I describe above and below also illustrate 
that migrant and refugee communities are not a homogenous “communitas” 
(Taylor, 2002: 360) of equal individuals, but that ‘othering’ is inherent in 
community-formation. Akin to samaj, RCOs are defined and structured by 
mutuality, trust and reciprocity – or, more importantly, the lack thereof – which 
determines the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
During my fieldwork service providers working with Bhutanese refugees 
disregarded these internal divisions, and, due to a lack of critical research and 
feedback on migration policies, these conflicts are not adequately addressed 
by bureaucratic bodies in the UK. In fact, service providers in Manchester were 
reluctant to discuss community divisions with me, arguing that there is “nothing 
[they] can do” to impede these conflicts. This view is problematic as the service 
providers themselves are responsible for establishing RCOs (as discussed in 
the previous chapters). 
 
But how can we explain these internal community divisions, and the emphasis 




                                            
292 Raja’s refusal to comply with the BWA leaders’ demands reflects the discussion on authority in 
Chapter 8, demonstrating that rather than holding absolute power over Bhutanese refugees, RCO 




Tracing divisions  
 
In order to understand this issue arising during my fieldwork, we have to 
explore how three distinct Bhutanese RCOs emerged. In order to do so, we 
have to go back to 2010 – two years before my fieldwork began – when the 
first Bhutanese refugees arrived in the UK.  
 
RCO divisions can be traced back to these first arrivals, and the origin story 
outlined below is based on hearsay and various narratives. It is, however, 
important to keep in mind that due to my lack of access to BWA, the origin 
story can only be told from the perspective of TA members. The narrative of 
the events leading up to the organisation-split can be seen as a myth of origin, 
perpetually revised and retold in order to legitimize the continuous rivalry 
between TA and BWA in the present293, as well as internal power structures 
and stratifications. 
 
For some, the symbolic boundaries between TA and BWA are unbridgeable, 
prohibiting social interactions and cooperation. For others, these boundaries 
are less relevant. Amongst Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, rivalries and 
animosities do not remain unchallenged, and especially young people (children 
and teenagers) do not limit their social environment according to RCO 
affiliations. Many individuals question the community division and actively 
move in and between the various RCOs to gain advantages, being part of all 
whilst being a ’member’ of none294. The three RCOs amongst Bhutanese 
refugees in Manchester may have been divided to some extent, but the shifting 
relationships between the RCOs shows that their divide is neither permanent 
nor based on actual differences. 
 
In the following section, I explore (what I call295) the Takin ‘myth of origin’ – that 
is, how Bhutanese refugees formed several, instead of one RCO in 
                                            
293 Following Malinowski’s (1954, in Barnard and Spencer, 1996: 492) functionalist approach of myth and 
collective narratives as legitimizing, supporting and preserving the status quo. 
294 As discussed below, membership is an important element of RCOs, especially when it comes to 
duties and responsibilities such as membership fee or attendance at Annual General Meetings 
(AGMs). 
295 The terms ‘myth of origin’ or ‘origin story’ are both mine, rather than used by my informants.  
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Manchester296, reiterating my argument that the RCO project is not as 
straightforward and unproblematic as UK policy makers and service providers 
assume. Similar to what Kiptinness et al. (2011: 84) describe for Bhutanese 
refugees in the USA, new arrivals in the UK fully rely on established refugees 
to become part of an already existing social network, and thus to gain access 
to information, facilities and support in order to navigate through the unfamiliar 
social, economic, political and cultural environment. For new arrivals, TA 
members recall an origin story of how TA was founded, that begins in the first 
few months of resettlement of Bhutanese refugees. 
 
 
The ‘Origin Story’ of Takin Association UK 
 
 
In late August and early September 2010, the first group of Bhutanese 
refugees arrived in the UK with the Gateway Protection Programme (GPP). 
The Bagales and Gadals, two families related through intermarriage, as well as 
the Malis and the Pathaks, were the first to arrive - followed by the Chettris, the 
Thapas, and various other families. The first group of Bhutanese refugees in 
the UK was the largest in the resettlement project of Bhutanese refugees in the 
UK, as the numbers peaked at around 150 individuals at the end of 2010, and 
most were housed in Manchester, although some were sent to Sheffield and 
Leeds297. Following the welcome and introductory events by UK resettlement 
agencies in the first few weeks of resettlement (see Chapter 6), this large 
group of new arrivals was also instructed on the formation of RCOs, and 
encouraged (by service providers) to form their own formalized associations in 
order to “help themselves” once governmental services are stopped or 
outsourced.  
 
Before Bhutanese refugees arrived in the UK with the GPP, Refugee Action 
and Refugee Council approached Hari, his wife Anusha (whom we have met in 
                                            
296 Due to my lack of access to BWA and HNC members (see Introduction), I cannot provide a detailed 
outline of the other two RCOs’ origin stories and perceptions of the internal divisions.  
297 Bhutanese refugees have been resettled in the Manchester area due to the availability of services and 
accommodation (see Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 3), as well as Ved and Yumi – all Bhutanese refugees who arrived in 
the UK before 2010, and already obtained British citizenship and high-skilled, 
governmental employment (see below). They were approached by service 
providers for two reasons. Firstly, they were invited to provide additional 
information and support to British social workers before the refugees arrived. 
Hari and Ved, for example, have given lectures to service providers on the 
‘history of Bhutanese refugees’ before resettlement began, to help social 
workers understand the background of refugees, and thus to better discern 
their needs. Secondly, they could serve as translators and support workers for 
the new arrivals, offering services not only in a familiar language (Nepali), but 
also by individuals who “have the same experience”298, as Ved once 
explained. These, what I call ‘native support workers’299, were important 
sources of information during the first few weeks after arrival, and continue to 
be consulted by resettled refugees – a point of contention that I discuss further 
below.  
 
Service providers trained native support workers to encourage the formation of 
RCOs, and offered funds to host a welcome party in late 2010. The event was 
intended as a meet-and-greet for Bhutanese refugees, who mostly did not 
know one another before resettlement, as they arrived from different camps in 
Nepal. As a community development worker explained (private 
correspondence), relationships (that is, a samaj) between resettled refugees 
have to be established before RCOs can be formed in the cooperative fashion 
as envisioned by service providers. With the received funds, Yumi, Hari, 
Anusha and Ved organised a welcome party at a Methodist church hall in 
Sheffield. My Takin informants later recalled that they appreciated the event, 
which included long speeches and Nepali food, allowing refugees, as one of 
my informants put it, “to feel like at home”.  
 
                                            
298 However, except Hari, who taught in a school in Beldangi II refugee camp for many years before 
claiming asylum in the UK, Bhutanese refugees did not know Anusha, Ved or Yumi before meeting 
them in Manchester.  
299 I do not intend to discuss the notion of the ‘native’ here. What I call ‘native support worker’ (which is 
my term rather than my informants) signifies individuals who are themselves Bhutanese refugees, 
and who acquired competence and trust by service providers to serve as support workers for 
Bhutanese refugee resettlement. Since 2010, some Bhutanese refugees (notably with excellent 
English language skills), receive training (by e.g. Refugee Action) to become ‘native support workers’. 
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I could never determine what led to the argument between the Pathaks and 
the other guests, but at one point during this event the mood turned sour. As 
Unnayak recalled from this day (and which has been retold several times by 
other informants): 
 
“[T]hese people [Pathak family] went to Hari, Ved and Yumi and said 
‘you should not have done this. We do not want this party. We are 
going’. ... [Hari, Ved and Yumi] were so upset, and said ‘this is the 
thanks we get for organising this?’ – I understand them. It was so 
good of them to make this party. And these people [Pathak family] 
are just rude to them. I don’t like them”. 
 
According to some of my Takin informants, the point of contention was that 
these native support workers did not arrive in the UK with the GPP, and 
therefore should not be involved with Bhutanese refugees who came here 
through organised resettlement. This harks back to the animosities towards 
pro-resettlement refugees in the refugee camps. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
many refugees who left the refugee camps either to settle in Nepal or India, or 
who sought asylum in other countries, were often portrayed as ‘traitors’, who 
were against the ‘cause’ to be repatriated to Bhutan. Referring back to this 
trend in Bhutanese refugee camps, it can be assumed that Hari, Ved and 
Anusha300 may have been considered as ‘traitors’ by some newly arrived 
refugees (such as the Pathaks) as these highly educated individuals left the 
camps for a ‘better life’ abroad. 
 
Interestingly, a contradiction emerges here. For example, the Pathaks and 
BWA work closely with Dr. Sharma and Dr. Poudel - both medical doctors who 
(as Bhutanese refugees) sought asylum in the UK in 2006, and now work at 
hospitals in Sheffield and Doncaster – inviting them to give presentations at 
BWA events and workshops (see Chapter 8). Due to my lack of access to 
BWA, I never fully uncovered the reasons for this discrepancy. The Nepali 
                                            
300 Interestingly, Yumi cannot be included in this, as she left Bhutan even before the ethnic conflict really 
began, and married a Briton. BWA members nevertheless grouped her with the others, who arrived in 
the UK as asylum seekers.  
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student Aadit, who is familiar with all Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester, guesses 
that personal animosities may be the root cause for these arguments. If so, it 
verifies Amit and Rapport’s (2002, Loc 508; see Chapter 7) claim that 
communities are “ego-based”, and thus prone to individual likes and dislikes.  
 
Although the ‘seed of mistrust’ was planted during the welcome party in 2010, 
service providers pressured both Bhutanese refugees and native support 
workers to continue working with each other. With the help of a community 
development worker (CDW) from Refugee Action, new arrivals were 
encouraged to establish a formalized organisation together.  
 
All Bhutanese refugees were somehow involved in this one organisation at the 
beginning, except the Christian community - the Himalayan Nepali Church 
(HNC) - which already established their own organisation with the help of 
British Christian churches. In late 2010, Bhutanese refugees in Manchester 
came together to discuss the foundation of Bhutan Welfare Association (BWA). 
The name was suggested by Kavi to emphasise the main aim of the 
association301: to support Bhutanese refugees and therefore to ensure their 
welfare and wellbeing. Moreover, it references Bhutan, in order to legitimize 
the purpose of the RCO302. 
 
However, this meeting resulted in arguments over details such as membership 
fees, and the RCO constitution (see Chapter 8 and Appendix 2). Because of 
these disputes, no RCO chair was elected, and no one obtained responsibility 
for the RCO bank account, increasing the hostilities that led to the final split 
between BWA and TA described below.  
 
According to TA members, antagonisms were fuelled by the arrival of Shaan 
Mali in late 2010, a political power player amongst Bhutanese refugees both in 
Nepal and in the UK. Stories about Shaan’s involvement in corruption and 
                                            
301 Even the RCO-name became a reason for argument: some were in favour of ‘Takin Association’ (the 
takin is the national animal of Bhutan – a goat-antelope living in the Himalayas), which others rejected 
on the ground that Bhutan should not be referenced “too much”.  
302 As discussed in Chapter 5, the legitimization of my informants’ refugee status and in turn their RCOs 
has a significant impact on funding opportunities and projects.  
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embezzlement in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal (see Chapter 4) 
spilled over to the UK. Regardless of whether the accusations are true or not, 
they continue to have leverage amongst many of my TA informants, including 
new arrivals who entered the UK during my fieldwork. Prasad, for example, did 
not want to be affiliated with the Mali brothers on arrival, explaining that “they 
have a bad name” amongst Bhutanese refugees. The Christian community, 
also questioned Shaan’s credibility, and insisted that whilst being affiliated with 
BWA, a Christian community member should serve as BWA’s treasurer. Binita 
(then treasurer of BWA, now one of the key players of HNC, see Chapter 8) 
confided in me, that she would never trust BWA members or “the Pathaks and 
Malis” with money, such as the membership fees, because of the “stories 
people tell”. In fact, arguments over funding money led to the final split 
between BWA and HNC in mid-2013 (see further below). This shows, again, 
that trust is an important feature of both samaj and RCOs – although mutuality 
is given (they are all Bhutanese refugees), the lack of trust impacts negatively 
on my informants’ relationships with one another.  
 
With Shaan’s arrival, the divide between the rival fractions became 
unbridgeable. TA members recalled that when Shaan arrived, he immediately 
attempted to take over the leadership of BWA. His first course of action was to 
visit Bhutanese refugee households across Manchester and collect money for 
“projects”. As stated above, gossip spilling over from the refugee camps fuelled 
people’s suspicions about what the funds would be used for, and many 
households refused to provide donations, leading to the Pathaks publicly 
naming and shaming those who gave no money, leading to further conflicts 
amongst Bhutanese refugees in Manchester.  
 
Following this and other small “scandals”, the native support workers, the 
Gadals, Bagales and Chettris wanted to stage a ‘coup’ and remove Shaan 
from his self-assumed position as chair of BWA. However, they were overruled 
by the Pathaks (a fairly large family with seven adult sons, each with their own 
families). Moreover, the Christian refugees supported BWA, as it was, 
262 
 
according to one Christian informant, “easier” than founding a new 
organisation303.  
 
Thereafter, the Gadals, Bagales and Chettris, as well as other Bhutanese 
refugees mistrustful of the Malis, held their own meeting, deciding to split from 
BWA and found Takin Association UK. As the native support workers Hari, 
Anusha, Ved and Yumi have been trained on community development, they 
helped TA to create their own constitution304, and open an RCO bank account. 
As the official CDW already provided support to BWA, service providers only 
offered minimal support to TA, and later argued that they “hoped these issues 
would resolve themselves” and that the split would only be temporary (private 
correspondence).  
 
In early 2011, Bhutanese refugees in Manchester were divided into three 
RCOs. Most refugees were or became members of BWA, chaired by Shaan 
and the Pathaks. HNC was, although largely independent, part of BWA. TA 
became the smallest RCO, mostly comprised of Bhutanese refugees who lived 
in Longsight, Salford and Bolton. However, the split is not a total one, and 
many TA, BWA and HNC members feel part of every group, and freely mingle 
with all RCOs. The division is mostly visible on the leadership level, but as 
these chairs (as outlined in Chapter 8) do not hold total authority over 
Bhutanese refugees, they are unable to prohibit their RCO members from 
crossing the ‘boundaries’ of RCOs.  
 
For example, TA and BWA still work together for several projects initiated by 
external parties, such as the film project mentioned above organised by 
Refugee Youth in 2012. In the first few months of my fieldwork, TA members 
were invited to BWA events and vice versa, and attended these except for the 
‘hardliners’ who refused to mingle. Baumann (1996: 160), who observed 
similar community divisions amongst his informants in Southall, outlines 
                                            
303 I emphasize that the Christian community has their own RCO in cooperation with Pentecostal 
Churches in the UK, through which they also receive their own funding (for religious purposes) and 
RCO venue for worship (see below). HNC operates independently of service providers and other 
RCOs, and is more closely affiliated with British Christian groups. It can therefore be classified as a 
religious group, rather than a formal RCO such as TA or BWA.  
304 See Appendix 2 for a revised version from 2012.  
263 
 
comparable “resistance to leadership”, as one of his informants remarks: “[o]ur 
lives will not be defined by community leaders. We will take up our rights to 
determine our own destinies”.  
 
Yet, as resettlement continued, a fierce competition for new members was 
initiated, as membership numbers impact on funding opportunities, as I outline 
further below. Before exploring ‘othering’ in detail, I briefly narrate the final split 
between BWA and HNC, highlighting the importance of trust (or the lack 
thereof) for community development.  
 
 
The split between BWA and HNC 
 
In 2012, HNC members removed themselves more and more from BWA. The 
points of contention between the two sides were not based on religious 
differences (between Hindus and Christians). Rather, mistrust increased 
through accusations that BWA board members (the Malis and the Pathaks) 
mismanage the RCO and their funding.  
 
The ‘official’ split occurred in the middle of my fieldwork in 2013, when HNC 
members declared that they relinquish all positions and memberships in BWA, 
and will remain in their own RCO. The separation was regarded as a “scandal” 
in the Bhutanese refugee community, the news quickly spreading both in the 
community in the UK and globally within an astonishingly fast time frame. As it 
was revealed to me, the breakdown of relations was based on disagreements 
on how obtained funds should be used. HNC believed that BWA leaders used 
obtained funds exclusively for Hindu festivals, rather than for ‘cultural’ events 
embracing both Hinduism and Christianity. This is reflected in other research, 
in which “conflicts over resource allocation” (Sigona et al., 2004: 8) result in 
disunity within RCOs. 
 
HNC moved closer to TA due to the BRFP, produced and filmed in early 
August 2013. In comparison to BWA, whose members refused to participate in 
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the TA project (see above), many HNC members were happy to become an 
active part of the project, and allowed TA and me to film one of their sermons. 
Moreover, HNC members visited Scarborough on a day trip organised and 
managed by TA in late August 2013, and TA members happily followed HNC’s 
invitation for a day trip to the English west coast in early September 2013.  
 
As depicted in the figure above, community relations between the three RCOs 
shifted in mid-2013, and remained more or less like this until the end of my 
fieldwork. TA and HNC attempt to cooperate in some matters, but the board of 
TA and HNC remains separate, and neither involve themselves in the other 
RCO’s decision making process.  
 
 
The relevance of Bhutanese RCO origin stories  
 
For Bhutanese refugees – at least TA members – the events above are an 
‘origin myth’, retold again and again amongst themselves and for new arrivals. 
Here, it is important to emphasize that my informants, contrary to other 
ethnographies on refugees (e.g. Chatty, 2010; Halilovich, 2013; Malkki, 1995), 
do not engage in story-telling about their ‘imagined homeland’ Bhutan305. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, their ‘origin’ in Bhutan is only relevant to legitimize 
their refugee status externally. In the absence of any other ‘origin myth’ related 
to Bhutan, my informants created a new founding myth – a shared history of 
‘othering’ common amongst refugees, that has powerful creative, political and 
personal functions (Colson, 2003: 9). Community development necessitates 
the establishment and collective recognition of mutuality and boundaries 
(Cohen, 1985). As emphasized throughout this work, communities operate by 
constructing the ‘other’, who is in turn excluded from the social network (Amit 
et al., 2002: Loc. 985; Shaw, 2008: 29).  
 
                                            
305 It is ‘imagined’ in Anderson’s notion (2006) of ‘imagined’ belongings to a community (see 
Introduction). Bhutanese refugees do not invent an “imagined homeland” or “locality of origin” to 
which they feel to belong and return to. For my informants, it is not Bhutan that serves as the “unifying 
symbol” (Chatty, 2010: 42), but rather the creation of ‘identities’, such as Bhutanese Nepalese-ness, 
Bhutanese refugee-ness and the refugee-label (see Chapter 5).  
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For my TA informants it is irrelevant if the ‘origin myth’ recalled above is 
accurate or invented. Referring back to Anderson’s (2006) central argument of 
‘imagined’ communities (see Introduction), the boundaries that Bhutanese 
refugees create between ‘us’ (for instance, TA) and ‘them’ (BWA or HNC) are 
‘imagined’ and collectively agreed upon. However, the imagination of similarity 
and difference is highly flexible, negotiable and sometimes even contradictory: 
who is excluded in a specific context today, may be included in the community 
in another context tomorrow – the Rochdale Boys (Chapter 7) are just one 
example of this permeability of boundaries.  
 
This creation of boundaries and the resulting divisions between Bhutanese 
RCOs in Manchester is contrary to the CDA envisioned by service providers, 
who assume that Bhutanese refugees would overcome differences in order to 
form one cohesive community based on mutuality, solidarity and cooperation. 
Their failure to adequately address RCO divisions prevents the realization of 
RCO aims, such as providing a strong and reliable support network in the 
absence of governmental service provision. This is mirrored in other research 
with refugee and migrant communities in the UK (e.g. Baumann, 1996; Hall, 
1996). For instance, in their work on Central African migrants in Birmingham, 
Sigona et al. (2004) highlight that their informants founded RCOs to cope with 
decreased service provision and the increased competition for scarce funding. 
At the same time, however, their respondents were divided within, due to 
internal disagreements over the boundaries of RCOs (that is, who is and who 
is not a legitimate member) and the utility of formalized associations. In turn, 
this prevented the realization of projects and the effectiveness of the support 
network, rendering RCOs powerless to support their members.  
 
But ‘othering’ does not only occur in RCOs, or between Bhutanese refugees 
and the host society. In the following section I explore internal ‘othering’ - that 
is, how my informants create boundaries amongst themselves, in order to 
determine who is, and who is not a Bhutanese refugee. Here I explore the 





‘Othering’: Who is a Bhutanese Refugee? 
 
 
Bhutanese refugees imagine boundaries not only between themselves and 
non-refugees, such as the British host population, migrants in the UK, and 
other (non-Bhutanese) refugees (see Chapter 5). My informants also construct 
similarity and difference within the category of Bhutanese Nepalese-ness. That 
is, not all Bhutanese Nepalese are considered Bhutanese refugees amongst 
my informants, and this complicates the notion of unity relevant for the 
formation of RCOs as envisioned by UK policy makers and service providers.  
 
As Shaw (2008: 29) notes, rather than “generating harmonious social relations, 
community can create, or at least reinforce, social polarization and potential 
conflict; differentiation rather than unity”. The formation of both samaj and 
RCOs is largely dependent on the individuals’ and the groups’ perspective of 
who is and who is not eligible to be a member of these communities – that is, 
who is a Bhutanese refugee, and who is not (see Chapter 5). In my fieldsite 
(on a small, local and face-to-face level) the intricate details of one's 
autobiography, affiliations and relationships are of immense significance for 
others.  
 
In the ethnographic vignette above, I emphasized that one point of contention 
between BWA and TA members is the role ‘native community support worker’ 
should play in RCOs. For example, if a Bhutanese refugee arrived in the UK 
not with the organized resettlement programme - such as Hari or Shaan Mali, 
who both arrived from the refugee camps as asylum seekers long before 
resettlement began – can and should they be part of the Bhutanese refugee 
community, and involve themselves with Bhutanese RCOs in Manchester?  
 
As we have seen above, Hari’s and Anusha’s (as well as Yumi’s and Ved’s, 
see below) role in the RCOs is contested and was one of the reasons why 
BWA split from TA. Hari and his wife may have experienced the conflict in 
Bhutan, but they left the camps in Nepal in the early 2000s, to seek a “better 
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life” in the UK. They lack the shared experience of organised resettlement, and 
therefore – in some Bhutanese refugees’ views – cannot be part of the 
community. However, there is a stark contradiction is this explanation: the 
same people who were against Hari and Anusha, welcomed Shaan Mali in 
their community, a man with a very similar biography (he also left the camps 
before resettlement began, and sought asylum in Germany) to Hari and his 
wife, and even made him chairperson of BWA.  
 
What distinguishes Hari from Shaan and what is it that makes the 'other' 
different? Although I cannot provide detailed evidence for my claim, I maintain 
that this contradiction is based on two elements. Firstly, Shaan is related to the 
Pathak family, who manages BWA. More importantly, during my fieldwork, 
Shaan’s brother Pran assumed the role of chairperson of BWA. Hari, on the 
other hand, lacks these kinship connections to resettled Bhutanese refugees in 
the UK (most of his family lives in the USA). This emphasizes the importance 
of pariwar as outlined in Chapter 7 – kin relations are an important signifier of 
similarity, and thus, engender belonging to a samaj and RCOs, regardless of 
one’s biography.  
 
Secondly, personal characteristics, preferences and biographies are essential 
factors determining the boundaries between who is and who is not an eligible 
member of samaj and RCOs. In the ethnographic example above, I showed 
that Shaan was (and still is) unpopular with many Bhutanese refugees in 
Manchester, due to rumours spilling over from the refugee camps in Nepal. 
This nurtured mistrust in the community, until the final split between BWA and 
HNC in 2013. Hari faces other obstacles due to his outspoken, and sometimes 
patronizing personality306. One reason why BWA members were so opposed to 
him in 2010 may have been due to his personal character. Here, we have to 
recall that RCOs require strong leadership - someone all members can support 
- in order to run it effectively (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 1315, see Chapter 
                                            
306 Hari is well known in the community for “telling things like they are”, as some of my informants 
admired. There were numerous incidences during my fieldwork, in which Hari told people off for e.g. 
not speaking enough English and thus not improving it; not to impart enough discipline in child-
rearing; or “waste money”. I always perceived Hari’s comments towards Bhutanese refugees as good 
advice, but the way he delivers it may be misconstrued as condescending.  
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8). Internal fights and criticism of leadership (by, for example, Hari) may lead to 
disunity, and thus the loss of these advantages. Therefore, in order to run a 
successful RCO, internal criticism has to be deliberately silenced in order to 
portray the RCO as one, cohesive social group (ibid.). To have strong 
personalities like Hari, the Pathak brothers and the Mali brothers in one RCO, 
may jeopardize the efficiency of an RCO. When debating this with a young TA 
member, he nodded in agreement, and remarked: “imagine – they would fight 
all the time, and nothing gets done”.  
 
Along the same lines, Ved’s and Yumi's position was contested amongst some 
BWA informants. A Nepalese Bhutanese, Yumi arrived in the UK some 25 
years ago, after marrying a Briton, and soon after tensions between the 
drukpas and the Nepalese Bhutanese began in the late 1980s, assured that 
her mother and her brother Ved (with his wife) were granted asylum in the UK. 
On the one hand, Yumi and her family are Nepalese Bhutanese, and thus 
share a similar ‘ethnic’ background307 (see Chapter 5) with Bhutanese 
refugees who arrived with the GPP. However, some Bhutanese refugees 
argue that what creates similarity is not this ‘ethnic’ classification, but the 
shared experiences of refugee-ness, which includes the shared history of 
conflict in Bhutan, “life and struggle” in the refugee camps in Nepal, and 
organized resettlement to the UK. As Yumi and her family lack these 
experiences (for the most parts), some BWA members do not regard them as 
members of both their samaj and their RCO.  
 
This differentiation is emphasized for Nepalese Bhutanese who stayed in 
Bhutan, rather than fleeing to Nepal. Some even go as far as to refer to them 
as “traitors” (also see Chapters 2 and 3) or “drukpa lovers”, who are said to 
have made “arrangements” with the drukpas in order to be allowed to stay in 
Bhutan. They argue that there is no other explanation for why these Nepalese 
Bhutanese were allowed to stay, whilst others had to flee. For example, Madur, 
whom I met briefly during his six months’ internship as a journalist in the UK, 
was a Nepalese Bhutanese whose “loyalty” was put into question by many of 
                                            
307 As discussed in Chapter 5, I do not argue that Nepalese Bhutanese-ness is an ethnicity, I use the 
term ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnicity’ in inverted commas to highlight the problems in adopting these term.  
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my informants. Although directly related to the Gadal family (with whom he 
briefly stayed in October 2012), Madur’s parents and he remained in Bhutan 
despite the ethnic conflict. Madur argued that the reason they were "allowed to 
stay" was that his family lives in the north of the country, rather than the 
targeted south with its large population of Nepalese Bhutanese (see Chapter 
2), and as he put it "the army couldn't be bothered to walk five hours from the 
closest road to [their] village in the mountains". Many of my informants, 
however, did not believe this explanation, and claimed that Madur's family 
must have made deals with the drukpa authorities, perhaps even provided 
information to the government leading to the expulsion of some Nepalese 
Bhutanese. Therefore, no trust could be bestowed on Madur, and during his 
stay in the UK, he remained marginalised from the Bhutanese refugee 
community. That is, he remained a pahuna throughout his stay (and thus 
treated with respect, see Chapter 7), but was never fully welcomed in either 
samaj or the RCOs.  
 
The examples above demonstrate the active creation of (imagined) sameness 
and difference: Nepalese Bhutanese may share a language and socio-cultural 
traits (religion, fashion, etc.), but similarity is also based on the shared 
experience of forced migration, life in the camps, and resettlement. Moreover, 
individual actions, decisions, affiliations and autobiographies impact on who is 
and who is not considered a member of samaj and RCOs.  
 
However, as I show in the following section, the most notable difference 
between samaj and RCOs is the flexibility of boundaries. Whilst samaj lacks 
clear boundaries, and people cross in between and maintain various different 
samaj, RCOs have rigid restrictions on membership and (on paper, at least) 
clear differentiations between members and non-members (Azarya, 1996: 






The Battle for Members 
 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, one of the main rationales for founding 
RCOs is that they are the only means to secure funding from governmental 
and non-governmental funding bodies, charitable and private organisations 
(such as the National Lottery Community Fund), or various neighbourhood, 
and community grants from (Manchester) city councils (Griffiths et al., 2006: 
890). Service providers such as RAUK or MRSN rely on governmental and 
public financial support, and struggled with underfunding during my fieldwork, 
which meant they were forced to reduce support to refugees (such as 
translation services, event organisation, legal advice), and outsource service 
provision to formalized RCOs to save resources. This outsourcing is then 
portrayed as the successful ‘integration’ of refugees. As one caseworker 
explained (private correspondence): RCOs that successfully obtain funding, or 
are able to organize an event by themselves, are said to have achieved 
independence and self-sufficiency (the aims of ‘integration’, see Chapter 4), 
and are seen as epitomes of the successes of the RCO project. As these 
RCOs are effectively ‘integrated’ into the British bureaucratic system, it is 
assumed that no further support is needed by governmental services, as 
RCOs now serve as the main service providers to their refugee ‘clients’ (Zetter 
and Pearl, 2000: 689; 694; also see Mosse, 2005).  
 
However, RCOs operate within so-called ‘funding regimes’, with certain 
(bureaucratic) requirements for RCOs308 (Griffiths et al., 2006: 889). Funding 
bodies have their own agendas309 (in order to increase their donations), and 
RCO leaders have to adopt the language of these funding organisations (ibid.). 
Moreover, RCOs have to show that they have enough members that would 
benefit from the obtained funding.  
 
 
                                            
308 I outlined the service providers’ assumptions on the role of RCOs in Chapter 4.  
309 This circle of aid money and funding for community organisations is an interesting one, but a detailed 
discussion does not fit in the scope of this work. See Crewe and Harrison (1998); Crewe and Axelby 





Rather than fostering a “political culture based on individual civil rights” that 
addresses the refugees’ actual needs, RCO aims have to be tailored to the 
funding bodies’ agendas (Baumann, 1996: 71; Farley and Garcia, 2006: 184). 
In their work on RCOs in the UK, Griffiths et al. (2006: 890) caution that 
“accountability to funders appeared to have taken precedence over 
maintaining contact with the needs of the refugee clients or ‘users’”. 
Successful funding applications depend on the knowledge of RCOs (leaders) 
about relevant political, ideological and public discourses endorsed by funding 
bodies (Baumann, 1996: 65-6). For example, projects that emphasize 
'integration', community cohesion, female empowerment and education310 are 
popular for funding bodies. When applying for the National Lottery Fund in 
2013, Takin adopted these catchphrases to be ‘attractive’ to the funding body, 
whose aim is to “help people and communities who are most in need” (National 
Lottery, 2011: 4). In their funding application, Takin stated: 
 
“[M]ore than 90% of Bhutanese refugees have no contact with the 
British population at all311, although they desire to build friendships 
with their hosts, and integrate themselves. Despite the greatest 
efforts … to host inclusive events to bridge these gaps, efforts have 
failed mainly due to a lack of financial support. … [W]e believe that it 
is of … importance to integrate our community with the British 
community as a whole. .... Many refugees feel marginalised from the 
community that surrounds them, especially due to language-barriers 
and a lack of awareness. Coming from a small-scale, rural lifestyle, 
we believe in a community-spirit with neighbourly help and care. ... 
We are convinced that only by coming together will we be able to 
tackle issues faced for all people in the UK, and gain mutual support. 
... Only by actively engaging communities from different 
backgrounds will we be able to shed light on the issues faced by 
                                            
310 However these concepts are defined by funding bodies, see Chapters 4 and 5.  
311 This percentage is based on my informants’ own assumptions, rather than on research. I argue that 
the adoption of statistical information is another tool to pander to the service providers’ and funding 
bodies’ terminologies and methods.  
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marginalised communities, and work together to initiate change, 
further integration and foster a diverse and tolerant society” (my 
emphases).  
 
This excerpt from Takin’s funding application demonstrates my informants’ 
adoption of terminology used in political and public discourses in the UK, such 
as “inclusiveness”, “integration”, “marginalisation”, “awareness” and “tolerance” 
(emphasized above). Through experience with funding applications, RCO 
board members have become acutely aware of the significance of these terms 
and the refugee-label (see Chapter 5), and successfully received funding by 
using these narratives312. Along the same lines, when BWA applied for funds in 
2013, the Big Lottery Fund website313 proclaimed that the funds are used for 
the organisation of a “celebration event of Bhutanese culture for the wider 
community. This will enable the organisation to promote their culture and bring 
unity between them” (my emphasis). Contrary to this statement of unity, the 
event led to the split between BWA and HNC (see above), and except me, no 
non-Bhutanese refugee attended the event in Central Manchester.  
 
These examples demonstrate the importance of 'advertising' to attract 
funding314, and thus be able to hold community events. RCOs have to compete 
with one another for scarce resources, and as Baumann (1996: 65; 71) claims, 
“creative alliances, factional appeals and some in-fighting are inevitable 
strategies in this competition”. However, Zetter and Pearl (2000: 686, 689) 
argue that this competition prevents not only the realization of RCO aims and 
purposes (therefore rendering it ineffective), but also inhibits partnerships and 
                                            
312 The National Lottery funding Takin obtained for the BRFP resulted in a one-hour film and a screening 
event in Manchester, but was only shown to Bhutanese refugees. Because of my active involvement, 
I was able to screen the film both at Brunel University, and at the 2015 SfAA conference in Pittsburgh 
(USA), attended by several Bhutanese refugees who resettled in the USA. In both cases, the 
audience was comprised of academics, rather than service providers or the ‘general’ public. 
Therefore, the aims stated in their application were not actually fulfilled, but Takin was not obliged to 
provide any evidence for the ‘success’ of their funded project after it was completed, besides showing 
that all funds have been utilized by providing receipts.  
313 From http://gotlottery.uk/big-lottery-fund-bhutanese-welfare-association-6-414983  
314 This ‘advertising’ continues in the virtual world (on the internet), and RCOs have to carefully 
orchestrate and monitor their online presence. Bhutanese RCO and information websites are (almost) 
exclusively in English (rather than Nepali) and are therefore mostly aimed at an external audience, 
such as funding bodies. Online visibility requires IT literacy, tying young people (who are the most 
knowledgeable in IT through their personal interest and access to education and training) into RCOs, 
giving them social capital and status within the wider community, as I showed in Chapter 8 in the 
discussion on liminal experts. 
273 
 
cooperation within and between various RCOs, charities and governmental 
services in the UK. Information, skills and know-how are strictly guarded 
capitals in RCOs: for example, under no circumstance would Takin share its 
knowledge and strategies (however limited) on how to obtain funding with 
BWA, and vice-versa.  
 
Bhutanese RCOs have to compete for funds with other, much larger 
associations (ibid.: 64-5). However, Bhutanese RCOs are fairly small in 
comparison to other refugee communities315, and therefore may not be as 
‘attractive’ to funding bodies. The same issues are reported by Griffiths et al. 
(2006: 889) in their research with an Ethiopian association in London, which is 
unable to compete with larger organisations in the “voluntary and refugee 
sector” such as Refugee Council (also see Sigona et al.’s [2004] and Zetter 
and Pearl’s [2000] studies). Bhutanese RCOs address these problems by 
attempting to increase their membership numbers. However, in order to do so, 
they have to compete with the other Bhutanese RCOs, which I discuss in the 
following section. It is here where ‘othering’ comes into play again, showing 
how Bhutanese refugees create ‘imagined’ differences in order to differentiate 





Membership to RCOs has to be formalised to be eligible for funding. RCOs 
have to comply with top-down regulations, one of which is that in order to 
become a member of an organisation, one has to complete a membership 
form and pay membership fee. Who can ‘apply’ for membership is prescribed 
by the notarized RCO constitution (see Appendix 2). 
 
For example, Bhutanese RCOs are construed as communities for Bhutanese 
refugees who resettled with the GPP, rather than asylum seekers and 
                                            
315 For example, there are about 12,000 Palestinian refugees in the UK, vis-à-vis about 350 Bhutanese 
refugees. Even if only a fraction of Palestinian refugees organizes themselves as RCOs, they still 
vastly outnumber my informants.  
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voluntary migrants such as Hari, Anusha, Ved and Yumi. In order for Takin to 
include these individuals, they devised two forms of membership316. On the 
one hand, there is Full Membership exclusively reserved for resettled refugees, 
which entails certain rights and duties, such as paying monthly membership 
fees (£5/month during my fieldwork), attending the meetings, having the right 
to vote at meetings, and be able to stand for a position in the organisation (e.g. 
secretary, treasurer, etc.). On the other hand, there is Honorary Membership, 
open for everyone (for example, I am an honorary member). Honorary 
members serve as advisors and support workers, but have no right to vote or 
stand for a leadership role. This allows Takin to utilize the expertise of people 
who fall outside of the membership criteria.  
 
Membership numbers determine how competitive an RCO is, and therefore it 
is in the RCOs’ interest to attract as many eligible members as possible. But 
why would a Bhutanese refugee, who just arrives in the UK (as shown in 
Chapter 6), choose one Bhutanese RCO over the other? How do my 
informants decide on which RCO to join? 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, RCOs serve to maintain samaj, and 
to foster a reliable support network. Thus, Bhutanese RCOs need to offer 
incentives to the Bhutanese refugee community, such as infrastructures and 
resources, to fulfil their members’ needs. Moreover, as outlined in Chapter 7, 
social interactions are important for Bhutanese refugees, and RCOs are called 
upon to offer a platform to gather for social events – both for special festivals, 
such as for Nepali New Year, as well as for small social gatherings over food 
and chai. Furthermore, Bhutanese RCOs have to ensure the possibility to 
“realize [their] potential”, as one of my informants explained, and showcase 
their talents. For example, many of my young informants (12-25) are keen 
singers, musicians and dancers, and enjoy performing in front of an audience. 
Therefore, they affiliate with RCOs that can provide the best and most regular 
                                            
316 According to BWA informants, they have a similar system in place, allowing Nepalese Bhutanese who 
arrived in the UK as asylum seekers (e.g. Dr. Sharma, Dr. Poudel) or voluntary migrants (e.g. Shaan 
Mali), as well as Nepali migrants (e.g. Nitin) to become part of the RCO as honorary members. 
However, as discussed before, although Shaan cannot hold an official board role at BWA, he is the 
de facto chair of the RCO, orchestrating it via his brother Pran, which is very much supported by BWA 
members I have met during fieldwork.  
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platform for their performances317. For example, many non-Takin members 
participated in the film project (BRFP), because we filmed them dancing, 
singing and playing football318. Moreover, many young refugees frequently visit 
the Sunday service of the Christian refugee community in Rochdale 
(regardless of their religious affiliation), because they are able to perform in 
between prayers and sermons.  
 
Sigona et al. (2004: 8) emphasize that refugee group affiliations are 
determined by “material and symbolic rewards” as well as by the “skills and 
capacities” an organisation offers. These pragmatic considerations play a part 
in the increased conversion rate of Bhutanese refugees from Hinduism and 
Buddhism to Christianity319. Gifford and Wilding (2013: 563), for example, 
attribute the high conversion rate to Christianity within the Karen refugee 
community in Australia to the fact that Christian churches are able to “provide 
economic and social support and act as a central organizing point for 
community life” (ibid.). Along the same lines, some Bhutanese refugees in the 
USA convert to Christianity because they have not established RCOs, and the 
“church is the only place where they can meet regularly” (Bhutan’s forgotten 
people, 2014).  
 
Similarly, the Bhutanese Christian community in the UK has the resources to 
support refugees, which BWA and TA are unable to provide (due to lack of 
funds). HNC has access to funding and facilities provided by British 
Pentecostal churches and Christian charities320, and are the only Bhutanese 
RCO with their own community venue in Rochdale (provided by Christian 
churches), which the congregation can visit and use at any time (for 
                                            
317 Performances also allow Bhutanese refugees to become part of other communities, such as the Yeti 
Foundation (Nepalese migrant association), the Salford Women's Dance Group or the Manchester 
Refugee Football Team, performing in various settings for diverse audiences outside of the 
Bhutanese refugee community.  
318 Here, we should recall the participating of the Rochdale Boys introduced in Chapter 7, and their 
insistence of keeping their contribution in the film, despite BWA’s demand to remove the content.  
319 However, I do not argue that pragmatism is the only and most important reason for conversion to 
Christianity. Many of my informants who actively practice Christianity highlight the ‘spiritual’ and 
‘metaphysical’ reasons for converting. Conversion may often originate in pragmatic considerations, 
but later transforms into spiritual conversion, as they become acquainted with scriptures and 
sermons.  




gatherings, rehearsals, etc.). Furthermore, HNC has access to a minibus321, 
helping their congregation to move, go shopping or travel. They are also a 
popular support network for “troubled” individuals, such as Durba (introduced 
in Chapter 6), who experienced problems with alcohol and drug abuse on this 
arrival in the UK. Through his peers, Durba was introduced to the Christian 
community, and was invited to perform his musical talent (playing percussions 
and singing) during the services and workshops. HNC’s emphasis on the 
prohibition of alcohol, tobacco and drugs forced Durba to give up his habits, 
and he found a strong support network in the Christian community, who helped 
him to enrol in English language classes and in Christian self-help groups to 
overcome his “bad habits”. During my fieldwork, neither BWA nor Takin would 
have had the resources, expertise and networks to help Durba with these 
issues. Although just one example amongst many, it shows that HNC is 
attractive to Bhutanese refugees, who benefit from the availability of such 
resources and networks.  
 
However, HNC employed controversial tactics to ensure membership for their 
community. On my very first visit to meet Bhutanese refugees at a community 
event in Sheffield in April 2012, Hari gave a passionate speech to new arrivals 
in the audience, reminding them that “the UK is free”, and that they can 
practice their religions respectively. After the speech ended, I approached Hari 
to enquire why he emphasized this point so vehemently. He elaborated that 
some established Christian Bhutanese refugees visit new arrivals, and try to 
convince them to convert to Christianity, or the financial support from the 
British government would be stopped, as “Britain is a Christian country”. Hari 
stated:  
 
"They are from our own [emphasized] community. They visit these 
poor people when they arrive - and they know nothing of England, … 
they don't know how it works. Then they tell them: 'join us, or the state 
won't give you any support', …. and [the new arrivals] believe them". 
 
                                            
321 Hardly any of my informants had a driving license during my fieldwork, and thus no access to cars, 
making them reliant on public transport.  
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This reiterates the arguments in the previous Chapter 6, whereby Bhutanese 
refugees arrive in the UK to an already existing structure of community 
organisations, who try everything in their power to gain members, in order to 
be more competitive for funding bodies.  
 
Hari’s attempt to advice new arrivals that they do not need to convert in order 
to receive governmental support did not stop some individuals from converting 
– not for religious, but for the pragmatic reasons outlined above. This furthered 
mistrust and thus divisions in the community, which cannot be easily be 
bridged, even after several ‘intervention’ attempts, as I briefly address in the 
following section.  
 
 
The struggle for unity 
 
Several external parties have attempted to unite the factions, including some 
members of both TA and BWA. As the chair of TA put it, it would be better to 
be united in order to realise projects and to obtain more funding. Here I 
extensively quote from an interview with Aadit, a Nepali translator and student 
who lived in Manchester (also see above and Chapter 4), and closely worked 
with my informants. His statements serve as a summary of what all mediators 
have told me:  
 
“As a support worker, I tried everything to unite them. For two 
weeks, I went to all the houses, just to listen [to the problems], but it 
makes no sense. There is nothing positive about the divide, but they 
only talk bad about each other. It is like politics – it’s the ego of 
people. … They cannot come together. I tried to unite them, and tell 
them, that they have more chance to get funds, to make events. But 
they don’t listen. … They all suffered the same fate. They all lived in 
refugee camps. Now they have a new life. Why would they fight with 
each other? They bring these issues with them [from Nepal to the 
UK], and do the same stupid thing here. They should have learned 
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from what happened to them in Bhutan and in the camps … This is 
what annoys me: the backstabbing and the leg-pulling. Not only 
strangers, but also family members. One against the other. ... I gave 
up on uniting them. But it’s sad for me to see. I try to help, but they 
do not want to. There is nothing I can do.” 
 
Attempts to mediate between the rival Bhutanese RCOs failed, and many 
support workers (myself included) gave in. In turn, the issues that these 
divisions bring about, such as lack of funding, and therefore a loss of 
relevance of RCOs in everyday life, cannot be resolved. More importantly for 
the discussion in this thesis, the divisions between RCOs described above 
demonstrate that the UK government’s and service providers’ assumption that 
community and RCOs can replace their service provision, and that community 
is the best way to ensure ‘wellbeing’ and foster ‘integration’, is flawed.  
 
At this point, I question whether RCOs are Bhutanese communities. That is, 
RCOs are in part a representation of samaj, build on the same foundations of 
mutuality, trust and reciprocity. But they are also an outcome of (British) social 
policy and the (Western) social re-engineering that began in the camps, 
making ‘democratic citizens’ out of refugees, who are assumed to be able to 
‘integrate’ into the mainstream, adopting new systems of hierarchy and 
communal representation. As I explore below, Bhutanese RCOs are British, 
rather than Bhutanese communities.  
 
 
Whose Community?  
 
 
Bhutanese refugees founded RCOs to serve as a support platform once 
resettlement agencies pulled out, and apply for the necessary funding to 
realize communal goals. But in order to be allowed to do so, each community 
organisation has to comply with the strict regulations for community 
organisations and charities. Therefore, these particular formalized Bhutanese 
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refugee communities have only emerged in the context of refugee resettlement 
in the UK at this specific time, with the current laws and social policies. 
Bhutanese refugee organisations in other resettlement nations have different 
structures, and operate on different bases.  
 
Bhutanese RCOs serve a purpose not only for the Bhutanese refugees, but 
also for UK service providers who aim to outsource services to these 
organisations. As Kelly (2003: 39) argues, the “basis for group formation may 
lie in the way British institutions create spaces for the recognition of groups 
rather than individuals”, and refugees have to create formalized organisations 
“in order to enter into a dialogue with the state”.  
 
The standards, rules and regulations pertaining to RCOs are often highly 
complicated. This leads back to the discussions in Chapter 8 – only those 
Bhutanese refugees who have relevant educational and linguistic capital, as 
well as knowledge about British bureaucracy are able (and are elected by 
others) to lead. Here, my research findings put into question the paradigm of 
UK policy makers, that regards RCOs as platforms on which all refugees 
operate as equal, democratic members. For example, all three Bhutanese 
RCOs in Manchester subscribed (as per their constitution) to elections of 
leaders based on majority vote. But in reality, no such votes took place during 
my fieldwork: all RCO board members are in power since the organizations 
were first conceived in 2010-11. In theory, a committee of trustees elects RCO 
leaders, but during my fieldwork, none of the RCOs had such a committee, and 
hardly any RCO member seemed to question the leaders’ positions. Their 
status is further perpetuated by service providers, who offer skills’ training 
merely to board members, rather than ordinary RCO members.  
 
Policies and practices may enhance the refugees’ lives, but also accentuate 
differences within the refugee community, and further marginalisation, 
subverting the objective of RCOs to provide efficient, socio-culturally tailored 
and inclusive services and support to refugees. This is echoed in Zetter and 
Pearl’s (2000: 688) research with RCOs in the UK, which critically reflects on 
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the accountability of formalized organisations, exposing the shortcomings of 
the RCO project.  
 
 
The problems with the RCO project 
 
“[BWA] has been running vocational trainings and intensive English 
learning programs in the community with an aim of enhancing 
capacity and competence” (BNS, 2012). 
 
Bhutan News Service – a website run by Bhutanese refugees in the USA, 
which shares news and information about Bhutanese refugees across the 
world – published an article about BWA’s achievements in 2012. In reality, the 
training programmes mentioned in the article never took place. Similarly, Takin 
states in their constitution that they aim to provide Nepali lessons to children in 
order to “preserve our heritage”, which were never realized. Both RCOs adopt 
the language of service providers in publications, in order to highlight the 
support they supposedly offer. However, similar to what Zetter and Pearl (2000: 
686-7) found, Bhutanese RCOs do not have any “quality assurance measures” 
in place assuring that decreed functions are realized, and service providers in 
Manchester do not assess RCOs once they have been founded. As mentioned 
above, RCOs are measured (by service providers) by focusing on the amount 
of funding they are able to obtain.  
 
These examples signify a gap between the functions of RCOs as assumed by 
policy makers and service providers, and the reality of effectively running an 
RCO on the ground. Again, we have to be conscious of the context in which 
RCOs operate: in a time of reduced public spending in the UK, service 
providers focus predominantly on cost-effectiveness and outsourcing of 
services rather than on quality and performance (see Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 
685-8). What my research revealed, however, is that Bhutanese RCOs are 




Yet, this is not to say that RCOs fail to be a support network for Bhutanese 
refugees. In fact, many of my informants remarked that “no one is left behind”, 
and that all refugees are part of the community, which I can verify through my 
observations. Despite the animosities between RCOs, all Bhutanese refugees 
who arrived in the UK with the resettlement programme are part of samaj and 
RCOs, and are supported by individuals or the group as a whole.  
 
But the broader functions of RCOs, such as generate funding, provide a 
communal space for social interactions, and foster integration both in the host 
society and the labour market, is not realized in Bhutanese RCOs. Again, 
Zetter and Pearl’s (2000) research reflects my own findings: despite the 
assumed importance of RCOs, they only have a “limited voice” (ibid.: 688) and 
have “neither the institutional capacity and robustness, nor the national 
coverage to be able to restructure and scale up activities to meet the ongoing 
situation” (ibid.: 692).  
 
The Bhutanese refugee community in the UK, comprised of only about 350 
members, is too small to compete with larger community organisations, and is 
therefore unable to obtain funding and “break into existing ‘power streams’ and 
networks of local authorities and larger … associations” (ibid.: 688). Small 
groups such as Bhutanese RCOs are often unable to provide the same 
services or be as “visible”322 as, for example, Middle Eastern RCOs, comprised 
of thousands of members. Thus, Bhutanese RCOs are not as ‘attractive’ to 
funding bodies as bigger organisations.  
 
Moreover, due to increasing commitments in their personal lives, such as child 
rearing, education and employment, the level of participation in managing 
RCOs is fairly low and sporadic, limited to a group of “committed members” 
(ibid.: 685). This affects both the efficiency of Bhutanese RCOs, and their 
cooperation with other organisations.  
                                            
322 The British public is not aware of Bhutanese refugees, as my own experience proves again and again. 
Both my informants and I constantly have to explain where Bhutan is, and what happened to them. In 
general, the refugee community of slightly more than 100,000 in total, is only a small fraction in 
comparison to, for example, the 6 million Palestinian refugees, or the more than 4 million Syrian 




More importantly, intra-community divisions between Bhutanese refugees led 
to the split into three separate RCOs, which are small in number and thus even 
more ineffective. Overall, these issues decrease the relevance of RCOs, and in 







RCOs in the UK struggle to compete for the limited funds and resources 
available. However, as I observed throughout my fieldwork, and as illustrated 
with the ethnographic examples above, in-fighting in the Bhutanese RCOs in 
Manchester means that they may lose out both against the rival Bhutanese 
RCOs and more established and unified RCOs in the UK. Similar issues with 
community divisions have been observed by Werbner (2002: 22) amongst the 
Pakistani community in Manchester. She argues that the “internecine fighting, 
mismanagement of communal institutions and constant appeals for state 
handouts and recognition … [that] plagued communal affairs” prevented 
community organisations from attaining funding and realizing projects.  
 
Limited funding in turn has an impact on what RCOs can do in order to “serve 
the community”, by for example offering events that would allow Bhutanese 
refugees to meet and interact socially. Although, of course, Bhutanese 
refugees across the UK meet in smaller groups on an almost daily basis, larger 
gatherings are highly dependent on organization, management and most 
importantly, funding. The almost complete split between TA’s and BWA’s 
leadership makes it impossible to devise projects and events together. As a 
small community, they may not be attractive to funding bodies, and therefore 
Bhutanese RCOs find it difficult to obtain larger amounts of funding, in order to 




As we have seen, the split between the three RCOs is a result of internal 
‘othering’ and the creation of imagined differences between them. In an almost 
perpetual circle, this ‘othering’ leads to further competition between them (for 
funding, and thus members), which then again amplifies ‘othering’. It shows 
that community development relies on a “symbolic discourse” of ‘othering’ 
(Rapport et al., 2000:63) that can be directed outwards “when facing what they 
perceive to lie beyond their boundaries” (Rapport et al., 2000:63), as I have 
shown throughout this work. But ‘othering’ is also employed inwards, by 
emphasizing trust (or mistrust), mutuality (or difference) and support (or the 
denial thereof). This fact of social relationships, is, as I highlighted throughout 
this work, too often ignored by service providers who facilitate resettlement, 
and therefore put into question the relevance of the CDA and RCO project in 









Political, public and academic discourses on forced migration represent the 
refugees’ experiences as ‘unsettling’, perceiving forced migrants as marred 
human beings (Turton, 2005: 278, see Introduction) who have to be aided (by 
humanitarian relief agencies, such as the UNHCR), managed (through social 
re-engineering) and controlled (through the use of classifications, and 
international and national policies). Within political and public discourses (in 
the global North) it is argued that forced migration removes refugees from their 
‘original’ cultures and communities, and that forced migrants strive to return to 
‘normality’ by re-inventing and re-creating singular ‘traditions’, identities and 
communities. As I have shown in this work, bureaucratic bodies in the global 
North argue that the creation of formalized communities (such as RCOs) as a 
reliable support network allows refugees to “develop a meaningful sense of 
social life and identity” (Loizos, 2000; cited in Mitchell et al, 2010: 95), and thus 
to ‘overcome’ their state of uncertainty and in-betweenness, and return to 
‘normalcy’ in third country resettlement.  
 
Focusing on the Community Development Approach and RCO project as a tool 
of Western relief and aid organisations and policy makers, I have shown that 
the assumed liminality refugees are said to experience is not something that 
has or can be overcome through resettlement and community development. 
Rather, forced migrants adapt to the context and environment in which they 
find themselves. Their history and past experiences are reworked in the 
process, engendering new meanings values, and new communities (Colson, 
2003: 9), rather than re-creating their lives, views and social networks as they 
were before migration occurred.  
 
As I argued throughout this thesis, Bhutanese refugees are active agents, who 
consciously use classifications and the RCO project, adopting the language 
and discourses of policy makers for their own advantages (for example to 
obtain funding for social events), and redefining meanings in accordance with 
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their personal use and the public discourse they engage in. As several 
researchers pointed out (e.g. Chatty, 2010; Colson, 2003), forced migration 
has an impact on both the refugees themselves and on international and 
national agencies and policy makers. It is not a top-down process over which 
refugees have no control and passively adapt to, although they operate within 
the confines of so-called opportunity structures (such as the labour market or 
welfare and benefit payment regulations). As Chatty (2010: 57) argues, 
refugees “may one day challenge the economic power systems and 
international politics”, and actively produce “distinct patterns of migration”. 
 
More importantly, by highlighting the divisions that have arisen among 
Bhutanese refugees in Manchester, I have called into question the UK service 
providers’ expectations that groups of refugees may overcome internal 
differences in order to form one coherent community for the benefit of all. 
Rather, my research revealed that (in my fieldsite) contrary to policy makers’ 
and service providers’ assumptions, RCOs may be the causes of issues 
(rather than addressing issues arising in resettlement, such as, for example, 
marginalisation and unemployment), and thus may not be able to replace 
governmental services once service providers cease support (see below).  
 
I situated my research in three anthropological frameworks: the study of forced 
migration (utilizing the works of, for example, Baumann (1996), Chatty (2010) 
and Malkki (1992, 1995, 1997, 2002); anthropological investigations of 
community (drawing on Amit and Rapport, 2002; Anderson, 2006; Barth, 1998; 
Bauman, 1996: 14; Cohen, 1985); and ethnographic explorations of the policy-
nexus (using the works of Baba, 2013; Colson, 2003; and Turton, 2005).  
 
As highlighted in the introduction, ethnographic research on forced migration 
has predominantly focused on the refugee camp and the experience of asylum 
seekers in the global North. My thesis, on the other hand, has attempted to 
address the gap in the literature on the long-term experience of organized 
refugee resettlement, countering the argument that the experience of forced 
migration is overcome through resettling in a Western nation. I also followed 
the call of several researchers (e.g. Baba, 2013; Colson, 2003) to make 
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anthropological research more relevant for global social policies, especially on 
forced migration.  
 
 
Community in Context  
 
 
In this thesis, I focused on how Bhutanese refugees create and maintain 
community in resettlement, both within their own understanding of community 
as personal social networks (samaj) and as formalized community 
organisations (RCOs). Rather than exploring the re-invention of ‘traditional’ 
communities how they were before forced migration (if there ever was such a 
thing), I illustrated how my informants developed communities in line with 
Western policy and aid-intervention. I showed that refugee communities are 
not an exact replica of social networks before relocation occurred (Malkki, 
1992: 35), and that Bhutanese RCOs are not Bhutanese Nepalese 
organisations, but bureaucratic British associations with non-British members. I 
demonstrated that Bhutanese RCOs operate within top-down funding regimes, 
and comply (more or less successfully) with the functions of RCOs as 
prescribed by UK policy makers and service providers. However, I also 
emphasized that Bhutanese RCOs are embedded in the same shared norms 
of mutuality, trust, reciprocity and social interactions (or lack thereof) as samaj, 
and are thus subject to ‘othering’ (see below) as well as internal and personal 
animosities, calling into question the UK government’s aim to outsource 
support to formalized community organisations.  
 
 
The creation of similarity and difference 
 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, communities operate by means of 
creating similarity and difference. This complex process of ‘othering’ is 
essential for community development, both to determine internally who is and 
who is not a member of the community, and to delineate the boundaries 
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between one’s community vis-à-vis other communities. By drawing on Barth 
(1998) and Cohen (1985), I demonstrated that this ‘othering’ is employed at 
the macro-level by nation states and international aid and relief agencies, as 
well as at the micro-level by small, personal social networks. For example, in 
order to assure sovereignty and maintain their power, Bhutan’s Ngalong 
leaders bureaucratized the difference between themselves and Nepalese 
Bhutanese by means of creating the term Lhotshampa enshrined in Bhutanese 
law through various acts, which was then used to justify the expulsion of more 
than 100,000 people (by declaring them ‘anti-nationals’) in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (see Chapter 2). I then showed that in Nepalese refugee camps, 
Bhutanese refugees were perceived (by aid agencies) as liminal beings in 
need of intervention by (Western) laws, regulations and agencies such as the 
UNHCR (see Chapter 3), and these international aid and relief agencies 
employed social re-engineering to make the ‘other’ (the refugee) into 
manageable and controllable individuals (and ‘us’), which can then be resettled 
into Western nations (see Chapter 4). In order to demonstrate that 
bureaucratic ‘othering’ occurs through the creation of simplified classifications, 
I discussed the use of the refugee-label by both my informants and 
international relief agencies (Chapter 5), which continues to be consciously 
used by Bhutanese refugees to legitimize their residency in the UK and their 
‘need’ of support (vis-à-vis for example asylum seekers and voluntary 
migrants). As I outlined in detail in Chapter 6, Bhutanese refugees create a 
difference between ‘established’ refugees (who have resided in the UK for 
more than six months) and ‘new arrivals’, who then have to be incorporated 
into community members by means of competition and management of 
expectations.  
 
However, I highlighted in the introduction that communities also operate by 
means of establishing similarity and coherence (rather than only ‘othering’), 
and emphasized in Chapter 7 that Bhutanese refugees create samaj by 
fostering mutuality and cooperation. These personal relationships are less 
about formalisation of social groups into one homogeneous, all-encompassing 
organisation based on commonality, and more about personal interactions 
(Amit et al, 2002: Loc 253, 552). However, in the last two Chapters 8 and 9 I 
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explored the flip-side of processes of ‘othering’, illustrating that rather than 
perceiving refugee communities as coherent social networks, they are complex 
and contradictory groups of individuals, who have to compete not only with 
other RCOs, but also with other Bhutanese refugees. This internal creation of 
difference complicates the formation of samaj, and impacts negatively on what 
Bhutanese RCOs are able to achieve.  
 
Furthermore, as I have emphasised throughout this work, these processes of 
creating boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are based on ‘imagined’ 
differences (Anderson, 2006) and made tangible by the creation of ‘narratives 
of ‘othering’ (Chapter 9). That is, membership in a community is determined by 
discourses on which shared history and experience and behaviour should 
signify similarity (Rapport and Overing, 2000: 63). The debate on whether all 
Nepalese Bhutanese are members of the community (Chapter 9) is just one 
example of this. Moreover, I demonstrated that individuals are part of many 
social networks, and adapt their ‘cultural identity’ to the environment and 
context in which they find themselves (Chapter 5), and therefore (as Stuart Hall 
argued) form multiple, hybrid identities and communities with elastic and 
contestable boundaries that can change over time.  
 
This thesis, then, has tried to critically engage with UK policy makers’ 
assumptions of the notion of community as unified social networks that benefit 
the ‘good of all’. Rather, I showed that there is no coherent, bounded group of 
Bhutanese refugees, but distinctive individuals, with different values, norms, 
multiple identities and perceptions, who are influenced by history, forced 
migration and aid intervention. They employ ‘othering’ in order to determine 
who is and who is not a Bhutanese refugee, and thus an eligible member of 
both samaj and RCOs. As I have maintained throughout this work, Bhutanese 
refugees are in a constant process of reinterpreting and reworking their 
perceptions (of e.g. community) and behaviours (including the creation of 





Furthermore, this thesis has called into question anthropological discussions of 
community as a taken-for-granted unit of analysis, and made the notion of 
community itself the focal point of research, as I briefly summarize in the 
following section.  
 
 
The problem with community 
 
In the past, anthropologists perceived community as something fixed, 
predictable and reifiable, based on a static, unconscious ‘habitus’, and 
enduring, hegemonic systems of power with stable and restrictive boundaries 
(Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 253; 3543). Community was an a priori, taken-
for-granted unit of analysis, and ethnographic research was said to be 
conducted in localized, bounded social groups. Since then, anthropology has 
shifted its gaze to the relationality and discursive practices in which social 
reality is taking place, and made the notion of community itself the focus of 
analysis. In line with existing ethnographic accounts, I have attempted to shed 
light on the meanings and values people ascribe to community, how these 
meanings are contested, debated and contextualized, and how community-
membership and boundaries are defined (see ‘othering’ above), ascribed and 
negotiated by both members and non-members (ibid; Rapport and Overing, 
2000: 62).  
 
However, I argue that what we find in anthropological discourses on forced 
migration is the assumption that community is something that forced migrants 
have to re-invent and re-create in order to overcome their prescribed liminality. 
The same misconception is apparent in political and public discussions on the 







The pitfalls of the CDA and RCO project 
 
I have demonstrated throughout this work that international and national policy 
makers, relief agencies and service providers employ the CDA and RCO 
project in order to provide a reliable support network for forced migrants. In 
political, public and development discourses in the global North (such as the 
UK), community becomes the solution for issues that arise due to resettlement 
(Baumann, 1996: 20; Zetter and Pearl, 2000: 681). In Zygmunt Bauman’s 
(2000, cited in Gemie, 2010: 32) words, this conception of community seems 
to promise a “safe haven, the dream destination for sailors lost in a turbulent 
sea of constant, unpredictable and confusing change”. UK policy makers and 
service providers are surely aware of internal conflicts, but expect that the 
positive functions of RCOs would transcend difference, and that the skills and 
resources RCO members possess (for example, language skills for 
translations, social capital, or organizing social activities) would be shared 
equally within the community (Spicer, 2008: 507; Zetter et al, 2000: 683).  
 
However, I have shown that Bhutanese refugees do not re-create a coherent, 
all-encompassing community in resettlement. Rather, their social networks are 
characterised by constant change and heterogeneity, and the values bestowed 
on the notion of community depends on individual circumstances, 
interpretations and interactions (Amit and Rapport, 2002: Loc 253). Contrary to 
some ethnographies that link forced migration to rites de passage (e.g. 
Muggah, 2005), refugees do not simply re-assimilate and re-integrate into a 
community once they have ‘overcome’ their state of liminality. They rather 
create new communities out of old and new social networks, re-interpret their 
values and meanings within the context, and negotiate their boundaries 
through internal and external influences (see above).  
 
The RCOs they create are not Nepalese Bhutanese communities, but are 
formalized British organisations with non-British members, which are created, 
controlled and limited by international and national policies, service provisions 
and infrastructures. To return to Chapter 4, policies focused on forced 
migrants, such as the CDA and RCO project, remind us of the well-known 
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proverb ‘give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, teach a man to fish and 
you feed him for a lifetime’. But service providers and policy makers teach 
them how to ‘fish’ the ‘Western’ way, rather than being sensitive to and 
acknowledging ‘native’ concepts and interpretations of ‘fishing’. That is, 
refugees are encouraged to found RCOs in order to support themselves once 
governmental agencies reduce and cease their assistance, but these RCOs 
have to comply with British policy standards, not emic conceptions of 
community.  
 
RCOs also serve to help refugees ‘integrate’ into the highly bureaucratised 
relationship between the ‘citizen’ (or resident) and the ‘state’ (Griffiths et al, 
2006: 893). It is as if social re-engineering is continued in resettlement – but 
this time from within the refugee community, rather than through direct aid 
intervention. Therefore, Bhutanese RCOs are tools of the British nation state to 
manage and control migrant groups within their territory.  
 
Moreover, RCOs are constrained by various internal and external forces. As I 
have illustrated in ethnographic detail, Bhutanese RCOs are divided due to 
internal animosities based on ‘‘othering’’ (see above), preventing many of the 
assumed positive attributes of community development and support. However, 
RCOs are also limited by decreased funding opportunities and reduced public 
services, and are therefore unable to address the needs of their members. 
Rather than focusing on the problems refugees experience (such as lack of 
employment and language classes), RCOs are forced to re-define their aims 
and values to pander to the funding bodies’ agendas, in order to be ‘attractive’ 
in an increasingly competitive funding regime (Baumann, 1996: 67; Griffiths et 








The Role of Anthropology 
 
 
Faced with this practice-policy gap, researchers such as (amongst other) Baba 
(2013), Colson (2003), Griffiths et al (2006), Shore (2012), Zetter (2007) and 
Zetter and Pearl (2000) call for more in-depth research with refugees in 
resettlement nations. Whilst there are numerous ethnographies on refugee 
camps (first and foremost Chatty’s and Malkki’s work), there are hardly any 
qualitative studies on the outcomes of organized refugee resettlement.  
 
Griffiths et al (2006: 884) highlight that thus far, research and literature has 
focused on idealised, functional notions of refugee communities, resulting in a 
lack of understanding amongst policy makers and service providers about the 
factual problems of RCOs, such as questions of marginalisation, 
representation, accountability and internal conflicts. Rather, research should 
and must question the “dominant paradigm” (ibid.) of the CDA and RCO 
project, and shed light on internal dynamics and external influences that may 
prevent the positive functions of community development.  
 
In the Introduction, I posed the question how anthropology can understand and 
address issues arising due to forced migration and refugee resettlement. 
Although I am cautious to present my qualitative data as applying to all migrant 
and refugee groups in the UK, I maintain that ethnographic research brings to 
the fore the complex, ambiguous and performative bureaucratic processes 
affecting ‘subjects’ of policies, and how policies reflect the various interests of 
individuals and organisations (Baba, 2013: 7; Shore, 2012: 92). These 
questions are not moral judgments of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ policy, but focus on, for 
example, how efficient (or inefficient) RCOs really are for the refugees 
themselves (Fischer, 2014: 14). Anthropological research, such as that 
presented in this work, has the advantage of teasing out the individuals’ hopes, 
needs, aspirations, values and meanings, which cannot be easily quantified. 
The contradictions, animosities and personal life-stories of refugees are often 
ignored in literature focused on international development and policy 
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intervention (ibid: 5). With this work, I aimed to address this gap in the 
literature, and add to the growing body of anthropological works that intends to 
be relevant not only for academic circles, but also for policy makers.  
 
The focus on this particular group with its comparatively small size (only about 
350 individuals) is both beneficial as well as problematic. On the one hand, by 
engaging with one, exclusive group of resettled refugees, I have been able to 
provide exceptional detail about my informants’ experiences. On the other 
hand, the data I have obtained may not reflect research findings amongst other 
groups of refugees, or may not be easily translated to what other (perhaps 
larger) groups of refugees experience in the UK. Future collaborations with 
research peers will provide the possibility to reflect on the similarity and 
differences between Bhutanese refugees and refugees from other nations 
living in the UK.  
 
 
The Emic Perspective 
 
 
Throughout this thesis, finally, I stressed that Bhutanese refugees come from 
all social, economic and educational backgrounds, that they have agency 
(rather than being ‘victimized’), and that they are capable of reflecting on their 
own situation, making their own informed decisions and engendering 
transformation within the wider ‘opportunity structures’ in which they find 
themselves. I argue that refuges actively reshape and adapt their values, 
meanings and interpretations through their experienced with forced migration 
and aid-intervention, and create new forms and shared principles.  
 
Some of my informants asked me to show them my work, and I received 
interesting and inspiring feedback from them. Therefore, the last words of my 
thesis should not be mine, but those of my informants. I end this work with an 
extract of the response I have received from one teenaged Bhutanese 
refugees, who read one of my papers on Bhutanese refugee community 
294 
 
development, which I presented at Brunel University in 2014. I believe that he 
is best equipped to sum up what community is for Bhutanese refugees in 
resettlement in the UK.  
 
“Community for me is a friendly and a fun environment where there 
are generous and helpful people, sharing their positive thoughts and 
feelings with each other, so that it will help the community to be 
developed. The people in the community should have a feeling of 
sharing, so that the community will never be left behind. It needs a 
unity of all the people to eradicate and eliminate problems, and this 
is how community is important”. 
 
“If we put our heads together and co-operate we can become 
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Appendix 1 - List of Nepali and Dzongkha terms  
 
 
aamaa NP mother 
baa NP father 
bahini NP younger sister 
bhai NP brother / close male friend 
Bhai Tika / Tihar NP Hindu sibling ritual 
bideshi dalal NP foreign agents, spies 
Bikram Sambat NP Nepali calendar 
Bon DZ Himalayan animist and shamanistic religion 
bhuṭani nepaliharu NP Bhutanese Nepalese / Nepalese 
Bhutanese 
chai NP tea 
chhora NP son 
chöje DZ aristocracy of Bhutan (lit. 'lords of religion') 
chori NP daughter 
dalpati NP commander, absolute leader 
Deepawali  
Dashain  
NP Nepali Diwali – Hindu festival ‘of light’ 
(most important holiday in the Hindu year 
deusi NP Hindu religious songs sung during Hindu 
festivals 
dhal NP Lentil or bean curry  
dharma DZ, NP religion 
didi NP older sister 
Driglam Namzhag DZ traditional Bhutanese (Ngalongs) dress, 
behaviour and etiquette 
druk gyalpo DZ ‘Dragon king’ of Bhutan 
Druk Yul DZ Bhutan (lit. Land of the Thunder Dragon)  
drukpas DZ Bhutanese people (majority Ngalongs) 
Dzongkha DZ Bhutan’s official language 
dzongs DZ Buddhist fortresses (defence and worship) 
ganja NP cannabis 
Holi NP Hindu festival of colour 
je khenpo DZ Buddhist religious leader of Bhutan 
jhara NP (obligatory) labour services 
lakh NP one hundred thousand 
Lhotshampa DZ 'Southern boarder dweller’ (here: Nepalese 
Bhutanese) 
Losar DZ Bhutanese New Year  
mandir NP Hindu temple 
mit NP Close relationships with non-kin friends 




neta NP leader, guide, chief 
ngolops DZ rebel, mutineer, here: 'anti nationals' 
Nwaran NP Hindu name-giving ceremony for newborns 
paan NP Betel nut  
pahuna NP guest 
pariwar NP family (also bhitriya or jahan in Nepali) 
paskanu NP to serve food 
Prabhashi Nepali NP immigrant Nepalese 
puja NP Hindu prayer (conducted at home or in the 
temple (mandir) 
saag NP Green-leaf vegetables, similar to spinach 
samaj NP Community, social group 
sati NP friend 
satyagraha NP civil disobedience action 
sel roti NP Nepali, doughnut-shaped snack prepared 
during festivals and celebrations 
shabdrung DZ Secular ruler of Bhutan (lit. 'at whose feet 
one prostrates’) 
tangyas DZ contractual workers 
Teej NP Hindu festival for women 
tika NP A thick paste made of (cooked) rice, red 
powder and water (or yoghurt) applied to a 
person’s forehead during (Hindu) religious 
festivals 
tsawa sum DZ “The three of Bhutan” (king/government; 
country/nation; people/citizens) 





Appendix 2 - Takin Association UK Constitution323 
 









  The organisation’s name is: “TAKIN ASSOCIATION (UK)” – 
Connecting Bhutanese in Diaspora. It is a non-profit, community-
based organisation. The association uses the abbreviation TA UK.  
 
2 THE PURPOSES OF THE ORGANISATION 
 
Takin Association UK has the following aims: 
 Community cohesion: Takin Association UK commits itself to 
foster integration and inclusion of Bhutanese in the UK, and to 
bridge the gap between the refugee community and the host 
population. In particular, TA UK aims: 
 To promote social inclusion of our community members for the 
public benefit in order to relieve the needs of members and assist 
them to integrate in British society 
 To raise awareness about UK rules and regulations for a smooth 
transition and towards effective integration and harmonious 
adjustment with the wider community 
 To liaise with other organisations and Institutions through 
volunteering, skill-oriented training and education 
 Quality of life: Takin Association UK aims to improve the community 
members’ quality of life by supporting the development of skills, 
                                            
323 Included in this thesis with permission of Takin Association UK.  
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access to training and education, as well as providing information and 
advice on life in the UK. TA UK focuses on: 
 To involve members in collective efforts to gain confidence in 
their own abilities and their capability to influence decisions which 
affect them 
 To provide, coordinate and facilitate training on core skills 
relevant for employment that would otherwise not be available to 
them 
 To offer support and assist community members seeking 
employment and work experience / placements 
 Community Support: Takin Association UK is committed to 
support the community and improve the members’ wellbeing. TA 
UK aims: 
 To encourage and empower women, children and young people 
 To provide recreational, leisure and sport facilities for all 
members, especially women and young children 
 To initiate inclusive projects to actively involve community 
members 
 To develop and maintain the organisations webpage in order to 
disseminate and make public information about TA UK 
 To help and support members in times of bereavement, hardship 
and similar situations 
 To enable and support members to connect with their scattered 
family members and friends around the world and to reunite them 
if possible 
 Preservation of heritage: Takin Association UK aims to preserve 
and promote culture, heritage and language, and to generate 
awareness of the Bhutanese and Nepalese culture amongst the 
host population. TA UK commits:  
 To safeguard the mother tongue and bilingualism, and to take 
steps to impart it to the younger generation through direct 
teaching and other methods 
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 To foster cultural heritage such as music, dance, dress, etc.; and 
to create awareness of our traditions amongst the host 
population  
3 CARRYING OUT PURPOSES 
 
In order to carry out charitable purposes, Takin Association UK has the 
power to: 
(1) raise funds and donations 
(2) apply for funds and grants to carry out the work of the 
organisation 
(3) co-operate with and support other charities with similar purpose 
(4) work with all members in order to achieve the purposes 
 
4 MONEY AND PROPERTY 
 
All funds, donations, grants and properties obtained by Takin 
Association UK must only be used for the organisation’s purposes and 
should serve the whole community. TA UK has the following guidelines 
in regards to money and property: 
(1) Received funds must be held in the association’s bank account 
under the responsibility of the organisation’s treasurer and 
assistant.  
(2) Individual members and trustees cannot receive money or 
property from the organisation if it does not benefit the whole 
community. 
(3) Expenses have to be approved by trustees and cheques have to 
be signed by at least 2 trustees. 
(4) Approved expenses are only refunded on production of a valid 
receipt.  
(5) TA UK is keeping updated accounts, which are available to view 
on request.  
(6) Donors and funding bodies are provided with information on how 






Takin Association UK shall have two types of membership – the voting 
members, also referred to as ‘full members’, and honorary members.  
 
5.1. Eligibility 
 Voting (full) members are Bhutanese who live in the UK, are age 18 and 
above, and subscribe to the aims and objectives of the Takin Association 
UK. Any individual fulfilling these criteria can apply to the organisation in 
order to become a member. Once accepted by the trustees, membership 
lasts for 3 years and may be renewed. Every voting member has one vote 
at the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  
 Honorary members may join TA UK or are identified by the trustees. The 
trustees may invite or nominate distinguished persons, who are active 
promoters or supporters of the charitable cause of Takin Association UK. 
The honorary members shall constitute an advisory board of the 
organisation. The honorary members shall not have access to the 
organisation’s financial resources, and do not enjoy voting rights at the 
AGM.  
 
5.2 Subscription  
The trustees shall have the power to levy membership and other fees, 
and the members shall pay such subscriptions or fees, as determined at 
the AGM. 
 
           5.3 Loss of Membership and Reinstatement  
Any member shall forgo his or her membership in the following 
circumstances: 
 
 Resignation: Any member may cease to be a member on tendering 
resignation in writing to the Secretary of the Organisation. 
Resignation shall not alleviate a member of unpaid dues or other 
charges previously accrued. 
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 Termination and Suspension of Membership: in case of violation 
of the organisation’s constitution and guidelines, membership may 
be suspended or terminated by a 2/3 majority vote of the trustees. 
Member shall also forfeit membership due to non-payment of annual 
dues or expiration of membership.  
Membership is non-transferable and shall cease upon the death of 
the member. 
 Reinstatement Revocation of suspension or expulsion of 
membership shall be determined by 2/3 majority of the trustees. 
 
5.4 Personal Information 
Takin Association UK is committed to keep an up-to-date record of all 
members. Members are required to complete a membership form which 
is available on request (or via the TA UK webpage). Records are 
handled strictly confidential, and only trustees have access to personal 




Takin Association UK shall be managed by a committee of trustees who 
are appointed for one year and are elected by a two third majority at the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the organisation. The organisation 
has a minimum of 7 trustees, who hold at least 8 meetings per year. In 
order to approve motions, the signature of at least 3 trustees is required.  
Trustee board members must be active, and attend at least 6 of the 8 
meetings. If trustees repeatedly fail to attend meetings, they will be 
taken of the board, and new trustees will be elected by trustees until the 




Takin Association UK is a democratically based organisation. All 
decisions must be ratified by its members. Members are responsible for 
electing the organisation’s Chair, Secretary and Treasurer, and these 
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positions must only be held by full members of TA UK, fulfilling the 
membership criteria.  
 
 7.1. Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
Takin Association UK holds an AGM every year, following these criteria: 
 The AGM must be held every year, with 14 days’ notice given to all 
members informing them of the AGM’s agenda 
 There must be at least two thirds of members present to vote on 
motions and to elect trustees, and all decision require a two third 
majority 
 Every member has one vote 
 The trustees shall present the annual report and accounts 
 Any member may stand for election as a trustee 
 Members shall elect a minimum of 7 trustees to serve for the next 
year. They will retire at the next AGM but may stand for re-election 
 A selected attendee of the AGM will keep the minutes of the 
meeting, and a summary of the AGM will be provided to all TA UK 
members  
 Honorary members may suggest motions, but have no vote 
 
7.2. Trustee Meeting 
Trustees must hold at least 8 meetings each year. At the first meeting 
following the AGM, trustees will elect a chair, treasurer and secretary.  
Trustees may act by majority decision. The following criteria apply to 
trustee meetings:  
 At least 3 trustees must be present at the meeting to be able to 
take decisions. 
 Trustees must stand down at the next AGM, but may be re-
elected. 
 The trustees may suggest reasonable additional procedures to 
help run the organisation. These motions must not conflict with 
TA UK’s constitution or the law. 
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 If trustees have a conflict of interest, they must declare it and 
leave the meeting while this matter is being discussed or 
decided. 
 
7.3. General Meeting 
If the trustees consider it is necessary to change the constitution, or the 
organisation itself, they must call a General Meeting so that all members 
of Takin Association UK may reach a decision.  
 Trustees must call a General Meeting if they receive a written 
request from the majority of members or in order to consult 
membership.  
 All members must be given 14 days’ notice and be informed 
about the purpose of the meeting.  




Takin Association UK is committed to follow several policies. These are 




Takin Association UK adopted a constitution on November 21st, 2010. 
The constitution has been established and ratified by the members 
present.  
Interested parties may obtain a copy of the constitution by contacting 





Appendix 3 – Brunel University Research Ethic 
Checklist  
         (copy) 
 
Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
This checklist should be completed for every research project that involves human 
participation, the collection or study of their data, organs and/or tissue.  It is used to 
identify whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be submitted. 
 
Before completing this form, please refer to the University Code of Research 
Ethics.  The principal investigator or, where the principal investigator is a student, the 
supervisor, is responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this 
review. 
 
The checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take 
part in any research. 
 
Section I: Project details 
 
1. Project title: The resettlement of Bhutanese refugees in the UK  
2. Proposed start date:   May 2012 
3. Proposed end date:    December 2013 
 
Section II: Applicant details 
 
2. Name of researcher (applicant): Nicole Ingrid Johanna HOELLERER 
3. Status (delete as appropriate): Postgraduate (PhD) student 
4. Brunel e-mail address: nicole.hoellerer@brunel.ac.uk 
5. Telephone number: - 
 
Section III: For students only 
 
6. Module name and number or 
MA/MPhil course and School: 
PhD Thesis in Social Anthropology Research 
7. Supervisor’s or module leader’s 
name: 
Dr. Peggy FROERER 




Supervisor: Please tick the appropriate boxes.  The study should not begin until all 
boxes are ticked: 
 
 The student has read the University’s Code of Research Ethics 
 The topic merits further research 
 The student has the skills to carry out the research 
 The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate 
 The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are 
appropriate 
 A risk assessment has been completed. 
 A CRB check has been obtained (where appropriate) 
 
Comments from supervisor: 
 
 
Section IV: Description of project 
 
Please provide a short description of your project: 
The study is concerned with Bhutanese refugees in the UK. The primary focus of the 
project is on how refugees experience and evaluate internationally aided resettlement-
programmes to third countries, such as the UK. The study will explore the effects of 
these initiatives on refugees, their daily lives and their relationships in host countries. 
Particular attention will be given to the generation-gap between the old and the young, 
and the refugees' motivations to resettled to a third country. Furthermore, the project 
investigates how modern media, such as the internet, are used to maintain 
relationships across boarders (e.g. between the camps and resettled communities), 
and to what degree these means are used for political participation and activism. The 
study is forming part of anthropology of development, conflict and diaspora. The study 
is based on long-term fieldwork (minimum of 12 months) in resettled communities in 
the UK. Furthermore, the researcher is seeking permission to utilize internet-platforms 
by Bhutanese refugees. Research will be conducted by means of participant 
observation, interviewing, case studies, focus groups and qualitative questionnaires. 
Research will be overt, and informant consent will be obtained prior to data collection, 
with particular emphasis on the protection vulnerable and under-age informants. The 
study will comply to the ASA Ethics Regulations, as well as to research ethics in UN-
led camps. Consideration will be paid to restrictions and the study will comply with the 











Section V: Research checklist 
 
Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box: 
 YES NO 
1. Does the project involve participants who are particularly vulnerable 
or unable to give informed consent (e.g., children, people with learning 
disabilities, your own students)? 
 
 
2a. Will the study require the co-operation of another organisation for 
initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited? 
  
2b. If the answer to question 2a is Yes, will the research involve people 
who could be deemed in any way to be vulnerable by virtue of their 
status within particular institutional settings (e.g., students at school, 
members of self-help group, residents of nursing home, prison or other 
institution where individuals cannot come and go freely)? 
  
3. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without 
their knowledge and consent at the time (e.g., covert observation of 
people in non-public places)? 
  
4. Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics (e.g., sexual 
activity, drug use) where they have not given prior consent to such 
discussion? 
  
5. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g., food substances, 
vitamins) to be administered to the study participants or will the study 
involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any 
kind? 
  
6. Will the study involve the use of human tissue or other human 
biological material? 
  
7. Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants? 
  
8. Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study? 
  
9. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause 
harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in 
normal life? 
  
10. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing? 
  
11. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to participants? 
  
12. Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through the 
NHS? 
  
 
X 
 x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
